Is telos in the kind of examples given facing the same direction as cause because it starts in your mind and crytallises or concretises later.

You may be intuiting the examples you said you wouldn't cite: the late S J Gould believed that at after a time of maximum mutations the form of many of which contained apparently useless features, after a contingent elimination episode had occurred some of the later surviving species found some of their features contingently matched the new environment they had to survive in. However if we were pious in an old fashioned way we could also add that this chain of events was in the mind of "god" beforehand, to be allowed to occur.

I think that what and who is, calls us to respect it / them as an end in it/themself-ves and not a means (of exploitation) to us only: my own original version of ought from is.

Physicists Shannon and Wheeler and linguist Halliday 1 are said to have suspected matter is a special case of meaning (this is very Peircian 2 too). I believe the meaning of what is, is "Is" (we are on an existence wave, hence our propensity * to be more than not be).

I've just spotted wave and weave are related in etymology. Jung is quoted as saying (roughly) that what we don't handle consciously, comes back to trouble us as destiny. Shopping done right doesn't haunt our destiny?

Lots of nice layers, it's your choice how to systematise your themes unconfusingly. I'm planning some articles myself, of this very sort!

{ * Propensity is a nice Popper word, occurring in The self and its brain }

1 Explained properly in 'On matter and meaning' in Halliday in the 21 st century ed Jonathan J Webster, Bloomsbury, 2013; I'm probably putting it too briefly

2 Peirce and pragmatism by W B Gallie, Dover, 1966

That said, because a goal is always a potential future which one strives to make objectively real (here placing goals found in fantasies and dreams aside), a goal as telos is always found in the future. — javra

I kind of have to disagree with this. The intent of a deed is never found in the world. The deed in itself is a means to achieve the intent but never really "wanted", in the sense of being the primary intent or will of the subject. What is objectively found in the future are consequences of deeds, not intents. Consequences are concrete and detailed while intents are abstract and general.

So defining each, however, renders backward causation nonsensical. — javra

That wouldn't matter anyways. The objective reality (of consequences) is nothing that would have anything to do with understanding anyways. You might understand proclaimed intents or not but you surely can't understand matter.

And we can all be teleological biscuits if we're not too half baked in the way we go about our lives :wink:

(The ultimate teleological biscuits being Choco Leibniz of course :yum: )

you surely can't understand matter — Heiko

Indeed. "Propensity", "existence", "respect" is perhaps as much detail as we shall grasp of this (beyond the physical sciences).

1) An endstate (maybe the same as “teleute” but nicer sounding): an actualized result; an actualized completion, conclusion, or consummation of one or more processes, activities, events, or changes
2) A telos: A potential result toward whose actualization one or more givens strive, strain, stretch, bend, or move; respective to sentience, a goal, aim, or objective.
3) A telosis: A given’s activity or process of striving, straining, stretching, bending, or moving toward a telos; respective to sentience, the act of intending. — javra

So:

• Telos = goal
• Telosis = plan for achieving that goal
• Endstate = intended future condition.

What value is added by using highfalutin philosophicalistic words? It just confuses things.

Let me see if I can summarize your point. My goal is to achieve a certain future condition. I have developed a plan, a series of actions, to meet that goal. When I've implemented that plan and the intended future conditions are achieved, they will have been achieved by backward causation because, as you've written, "a goal as telos is always found in the future."

Response - All the factors we are considering - goal, intended final condition, and plan - exist in the present. They are not in the future. Therefore, we are talking about just normal old everyday causation.

Is telos in the kind of examples given facing the same direction as cause because it starts in your mind and crytallises or concretises later. — Fine Doubter

Though it takes place in the mind, in the mind it takes place in the future - and from this mentally established potential future is determined what one chooses to do in the present. Contrast this with a memory, which takes place in the past, or a perception, which takes place in the metal present, both of which determine one's mental states and activities in different ways from that of goals.

You may be intuiting the examples you said you wouldn't cite: the late S J Gould believed that at after a time of maximum mutations the form of many of which contained apparently useless features, after a contingent elimination episode had occurred some of the later surviving species found some of their features contingently matched the new environment they had to survive in. — Fine Doubter

I'm focusing on goals because while non-sentient "ends toward which things move" in biology are contestable, and much more so in physics (despite the mathematical notion of attractors), I don't know of any that would contest the reality of consciously held goals determining at least some behavior. This, however, doesn't make me want to be dogmatic about goals being the only type of "ends toward which things move".

That said, because a goal is always a potential future which one strives to make objectively real (here placing goals found in fantasies and dreams aside), a goal as telos is always found in the future. — javra

I kind of have to disagree with this. The intent of a deed is never found in the world. The deed in itself is a means to achieve the intent but never really "wanted", in the sense of being the primary intent or will of the subject. What is objectively found in the future are consequences of deeds, not intents. Consequences are concrete and detailed while intents are abstract and general. — Heiko

Thanks for the disagreement. I assume you are approaching this from an eternalism pov. If not, the future is not yet objectified and so is also never found in the world in the sense I believe you're using, in so far as the future is never objectified until it becomes the objective present. I find that this applies both in presentism and in the growing block theory.

But even for an eternalist theory of time, would it make sense to then say that intents don't exist since they're never found in the world?

So:

Telos = goal
Telosis = plan for achieving that goal
Endstate = intended future condition. — T Clark

No. I'll try to re-describe the three concepts:

Telos = the potential end toward which a given moves; e.g., a goal (that which one wants to accomplish)
Telosis = the movement of a given toward a potential end; e.g., a striving (what one does to so accomplish)
Endstate = the actual end; e.g., the outcome of the striving toward a goal

If one's telos happens to be the taking to flight by the flapping of hands, one will start flapping ones hands as the telosis. The endstate of so doing is that one will not take to flight no matter how hard one tries. The goal determines what one chooses to do - is the motive for the activity one engages in - but the endstate of this might be opposite of ones intent, as per the example just given.

