This misrepresents my post on your thread:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/599793

Please edit accordingly.

I am afraid that I don't know how to edit my post on my phone. At the moment, I have some of the writing showing up as red and struggling with this, but it may be of lesser significance

I definitely don't wish to misrepresent you in any way. But, I have been struggling with your thinking about my question of the expression ' I believe', which has lead me to query the nature of belief. I do welcome your clarification on this, because I was left struggling with what you were trying to say.

I am not sure that links to your views on my thread are particularly helpful, because' it goes beyond that, into the nature of what is considered to be 'belief'; and how beliefs are formulated.I am trying to open it as a wider philosophy question.

I am writing this thread with a view to wider consideration of the nature of belief and how it figures In the scope of knowledge and ideas. I wish to argue that belief and the idea of suggesting that 'I believe' is about ownership of ideas, rather than bringing these in a vague way' as aspects of development of argument for any philosophy position.I am hoping that I have not misrepresented @Amity, and what I am trying to explore in the idea of this thread is the personal and wider aspects of ideas, especially in relation to what may be considered under the scope of 'belief, in the context of the personal and cultural contexts. What is'belief, or system of beliefs and the scope of its validity'? How does one justify belief, through scientific methodology or through other means of verification of personal belief systems? Do collective aspects of verification and validity cancel out the individual ways of thinking, as inferior to larger systems of belief?

Just my take in things…

I wish to argue that belief and the idea of suggesting that 'I believe' is about ownership of ideas, rather than bringing these in a vague way' as aspects of development of argument for any philosophy position. — Jack Cummins

“Ownership of ideas” seems odd to me. What do you mean by ownership? I would just characterize belief as agreement that a statement is true. “I believe X” is more or less equal to “X is true.” I guess there are some circumstances where we may know something is true (i.e. my father is dead), but do not believe it, due to shock and the denial that can come with it. Not really sure how that situation would figure into things.

What is'belief, or system of beliefs and the scope of its validity'? — Jack Cummins

You mean what makes our beliefs valid?

How does one justify belief — Jack Cummins

Well, people use all sorts of methods to justify their beliefs, but that doesn’t mean others accept their justification. Practically speaking we’re not always rational, and often choose to believe something because it appeals to our emotions. It feels good, or is too painful to not believe it. This type of justification isn’t accepted in philosophy, but occurs nonetheless.

In philosophy, debates about justification tend to depend on whether you think empirical observation and experience is more or less reliable than logic and reason when determining what is true. The former has issues because we are susceptible to illusions, hallucinations, etc. that warrant some distrust in our senses. Also, Kantians will talk about how we’re never able to observe the thing-in-itself, so are never truly able to know it’s essence. The latter has issues because paradoxes exist, and there is an infinite regress issue with justifying a belief with another belief (which itself has to be justified). Also, things in nature need not necessarily be logical or rational (i.e. human behavior).

How does one justify belief, through scientific methodology or through other means of verification of personal belief systems? — Jack Cummins

If one needs to justify a belief, is it not then an opinion, comparable with other opinions?

To accept something on the basis of faith is to trust as expressed in the Greek word πίστις. The trust involves not subjecting the matter to comparisons.

And that meaning is related to the Latin expression of Fidelity. The love that is tested by comparison is not the love that keeps faith without recourse to such.

Beliefs are propositions that one holds to be true.

Belief systems are sets of assumed/accepted as true propositions that constitute an internally consistent picture of the world.

When we examine, put beliefs and belief systems under the microscope, we're checking whether or not they are justified and/or internally and externally consistent.

How does one justify belief, through scientific methodology or through other means of verification of personal belief systems? Do collective aspects of verification and validity cancel out the individual ways of thinking, as inferior to larger systems of belief? — Jack Cummins

Does it not depend on the nature of the proposition you are accepting as true? How does one justify, in any way, the belief that the world is run by a secret cabal of Martians? Individual ways of thinking may well be dysfunctional and stupid.

I've always assumed that one of the roles of philosophy is to examine one's beliefs to see how they stand up to that examination. As difficult and incomplete as this exercise might be in some instances.

