Luke, the concept of "a private language" is incoherent from the outset, so there is no point in trying to determine what Wittgenstein means by "private language". — Metaphysician Undercover
Furthermore, I think that Wittgenstein presents this as a common occurrence and feature of natural language, that a private language-game (one in which the user of the language-game cannot be said to understand or know the language-game being played) gets integrated into the common language. — Metaphysician Undercover
A person could have a language, which oneself does not know or understand the usage of the words, yet the person could appear to understand the usage of the words — Metaphysician Undercover
If we cannot understand what Wittgenstein means by a private language, then how does his private language have two conditions as you claim? — Luke
How can the concept of a private language be incoherent on the one hand, but then a private language can exist and become integrated into the common language on the other hand? How can a private language exist if the concept of a private language is incoherent? — Luke
In what sense could a person "have" this language? They don't know or understand the language, but yet they "have" it? How? — Luke
But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right' — PI 258
Just like any logically incoherent proposal can have two conditions. That's why I presented the square circle example. In this example, the one alone is not logically incoherent, it is the inconsistency between the two which produces the incoherency. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is why I explicitly referred to it as a "private language-game" rather than a "private language", to avoid this problem. What is presented at 258 is a language-game. A "language" consists of a multitude of language-games. The example at 258 is not an example of a "private language". We discussed this already, it is an example of a private language-game (the private use of S to name something) within the context of a common language (S is a sensation). — Metaphysician Undercover
The person can have, and use this language In the same sense that the person has and uses the private language-game described at 258. — Metaphysician Undercover
I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the activities into which it is woven, a “language-game”. — PI 7
We can imagine that a person might have an entire language full of such private language-games. — Metaphysician Undercover
This person does not know or understand the use of "S", but is still using "S". — Metaphysician Undercover
Don’t consider it a matter of course that a person is making a note of something when he makes a mark — say in a calendar. For a note has a function, and this “S” so far has none. — PI 260
If we remove this condition we could define "private language", such that the person has a "private" language, and does not know what the words refer to, as in the example at 258. — Metaphysician Undercover
But the person might still "appear to understand" what the words refer to (269). That is why 258 is not an example of a "private language" as defined at 243. — Metaphysician Undercover
I believe that what Wittgenstein was trying to demonstrate is that any proposed form of a "private" language could not produce "knowledge", as knowledge is understood in epistemology, requiring justification. — Metaphysician Undercover
The proposed form of "private language", defined at 243, requires that the speaker knows what the words refer to, and so is ruled out as impossible. But other forms of "private" language, similar to the language-game described at 258, which consist of word use without knowing, might be very possible and very real. — Metaphysician Undercover
(iii) "the words of this language refer to what can only be known by the person speaking".
How does this fit in? Is it another condition? How does it differ from (i) and (ii)? — Luke
Nonsense. You cannot have a language-game without a language, and you cannot have a private language-game without a private language. — Luke
It is supposed that the person knows what "S" refers to at 258 because they are associating
"S" with a certain sensation and "writ[ing] this sign in a calendar for every day on which [they] have the sensation." — Luke
The language is not private because a person might appear to understand? What does "appear to understand" mean in terms of a private language? How can an outsider know how it appears to understand a private language? — Luke
You said that a private language was an incoherent concept and that we cannot understand what Wittgenstein means by it, but you are now speaking as though it is not only a perfectly coherent concept, but that a private language could actually exist. That's quite a turnaround. Next you'll tell me that square circles can exist. — Luke
So it's a private language but the speaker does not know what the words mean? How is it a language? What is it used for? — Luke
There is no language-game described at 258. There is nothing more than an association of a sign with a sensation. — Luke
(iii) "the words of this language refer to what can only be known by the person speaking".
How does this fit in? Is it another condition? How does it differ from (i) and (ii)?
— Luke
You can take it as another condition if you want, that might be best way. — Metaphysician Undercover
You cannot have a language-game without a language, and you cannot have a private language-game without a private language.