Response - All the factors we are considering - goal, intended final condition, and plan - exist in the present. They are not in the future. Therefore, we are talking about just normal old everyday causation. — T Clark

Causation, as typically understood, does not occur strictly in the present. The cause is not simultaneous to the effect, but precedes the effect in time. If the effect occurs in the present, the cause occurred in the past and no longer occurs in the present. If the cause occurs in the present, the effect will occur in the future after the present cause. This, in and of itself, does not adequately specify the nature of goal-driven determinacy: The goal, while being a potential future end, is always present for as long as that which it determines - viz, the striving toward it - persists.

Or maybe I should ask, how do you define causation?

That said, because a goal is always a potential future which one strives to make objectively real (here placing goals found in fantasies and dreams aside), a goal as telos is always found in the future. It doesn’t matter if it occurs prior to the intending or is contemporaneous to the intending; in both aforementioned cases, the goal always holds place in the potential future (and, contingently, in the actual future as an endstate if one’s intending is fortuitous). — javra

I don't think you can truthfully say that the goal is in the future. The goal always exists in the mind, at the present, and it is the intended fulfilment of the goal which is understood as in the future. The goal itself is in the present. That there is a difference between the goal itself (in the present), and the apprehended potential fulfillment of the goal (in the future), is evident from what you say about telos-accordant, and telos-discordant endstates. If the goal itself were in the future, then fulfilment of the goal would be necessitated, and telos-discordant endstates impossible.

So the following assumption cannot be held either:

And, since in telos-driven activities the telos always occurs in the potential future relative to that which it determines, then telos-determinacy can be further specified as backward determinacy. — javra

We cannot make backward determinacy out of telos-driven activities, because the goal is always existent at the present, with only a view (imagination) toward the future. It is not a real future, that the goal pertains to, but an imaginary one. That is why the telos discordant end state is possible. Therefore the activity which is supposed to be the means to the end might occur without the desired end state occurring, so we cannot say that it was the end state (in the future) which caused the activity. It was the goal, in the mind, at that time, with the imaginary future, which caused the activity which followed.

I don't think you can truthfully say that the goal is in the future. The goal always exists in the mind, at the present, and it is the intended fulfilment of the goal which is understood as in the future. The goal itself is in the present — Metaphysician Undercover

How is "the intended fulfillment of the goal" - which, as you say, is understood as in the future - not a redundant way of saying "the goal"? (e.g., Wiktionary defines "goal" as "a result one is attempting to achieve". To which I add that this result is not yet achieved, hence not of itself in the present.)

Also, as I mentioned in a previous post, memories, perceptions, and goals all occur, ontologically speaking, in the mind and in the present. Everything that we are consciously aware of does. Yet our memories are our epistemological past, our perceptions are our epistemological present, and our goals are part of our less than certain epistemological future. To say that a goal takes place in the present holds the same weight as saying that a memory takes place in the present. Yet the memory is our awareness of the past (of past present moments we have already lived through) just as a goal forms part of our awareness of the future (of future present moments we have yet to live through).

While this can make little sense in eternalism, it can fit in neatly into a system of presentism. Whereas this quote seems to presume eternalism as regards the future:

If the goal itself were in the future, then fulfilment of the goal would be necessitated, and telos-discordant endstates impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover

What I'm maintaining is that the future is not fully fixed ontologically. A goal is as much of the future as a memory is of the past. But, if for no other reason, there are a multitude of goals in competition with each other, and only some can become actualized as future present moments. When a predator pursues some prey, the goals of the predator and prey conflict, and only one of these two goals can become actualized as an endstate. Yet the "result each is attempting to achieve" resides in the potential future and not in the present.

As an aside, do we agree that a goal partly determines one's present choices of how to best achieve given goal?

How is "the intended fulfillment of the goal" - which, as you say, is understood as in the future - not a redundant way of saying "the goal"? (e.g., Wiktionary defines "goal" as "a result one is attempting to achieve". To which I add that this result is not yet achieved, hence not of itself in the present.) — javra

Perhaps I didn't phrase that well. There is a difference between the goal, and the fulfillment of the goal. The former is what exists in one's mind, at the present, as a determinate thing, the latter is indeterminate. Because it is indeterminate, I could not refer to it as a thing, "the fulfillment of the goal", so I referred to the "intended fulfillment of the goal". I think we must distinguish between "the goal", as a determinate thing intended, and the "intended fulfillment of the goal", to maintain the possibility that the goal might not be fulfilled.

Also, as I mentioned in a previous post, memories, perceptions, and goals all occur, ontologically speaking, in the mind and in the present. Everything that we are consciously aware of does. Yet our memories are our epistemological past, our perceptions are our epistemological present, and our goals are part of our less than certain epistemological future. To say that a goal takes place in the present holds the same weight as saying that a memory takes place in the present. Yet the memory is our awareness of the past (of past present moments we have already lived through) just as a goal forms part of our awareness of the future (of future present moments we have yet to live through). — javra

I agree with this, but I would not say that our memories are necessarily our epistemological past, nor that our goals and anticipations are necessarily our epistemological future. I wouldn't even say that our perceptions are necessarily our epistemological present. This is because I think we use other conceptions to form our temporal conceptions, which serve as the base for our epistemological "time", therefore, past, present, and future. This is why we can have an epistemological "time" like eternalism, which removes past present and future from the experiential definitions which you give them.

