In summary, Meno's paradox assumes that when someone says, "I don't know," this person has no proposition that could initiate an inquiry, a dubious assumption. — TheMadFool

Falsified by Galileo, who asked questions about things he didn't know, and did experiments to find out. For example he rolled balls down an inclined plane to discover gravitational acceleration. That's how science works.

Look at it this way. There are things you don't know and don't know enough about to even frame a question.

Then there are things you don't know, but still conceptualize well enough to frame a question. This is the domain of science.

In the words of the great American philosopher and lousy secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (recently deceased, Rest in Hell), there are the known unknowns and the unknown unknowns.

Meno is talking about the unknown unknowns, the subjects of which our ignorance is so profound that we can't even frame a question. But he's forgetting about the known unknowns: the subjects about which we are ignorant, yet about which we are able to frame questions and conduct experiments. That's the realm of science.

From Galvani making frog legs twitch when connected to an electric spark, to the modern digital computer. That's the march of the known unknowns. Meno soundly falsified.

Meno is talking about the unknown unknowns, the subjects of which our ignorance is so profound that we can't even frame a question. — fishfry

I now realize Meno's equivocating. When he says "know" he means a justified, true belief (no inquiry necessary) but when he says "don't know" he's talking about the absence of a proposition (inquiry impossible).

Had he been consistent, two possibilities:

1. "Don't know" implies that there's a proposition that's yet to fulfill the conditions for it to qualify as knowledge. Inquiry ergo, possible.

or

2. "know" implies there's a proposition and nothing else i.e. it isn't justified and nor do we believe it. Inquiry ergo, possible.

Donald Rumsfeld — fishfry

Donald Rumsfeld equivocates like Meno

3. Known unknowns: Known means a proposition formulated. Unknown means justification pending

4. Unknown unknowns: Unknown means proposition not formulated.

Notice: Unknown in 3 refers to justification but in 4 refers to a propositions.

I don't think its a matter of equivocation. The great philosopher Rumsfeld analyzed this one adequately. There are three types of questions:

1. Those we have asked and know the answer.
2. Those we have asked and do not know the answer.
3. Those we have never considered asking.

Meno considers 1 and 3, but omits 2.

From 3. it follows that if you don't know where your house keys are then you can't look for them because you don't know where to look. You could try to remember where you put them down. But if you knew that you wouldn't need to look for them. It's an everyday problem. Why is it a paradox?

In the context of the Dialogue of that name, the idea of recollection was introduced, proposing we are able to understand new things because we already have a kind of understanding of them.
You seem intent upon separating the "paradox" from one of the possible solutions.
How does your approach relate to leaving the Platonic element out of it?

1. Those we have asked and know the answer.
2. Those we have asked and do not know the answer.
3. Those we have never considered asking. — hypericin

:up:

1. Known knowns [proposition (+), justification (+)]
2. Known unknowns [proposition (+), justification (-)]
3. Unknown unknowns [proposition (-), justification (Mu/NA)]

In 1, Rumsfeld considers known to be both that there is a proposition & that proposition is justified.

In 2, Meno-Rumsfeld are of the view that known means there is a proposition and unknown is absence of justification.

In 3, Meno-Rumsfeld treats the absence of a proposition as unknown. Looks very much like an equivocation to me. I could be wrong of course. Thanks!

Why is it a paradox? — Cuthbert

That slipped under my radar. My guesstimate is that Meno's argument proves that inquiry is either pointless or impossible AND yet we engage in both informal and formal inquiry as if both that inquiry is possible and also has a point to it.

In the context of the Dialogue of that name, the idea of recollection was introduced, proposing we are able to understand new things because we already have a kind of understanding of them.
You seem intent upon separating the "paradox" from one of the possible solutions.
How does your approach relate to leaving the Platonic element out of — Valentinus

Good question. Thanks for bringing it to my attention. It seems Socrates chose to grab this horn of the dilemma :point:

2. If one knows then inquiry is unnecessary. (premise) — TheMadFool

Socrates thought that we do know i.e. knowledge is innate but that doesn't mean inquiry is unnecessary (as premise 2 in the OP suggests) because we've forgotten, and inquiry amounts to jogging one's memory.

What are these kind of paradoxes suppose show us?

1. That something is dubious about reality because the logic is sound.

2. That something is dubious about our logic because reality is not problematic as it appears in the argument

3. That logic analysis is sometimes a fruitless tool that does not reflect or describe the world we live in.

I am incline to say #3 when it comes to these kind of paradoxes.

Meno is talking about the unknown unknowns, the subjects of which our ignorance is so profound that we can't even frame a question. But he's forgetting about the known unknowns: the subjects about which we are ignorant, yet about which we are able to frame questions and conduct experiments. That's the realm of science. — fishfry

I think that's right. Aristotle addressed the first kind by saying that philosophy (or science) begins with wondering, thaumazein, which I would say roughly translates as the wow factor, the stuff we gaze at in astonishment without even being able to say what it is, let alone ask why it is what it is. Awesome.

Clarification:

1. We have a proposition P.
1a. Proposition P is justified (knowledge) [known knowns]
1b. Proposition P is not justified (not knowledge) [known unknowns]

2. We don't have a proposition P (not knowledge) [unknown unknowns]

Meno's paradox concerns 1a (we know - inquiry unnecessary) and 2 (no proposition - inquiry impossible). Meno seems to have forgotten the possibility 1b (inquiry both possible and necessary so that we can know P).

I accused Meno of equivocating on the words "don't know". In 1a (one horn of the dilemma - inquiry unnecessary) "know" means there's a proposition and that proposition is justified. In this case, "don't know" implies,

3. No proposition

or

4. Yes proposition but proposition unjustified

In 2 (the other horn of the dilemma) , "don't know" means there's no proposition which matches 3 (inquiry impossible) above. But "don't know" can also mean 4 (inquiry possible & necesssary).

Thus, Meno's "don't know" in 1a (one horn of the dilemma) also means 4 (yes proposition but proposition unjustified) but "don't know" in 2 (the other horn of the dilemma) means 3 (no proposition).

One meaning of "don't know": yes proposition but that proposition unjustified.

The other meaning of "don't know": no proposition.

Equivocation!

Isn't it just that #3 is false? "If one doesn't know then enquiry is impossible." I don't know where my keys are. But I can look for them. That's a counterexample. So 3 is false. So the argument, valid or not, yields a false conclusion.

for he does not know the very subject about which he is to enquire.

Firstly: Logic is limited and it's limitations are not the limitations of actual reality.

Secondly: Man can ask an open ended question for more information from other beings he sees as similar to himself that are accomplishing something he cannot. The new information can simply connect dots he already contains in his mind, which were derived causally and automatically from his senses.

The mind is nothing but a map of the territory. We don't really "know" anything.

'enquiry' doesn't really exist.