— Luke
Where's your proof of this? — Metaphysician Undercover
If a language consists of a multitude of language-games, then most likely there was a first language-game prior to there being a language. — Metaphysician Undercover
It is explicitly stated at the end of 258, that there is no such thing as the correct use of S, there is no right here. "There is no criterion of correctness" Therefore we can conclude that the person cannot "know" the sensation called S. You seem to be missing the gist of the example. "I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation", does not mean that I actually can do that. "Want" implies a lack of. That I want to know my own sensations implies that I actually do not know them. The conclusion at the end of 258 is that I cannot come to know "a certain sensation" in the way proposed by the example. — Metaphysician Undercover
But you need to accept that "private language" as described at 243 is incoherent, and move along to Wittgenstein's next proposal of "private language", the one at 269, which is inconsistent with 243, as different from it. — Metaphysician Undercover
So at 269, there is a proposal that the "private language" user has a "subjective understanding" of what the words refer to, rather than actually knowing what the words refer to as "private language" at 243 requires . In this sense of "private language", at 269, the person might "appear to understand", rather than actually "know" which is required at 243. — Metaphysician Undercover
So far the argument has been conducted in terms of an ‘I’ not essentially related to body or related only to an inert body. At §269, however, it moves to examples where there is bodily behaviour but despite this there is still the temptation to think of private meanings for words independent of their public use. This suggests a further chance for a defender of the idea of a private language: that a private linguist might secure a meaning for his sign ‘S’ by correlating its private use with some public phenomenon. This would apparently serve to provide a function for the noting of ‘S’ in the diary (§260) and thus give a place for ostensive definition, and would give as well a guarantee that there is some constancy in the linguist’s use of the term ‘S’ independent of his impression of such constancy. Wittgenstein uses the example of the manometer in §§270–271 to consider this idea, and his criticism of it is in effect that this method of securing meaning works, but that the secured meaning is public: the so-called “private object”, even if there were such a thing, is revealed to be irrelevant to meaning. Presumably a defender of “private language” would hope that the example would work like this: if I keep saying, on the basis of my sensation, that my blood pressure is rising, and the manometer shows that I am right, then this success in judging my own blood pressure shows that I had in fact established a private meaning for the sign ‘S’ and was using the sign in the same way each time to judge that my sensation was the same each time. However, all the example really shows is that just thinking that I have the same sensation now as I had when my blood pressure rose formerly, can be a good guide to the rising of my blood pressure. Whether in some “private sense” the sensation was “actually the same” or not becomes completely irrelevant to the question of constancy in the use of ‘S’—that is, there is no gap between the actual nature of the sensation and my impression of it, and ‘S’ in this case could mean merely ‘sensation of the rising of the blood pressure’; indeed, for all we are told of the sign’s role, it could even mean just ‘blood pressure rising’. — SEP article on Private Language
Yes, the revised definition of "private language", offered at 269, is coherent, and describes something which could actually exist. — Metaphysician Undercover
So it's a private language but the speaker does not know what the words mean? How is it a language? What is it used for?
— Luke
Perhaps you ought to read Wittgenstein a little bit closer, to provide yourself with a better understanding, then the answers to these questions might be revealed to you. — Metaphysician Undercover
Why do you think that associating a sign with a sensation does not qualify to be called a "language-game"? — Metaphysician Undercover
It is explicitly stated at the end of 258, that there is no such thing as the correct use of S, there is no right here. "There is no criterion of correctness" Therefore we can conclude that the person cannot "know" the sensation called S... The conclusion at the end of 258 is that I cannot come to know "a certain sensation" in the way proposed by the example. — Metaphysician Undercover
To understand a language means to have mastered a technique. — PI 199
Then that language-game would constitute the language. See PI 7. Therefore, a private language and/or private language-game cannot exist because they are incoherent concepts. — Luke
In this latter case, "sounds which no one else understands but which I ‘appear to understand’ might be called a “private language”." But that does not mean that it is a private language (or any language). — Luke
Then that language-game would constitute the language. See PI 7. Therefore, a private language and/or private language-game cannot exist because they are incoherent concepts.