I believe it is important to ground epistemology in solid ontology, so I think that going in the way which you do, referring to the ontology of time, for your epistemological definitions of past, present, and future, is the correct way. But I do not think that this is necessarily the way that epistemological definitions of past present and future, are formulated.

What I'm maintaining is that the future is not fully fixed ontologically. A goal is as much of the future as a memory is of the past. — javra

This is why I insisted on the distinction between the goal, and the (intended) fulfilment of the goal. A goal is "of the future", just like a memory is "of the past". But this is an imaginary past and future, existing in the mind, at the present. We ought to stress this point, that a memory, though we say it is "of the past", is a creation of the mind, it is the mind's attempt to recreate the past, so it is a product of the imagination, at the present. Therefore it is not a true product of the past, It may be influenced by the mind's anticipations of the future for example. This is why the memory can often be wrong, it is not truly "of the past", it is an imaginary recreation of the past.

Because of this situation with the memory, the past is not fully fixed epistemically., just like the future is not fully fixed ontologically. This results in two very distinct senses of "possibility", the epistemic, or logical possibility as to what may have occurred in the past, and the ontological possibility as to what may occur in the future.

Yet the "result each is attempting to achieve" resides in the potential future and not in the present. — javra

You use "potential future", here, in a similar way to my "imaginary future". I think it's better that we use something like "imaginary", to maintain that this future is only in the mind, and the future within the prey's mind is different from the future in the predator's mind. We can compare this to two people who have different memories of the same past situation. They have competing "pasts". And we might say that these are two "potential pasts", referring to epistemic potential. But when we're talking about "potential futures", it's a different type of "potential", because there is no real future, as there is a real past, so this is an ontological potential.

As an aside, do we agree that a goal partly determines one's present choices of how to best achieve given goal? — javra

Yes, I mostly agree with what you have written. It's just that the terminology is difficult with this subject, so I'm trying to clarify some things to make sure that we actually do agree.

There is a difference between the goal, and the fulfillment of the goal. The former is what exists in one's mind, at the present, as a determinate thing, the latter is indeterminate. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I agree. As much as I dislike introducing novel terminology, it's the difference between a goal one strives to achieve and a goal-accordant endstate in the terminology I'm proposing - as you initially mentioned. The first is determinate for as long as it persists, the second indeterminite until the time it becomes actualized, if it does become actualized.

I agree with this, but I would not say that our memories are necessarily our epistemological past, nor that our goals and anticipations are necessarily our epistemological future. I wouldn't even say that our perceptions are necessarily our epistemological present. This is because I think we use other conceptions to form our temporal conceptions, which serve as the base for our epistemological "time", therefore, past, present, and future. This is why we can have an epistemological "time" like eternalism, which removes past present and future from the experiential definitions which you give them. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, agreed, and there are also false memories, hallucinations, and futile goals or incorrect predictions to add into the mix. There's more to comment on here, but it will likely deviate from the thread's theme.

I believe it is important to ground epistemology in solid ontology, so I think that going in the way which you do, referring to the ontology of time, for your epistemological definitions of past, present, and future, is the correct way. But I do not think that this is necessarily the way that epistemological definitions of past present and future, are formulated. — Metaphysician Undercover

I do have an ontology in mind, but I'm trying my best to approach the issue from a perspective where ignorance of ontology is (first) assumed.

You use "potential future", here, in a similar way to my "imaginary future". I think it's better that we use something like "imaginary", to maintain that this future is only in the mind, [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

I see where you're going with this. Still, connotations stand in the way for me. For instance, given the possibility of hallucinations, one could say that all our present perceptions constitute our "imaginary present", since our perceptions are only in the mind, and since there is a slim possibility that they could be wrong. In short, describing all our awareness of past, present, and future as imaginary on account of it taking place in the mind fails to distinguish between imagined truths and factual truths - for me at least.

In assuming as much of an ontological ignorance as possible, can we experientially agree that our goals reference a future that has not yet been actualized but which we want to see objectified, i.e. to see actualized? Furthermore, that it is this referenced unactualized future of which we are aware that then determines our present choices (regarding how to best actualize this as of yet unactualized future)?

There's something subtly difficult about goal-driven determinacy (whose occurrence I find is incontestable) and, as mentioned in a previous post, it as determinacy is a different category from that of causality as understood in modernity. To introduce other Aristotelian notions, also different from formal (top-down) and material (bottom-up) determinacies. Maybe noteworthy, to Aristotle, goal-driven determinacy was about the (potential) ends to present activities determining said present activities; hence the Aristotelian term of "final cause".

Telos = the potential end toward which a given moves; e.g., a goal (that which one wants to accomplish)
Telosis = the movement of a given toward a potential end; e.g., a striving (what one does to so accomplish)
Endstate = the actual end; e.g., the outcome of the striving toward a goal — javra

I don't see how these are significantly different than my formulation.

If one's telos happens to be the taking to flight by the flapping of hands, one will start flapping ones hands as the telosis. — javra

I'm not sure this is relevant, but I'd think the first step would be to research the history of flight, aerodynamics, anatomy, and other relevant technical information. Then maybe I'd do some calculations about wing/arm surface, muscle strength, drag on my body, and other factors. Then, when my calculations showed I wouldn't be able to fly that way, maybe I'd do some research on eastern religions that are reported to teach us to levitate.

Causation, as typically understood, does not occur strictly in the present. — javra

Everything occurs strictly in the present. Our memories of the past and thoughts about the future take place in the present. Ok, ok, I'm being tediously pedantic.

