Based on what reasoning should we conclude that the presence of those things is evidence that God (if he exists) is not benevolent? — baker
Epicurus’s old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil? — Hume
Leibniz's solution of the problem of evil, like most of his other popular doctrines, is logically possible, but not very convincing. A Manichean might retort that this is the worst of all possible worlds, in which the good things that exist serve only to heighten the evils. The world, he might say, was created by a wicked demiurge, who allowed free will, which is good, in order to make sure of sin, which is bad, and of which the evil outweighs the good of free will. The demiurge, he might continue, created some virtuous men, in order that they might be punished by the wicked;
for the punishment of the virtuous is so great an evil that it makes the world worse than if no good men existed. I am not advocating this opinion, which I consider fantastic; I am only saying that it is no more fantastic than Leibniz's theory.
Based on what reasoning should we conclude that the presence of those things is evidence that God (if he exists) is not benevolent? — baker
Based on what reasoning should we conclude that the presence of those things is evidence that God (if he exists) is not benevolent? — baker
The way I see it, if God exists and is omnipotent, then I think he can do as he pleases. He is under no obligation to submit his actions or the motives of his actions to human scrutiny and judgment. — Apollodorus
That is not the question. The questioning presupposes goodwill. Then the existence of suffering is illogical.
If God is not benevolent, then it is a different question. — SolarWind
If you ask the wrong question you will inevitably get the wrong answer. — prothero
That paves the way for a souless universe devoid of any inherent value or purpose.
That is not the question. The questioning presupposes goodwill. — SolarWind
God is usually conceived of as being omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent and omnibenevolent as well as having an eternal and necessary existence.
Conceptions of maximal greatness differ but theists believe that a maximally great reality must be a maximally great person or God. Theists largely agree that a maximally great person would be omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient, and all good.
– Oxford English DictionaryGod a. A superhuman person regarded as having power over nature and human fortunes
And the main attribute of God seems to be that he is omnipotent or powerful:
God is usually conceived of as being omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent and omnibenevolent as well as having an eternal and necessary existence. — Apollodorus
Being that this is a philosophy forum maybe we should try a little philosophical theism and dispense with preconditions or presumptions which cause us profound cognitive dissonance regarding science and experience. — prothero
Based on what reasoning should we conclude that the presence of those things is evidence that God (if he exists) is not benevolent? — baker
A common line of reasoning against God's presumed omnibenevolence goes like this:
If God was omnibenevolent, there wouldn’t be ... any earthquakes, tsunamis, droughts, floods, wars, children with genetic dysfunctions, ... and in general, there wouldn't be any suffering.
But why should the absence of these things be evidence of God's benevolence?
Based on what reasoning should we conclude that the presence of those things is evidence that God (if he exists) is not benevolent? — baker
If God has to allow pain for a greater good, there is still the problem of predestination. Why create people who will go to hell or not ensure that they go to heaven? — Gregory
If we drop our humanist sensitivities, a whole new world of opens up, a world of new ways of conceiving goodness and justice. Capitalism has been teaching us that for a couple of centuries now, it's time we learned the lesson.Other than wishful thinking and human anthropomorphism there is absolutely no reason to assume god is omnibenevolent or for that matter omnipotent.
Given the assumption of both omni's (all Christian apologetics and other theological hand waving aside) there is no convincing or satisfactory response to the religious "problem of evil". Thus it becomes a major problem for religion and a major source of disbelief in any form of deity, sacred, holy or numinous entity. — prothero
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.