De nada.

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Anything that can be thought, can be described. Doesn’t mean the description is communicable, but that wasn’t the question.

More broadly, I've wondered in the past if there are actual aspects of fundamental reality that are only grasped by speakers of specific languages through words and expressions in their respective languages... — Noble Dust

Something I learned many moons ago in my psychology of language class. From Wikipedia:

The hypothesis of linguistic relativity, also known as the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis, the Whorf hypothesis, or Whorfianism, is a principle suggesting that the structure of a language affects its speakers' worldview or cognition, and thus people's perceptions are relative to their spoken language.

I, and I think psychologists in general, were skeptical of this even back when I took the class, but I think there is something there. My children were all involved in a French Immersion program from the time they were in kindergarten. Watching them, it has always seemed to me that having two languages gives you two different minds.

I love German. I think being able to speak it a little opens me up to concepts and ways of thinking. On the other hand, I think that's the weak version of the Whorf hypothesis, i.e. some ideas are easier to express and come more naturally in one language vs. another, but it's possible to translate. Or, you can just steal the word.

Being certain is easy. Any fool can be certain. Demonstrating that your notion of French grey doesn't change - that'd be interesting. — Banno

Agreed. In this context french grey is actually a static color that I happen to enjoy. Really, grey itself represents a unique balance, but a little blue washing over it meets my preference. So, in a PLA sense it is unchanging.

What about color spectrum gradient? Let's get off the religiousic Witty high horse for a minute and realize that color exists on a gradient more fine than language does. Who's going to argue for one exact color gradient that the phrase "French Grey" defines? Come on now boys. — Noble Dust

The OP requests the indescribable; I try to make posts to order. To demystify the matter colors are describable by hexadecimal and I imagine even more sophisticated means by now. We have chosen a language our machines understand.

There are certain feelings which aren't captured as neatly as one would in other languages. For example, in Spanish we sometimes say "Hasta siempre", which roughly means, until forever. It is usually said when a person dies or is about to, conveying the emotion that we will never see them again. I suppose "farewell" could be similar-ish given a certain context.

Likewise, in English the word "Schadenfreude" is borrowed from German, which is taking pleasure at someone else's misfortunes. Apparently, there is "epicaricacy" in English, which means something similar. But it sounds less nice.

Also, the term often used in English in philosophy "what it's like" to be so and so, is not sufficiently well translatable to other languages. You can get the main idea, but there is an important residue (or nuance) which can't really be conveyed.

I imagine that if China, Japan and so on, the cases sky rocket. Nevertheless, the main ideas can be expressed in any language.

And surely many emotions and perceptions can't be stated appropriately in words at all.

Schadenfreude is sadism in English.

Not quite, though there are similarities. Sadism implies liking to actively harm people. Schadenfreude doesn't necessarily carry a connotation of enjoying other people's pain, more like enjoying whatever misfortunes happens to them. Pain could be involved, but not obligatorily.

I know that you query the understanding of English language, but I wonder if your question goes further and is about the limits of any language. How do we construct the many complex aspects of experience into words and theories which can be discussed amongst others? How much is language itself, or the ideas which lie behind the surfaces of language?

its meaning is unambiguous in the given context and situation. — Cidat

Some questions occur to me.

How do we judge whether something is sufficiently unambiguous? In general I think we rely on practical criteria. We are simply satisfied or not with the results of talking-acting together in a context.

You ask:

Are there things we can’t describe with the English language?

I'm tempted to joke with you and ask for an example. Does it make sense that there's a proper answer to this question? IMV, a simple yes/no answer would be useful, and the justifications for either yes or no might be illuminating or amusing. Can God make a stone he can't lift?

Something I learned many moons ago in my psychology of language class. From Wikipedia:

The hypothesis of linguistic relativity, also known as the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis, the Whorf hypothesis, or Whorfianism, is a principle suggesting that the structure of a language affects its speakers' worldview or cognition, and thus people's perceptions are relative to their spoken language. — T Clark

If we change "perceptions" to "experiences", and if we understand experiences to be strongly entwined with all manner of conceptualizations which over time become ingrained into the way we experience, then I think this hypothesis of linguistic relativity makes a good deal of sense.

While there are basic concepts that can safely be assumed common to all beings and hence languages - such as the roundabout concept of other(ness), or the dichotomy between thing(ness)/noun and activity/verb - think, for example, of the vast chasm between Western and Eastern concepts which in English go by the term of "emptiness". Such as in statements like "heightening your own realization of emptiness". There's a great divide in conceptual understanding here, and a plethora of entwined connotations that result in generalized meaning that get lost in translation. And, were one to be in no way exposed to Eastern thoughts, one as typical Westerner would almost certainly hold no experience whatsoever - regardless of how marginal - of what a philosophically educated Easterner's experience is in relation to reality at large.