— Luke
Sorry Lujke, I don't follow your logic. — Metaphysician Undercover
I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the activities into which it is woven, a “language-game”. — PI 7
What makes the "private language" described at 243 incoherent is the condition that the speaker "knows" what the words refer to. — Metaphysician Undercover
If we remove that condition, as Wittgenstein does at 269, and replace it with the condition that the speaker has a "subjective understanding", or might merely "appear to understand" what the words refer to in a private language, then "private language" is no longer incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover
...the private language argument is that the idea is exposed as unintelligible when pressed—we cannot make sense of the circumstances in which we should say that someone is using a private language. — SEP article on Private Language
Of course it is not a "private language" as described at 243, but now Wittgenstein has decided to call something else a "private language". — Metaphysician Undercover
What Wittgenstein calls a language-game includes "the whole, consisting of language and the activities into which it is woven". As I said, you cannot have a language-game without a language. — Luke
How does this "condition" make it incoherent? — Luke
Appearances can be deceiving. What is it that he appears to understand? Wittgenstein tells us at 269 that the alleged private linguist is "attaching some meaning to the word, but not the right one". Doesn't this imply that he does not understand the meaning of the word? To paraphrase 246, if we are using the word “understand” as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then this person does not understand the meaning of the word. It is not coherent for a person to have or to know a private language that they do not understand. — Luke
It is not coherent for a person to have or to know a private language that they do not understand. — Luke
Do you consider there to be a difference between having and knowing a language? — Luke
Nah, he's talking about the same private language throughout. — Luke
That definition of :"language" at 7, is itself logically incoherent, by a fallacy of composition. It is incoherent to have the whole, and the parts which make up the whole, go by the same name (language-game). — Metaphysician Undercover
As demonstrated at 258, there is no criterion of correctness, no "right" here, so the condition, that what the words refer to is "known" by the speaker, is necessarily violated. — Metaphysician Undercover
Wittgenstein demonstrates at 258 that the diarist does not know or understand one's own usage of the symbol "S". That is what is intended with "I have no criterion of correctness". — Metaphysician Undercover
262. One might say: someone who has given himself a private explanation of a word must inwardly resolve to use the word in such-and-such a way. And how does he resolve that? Should I assume that he invents the technique of applying the word; or that he found it ready-made?
263. “Surely I can (inwardly) resolve to call THIS ‘pain’ in the future.” — “But is it certain that you have resolved this? Are you sure that it was enough for this purpose to concentrate your attention on your feeling?” — An odd question. — — PI 262-263
That, "the private language which they do not understand", I tell you, is the "private language" presented at 269. This is a fully coherent "private language" (if we overlook Wittgenstein's problematic definition of "language" referred to above, which is really not relevant at this point)), in which the speaker might "appear to understand" the use of the words, through some form of "subjective understanding", which does not qualify as "knowing" — Metaphysician Undercover
This presupposes that the words have an established (private) use — Luke
This is no different for the purported "other" private language at 269. — Luke
"S" cannot have a usage because there is no criterion of correctness. — Luke
Does "subjective understanding" qualify as understanding? Because you are claiming that a person can have a private language which they do not understand. — Luke
How is it "fully coherent" that there can be a speaker of a private language who does not understand, know, or speak his own private language? — Luke
The person privately develops a use for "S" without knowing what "S" refers to. — Metaphysician Undercover
Well, that is done precisely by concentrating my attention; for in this way I commit to memory the connection between the sign and the sensation. — But “I commit it to memory” can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connection correctly in the future. But in the present case, I have no criterion of correctness. — PI 258
Wittgenstein points out in the diary case ‘I first want to observe that a definition of the sign cannot be formulated’. (The translation here obscures the reason why. Wittgenstein’s word is ‘aussprechen’, better translated as ‘expressed’ than ‘formulated’: the point follows by definition from the fact that the case is one where the definition is private.) So if meaning is to be obtained for the “sign”, this must be achieved through a private exercise of ostensive definition, where I concentrate on the sensation and produce the sign at the same time. (In these circumstances, meaning cannot be extracted from a pre-existing practice of private use, since what is in question is how such a use could be established in the first place.) But if this exercise is to be genuine and successful ostensive definition, it must establish the connection between sign and sensation, and this connection must persist. As Wittgenstein says, ‘“I commit [the connection] to memory” can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connection correctly in the future’. For I do not define anything, even to myself let alone anyone else, by merely attending to something and making a mark, unless this episode has the appropriate consequences. — SEP article on Private Language