What is'belief, or system of beliefs and the scope of its validity'? How does one justify belief, through scientific methodology or through other means of verification of personal belief systems? Do collective aspects of verification and validity cancel out the individual ways of thinking, as inferior to larger systems of belief? — Jack Cummins

I would have thought beliefs don't need verification. When beliefs are verified beyond doubt, they qualify as knowledge, at which case no longer beliefs, but knowledge.

Beliefs are more psychological than epistemological. Beliefs can be based on emotions rather than reasons or evidence. Not all beliefs are false, but where facts or propositions cannot be supported with evidence, logic or reason, they could still be one's mental state for believing something, because one feels like it, or just wants to, or by inference and guessing.

Belief is the act of accepting a claim as a personal position(thesis). Belief is the general umbrella term. Under it we can find two types of claims Knowledge based beliefs and faith based beliefs. Those that are based on good reasons (knowledge, evidence etc) and those who are based on bad reasons (faith, fallacies etc).

I wish to argue that belief and the idea of suggesting that 'I believe' is about ownership of ideas, rather than bringing these in a vague way' as aspects of development of argument for any philosophy position. — Jack Cummins

Modern philosophy has an understanding of our ownership of our expressions. That once you say or do something at a time and place, you are the one who said it--you are responsible for answering for it: clarifying, defending, apologizing, etc.

I am trying to explore in the idea of this thread is the personal and wider aspects of ideas, especially in relation to what may be considered under the scope of 'belief, in the context of the personal and cultural contexts. — Jack Cummins

Your point differs in claiming the ownership of "an idea". But maybe saying "you believe" is in the same sense that Wittgenstein points out in that you "feel strongly about it" (#574-575), which is to say you are serious, ready to justify, defend; and even more, to be making a comment on the criteria for being able to say one believes. If you are going to say you believe something, you must be prepared to back it up by owning it, standing up for it, allowing it to define you.

There is also the sense of belief as a hypothesis, as "I believe it is going to rain" (PI, x), but I don't see that touching on your OP. Perhaps it matters more in the sense that believing is more like hoping than thinking, but it appears you are starting with the more traditional sense of belief: that a belief is like an opinion.

IWhat is 'belief, or a system of beliefs and the scope of its validity'? How does one justify belief, through scientific methodology or through other means of verification of personal belief systems? — Jack Cummins

If we start with the idea of knowledge, or truth, and we characterize everything else as opinion or belief, then we can hold onto the standard and goal of that abstract certainty despite the partiality, failure, and unpredictability of the human. So we say that opinion is individual and that belief is unjustified.

But there is the sense of believing as having faith, trusting. There is blind faith, which would be trusting despite any/every evidence to the contrary (as unjustified as "opinion"). But we also say it as a request, to trust in me (or my authority) without questioning further, despite the opportunity of doubt. So faith could be said to have justifications, but, rather than to convince you that my opinion is knowledge, I would have reasons for asking the request for trust. And then having faith can be the relinquishment of myself as the measure (of certainty, as reliability), giving over my fear of uncertainty, as an acknowledgement that not everything stands in a relation to doubt, that I need not question you (your humanity), nor not trust myself.

In this sense of certainty, we are resolved, steadfast. Now this can come from power, stubbornness, righteousness, ego, or, as Emerson calls it, just quoting another. We can believe, as have confidence, in ourselves even (especially) in a position where there can be no certainty, when we have reached a point where there is no right, because we are sure we did the best we could, considered the negative outcomes, thought it through, explicated all the criteria, questioned our assumptions, etc. We are prepared to have faith in ourselves to be questioned, to answer for our position, etc.

Do collective aspects of verification and validity cancel out the individual ways of thinking, as inferior to larger systems of belief? — Jack Cummins

Science's methodology is to provide conclusions where the outcome does not matter whether you or I did the experiment (unless done poorly). So yes, in this, you as an individual are cancelled out completely. And no one is beating science on its turf. That does not mean that an individual's thought cannot be rigorous, specific, precise, etc., just that there are some areas where we can not be certain in the same way science is. But science has infected politics, economics, sociology, and moral situations with the desire to remove us and impose a predictable, generalized, abstract certainty. Though we may not come to agreement in these areas, or be able to predict, or determine outcomes, that does not mean, however, that the judgments, implications, and conclusiveness are up to you.