Then there are languages and cultures we are fully unacquainted with, many an individual tribal culture for instance. A typical Westerner cannot experience reality in the animistic ways that many an individual from such tribal cultures do - in large part due to the differences in languages used to engage in internal thoughts regarding reality.

I love German. I think being able to speak it a little opens me up to concepts and ways of thinking. On the other hand, I think that's the weak version of the Whorf hypothesis, i.e. some ideas are easier to express and come more naturally in one language vs. another, but it's possible to translate. Or, you can just steal the word. — T Clark

Yes, but this already presupposes that some individual which so translates or steals words holds multilingual understanding, hence knowledge of two or more languages. Were the other culture's language to not be known by a given cohort, this cohort would not have recourse to the concepts uniquely captured by the given other language.

ay, there's the rub:

The meaning is the use. — Banno

Millennia of philosophy of language settled in one short passage.

- - -

Meaning isn't use. That one can assign different meanings to a word doesn't, in any way, imply that all there is to words is how we use them. — TheMadFool

Indeed. For use to have the potential to define the meaning of a word, the word must already have some previous definition (the result of a previous use?). (Except for true novums where an entirely new, non-onomatopoetic, non-abbreviating sequence of sounds is produced; such words are extremely rare.)

It seems that the meaning of a word consists of two components: a relatively static one and a relatively dynamic one, and that the two are in a temporal mutual relationship.

For example: mouse, as in computer mouse. The relatively static part is the meaning of mouse, as in mouse the animal. The dynamic part is in using this word to also name a part of computer equipment which in shape and movement somewhat resembles mouse the animal.


The other point is that for a particular use of a word to become its meaning, it must gain enough social traction. We have a computer mouse, but not a computer turtle.


(But it seems that the actual question that such inquiries are trying to answer is something like, What came first: use or definition?)

(But it seems that the actual question that such inquiries are trying to answer is something like, What came first: use or definition?) — baker

Going by the Humpty Dumpty quote ( :up: , btw), shouldn't this be: What came first: use of pre-established symbols or the intentional creation of symbols we use?

Hence, the "which is to be master" part: words that create the limits of concepts with which we think or the agency to express concepts we choose to think via words.

shouldn't this be: What came first: use of pre-established symbols or the intentional creation of symbols we use? — javra

True novums are extremely rare. Normally, we use existing language material (or, more generally: symbol material) and make something other out of it.

Hence, the "which is to be master" part:

Humpty Dumpty is refering to which particular meaning of the word is the relevant one, the one that prevails.

words that create the limits of concepts with which we think or the agency to express concepts we choose to think via words.

I think this is a misleading dichotomy. I think the relationship between the two is mutual, they are mutually interdependent, and that we cannot meaningfully talk about one without the other, nor assume that one came first and is the condition or requirement for the other.

You're looking at things from the perspective of one who is birthed into and thereby embedded within, at the very least, one language, and from this vantage I of course agree with you. I looked at the "which came first" question a bit more literally in the ontological sense. And I understand if we disagree on that.

I’m halling about describing in such a way that its meaning is unambiguous in the given context and situation. — Cidat

A description is like the handle on a coffee cup.

Indeed. Take a swatch of french grey out of the paint shop and into the sunshine, and it will be different.

Which is the french grey you love? It doesn't matter, of course, since the french grey you love is not a colour you have in mind, but a colour on the swatch, the wall, the art work.

The meaning of french grey is what you do with it; ordering and applying a colour that is pleasing.

Are you agreeing with Humpty or with me? You can't have both.

You're looking at things from the perspective of one who is birthed into and thereby embedded within, at the very least, one language, and from this vantage I of course agree with you. I looked at the "which came first" question a bit more literally in the ontological sense. — javra

Unless you subscribe to a kind of biblical "and then God gave man language", you're always looking at matters of language as someone who is birthed into and thereby embedded within, at the very least, one language.

I assume that just like there is unbroken evolutionary continuity that spans through time to our present state, from our ancestors who lived in the sea to ape like creatures to H. sapiens, so there is unbroken evolutionary continuity of language, where at each t + 1 we use what was already there at t and make other things out of it (but which cannot rightfully be called "new"). It's not recycling, but it's also not invention.

I don't see how the "which came first" question can be asked meaningfully.

Are you agreeing with Humpty or with me? You can't have both. — Banno

Both of you say that the meaning of a word is in its use. Except that Humpty Dumpty goes further and specifies which use (the one of his choice; the one that prevails).

