• thth
    2
    Everything below in quotes is not my work.

    Can someone try to explain the author perceptive.
    Are there any flaws in defining the self the way the author does?

    Take the sorties paradox. To summarize the sorties paradox how many grains of sand can i remove till there is no longer a heap of sand. Is 2 still a heap? What about 44 grains? What exact grain is not a heap It has to do with vagueness

    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sorites-paradox/

    My question is when exactly can't you compute new experiences? What exact change to the brain from stroke or other cause?




    "In that post I lay out an elaborate metaphor between the existence of a view (say, a mountain scene) and the existence of my experience of self. Both are things we think of as "just there" in a particular time and place, but in fact, both are the result of a large amount of computation that ones brain performs. They do not exist without that computation, because they are the result of the computation.

    The objects that appear in the scene (the mountains, the sky, trees) are present whether anyone is there to look at them or not. But the scene itself, the experience of objects arranged in space, is not.

    The memories and linguistic patterns and perception filters that my life's experiences have created in my brain are present whether my brain is alive and functioning, or not. Of course, if the cells of my body or brain were no longer alive, my brain would soon decay and those patterns would be lost. Those patterns are not lost, though, if I am merely asleep for a while, or under anesthesia, or if they were somehow erased from my brain but re-created in another machine.

    My experience of those patterns does not occur, though, when I'm unconscious.

    Experience, as best I can tell, does not move through time; it merely exists in the moment while my brain is computing it, just like the mountain scene exists when my brain is computing it. My experience does seem to move through time, because part of those remarkable computations my brain does without apparent effort is to generate a chronological narrative from a variety of types of memory. But there is nothing to indicate that experiences, as distinct from the existence of the patterns in the brain and the existence of the process of computation, persist over time.

    So, to understand this, you have to carefully distinguish between not two things (brain and mind), but three: the brain's stored patterns, the brain's computation, and subjective experience. Respectively, a collective physical thing, an active process, and an abstract thing created from the patterns (and from sensory input) by the computation.

    The analogy is this:
    Mountains, trees, sky --> sensing and computation --> the scene
    Memories and other stored patterns (+ current sensory input) --> computation --> my experience

    If the body dies, the brain's computation stops, so no further subjective experiences are computed from the stored patterns.

    If the body dies, the brain's stored patterns eventually disintegrate, so no further experiences can ever be computed from them.

    If the brain stops computing (such as, if I am rendered unconscious or frozen in a cryogenic chamber), but the stored patterns are not destroyed, then further experiences can be generated if the computation is restarted.

    If the stored patterns are moved or copied elsewhere, and some device (another brain, or a computer) makes the same sort of computation possible using the copied patterns, then further experiences can be generated. (This is of course not actually possible at present.)

    The condition of being unable to compute any further experiences is as good a definition as any, of "dead." That applies if the stored patterns are lost, or if the brain becomes unable to perform computation. Either condition is sufficient for death.

    If the stored patterns are lost but the brain is still able to compute, that still counts as death by my definition. (The term in science fiction would be "mind wiped.") However, such a brain could, in theory, begin computing new experiences. Since the old patterns are gone, though, it wouldn't be in any way a continuation of the person's previous life. (Also, again, though "wiping" a computer is not only possible but routine, there is no known way for that to actually happen to a brain, at present. Amnesia is never so complete as to erase all patterns of perception, and when degradation is that complete, as might happen in advanced stage dementia, the computing capability of the brain is also destroyed.)

    As far as experiences are concerned, though, there are only two possible conditions: experiences that have occurred, and experiences that have not occurred. Experiences that have not occurred (just like scenes that have not been seen/computed) do not exist. Experiences that have occurred have at least existed at a particular time. Whether those that I think of as having occurred in the past still exist in some way (that is, whether the passage of time is illusory or not) is a mystery that has not been fathomed yet.

    But note that "experiences exist for a while and then die" is not a coherent statement. Memories of experiences (that is, patterns in the brain) exist for a while and then (when the patterns disintegrate) do not, but it does not follow that the experiences themselves either "live" or "die."

    A disclaimer:

    For me this is all hypothetical, though it appears to be consistent with everything I know. It is not generally agreed truth in most "systems of practice" (the various assortments of beliefs, modes of thought, terminology, experiences, and practices by which people understand and teach one another about the world), and in fact is understood by relatively few, and should be considered pretty advanced thinking. Most people still think of the body and brain as puppets operated by the mind, rather than thinking of the experiential mind as a result of computations that evolved because they help keep the body and brain alive."






    Parts in quotes Still not my work.


    "- your physical body and brain
    - your brain's ability to function as a brain; that is, to compute
    - the patterns (memories, perception filters) recorded in your brain
    - the potential to compute new experiences from those patterns
    - existing (past) experiences
    - new (present) experience

    If your brain is destroyed but downloaded into a computer, the first and second "yous" cease to exist (that is, die). The third and fourth "yous" continue to exist in their new instantiation in the computer. The fifth "you" continues to exist as much as it ever did, being an abstract entity in the past in any case. The sixth "you" might exist if the computer your brain patterns were downloaded into is running so as to generate present experience.