Not really belief means to "accept a claim". Whether it is knowledge or blind faith that only makes a belief founded or not.
So knowledge is one of the reasons why we accept/believe a claim. You can not "Know" something and not believe/accept it!

As I just responded to others...belief is the umbrella term. Under it we will find Knowledge and faith.
We believe things either on faith or knowledge(without or with evidence). We can not say that we "know" something but we don't believe in it.
So we need to distinguish beliefs that are knowledge based and claims claims that are faith based.

You can not "Know" something and not believe/accept it! — Nickolasgaspar

I would have thought, if you know something, you don't need to believe it. You know it, and it is enough. To believe in what you know, you need perhaps some other peculiar situation or reason for that. For example, I know Paris is the capital of France, but I also believe it is so, because I am not in Paris. I am not sure if they have decided to change the capital city to Lion. I have no idea on their current social political situation in the country. This situation of mine force me to believe that Paris is the capital of France, even if I know it is.

Knowledge is a subset of belief. People accept/believe or reject/disbelieve knowledge claims. Knowledge IS a belief based on facts and objective evidence. Sure, we can say "I just know it" but knowing something just informs us about the reasons we believe/accept a claim
We can not go around it. Knowledge used to be defined as "justified true belief"(classical/traditional definition).

As I just responded to others...belief is the umbrella term. Under it we will find Knowledge and faith. We believe things either on faith or knowledge(without or with evidence). — Nickolasgaspar

I'm not sure if you want to restrict the discussion either to only include certain people under "we", or to just the topic of belief as opinion that is either justified or not (that's a well-trod circle), but I discussed a number of other senses of belief, some of which do not function on a dichotomous relationship to "evidence".

We can not say that we "know" something but we don't believe in it. — Nickolasgaspar

You appear to be making a categorical claim. Something like, if we do not believe in it, or we do not have faith in it, then we cannot say we "know" it. As syllogistic as it sounds, I would think you mean the sense of know as don't doubt. If we do not believe it, we can not say we know it, without a doubt, for certain. But when you phrase it as "believe in it" then what you are saying is there is something that you can not say you know if you don't believe in it, and the first thing that comes to mind is what people say about God. You can not say you know God without believing in Him.

Perhaps the "in" was added by mistake, or perhaps there is another example I am not thinking of. To say we know something, but do not believe in it, might be something we would say about a politician's campaign, that, despite our lack of support, will happen anyway (though maybe not quite certainly). Or to say we know (the facts) about, say, climate change, but we don't believe that knowledge (those facts) will persuade anyone; don't believe in the knowledge's ability to overcome our selfish, lazy, blasé, denial/death wish.

Or maybe it is a different claim. Knowledge determined by the scientific method can be reproduced by anyone (should be able to be, if done right). With this sense of knowledge it does not matter if I believe in it or not, though this does not have any positive force to make me interested, say, to believe strongly about it.

So we need to distinguish beliefs that are knowledge based and claims that are faith based. — Nickolasgaspar

Now you've thrown in "claims" as well as "beliefs". Because we can say a belief is an opinion, like a guess (hypothesis), or in comparison to knowledge, but a claim can be me making a claim upon you, for your support or recognition. And that can be to ask you to trust me, but also my claiming to know something, which would not be verified in the same way as a guess. So, water's a little choppy here.

You are equating faith with belief. Belief is the act of accepting a claim. Faith defines the reasons (bad reasons) why we accept a claim. Those two words communicate two different aspects of the act of "accepting".
Under this definition we avoid an "absolute" meaning nothing is absolute , not even knowledge. Even Science (methodological naturalism) that ALL our frameworks are our tentative positions(knowledge claims) based on our current available evidence.
So we believe claims either on evidence, bad evidence or no evidence at all.
The believe that is based on good evidence is labeled knowledge.
All beliefs are beliefs in claims about the world, us ...everything. We accept/believe narratives/theories about facts, descriptions or hypotheses. All those are claims(premises) we make about reality.
Your examples seem to be a bit off of what I am saying so I can not really address them (god, politics".)

...personal meanings... — Jack Cummins

There's your problem.