Or maybe I should ask, how do you define causation? — javra

Some definitions from the web:

[1] The act of making something (the effect) happen
[2] The relationship of cause and effect between one event or action and the result
[3] The act or agency which produces an effect
[4] From Bertrand Russell - "Cause and effect . . . are correlative terms denoting any two distinguishable things, phases, or aspects of reality, which are so related to each other that whenever the first ceases to exist the second comes into existence immediately after, and whenever the second comes into existence the first has ceased to exist immediately before."
[5] More from BR - "Causality - The necessary connection of events in the timeseries"
[6] More from BR - "Cause - Whatever may be included in the thought or perception of a process as taking place in consequence of another Process. ."

Boy. That's not much help. First off, I want to stay away from old Aristotle's four types of causation, at least for the purposes of this post. Too complicated. I think the only helpful use of the word involves very simple systems, e.g. the cliche billiard balls. Hey, how about this. Physical causation is the transmission of energy from one thing to another. I like that. The moving cue ball strikes the three ball. Some of the kinetic energy of the cue ball is transmitted to the three ball, which then moves. Even non-physical causation has to eventually lead to physical causation.

I've been thinking for a while that causation is not a very useful concept. That is not a new thought. Bertrand Russell wrote about it extensively. Maybe I'll start a new thread.

Have you looked at Husserl’s notion of intentionality? He begins from a notion of the present as ‘thick’ or ‘specious’. This time consciousness underlies all of our experiences. The present is not a punctual now but a triad consisting of the just elapsed past ( called retention) , the immediate present and a protentional aspect anticipating into the future. The retentional aspect is not the same thing as a memory. It is more like a lingering of the just past as a slightly faded ‘present’ alongside the fresh present. Without this notion of a retentional phase of the now , it would be impossible to explain how we are able to enjoy a temporallly extended event like a melody. If perceived time is just puctual ‘nows’ one after the other. , the temporally unfolding context of a melody or book or movie or conversation would be lost.

Intention is the act whereby we experience the present. We intend a present event by expecting into it via protention. The protention is a kind of empty anticipation which is ‘fulfilled’ by what actually occurs into our intending. This fulfillment can be relatively ( but never perfectly) complete, or our anticipation can be disappointed by what actually happens. Even in disappointment what we expereince is never a complete surprise.. Protention makes even the most unexpected, disappointing event familiar and recognizable
to us to some extent. Also note that, since fulfillment is never perfect , what occurs into an intention is always novel in some fashion , in some aspect.
So every intention is teleologically oriented , every intention is both a prediction and a fulfillment , in the same act and same moment. And every intention produces novelty and the unexpected at least in some smalll measure.
The other feature of intentionality is that the world always appears to us in modes of givenness. The intentional object could be an imagining , a remembrance, a perception or the experience of an social value, depending on whether we are imagining, perceiving , remembering or valuing the object. So how the ‘same’ world appears to us shifts depending on our mode of intending.

I hope this helps.

I see where you're going with this. Still, connotations stand in the way for me. For instance, given the possibility of hallucinations, one could say that all our present perceptions constitute our "imaginary present", since our perceptions are only in the mind, and since there is a slim possibility that they could be wrong. In short, describing all our awareness of past, present, and future as imaginary on account of it taking place in the mind fails to distinguish between imagined truths and factual truths - for me at least. — javra

Yes, this is the point, all such temporal distinctions are imaginary, even our designation that now is the present. Notice that even by the time you say "now", it's in the past, so the present is just as illusory as the past and future. What I think is that we recognize a real difference between past and future, and this leads us to believe that there must be a division between them, hence "the present" is afforded reality. However, from this perspective we only come to believe in "the present" as a logical conclusion. The present is not experiential, we experience the past, and anticipate the future, and since we understand a substantial difference between these two, we come to the logical conclusion that there must be a present which separates them.

I really don't know what you mean when you suggest a difference between imagined truths and factual truths. I think that "truth" is always a judgement, so it is always a product minds, and in that sense, always imagined. We might assume a "factual truth" as independent from human minds, but that would imply a judgement of God, or something like that, as truth is a judgement.

In assuming as much of an ontological ignorance as possible, can we experientially agree that our goals reference a future that has not yet been actualized but which we want to see objectified, i.e. to see actualized? Furthermore, that it is this referenced unactualized future of which we are aware that then determines our present choices (regarding how to best actualize this as of yet unactualized future)? — javra

Yes, I'm in agreement with this.

There's something subtly difficult about goal-driven determinacy (whose occurrence I find is incontestable) and, as mentioned in a previous post, it as determinacy is a different category from that of causality as understood in modernity. — javra

By "determinacy" here, do you mean that we, in a sense, determine the future, through our goal-driven acts? This is obviously different from "determinacy" in the sense of determinism.

I like your OP a lot.Many people take for granted that forward-determining 'causation' should be credited with exclusive responsibility for the shaping of the world. That doesn't match my experience - and I don't think most people experience the world this way in their every day life either - but its still treated as an implicit article of faith for many philosophers talking about this stuff. You often see philosophers tying themselves in knots, attempting to translate all determination into forward-determining causation. It's like they're operating in an ethos where you can't be credible if you admit any determination but 'causation' (as you define it in the OP.) Interested to see where you go with this. (And I'm curious if you have any ideas about when & why the emphasis on forward-determining causation came about.)

What you call "forward' causation is really, backward, and this is because determinations of forward and backward are perspective dependent, they are determined according to which way one is looking. If we place cause and effect in a temporal relation to each other, the cause is always further away from the observing perspective, than the effect is.

So if we orient ourselves in time, such that we are looking backward, into the past, the cause is further back in the past than the effect is. You call this "forward-determining causation", but it is dependent on a backward looking perspective. If, on the other hand, we turn ourselves around, such that we are facing the future, then the goals which are furthest in the future are the more final ends, and we prioritize the nearer goals as means toward those more final goals. In reality therefore, a true forward looking perspective will see things furthest in the future as being most significant causally, and things furthest in the past as least significant causally.