But "private language" as described at 243 requires that the person knows what the symbols refer to (that's one of the conditions). — Metaphysician Undercover
But usage is not excluded from "S". That's what Wittgenstein demonstrates(270). — Metaphysician Undercover
§258 and 270, for example, are attempts to give the interlocutor what he says he wants, but which, in the end, amount to nothing (in the case of 258) or bring us back to a publicly understandable language (in the case of 270). — SEP article on Private Language
No, "subjective understanding", as Wittgenstein uses it does not qualify as understanding, it might make the person "appear to understand" though. — Metaphysician Undercover
A good example of "subjective understanding" is your supposed "understanding" of Wittgenstein's "private language". — Metaphysician Undercover
Of course the person speaks the private language, he just does not understand or "know" it. — Metaphysician Undercover
The person does not "develop a use for "S"". Wittgenstein asks us to imagine this development, but upon closer inspection, this development cannot get off the ground. — Luke
At 258, he notes that "S" cannot be defined. However, he tries to give himself a "kind of ostensive definition" by "concentrating [his] attention on the sensation" while he writes the sign down. But this is problematic: — Luke
Wittgenstein tells us at 258 that he cannot commit to memory the connection between the sign and the sensation because there is no criterion of correctness here. If he cannot commit the connection to memory, then no use for "S" can be developed. Therefore. "S" cannot refer to anything. — Luke
You are still presupposing that the symbols can refer. You are missing the fact that a use for "S" cannot be developed. — Luke
I quoted the SEP article regarding 269 and 270 the other day, if you'd care to read it. — Luke
S" is said to signify the sensation that one's blood pressure is rising. Whether one's blood pressure is actually rising (or has actually risen) is something that can be publicly verified with a manometer.
...
Either way, "S" cannot be a private sign. — Luke
What might make the person "appear to understand" though? If "subjective understanding" is not understanding, then what is it? — Luke
Sure it gets "off the ground", keep reading, by 270 "S" has a use. — Metaphysician Undercover
The meaning of "S" cannot be known by the person. There is no disagreement between us here. — Metaphysician Undercover
However, it does qualify as a "private language" as described at 269, where it is not required that the meaning is known. It is only required that the word has a use, as developed at 270. — Metaphysician Undercover
That it might refer to something different every time he uses it does not negate the fact that it refers to something each time. He said "whatever is going to seem right to me is right". — Metaphysician Undercover
It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which only one person followed a rule. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which a report was made, an order given or understood, and so on. — To follow a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (usages, institutions). To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to have mastered a technique. — PI 199
We have now uncovered a second sense of ambiguity, distinct from the other sense we discussed. What we discussed was using a word once, to imply possible different meanings, like your example of "bank". Now we have using a word numerous time "S" in the example at 258, each time potentially referring to something different. — Metaphysician Undercover
Where we seem to disagree is whether "S" can have a use when its meaning is not known. You do not seem to be able to grasp this fact of language, that people sometimes use words when they do not know the meaning of them. — Metaphysician Undercover
Every time he writes "S" in the book, it refers to something. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is simply incorrect. And that's very obvious. The symbol "S" does refer, and a use is developed, — Metaphysician Undercover
Sorry, I'm not interested in secondary sources, and appeals to authority. — Metaphysician Undercover
Regardless of what you got from SEP, the use described at 270 is purely private. "So I shall be able to say that my blood-pressure is rising without using any apparatus." That's a private use, he is describing, regardless of how you depict as "something that can be publicly verified" — Metaphysician Undercover
270. Let us now imagine a use for the entry of the sign “S” in my diary. I find out the following from experience: whenever I have a particular sensation, a manometer shows that my blood pressure is rising. — PI 270
The manometer will say whether the blood pressure rises, but the private language user could say whatever he wants, refusing to cooperate with your proposed public verification. — Metaphysician Undercover
Therefore the use described at 270 is purely private. — Metaphysician Undercover
What might make the person "appear to understand" though? If "subjective understanding" is not understanding, then what is it?
