Hello fellow thinkers,

One of the many interesting topics that we're discussing in one of my philosophy courses is whether Quine's view of ontology changes or remains static over the course of his works such as A Logistical Approach to the Ontological Problem, On What There Is, and finally Ontic Decision. From my interpretation so far, it seems to me that Quine's ontological perspective remains fairly consistent, but I'm not completely convinced either. Starting with his lesser known Logistical Approach to the Ontological Problem (a four page paper about the 'roundness' of pebbles', he brings up his conception of "To be is to be the value of a variable". Moving onto On What There Is, he states "a theory is committed to those and only those entities to which the bound variables of the theory must be capable of referring in order that the affirmations made in the theory be true". This seems pretty consistent with his criterion of ontological commitment, it actually seems to me to be the same concept in itself. Moving to his Ontic Decision, he speaks of abstract entities as if they must be admitted into his ontology based on 'systematic efficacy'...stating that "abstract objects be grudgingly admitted too for their efficacy elsewhere in the theory". Admitting himself as a reluctant Platonist, does this hold up with his Criterion of Ontological Commitment?

Basically my questions are as follows for you Quine experts that may provide me with some insight onto this topic,

1.) Does my reading seem to be reflective of Quine's presented ideas (if not what am I missing?)

2.) Does Quine's view of Ontology change in the course of his writing in his admission of abstract entities or is this consistent with his criterion of ontological commitment? (If not, why does his view remain static?)