Now it is only from that backward looking perspective that "forward-determining causation" appears to be responsible for shaping the world. This is the perspective of those cave dwellers in Plato's cave allegory. They are looking at the past, as if it is the true reality, when the remembered past is really just a shadow of the activity which is occurring at the present. The memories are a representation, a reflection. Until they apprehend this fact, and turn around to look directly at the other side of this activity at the present, the future side, to see the good (what is intended, the goal), as the cause of whatever activity occurs at the present, they will not recognize that all the occurrences of the past are just reflections, shadows or representations, of that cause of the activity at the present, final cause, intent, free will, and so they are merely the effects of final cause, or intention.

Telos = the potential end toward which a given moves; e.g., a goal (that which one wants to accomplish)
Telosis = the movement of a given toward a potential end; e.g., a striving (what one does to so accomplish)
Endstate = the actual end; e.g., the outcome of the striving toward a goal — javra


I don't see how these are significantly different than my formulation. — T Clark

Hm. The telos is the objective that might or might not become a reality. The telosis is all the activities one engages in to make the objective a reality. And the endstate is the reality that unfolds at the end of one's telos-driven telosis, which might be accordant to the objective or might not be.

Telos = goal
Telosis = plan for achieving that goal
Endstate = intended future condition. — T Clark

So telosis includes planing but also incorporates movements toward the goal, as in the implementation of plans (if plans were made). And the endstate is the future condition that actually unfolds, not necessarily the future condition that was intended to unfold.

Everything occurs strictly in the present. Our memories of the past and thoughts about the future take place in the present. Ok, ok, I'm being tediously pedantic. — T Clark

I'm not disagreeing, but this can lead to a trivializing of past, present, and future such that no meaningful distinction obtains. Ontologically, presentism can make sense. But we nevertheless can only live by separating events into the past, the present, and the future.

Even non-physical causation has to eventually lead to physical causation. — T Clark

Interesting hypothesis, though I'm not clear on what "non-physical causation" is meant to entail. I forget what ontology tickles your fancy. Would thoughts that cause other thoughts that eventually go nowhere and never get turned into observable behavior be an example of non-physical causation that doesn't get turned into physical causation?

I've been thinking for a while that causation is not a very useful concept. That is not a new thought. Bertrand Russell wrote about it extensively. Maybe I'll start a new thread. — T Clark

:grin: Yea, I'm somewhat familiar with Russell's take. If memory serves right, he also thought everything is mathematical and, hence, non-causal. Thing is, blame/credit would be impossible without the notion of causation. And its hard to live without figuring out who does what. To not mention what does what. Here I'm entertaining one of the reasons for why things get done.

Have you looked at Husserl’s notion of intentionality? He begins from a notion of the present as ‘thick’ or ‘specious’. This time consciousness underlies all of our experiences. The present is not a punctual now but a triad consisting of the just elapsed past ( called retention) , the immediate present and a protentional aspect anticipating into the future. — Joshs

Thank you for the well written post regarding Husserl's intentionality. In truth, I need to delve into Husserl's notions more than I have. In my view of ontology, I agree with this quote. The present isn't infinitesimal or else illusory but holds an extension, and part of that extension includes the very recent past and future. As I once discussed with MU, sounds stand out to make this point. A musical note can only be heard within an extended present. And, as you say, so too is a melody, reductionistically composed of various musical notes.

I've, for better or worse, shied away from Husserl due to, imo, his "intentionality" being significantly different from the more common sense of intentionality that stems from "intends", which basically describes a stretching out from here to there. When it comes to goals, a consciousness's stretching out from the current conditions it is in toward the goal as desired future conditions it wants to see objectified. E.g., one generally plays a competitive game with the intention of winning. One here intends to win, i.e. as psyche, stretches out from where one is in the game to a future state where one has won the game. This notion of a psyche's stretching out so far seems to me to be a different category than that of aboutness.

Your thoughts are very welcome on this subject. I'm especially intrigued by this conclusion, which I believe I understand from Husserl's pov, although too vaguely for my own tastes:

So every intention is teleologically oriented , every intention is both a prediction and a fulfillment , in the same act and same moment. And every intention produces novelty and the unexpected at least in some smalll measure. — Joshs

BTW, in an ultimate scheme of things, I very much agree that all aspects of the psyche are at least in some measure teleologically oriented.

I'm thinking you'll need to look more into telosis (or maybe I should since I'm seeing it). Let me explain with an example:

My telos is "Type 'typo'"
The endstate is "tyop"

So how do we conceive of the telosis? If you go chronolocially, you get:

Step 1. Telos: type "t" - endstate "t"
Step 2. Telos: type "y" - endstate "type y"
Step 3: Telos: type "p" - endstate "type o"
Step 4: Telos: type "o" - endstate "type p"

But that's not enough. Taken like that steps 3 & 4 would be two separate mistakes, but seem to be systematically related to the telos: correct letters, incorrect order. But you need to have the full endstate to be able to judge this. For example, on my German keybord I might additionally misplace my hand and produce "typü". Now it looks like "p" is correct, but it's actually an invisible set of two mistakes: wrong finger sequence and misplacing my hand on the keyboard.

So other than outlining the steps, we need some sort of meta-level of revision, but I'm not sure how to allow for that. For example, a sneeze might interrupt my telosis, or lead to an uninted endstate, messing with suboridante teloi. And how we interpret this seems to related to the telos, too. It's at this level that I'm getting confused.

My hunch is that this is pointing towards any action being the relationship between what you meant to do, what you ended up doing, and how you see what you ended up doing from the point of view of what you meant to do, and how that feeds into what you want to do next. But I'm unsure how that relates to time, except that some of it seems... nonlinear in some way? I'm not sure.