— Luke
Obviously, that's what is explained at 270 — Metaphysician Undercover
Something like the manometer would serve that purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover
"Subjective understanding" is use for a purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover
"Let us suppose I regularly identify it wrong, it does not matter in the least. And that alone shews that the hypothesis that I make a mistake is mere show. " — Metaphysician Undercover
For the person using "S" there is purpose and use — Metaphysician Undercover
For the person using "S" there is purpose and use, for the public it is pure show, it appears like the person knows what he is doing. Neither of these justify "the person knows what he is doing". — Metaphysician Undercover
The only use "S" has at 270 is public. — Luke
It's not my public verification; it's the manometer's. — Luke
If the use described at 270 were purely private, then there could be no possibility of error. As 258 tells us, a private language has no criterion of correctness and whatever seems right to the private linguist is right. — Luke
I must have missed it. Could you explain it? — Luke
How can the private linguist misidentify their sensation? What criterion of correctness is there? Whatever is going to seem right is right. — Luke
If the person doesn't really know what they are doing, then - contrary to Wittgenstein's scenario - are they not really able to say that their blood-pressure is rising without using any apparatus? — Luke
And now it seems quite indifferent whether I have
recognized the sensation right or not. Let us suppose I regularly
identify it wrong, it does not matter in the least. And that alone shews
that the hypothesis that I make a mistake is mere show. (We as it were
turned a knob which looked as if it could be used to turn on some part
of the machine; but it was a mere ornament, not connected with the
mechanism at all.)
After the diarist discovers, for himself (privately), with the use of a manometer, that the sensation coincides with a rise in blood pressure, he starts to say "my blood pressure is rising" instead of "S". — Metaphysician Undercover
Now, his use of "my blood pressure is rising" is equivalent to his use of "S" at 258, and there is equally no such thing as "right" here. — Metaphysician Undercover
So he is just pretending to know when his blood pressure is rising, as described at 270 — Metaphysician Undercover
I find out the following from experience: whenever I have a particular sensation, a manometer shows that my blood pressure is rising. This puts me in a position to report that my blood pressure is rising without using any apparatus. This is a useful result. — PI 270
And, as he describes, if there was a public audience, they would have no way of knowing if he was getting it wrong — Metaphysician Undercover
and it would be as if the machine (being replaced by him now) is just for show, not even turned on. — Metaphysician Undercover
And what reason do we have here for calling “S” the name of a sensation? Perhaps the kind of way this sign is employed in this language game. — And why a “particular sensation”: that is, the same one every time? Well, we’re supposing, aren’t we, that we write “S” every time. — PI 270
This is an example of the "subjective understanding" described at 269, he would appear like he knew when his pressure was rising, but he really didn't, because he really can't know the sensation called "S", as described at 258. — Metaphysician Undercover
Your conclusion "no possibility of error" implies 'always right', which is the exact opposite of Wittgenstein's conclusion "here we can't talk about 'right'", which implies 'always wrong". — Metaphysician Undercover
That the use of "S" is always wrong is the basis for the description of "subjective understanding" at 269, "attaching some meaning to the word, but not the right one". — Metaphysician Undercover
The meaning of "S" is now "my blood pressure is rising". But as described, it is a subjective understanding, and therefore "not the right" meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover
It's not "contrary to Wittgenstein's scenario, it is the exact scenario. The person clearly does not know when their blood pressure is rising, it's all just a show, a pretense. — Metaphysician Undercover
270. Let us now imagine a use for the entry of the sign “S” in my diary. I find out the following from experience: whenever I have a particular sensation, a manometer shows that my blood pressure is rising. This puts me in a position to report that my blood pressure is rising without using any apparatus. — PI 270
It appears as if the person knows when his blood pressure is rising but he does not, as 269 explains. — Metaphysician Undercover
Gertie says, "Experiential states exist as private certain knowledge to the experiencing subject. — Sam26
Anybody else with a manometer could also measure his blood pressure. That's what makes it publicly verifiable whether or not his blood pressure is rising. — Luke
He says this in relation to misidentifying the sensation, not in relation to being wrong about his blood pressure rising. We can verify whether or not his blood pressure is rising and whether he is right or wrong about that. What we cannot verify is whether he has correctly identified the sensation that he associates with his rising blood pressure. If he marks "S" in his diary and his blood pressure is measured as rising, then it makes no difference whether he identifies the sensation correctly or not.
