Since everything is a thing in itself, the 'thing outside of itself' is simply Being experiencing the being of being-for-it. Make sense? Good.

:up:

What about a thing outside the inside of itself. The way it sees me trying to see it as if it were me.

Dasein is the thing outside itself.

Does the implication of infinite regression hold?

Interesting test; propose a nonsense term and find a catalog of reference material is already available.

It is the view a thing in itself has of us. — Cheshire

Things don’t have views. Beings have views.

The point of Kant’s idea of the thing in itself is simply that perspective is inextricable from the knowledge of appearances, that we can only know things as they appear to us. I’m generally bemused by the amount of controversy this seems to cause as it seems mere common sense as far as I’m concerned.

I think so. The nature of psyche is that one experiences an experiencer experiencing - I would not call it a regression exactly, but a circle such that thereafter one repeats and can simply say etc. Hence the eternal trinity of psychological theory - I am divided, and in so saying, I divide myself from the divided self, but in saying that, I am merely repeating the division, so three is always 'enough' of an explanation.

that we can only know things as they appear to us. — Wayfarer

This may appear to be the case, but our knowing in itself may be quite different from our knowing as it appears to us..

The point of Kant’s idea of the thing in itself is simply that perspective is inextricable from the knowledge of appearances, that we can only know things as they appear to us. I’m generally bemused by the amount of controversy this seems to cause as it seems mere common sense as far as I’m concerned. — Wayfarer

I can agree that it seems common sense. I think that is because we know what it's like to imagine a different point of view. But, in this case we are imagining a point of view that doesn't exist by definition. When is the case we'll be seeing something without a perspective and how will it compare to when we do have one?

Things don’t have views. Beings have views. — Wayfarer

Technically, it's an observation that the thing doesn't see us.

When is the case we'll be seeing something without a perspective and how will it compare to when we do have one? — Cheshire

Isn’t perspective intrinsic to seeing? If you want to see an object, you can’t see it if your face is pressed against it. Only through perspective, and the ability to differentiate the figure from its background, can anything be seen.

I should add, although it’s probably a can of worms, that seeing arithmetical proofs, for instance, is a different matter. I think in this case, the use of ‘to see’ is metaphorical for the act of logical apprehension. That step of logical judgement is, however, part of the act of apperception (the process by which the subject assimilates an object into previously-existing ideas and impressions.) So in the case of human perception, ‘seeing’ can cover a spectrum from the simple visual impression (I see it!) through to understanding the point of something (I see what you mean.)

If you want to see an object, you can’t see it if your face is pressed against it. — Wayfarer

How could you miss it? Yes, stepping back a bit helps. But, it isn't exclusive.

I'm not sure that specifing mathematical proofs as the subject captures the intention of the discussion. Maybe, The way you see a being see you the way it sees you see it.

How could you miss it? — Cheshire

But you can’t see what anything is, if your face is hard up against it. Obviously. I don’t need to ‘try it’, or ‘prove it’.

Maybe, The way you see a being see you the way it sees you see it. — Cheshire

I see no reason to believe that for an instant. I know what a goldfish is when I see one. A goldfish has no idea of what I am.

Try it.

I successfully identified several objects correctly.

This may appear to be the case, but our knowing in itself may be quite different from our knowing as it appears to us.. — unenlightened

Yes, that's better than I imagined. I was thinking their was merit to challenging itself validity, but I wasn't sure how to demonstrate it properly. Well done.

I see no reason to believe that for an instant. I know what a goldfish is when I see one. A goldfish has no idea of what I am. — Wayfarer

You'd have to base that belief on knowing what it is to see a goldfish when you see one as you imagine what it sees.

Yes, that's better than I imagined. I was thinking their was merit to challenging itself validity, but I wasn't sure how to demonstrate it properly. Well done. — Cheshire

Perhaps Kant has it the wrong way around: perhaps my knowledge/perception is the thing in myself, and and the object thereof is the thing outside myself. As if I contain a map, but the territory contains me. How's that for a radical philosophy? :cool:

The thing outside of itself

It is the view a thing in itself has of us. — Cheshire

perhaps my knowledge/perception is the thing in myself, and and the object thereof is the thing outside myself. As if I contain a map, but the territory contains me. How's that for a radical philosophy? :cool: — unenlightened

It seems consistent with my experience of the world. I can imagine the things I can see and places I can be. I can also differentiate between the memory and experience.

Exactly.

Exactly — Cheshire

And...???

It's all the same perspective at the end of the day. We pretend what we must look like to the mirror as the mirror. But, there's no real other view to be described regardless of how many qualifications you stack on it.

It's all the same perspective at the end of the day. We pretend what we must look like to the mirror. But, there's no real other view to be described regardless of how many qualifications you stack on it. — Cheshire

The thing outside of itself knows the thing in itself. I've always wondered about inanimate objects and what, if they could speak, they would have to say.

Could it be the other way round too - because we're watching, the world pretends to be something it's not? :chin: Hmmmm.

Could it be the other way round too - because we're watching, the world pretends to be something it's not? :chin: Hmmmm. — TheMadFool

I mean I'm at least two assertions deep in some speculation about material. My basis is that Wittgenstein was right, but there's easier ways to demonstrate ideas. Maybe, professional philosophers are so given to the assumption of the validity of it in itself statements they need a long leash to drag them through it at the time.

To your question; I think I subscribe to a type of participatory realism. The world's real and reality results from our interactions with it. If I were you then perhaps I might participate differently, but the parts that don't change are common for a reason. If the world chooses it's participation as well, then there could be more going on than we know. Which we already knew.

I understand it is supposed to be a metaphor. Seeing the forest for the trees or the end of the wall when all I see is wall. But, it ignores so much back ground information. If I truly don't know what something is you can press it to my face or parade it around the room and I still won't know what it is I'm looking at. It's a valid metaphor for a questionable idea.

Wait a minute so you being a thing inside of itself thinks that it can comprehend a thing outside of itself by using the thing inside itself to create something inside itself which is an idea and a concept of something that could be outside of itself. Do you see the contradiction here?

Wait a minute so you being a thing inside of itself thinks that it can comprehend a thing outside of itself by using the thing inside itself to create something inside itself which is an idea and a concept of something that could be outside of itself. Do you see the contradiction here? — MAYAEL

So far I've only claimed that I could give a name to thing outside of itself and others could then reason about it as a result. Confirming that we know ourselves as seen by the thing outside of itself point of view is problematic; now that some one has decided it is problematic. Up until this point it's been confirmed twice as viable; one poster even referencing quite a bit of work done on the topic. 1 dismissed the idea and another has offered some insightful speculations and a cartoon.

this pondering as well as the actual "thing" that supposedly exists outside of itself how can we confirm that the hypothesis is correct when we aren't out side of are self?

I say that we can't and to make matters even more difficult we can't even properly ponder it because that would be an attribute we don't have so any concept we come up with is inaccurate in comparison to the actual thing assuming the actual thing did in fact exist so rather it exists or not we are incapable of comprehending it so whatever you're calling a thing outside of itself is not how a thing outside of itself would exist

propose the concept of the 'thing outside of itself'; as an extension to the thing in itself. — Cheshire

implying an error probably exist in the original notion of the thing in itself. — Cheshire

....an extension of a probable error, which would necessarily implicate itself as a probable error.

1 + 1 = 3 + 1 = 4 is the error compounded, iff 1 + 1 = 3 is the error.

The thing outside of itself is actually very natural to us. We are the thing (persons) living in a universe (outside). We are "the thing" outside of itself.

Unless we are purely in the mind, which is every bit as amazing.