Not a good reason.

I wrote this in response to a thread on another forum, in respect of a discussion of this paper:

'Heisenberg had in mind Aristotle’s ‘potentia’ which is more like ’the realm of possibilities’. There is a real ‘realm of possibilities’ which is defined by the wave function, very precisely, as a distribution of probabilities of possible outcomes. (The possibility of the electron being, say, 'a rabbit', is not included in that realm, because that result is not ‘in the realm of possibility'.) When the observation is taken then the realm of possibilities collapses into a single actuality, which is the so-called ‘collapse of the wave function’. That’s what the Everett formulation is seeking to avoid, hence its proliferation of worlds.

Surely if I ask you the whereabouts of some unobserved particle, the answer is given by the Schrodinger equation, right? You can’t say ‘oh, that’s it, right there’. The only reply you can give to that question is a distribution of possibilities. which is the likelihood of a particular result when it’s measured. So put another way, the answer to the question ’does the object exist?’ is the equation, isn’t it? You can’t say ‘yes it exists’ until the measurement has been taken. So the object is not unambiguously real until it’s measured. All there are until that point are patterns of probabilities. The wave function describes degrees of reality, which is the same as degrees of likelihood.'

Determinism and non-determinism aren't real properties of the universe, for as demonstrated with the Middle-Earth fictional universe, these terms have no descriptive value with respect to any complete data-set. Therefore it makes no sense to speak of the universe as a whole as being either determined or not.

Probability theory hints at what those terms describe; they describe semantic relationships between data-sets or theories. For example, the sequence {1, 2, 3} is "determined" in relation to the sequence {a,b,c} under the assignment a --> 1, b --> 2, c-->3. But it is undetermined with respect to the set of sequences beginning {1,2,...} which include it as a special case.

Consider historical counterfactuals; Must Hitler have invaded Poland? In spite of appearances, the meaning of this question isn't about the literal existence of a possibility available to the German government in the year 1939, rather it concerns the relation of a model of the actual event to a hypothetical set of "similar" circumstances, such as that defined by a historical simulator, where it is the notion of "similarity" that is actually the focus of the question.

There is a real ‘realm of possibilities’ which is defined by the wave function, very precisely, as a distribution of probabilities of possible outcomes. — Wayfarer

Yep. That is the creation of concrete possibilities by the preparation of a system. It is like carving a die with six sides. You constrain things so that outcomes are limited to a particular range of choices.

Vagueness would be a deeper state of indeterminacy. The wavefunction of the universe would be so broad as not to either rule in or rule out the existence of any particular electron and its history.

So put another way, the answer to the question ’does the object exist?’ is the equation, isn’t it? You can’t say ‘yes it exists’ until the measurement has been taken. So the object is not unambiguously real until it’s measured. — Wayfarer

The problem is that the collapse isn’t part of the formalism. So there isn’t a good ground for claiming some kind of definite transition that promotes the particle from some kind of existence as a probability to a state of being real.

I don’t have a hard position on the issue for that reason. But decoherence at least let’s the thermal environment be the “observer”. We can do without an actual collapse because the uncertainty reduces asymptotically towards a definable limit.

I like the term, almost surely, in probability theory - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Almost_surely

A probability of 1 isn’t absolutely certain. But close enough for all practical purposes.

The demand for a collapse is another example of the backwards metaphysics that infects the quantum vs classicality discussions. The holistic view says uncertainty is merely being constrained. Reality doesn’t actually have to be made certain to exist. Being highly constrained gives it enough of a definite counterfactuality to amount to the same thing.

What prima facie case is there that there ought not to be chance? — Wayfarer

Your question reveals your implicit materialism.

( ;) It can happen to the best of Buddhists that a hint of materialism sneaks into their thinking.)

This is wrong view:

These are the seven substances — unmade, irreducible, uncreated, without a creator, barren, stable as a mountain-peak, standing firm like a pillar — that do not alter, do not change, do not interfere with one another, and are incapable of causing one another pleasure, pain, or both pleasure and pain.

"'And among them there is no killer nor one who causes killing, no hearer nor one who causes hearing, no cognizer nor one who causes cognition. When one cuts off [another person's] head, there is no one taking anyone's life. It is simply between the seven substances that the sword passes.'

https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/dn/dn.02.0.than.html

It can happen to the best of Buddhists that a hint of materialism sneaks into their thinking.) — baker

What's wrong with materialism? Matter's true nature is unknown. It stays mystique, even if it's matter "only".

But one of the other things I would point out here is the “weirdness” of the situation where the random kinetics of the particles of an ideal gas is seen as the deterministic part of the story, and macro properties like pressure and temperature become the emergent accidents. — apokrisis

This is something I've thought about. I don't find the idea of determinism very convincing. To much of the world is too complicated to make that a useful way of thinking, e.g. the molecules bouncing around with a wide range of kinetic energies. On the other hand, the macro behavior, the pressure and temperature in the boiler, behaves in a very predictable way, at least as long as we keep it fairly simple.

Then, by extension, determinism isn't perfect! In other words, chance and free will are a possibility. — TheMadFool

Here's one of my familiar refrains. Determinism vs. free will is a metaphysical distinction. Neither is true. Neither is false. Either may be useful in different situations.

What's wrong with materialism? Matter's true nature is unknown. It stays mystique, even if it's matter "only". — Khalif

What's wrong with materialism? That materialists typically _don't_ believe things like "Matter's true nature is unknown. It stays mystique".

What's the heart of the matter? The heart is that which is actually going on. How can there be no determined process going on behind the chances? Giving a new kind of chance. — Zweistein

I have no idea why people cry for determinism/deity. I guess it is the assurance that they have no say in the direction of their life.

Nothing is determined. There are learned habits (memory of the Mind) as well as choices in intention that the Mind makes.

Here's one of my familiar refrains. Determinism vs. free will is a metaphysical distinction. Neither is true. Neither is false. Either may be useful in different situations. — T Clark

Right up my alley,

Sarvam mithyā bravīmi (Everything I'm saying is false). — Bhartṛhari