When he identifies the sensation correctly, he marks "S" in his diary and his blood pressure is measured as rising, so the association between the sensation and his blood pressure holds true. But when he does not identify the sensation correctly, then he still marks "S" in his diary and his blood pressure is still measured as rising. In other words, he was correct about his blood pressure rising even though he misidentified the sensation. Therefore. it makes no difference to the correct use of "S" whether he identifies the sensation correctly or not. (This explains the 'mere ornament in the machine' metaphor.)
But, of course, it does make a difference to the use of "S" whether his blood pressure is measured as rising or falling, because then we have a criterion of correctness and can say whether or not his use of "S" was correct.
This might now lead you to question whether "S" actually refers to a sensation at all. Wittgenstein is well aware of this and invites the question: — Luke
This is inconsistent with the scenario at 270 where he discovers from experience that whenever he has a particular sensation, a manometer shows that his blood pressure is rising. How can he discover this association from experience if he can't know the particular sensation called "S"? — Luke
At 258 he says that whatever is going to seem right to the private linguist is right. This means that we public linguists cannot talk about either "right" or "wrong" here (in the public sense of these words). — Luke
At 269 we can talk about "wrong" and "right", because Wittgenstein is using these words in the public sense. A person attaches a meaning to a word, "but not the right one". The judgment that the person attaches the wrong meaning to the word is based on their publicly observable behaviour. Wittgenstein tells us that "one might speak of a subjective understanding" in this case. And what might be called a "private language" are "sounds which no one else understands but which I ‘appear to understand’". — Luke
That the person knows when their blood pressure is rising is not ruled out as impossible at 270. In fact, it's how the meaning of "S" was supposedly established in the first place. Once again: — Luke
Read what is written! It is "I" who uses the manometer, and "I" who can then say 'my blood pressure is rising'. There is absolutely no public verification described. And, if such a verification were proposed, the person who is "I" could decline it. Therefore a "public verification" is not even implied. — Metaphysician Undercover
That's not what is written. He said "here we can't talk about 'right'". He does not say neither right nor wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover
I first want to observe that a definition of the sign cannot be formulated. — But all the same, I can give one to myself as a kind of ostensive definition! — How? Can I point to the sensation? — Not in the ordinary sense. But I speak, or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation — and so, as it were, point to it inwardly. — But what is this ceremony for? For that is all it seems to be! A definition serves to lay down the meaning of a sign, doesn’t it? — Well, that is done precisely by concentrating my attention; for in this way I commit to memory the connection between the sign and the sensation. — But “I commit it to memory” can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connection correctly in the future. But in the present case, I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem correct to me is correct. And that only means that here we can’t talk about ‘correct’. — PI 258 (4th edition)
The "correct" meaning of "S" is not established by the manometer, that's what Wittgenstein is explaining. That "S" means "my blood pressure is rising", is the "subjective understanding". The person thinks that they understand the meaning of "S", with reference to the manometer, but they really do not. The person has found a use, and therefore meaning, but it is not "the right meaning". It is the subjective understanding which is described at 269, as a "private language". The person appears to understand, having associated S with a meaning, but the meaning is not the right meaning.