However, from this perspective we only come to believe in "the present" as a logical conclusion. The present is not experiential, we experience the past, and anticipate the future, and since we understand a substantial difference between these two, we come to the logical conclusion that there must be a present which separates them. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hm. We here hold different perspectives. I find that the separation of all experiences strictly into past and future is the product of a logical, rather than experiential, conclusion. I again find that the present is extended experientially, as in the experienced sound of a musical note. An interesting topic for debate, though I'm not sure it is pertinent to the issue of where goals are temporally located.

I really don't know what you mean when you suggest a difference between imagined truths and factual truths. — Metaphysician Undercover

Imaginary as in "existing only in the imagination (but not in reality)". For example, that Santa Claus gives presents to good kids would then be an imaginary truth, since this state of affairs exists only in the imagination. That no such being as Santa Claus exists in reality would, for most, be a (factual) truth. Maybe my word choice was poor, but I still find the connotations to "imaginary" to be problematic due to aforementioned reasons. I'm thinking we could get into notions of Maya where everything but Brahman is imaginary, but that wouldn't be much help in better understanding how goal-driven teleology operates ... kind of a thing. :smile:

In assuming as much of an ontological ignorance as possible, can we experientially agree that our goals reference a future that has not yet been actualized but which we want to see objectified, i.e. to see actualized? Furthermore, that it is this referenced unactualized future of which we are aware that then determines our present choices (regarding how to best actualize this as of yet unactualized future)? — javra

Yes, I'm in agreement with this. — Metaphysician Undercover

This to me points to goals having an important relation to the yet to be actualized - hence potential - future. I'm trying to see where our disagreements dwell and how we might, maybe, remedy them. If a goal is not, in and of itself, a potential future (of which we are aware and yearn to actualize), then, given the aforementioned agreement, how would you say a goal differs from a memory or a perception? This with agreement that all three (memories, percepts, and goals) in at least some sense also always occur in the present.

By "determinacy" here, do you mean that we, in a sense, determine the future, through our goal-driven acts? This is obviously different from "determinacy" in the sense of determinism. — Metaphysician Undercover

The short answer is "yes": determinacy as in "to fixate the boundaries or limits of, either in part or in whole". I can't use the Aristotelian term of causation, since today causation strictly signifies efficient causes. But, as you rightly point out, determinism is today understood to be a system wherein the boundaries or limits of everything is completely fixated in advance, with no possibility of ontological change. Again, I dislike introducing novel terms where they're not needed, so I'm sticking to "determinacy" for now.

Thanks. Unfortunately I think I may have bitten off more than I can chew with this thread, since it turns out I'm shorter on time than anticipated. But I'll do my best to reply as needed.

Interested to see where you go with this. (And I'm curious if you have any ideas about when & why the emphasis on forward-determining causation came about.) — Arcturus

Right now trying to see how fluidly goal-driven determinacy would fit into the label of "backward determinacy: where that determined occurs in the present and that which determines occurs in the potential future".

There are further implications, but this thread isn't the place to mention them, I'm thinking.

As to why teleology has become out of favor in philosophy nowadays, tmk, it has a lot to do with folk like Descartes, Bacon, and Hume - in no particular order - which saw no use for any type of Aristotelian causation other than those of "material cause" and "efficient cause" ... making it easy for modern day materialism/physicalism to take root.

My hunch is that this is pointing towards any action being the relationship between what you meant to do, what you ended up doing, and how you see what you ended up doing from the point of view of what you meant to do, and how that feeds into what you want to do next. But I'm unsure how that relates to time, except that some of it seems... nonlinear in some way? I'm not sure. — Dawnstorm

Nice post! I'm interpreting goal-driven determinacy to be performed by sub/unconsciousness as well - which obviously isn't strictly divided from consciousness. An easy example: a slip of the tongue. This complicates matters, but it might also serve as a way to resolve at least some of the issues you've brought up.

But, personally, I'm right now just focusing on how to best understand goals in and of themselves. To keep things simple, from a consciousness pov.

But, personally, I'm right now just focusing on how to best understand goals in and of themselves. To keep things simple, from a consciousness pov. — javra

I'm not actually sure the consciousness/unconsciouness distinction is my major point, though it's definitely relevant. I think I'm trying to piece together your model, but I'm unsure how to conceptualise the telosis:

The distinction between telos and endstate, in your model, seems to primarily be one of "projected" vs. "actual". And somehow a projected endstate engenders a process - "telosis". What is this process? I started out my post by saing it's not simply a series of telos-endpoint pairs; that there needs to be some constant monitoring going on.

For there to be an endpoint, there has to be goal, but not only in the sense of determinism. The goal also determines what counts as an endpoint, either by supplying any given state with flags such as "success", or "give up", "hey, that's even better", or whatever. But what that means is that goals don't fix endpoints, and endpoints might in turn influence how you see your goal. But then it would have to be active all through the telosis. Basically, my hunch might be that the telos doesn't determine your actions; it's just the meaningful part of your actions. As such, whatever determines what happens (if you assume determinism) determines both the telos and endpoint and how they relate to each other.

Note that I'm not actually making any arguments. I'm not even sure how coherent I am. I'm just playing around with what your model looks like to me in order to better understand it.

For example, if a goal is a projected endpoint and there's an actual endpoint, what is that actual endpoint? The totality of what really happens has a detail level magnitudes higher than what you project. Some of it interfers with the goal, but a lot of it is irrelevant. So is your endpoint the totality of happens, or the totality of what happens minus what the goal considers irrelevant. I had the impression its the former. But if it's the former, it's not really an endpoint to begin with, it's just a moment in which stuff happens. Do you see where I'm going with this?