    Most people regard the first "you" as their puppet self (including most who believe in an afterlife, who regard the body as discarded and no longer needed after death), and the sixth "you" as their "real self." I regard the fourth as my "real self."
    "
  • BC
    13.6k
    How many grains make a heap depends on the shape of the grain. If they are square or have flat parallel surfaces then 2 grains can make a heap -- 1 resting on top of another. 2, 3, 4, and on up. if they are round, it would take 4 grains. 2 or 3 grains stacked with spheres would fall over. Four however, can form a heap. Not much of a heap, but a small heapish pile nonetheless.

    Do you suppose you could get to the point in somewhat fewer words? I can't quite untangle all of the text.
  • thth
    2
    Its is not my work. I am having trouble understanding it.
  • Cavacava
    2.4k


    If your experiences were downloaded onto a computer do you think that the computer, regardless of how fast or massive, could get your memory of the aroma and taste of your mom's fresh baked apple pie just right? Do you think you would retain personal identity without your specific body?

    Anyway, it sounds like your talking about the computational theory of the mind, which is often discussed hereabouts. Take a look at the following for an overview:

    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-mind/
  • Rich
    3.2k
    The author is confusing that which experiences, which is the in the providence of living consciousness (which experiences duration) vs. that which is experienced, e.g. some computer output. Computers are simply not alive (experiencing duration) and conscious in the way life is.

    As far as where experiences are "stored", no one had ever seen an experience in a brain. What they have observed is brain activity which is much different.
  • thth2
    2
    hi I needed to create a new account.

    Cavacava I disagree with your answer. The universe can be explained by math. The brain is part of the universe so it can be explained by math. It may be complicated math but still math.

    Rich, I am having trouble understanding what you are saying. Please dumb it down.

    Can someone answer the above questions?

    Can someone try to explain the author perceptive?

    Take the sorties paradox. To summarize the sorties paradox how many grains of sand can i remove till there is no longer a heap of sand. Is 2 still a heap? What about 44 grains? What exact grain is not a heap It has to do with vagueness

    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sorites-paradox/

    My question is when exactly can't you compute new experiences? What exact change to the brain from stroke or other cause?
  • Wayfarer
    22.5k
    If your experiences were downloaded onto a computerCavacava

    Computers can't store experiences. They store data in binary code. It's one of the fixations of the technological society that computers have or are minds.

    The universe can be explained by math.thth2

    'Not everything that counts can be counted, and not everything that can be counted, counts' ~ Albert Einstein.
  • Cavacava
    2.4k
    My question is when exactly can't you compute new experiences?

    Computers can only compute, they act syntactically, not semantically. Think about Searle's 'Chinese Room' thought experiment. [detailed description: http://www.iep.utm.edu/chineser/] He asked us to imagine a man in a room with a rule book that tells him how manipulate symbols in a certain manner, in this case Chinese figures. The man does not speak a word of Chinese, but he becomes very adept at receiving and transmitting answers according to his guide book, to the extent that no one could tell the difference between his answers and a native speaker's answers, but he does not understand anything about the messages he transmits, which is a lot like a computer. Computation is syntactically formal, that's why computers are so powerful, but they lack any semantic meaning.

    Computers can't store experiences. They store data in binary code.
    Yes, but we can imagine it being the case, for the purpose of discussion, that is why I said
    If
    . An Australian Philosopher Frank Jackson [he latter distanced himself from the argument, but it sounds pretty strong to me] came up with a pip of an argument, another thought experiment. It's called Mary's Room:

    Mary lives her entire life in a room devoid of colour—she has never directly experienced colour in her entire life, though she is capable of it. Through black-and-white books and other media, she is educated on neuroscience to the point where she becomes an expert on the subject. Mary learns everything there is to know about the perception of colour in the brain, as well as the physical facts about how light works in order to create the different colour wavelengths. It can be said that Mary is aware of all physical facts about colour and colour perception.

    After Mary’s studies on colour perception in the brain are complete, she exits the room and experiences, for the very first time, direct colour perception. She sees the colour red for the very first time, and learns something new about it — namely, what red looks like.

    So yea, our experiences are not downloadable by computers, and can't be encompassed except by our actual experience.
  • Wayfarer
    22.5k
    Thanks. (I don't know why Jackson changed his argument, but I suspect it was due to the unpopularity of defending a non-materialist point of view, especially in the context of Australian academic philosophy which is strongly tilted towards materialism.)
  • thth2
    2


    I don't really want to get into a long discussion at this time.

    But lets assume one day someone finds the key that make a computer conscious and consciousness can be downloaded.

    Would the authors explanation of self overtime make sense?

    In current times computers are not conscious. So what would be a good definition of self overtime?


    Take the sorties paradox. To summarize the sorties paradox how many grains of sand can i remove till there is no longer a heap of sand. Is 2 still a heap? What about 44 grains? What exact grain is not a heap It has to do with vagueness

    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sorites-paradox/

    My question is when exactly do you no longer have continuity of self? What exact change to the brain from stroke or other cause?

    Please answer when you can download brains into computers and also answer from the perceptive of current technology.

    Thanks
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