The right meaning is that "S" is the name of "a sensation". — Metaphysician Undercover
270. Let us now imagine a use for the entry of the sign “S” in my diary. I find out the following from experience: whenever I have a particular sensation, a manometer shows that my blood pressure is rising. This puts me in a position to report that my blood pressure is rising without using any apparatus. This is a useful result. — PI 270
In case you've forgotten, Wittgenstein is investigating the possibility of a private language. Moreover, he is investigating the possibility of a private language in principle. That you might choose to be uncooperative or to keep a secret are beside the point, These have nothing to do with the privacy of language, in principle. — Luke
A private language has no criterion of correctness. Having no criterion of correctness implies having no criterion of incorrectness. If I think that the connection between the sign "S" and this particular sensation defines the sign correctly, this implies that I think that the connections between the sign "S" and other sensations define the sign incorrectly. By implication, whatever is going to seem correct to me is correct and whatever is going to seem incorrect to me is incorrect. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'correct' or 'incorrect'. — Luke
What makes you think that the diarist does not use "S" to refer to a sensation, or that they do not understand that they are using "S" to refer to a sensation? — Luke
Getting back to the reason this thread was started, which had to do with the idea or belief that knowing can be something coming from within, i.e., it can be generated from the mind, a kind of self generation of what it means to know. I think this confusion may arise from the use of the word know as a kind of subjective certainty. — Sam26
This is done when the speaker recognizes that "S" (private) is a "sensation" (common), rather than "S" (private) means "my blood pressure is rising" (private). — Metaphysician Undercover
In the situation described at 258, if there is neither right nor wrong, we can say that whatever the diarist is thinking, is not right, because the possibility of being right has been excluded. And that is exactly what is said about the private language at 269, attaching a meaning but not the right one. — Metaphysician Undercover
The private language described at 243 is one where the word/symbol refers to what can only be known by the speaker. This is not merely “a sensation” or just any old sensation. It is a “certain sensation” or a “particular sensation”, the nature of which is private and known only to the speaker (one’s “immediate private sensations”). The word/symbol does not simply refer to any general sensation, or to the common meaning of the word “sensation”, as you suggest. And “my blood pressure rising” is not private in principle, because it can be verified by others. — Luke
Regarding 269, I view it as Wittgenstein’s view of the only possible thing that we might actually call a private language, which is where some individual behaves as though they actually understand sounds or words that nobody else understands. We are not told what the words or sounds of this language refer to, and I don’t see how such an individual understanding would be possible, but it is Wittgenstein’s concession regarding the possibility of a private language. — Luke
Wittgenstein asks, “It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain (PI 246)?” The adding of the word know is meaningless in this situation. It’s as if you’re discovering your own awareness, “Oh, I’m in pain, gee, I didn’t know that until just this moment.” — Sam26
Clearly, at 270, "my blood pressure is rising" is not verified by others, so it remains a private principle. And if the individual refuses, it cannot be verified. — Metaphysician Undercover
If someone were to behave as if they understood a language of which no one else can make sense, we might call this an example of a private language. It is not sufficient here, however, for the language to simply be one that has not yet been translated. In order to count as a private language in Wittgenstein's sense, it must be in principle incapable of translation into an ordinary language – if for example it were to describe those inner experiences supposed to be inaccessible to others. The private language being considered is not simply a language in fact understood by one person, but a language that in principle can only be understood by one person. So the last speaker of a dying language would not be speaking a private language, since the language remains in principle learnable. A private language must be unlearnable and untranslatable, and yet it must appear that the speaker is able to make sense of it. — Private language argument (Wikipedia)
The idea of a private language was made famous in philosophy by Ludwig Wittgenstein, who in §243 of his book Philosophical Investigations explained it thus: “The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language.” This is not intended to cover (easily imaginable) cases of recording one’s experiences in a personal code, for such a code, however obscure in fact, could in principle be deciphered. What Wittgenstein had in mind is a language conceived as necessarily comprehensible only to its single originator because the things which define its vocabulary are necessarily inaccessible to others. — Private language (SEP)
So, do you think that what is said at 270 relates to the "private language" described at 243, or to the one described at 258 and 269? — Metaphysician Undercover
Of course you don't actually know what Wittgenstein means by a private language. No wonder this has been so difficult. Here are two separate explanations: — Luke
What Wittgenstein "means by a private language" is distinctly different at 243, from what it is at 269. — Metaphysician Undercover
The example at 258 shows that a "private language" as described at 243 is completely incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover
What produces the incoherency in Wittgenstein's "private language" definition, is the condition that the person "knows' what the words refer to. If we remove this condition we could define "private language", such that the person has a "private" language, and does not know what the words refer to, as in the example at 258. But the person might still "appear to understand" what the words refer to (269). That is why 258 is not an example of a "private language" as defined at 243. The person at 258 does not "know" what the symbol "S" refers to, as required by 243. — Metaphysician Undercover
So at 269, there is a proposal that the "private language" user has a "subjective understanding" of what the words refer to, rather than actually knowing what the words refer to as "private language" at 243 requires . In this sense of "private language", at 269, the person might "appear to understand", rather than actually "know" which is required at 243. — Metaphysician Undercover
269. Let us remember that there are certain criteria in a man’s behaviour for his not understanding a word: that it means nothing to him, that he can do nothing with it. And criteria for his ‘thinking he understands’, attaching some meaning to the word, but not the right one. And lastly, criteria for his understanding the word correctly. In the second case, one might speak of a subjective understanding. And sounds which no one else understands but which I ‘appear to understand’ might be called a “private language”. — PI 269
What's your argument for this? — Luke
How is the private language described at 269 completely coherent? — Luke
The last sentence of 269 does not refer back to the earlier sentences. There are two separate descriptions here:
(1) We might speak of a "subjective understanding" in relation to the behavioural criteria of a man 'thinking he understands' the meaning of a word, but who does not really understand because he attaches the wrong meaning to the word.