For there to be an endpoint, there has to be goal, but not only in the sense of determinism. The goal also determines what counts as an endpoint, either by supplying any given state with flags such as "success", or "give up", "hey, that's even better", or whatever. — Dawnstorm

Well that could have been said clearer. As soon as I figure out what I meant to say, I'll let you know how. I do know that used the word "determine" in two different ways, but I'm unsure how. Sorry for the confusion (maybe it's only mine).

one generally plays a competitive game with the intention of winning. One here intends to win, i.e. as psyche, stretches out from where one is in the game to a future state where one has won the game. This notion of a psyche's stretching out so far seems to me to be a different category than that of aboutness. — javra

The way I see it , being about something entails having an attitude and aim toward that object. I understand what you’re saying. Instantaneous perception would seem to imply a kind of passive contribution of then subjective intending or ‘aiming’ in comparison to the active, engaged preparatory posture of competing to win.
Husserl a tally brews foe what would seem to be a simple and immediate structure of perception into a complex of constitutive levels. At the most primordial level of sensing, intentionality is absent. The stimulus exerts an attraction on the the subject which the subject responds to be being attracted. At the next level of constitution, the subject actively turned toward the stimulus to ‘get a better look at it ‘, that is ,it strives to understand it better. What beings to this striving is a series of preparatory postures and bodily adjustments.

Husserl calls this active intentional process objectification, because it is how we constitute spatial
objects out of what are only a constantly changing flow of data. one could look at the constituting of a kind as a kind of sport, with the aim being to see the phenomenon as a more and more harmoniously correlated unity ( this chair, this ball, etc, rather than these disparate perspectival appearances and disappearances). In a sense we are competing with ourselves to achieve this elusive goal of the perfectly unified perceptual object, and we know we have gotten on the wrong track when we encounter optical illusions and mistaken identifications , such as when a shape in the dark first appears as a person but on closer inspection turns out to be only the shadow of a lightpost. So I think simple
perceptual identification is already well along in capturing the centra composted of the kind of intentionality you have in mind.

Hm. We here hold different perspectives. I find that the separation of all experiences strictly into past and future is the product of a logical, rather than experiential, conclusion. I again find that the present is extended experientially, as in the experienced sound of a musical note. An interesting topic for debate, though I'm not sure it is pertinent to the issue of where goals are temporally located. — javra

Well, what does "experience" mean to you? Let's say, it's real observation, or something like that. Isn't all observation, and all experience, past? You assume that it occurs at the present, but the present is not an experiential aspect of time at all. Imagine that you sit and do nothing, meditate, or just enjoy the experience of being present, or something like that. This in itself, is not a temporal experience, and does not give rise to any notion of "present" in time. It is only when you take notice of things having just happened, or anticipate things in the future, that temporality becomes part of the experience. Temporality only becomes a feature from these determinations of past and future. Then, it is from these constructed notions of past and future, that we produce a concept of time, and proceed to the logical conclusion that we are experiencing something called "the present". But without the construction of these temporal notions of past and future, we would not see ourselves as being at the present. We might say that a creature without temporal conceptions would still enjoy the experience of being present, but I do not think this being would be cognizant of being "present" in the sense of present in time.

That is why I argue that our base "experience" gives us the past as memories, and the future as anticipations, but it does not give us the present. All of our feelings concern the past and future, and although we say "we are sensing at the present", we are really sensing things which are separated from the mind by a medium, and because of this separation, the things sensed are in the past by the time they are sensed. We sense the past, not the present. That we are experiencing "the present" is a sort of self deception which we impose in our attempt to come to grips with the overwhelming difference between past and future.

This to me points to goals having an important relation to the yet to be actualized - hence potential - future. I'm trying to see where our disagreements dwell and how we might, maybe, remedy them. If a goal is not, in and of itself, a potential future (of which we are aware and yearn to actualize), then, given the aforementioned agreement, how would you say a goal differs from a memory or a perception? This with agreement that all three (memories, percepts, and goals) in at least some sense also always occur in the present. — javra

See, I look at this as if you are starting from a faulty premise, that premise of self-deception in which "all three (memories, percepts, and goals) in at least some sense also always occur in the present". Memories tell us of a past, and anticipations tell us of a future. The substantial difference between these two inspire us to assume "the present", to separate them. But "the present" only serves as a non-dimensional boundary, a division between past and future. As a divisor between the two parts of time, past and future, the present cannot partake in time at all. Then there is no time passing at the present, because all time is on one side or the other of the divisor, so we cannot say that these things occur "in the present".

This is a dilemma, and it leads to the notion which Joshs was talking about, the "thick" present. I like to think of two dimensional time, and call it the breadth of time. Now we do not have a single dimensional timeline with an arrow, but a wide line, and within that line, we do not really understand the directionality..

So to answer your question, how does a goal differ from a memory, it differs by the same principle that the past differs from the future. And, as I say, I believe this is a substantial difference, because we know from our experience that we cannot go back in time. Things which have happened cannot be changed, they are necessary, but things of the future have no real existence, being contingent. The difficult question is, how do things change from being contingent to being necessary, at what we call "the present" It is impossible that things can change in an instant of a dividing line, so the present must consist of some parts of past, and some of future.

For there to be an endpoint, there has to be goal, but not only in the sense of determinism. The goal also determines what counts as an endpoint, either by supplying any given state with flags such as "success", or "give up", "hey, that's even better", or whatever. — Dawnstorm

This is an important point. When one attempt fails, we often try another, so in these situations there is no real "endpoint", until success is achieved. This is actually a fairly common aspect of life, trial and error. Also we see a similar situation when one practices to better oneself, a musical instrument, a game, an athlete, etc... The goal is simply to get better, and this is like an "ideal", as there is no real endpoint because we never reach perfection.