No, that's not at all what "meaning is use" is. Quiet the contrary, the meaning is found in the place of the words used in the language game being played. Meaning is essentially social.

Contrast "The meaning of the word is whatever I say it is" with "The meaning of the word is the part it plays in the language game being played".

But it's good to see you thinking about this.

Unless you subscribe to a kind of biblical "and then God gave man language", you're always looking at matters of language as someone who is birthed into and thereby embedded within, at the very least, one language.

I assume that just like there is unbroken evolutionary continuity that spans through time to our present state, from our ancestors who lived in the sea to ape like creatures to H. sapiens, so there is unbroken evolutionary continuity of language, where at each t + 1 we use what was already there at t and make other things out of it (but which cannot rightfully be called "new"). It's not recycling, but it's also not invention.

I don't see how the "which came first" question can be asked meaningfully. — baker

I get what you're saying, but unless one assumes that all life is endowed with language, then language appeared at some point in time after life appeared. (One could even extend this form of reasoning prior to life: if bacteria have language, do self-replicating protein molecules like prions have language, how about crystals, rocks, atoms, and so on.) In this line of reasoning, language appeared out of non-language at some point in time.

Besides, rare as they might be, novums - new features - perpetually occur, thereby the evolution of any living language, and how are novums not invented?

No, that's not at all what "meaning is use" is. Quiet the contrary, the meaning is found in the place of the words used in the language game being played. Meaning is essentially social.

Contrast "The meaning of the word is whatever I say it is" with "The meaning of the word is the part it plays in the language game being played". — Banno

Can there be use devoid of intention?

I find that to mean X is to intend X. The meaning of "tree" I cognize at any given time is what I intend via the use of the symbol - hypothetically ranging from aspects of divinity like the tree of knowledge of or life to fully profane generalized ideas like the biological workings of a lifeform (no, I'm not Abrahamic). What another might mean - intend - by "tree" is relative to what they as other individual agency intends. There then is intersubjective, or shared, intention. The atheist and the spiritualist will both minimally intend by the symbol "tree" the generalized idea of something endowed with roots, a trunk, and branches. But this shared, hence social, intention is yet constituted of individuals' intentions ... a plurality of intentions that find accord.

Can there be use devoid of intention? — javra

Hm. let's see.

Can you put something to use accidentally?

Intent is built into an analysis of use. Indeed, there's a whole branch of work on the topic.

If someone else has a different "intended meaning of tree", does that prevent communication? Usually not. Meanign is not a thing in your head.

If someone else has a different "intended meaning of tree", does that prevent communication? Usually not. Meanign is not a thing in your head. — Banno

Usually, but not necessarily. Suppose someone intends the generalized idea of cat by the use of "tree". We'd likely call them other than perfectly sane, but that's beside the point of what constitutes meaning.

At any rate, is intention not something in your head?

At any rate, is intention not something in your head? — javra

But you implied meaning was a thing in your head.

Immediately, the thing in your head is not the same as the thing in my head, and we do not have a shared meaning.

And yet we can have conversations, implying that we can mean the same thing...

So, by a reductio, something has gone wrong in equating intent with meaning, or claiming that meaning is private.

Well ... a per my initial post to you, in equating meaning to what an agent intends by a symbol, this being (intra-)subjective, I then also find that communication is inter-subjective, consisting of an accord between different subjects in what they individually intend by symbols.

In short, a language does not strictly exist in my head, no. Yet meaning - or, what is intended via symbols - does.

As one example, the pain or pleasure I might at one moment associate with a given color due to my own idiosyncratic experiences - with this color momentarily leading my thoughts to a certain outcome of affect and, in so governing my thoughts' intentionality, granting this color a momentary meaning to me - will be a fully private occurrence. That the color orange momentarily means putrid to me on grounds that it vividly reminds me of an orange I one ate that was spoiled will be a meaning of the color orange that is fully private to me.

Its just that when it comes to language, there is a conformity between a) what an individual intends via a symbol and b) the commonly agreed upon understanding of what is to be intended via a symbol which pertains to the cohort (a) is a part of. This general conformity - whose limits can on occasion be tested - is necessary for communication.

So for example, that the color red means passion or love when on a rose or a heart will be an intersubjective meaning relative to those who understand red to so symbolize in the given contexts - a meaning that resides in the head of each individual and which is commonly agreed upon.

Yet meaning - or, what is intended via symbols - does. — javra

Nuh.

Have a read of Philosophical Investigations. Especially the first forty or so paragraphs.

Nuh.

Have a read of Philosophical Investigations. Especially the first forty or so paragraphs. — Banno

No, and I'm so far not inclined to. Have you read the two examples of color's meaning which I just posted?