(2) Sounds which no one else understands but which I 'appear to understand' might be called a "private language".
You seem to think that (1) and (2) both continuously refer to a private language. I disagree as I think that only (2) refers to a private language. — Luke
We are told that the man attaches the wrong meaning to a word at (1), but not at (2). — Luke
At 243 "private language" requires that what the words refer to is "known" to the user of the language. This is shown to be incoherent by the example at 258. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think it's very clear that "sounds which no else understands, which I appear to understand", is a form of what has been called "subjective understanding". What he is saying can be described in this way: these are words which no one understands (there is no 'right' here), but I pretend to understand. That's why i used the word "pretense" earlier, which you objected to. The person is "thinking he understands", and so is acting as if he understands, even to the point of exuding certitude, when he really does not understand. — Metaphysician Undercover
We are told that the man attaches the wrong meaning to a word at (1), but not at (2).
— Luke
What kind of nonsensical argument is this? Why do you think Wittgenstein uses the word "appear" here? — Metaphysician Undercover
Furthermore, Wittgenstein does not use the word "wrong" here, he says "attaches some meaning to the word, but not the right one". By removing this sort of understanding from that which is said to be "right", Wittgenstein is completely consistent with 258, "here we can't talk about 'right'", making the rest of your argument irrelevant gibberish. — Metaphysician Undercover
How is the incoherence shown to be a result of the private language user’s knowledge at 258? — Luke
Pretending one understands means appearing to understand without the belief one understands.
Thinking one understands means appearing not to understand with the belief one understands.
These are not the same. — Luke
What does the word “appear” have to do with the man attaching the wrong meaning to the word? — Luke
If you think that we can talk about ‘not right’ or ‘wrong’ wrt a private language, then you don’t understand why we can’t talk about right. — Luke
f Wittgenstein is correct about meaning, viz., that it’s a rule-based use that happens in social settings, then it’s an error to think that one’s use of know is based on some internal mechanism of the mind. In other words, the association of the word know with some internal or subjective mechanism gives us the false idea that we have privileged internal access to knowledge. This idea removes the concept know from its social foundation where its meaning, again, is derived. — Sam26
Luke, we've been through this. He has no criterion, there is no such thing as "right". Therefore it is impossible that he could identify and "know" the thing which "S" refers to. — Metaphysician Undercover
And your explanation of "thinking one understands" doesn't make any sense to me, and is clearly not consistent with Wittgenstein's use. — Metaphysician Undercover
‘Thinking he understands’ is not acting as if he understands. On the contrary, his behaviour shows that he has attached the wrong meaning to the word and that he does not understand its meaning. — Luke
269. Let us remember that there are certain criteria in a man’s behaviour for...his ‘thinking he understands’, attaching some meaning to the word, but not the right one. — PI 269
Because the meaning attached to the words by the person is not the right meaning, his behaviour is that of "appearing to understand" (he thinks he understands and therefore is pretending to understand) when he really does not understand. — Metaphysician Undercover
As I explained to you, the situation in which we cannot talk about right, is necessarily not right. — Metaphysician Undercover
When "right" is excluded as a possibility, such that we cannot even talk about the possibility of the person being right, then the person is necessarily "not right" — Metaphysician Undercover
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