...although we say "we are sensing at the present", we are really sensing things which are separated from the mind by a medium, and because of this separation, the things sensed are in the past by the time they are sensed — Metaphysician Undercover

Even if "the things sensed are in the past by the time they are sensed", that needn't contradict the statement that "we are sensing at the present". The present could just as easily be defined as the time at which we are sensing, instead of "the time of things" - whatever that is.

That is, when is the present moment if "the things sensed are in the past by the time they are sensed"? If the present moment is not 'the time at which things are sensed', then the present moment must presumably be time shifted by adding or subtracting some arbitrary amount of time to or from 'the time at which things are sensed', in order to account for light bouncing off an object, brain function, or something else. In other words, you are still using 'the time at which things are sensed' as your benchmark of the present moment, except that you account for some arbitrary "gap" or "medium" between an event and our sensing it. I can tell you what I am sensing at any given time, but what is the definition of this arbitrary gap or "medium" between some event and my sensing it? What, according to you, is the amount of time between the present moment and the moment things are sensed?

...without the construction of these temporal notions of past and future, we would not see ourselves as being at the present. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the present is the time at which we are sensing, then the past and future are not needed to help define the present; they are instead defined by it.

[...] I'm just playing around with what your model looks like to me in order to better understand it. [...] — Dawnstorm

First, I don’t assume determinism. I assume a form of compatibilism that is largely rooted in what most would nowadays term indeterminism (rather than one that is grounded in determinism). This part is exceedingly hard to explain in a nutshell. But such is my stance: compatibilism.

In attempts to better express my pov:

The telosis is the active striving to accomplish a given goal/telos – is what one does to reach what one aims for. The endstate is simply the outcome of this goal-driven striving. I’m going to make this post a little more complex, hoping that via this complexity some of your questions might be better addressed.

For any given goal, there can be subordinate goals and supraordinate goals. Subordinate goals will serve the purpose of accomplishing the given goal. Ultimate supraordinate goals can potentially take the form of what various philosophers have described as a psyche’s overarching and generalized will to – be this will to power (Nietzsche), to meaning (Frankl), to pleasure or else the “pleasure principle” (Freud, which I acknowledge is not that great of a philosopher), and so forth (self-preservation also comes to mind as a candidate for some), which would then as an ultimate supraordinate goal hold all other goals as subordinates of itself.

Think of, say, a tennis match between two professionals at a tournament. Why does a player move this way and not that way at some particular time during the match? Because they deemed it the best way to act at that given time so as to win the tennis match. Right? Their actions during the tennis match where thus significantly fixed, determined, by the goal of winning the match. This being the goal of each of the two players which is taken for granted while they’re playing in the tennis match (barring the goal of loosing the tennis match for whatever reason). A subordinate goal to so winning might be to tire the other player out by making them run left and right as much as possible. A subordinate goal of this might be to hit the ball in a certain way rather than another. Yet all these subordinate goal serves the purpose of winning the match. On the other hand, a supraordinate goal to winning the match might be increased fame, or money, or obtaining a kiss from some gal/guy in the stands. And this supraordinate goal might itself be subordinate to some overarching will-to that is ever-present.

The endstate of the tennis match cannot have both player’s goals to win the tennis match actualized. As the tennis match’s endstate, only one of the two players will be the winner of the tennis match – and this is known beforehand by both. The characteristics of the endstate to the tennis match are indeterminate until the outcome – i.e. the endstate – of the tennis match becomes actual … rather than being a potential outcome/endstate that dwells in the future.

As to goals determining the striving toward said goals (else expressed, the telos determining the telosis): Would a person invest the time and effort in preparing for and then playing a competitive tennis match in a tournament if they didn’t have the goal of winning said tennis match? The goal of so doing determines, for example, that the person practices prior to the match rather than, say, binging on TV and ice-cream on the sofa during the same period of time. Or, else expressed, the telos of winning the tennis match determines the telosis of practicing for and partaking in the tennis match in such ways as one deems best to accomplish the telos – with the telosis, again, being the striving, moving, etc. toward the particular telos.

The end as eventual actualized outcome, as endstate, doesn’t determine one’s present behaviors. For starters, one doesn’t know whether one will win or lose the tennis match prior the tennis match’s conclusion. Instead, it’s the end as telos, as goal, as a potential future outcome one strives to actualize, that determines one’s current behaviors … which, again, seek to make this potential future outcome an actual outcome at some future time.

What led to someone having the goal of winning the tennis match is a separate issue, but I maintain that this too would need to be accordant to some supraordinate goal the person holds. And if, for example, one were to change one’s mind about wanting to win the tennis match, this too would be in part determined by some goal that is supraordinate to that of winning the tennis match. Depending on example, such as the supraordinate goal of wanting to survive, or to have a good reputation, or some such.

In sum, my general stance: Every consciously performed action is in part determined by what one wants to accomplish by performing that action. Else it is not volitionally enacted. This serves as an important reason for our actions: our intents. Our intents don’t simply give our actions meaning. They significantly determine what we do (and what we don’t do) in our striving to accomplish our intents. All the same, our intents are not always the actual outcomes that result from our striving to actualize our intents.

Complexities of course abound. And, I’m now thinking, other examples might have better served my purpose (my intent, or goal, or telos) of clarifying where I’m coming from. But I’ll leave it here for now and see what unfolds.

(I’ll have to further respond to other posts later on.)

If the present is the time at which we are sensing, then the past and future are not needed to help define the present; they are instead defined by it. — Luke

To @Metaphysician Undercover: Yes, what Luke said.