, , , , ,
There are all kinds of ways to use the words "belief", "True", "fact", "knowledge" "certainty", and their synonyms and conjugates. The variation allows for all form of confusion. There is a pretty standard set of usages found in more critical texts, a hierarchy that permits the words to be used with a good deal of clarity.

Start with sentences. These can include questions, commands and so on. From amongst those we might notice the peculiar characteristics of statements - they have a form that permits us to say how things are. Some statements even admit of being either true or false, and we can call these propositions. Questions and commands don't admit to being true or false, but have their own felicitudes.

When we start to talk about statements being true or false, we've made a move from using statements to say things to talking about the statements. They have become our subject. We can examine the way truth and falsity relate to various differently structured statements, which is what we do in logic.

We can also look to the way the truth or falsity of statements is related to people. So we might note that Jack holds that it is true that he wrote the OP. To hold a statement to be true is to believe it. Now belief has various cognate uses, but in the main it remains a relation between a person or persons, a statement and truth.

Now interestingly, that Jack wrote the OP might be true, but might be false. Perhaps it was written by someone else logging in on his account...

That is, Jack - and anyone else - may believe things that are not true. This is a simple observation, but is surprisingly important. An astonishing number of folk have problems with this. A statement's being believed is not the same as it's being true.

One result of this is that folk can on occasions hold beliefs that are false. People's beliefs can be wrong, mistaken, erroneous.

And now we can introduce knowledge. This is another relation between people and statements, and it builds on what was said above by being restricted to what is believed to be true, and is indeed true. that is, one cannot know something that is not true. One might think one knows it, but one would be mistaken.

Since Socrates, philosophers often add that knowledge must in some way be justified. Much of the discussion in epistemology centres on what is to count as a justification - observations, and deductions form first principles being prime candidates - even Socrates knew that the definition of knowledge as justified true belief was problematic, So there's a lot to be said here.

And then there is faith. Faith is a form of belief that does not admit to doubt; a definition that goes back at least to Augustin of Hipio. Faith holds that its subject is true, regardless of justification. The wine is the blood of Christ, in the face of all the evidence tot he contrary.

Now that is a neat, reasonably coherent way to think about these terms. You are not obligated to think in this way, of course - you will do as you will. But if you keep this hierarchy in mind you will be able to follow the philosophical discussions around these issues with some clarity, and event to critique a few odd alternatives.

So I commend it to you.

Oh, I left out the "personal meanings" bit.

Any personal meanings you might have either cannot enter into the conversation, their being yours and not ours; or they are both yours and ours, and hence not personal.

Meaning is public.

So if treating beliefs as statements you "own" makes them somehow personal, or if their being personal makes them something you own, then they are irrelevant to us.

But also, owning your beliefs makes them all the harder to modify when you find them to be wrong. And being wrong is something beliefs are apt to do.

So better to treat them just as statements you hold to be true, rather than to own them.

Keep ownership for certainties.

:up: Useful clarification.

Oxford university Logic 101 ;""belief", "True", "fact", "knowledge", Only claims premises and arguments can be true or not true and communicate facts and faith based or knowledge based beliefs.
...and then its the idealistic aspect of those terms that are philosophically useless.

Any personal meanings you might have either cannot enter into the conversation, their being yours and not ours; or they are both yours and ours, and hence not personal. — Banno

This is too black and white for my taste. The alternatives are not only that any meaning is either mine alone or is shared by everyone (i.e. is public). A meaning might be shared with only one other person or with a few or with many but not all. Taste and nuance is important, in philosophy as much as it is in poetry and the arts.

Oxford university Logic 101 ;""belief", "True", "fact", "knowledge", Only claims premises and arguments can be true or not true and communicate facts and faith based or knowledge based beliefs. — Nickolasgaspar

Not sure how to parse that...

Is it a list? Is your claim that only claims, premises, and arguments can be true or false?

Seems to be the same point as made on the other thread. Let's keep it in one place.

that is, one cannot know something that is not true. One might think one knows it, but one would be mistaken. — Banno

Can you prove the statement "one cannot know something that is not true"? Does this follow from the JTB (justified true belief) definition of knowledge. If yes, it's as arbitrary as the JTB. If no, kindly explain.

I ask because I recently downloaded and watched an online philosophy course on the meaning of knowledge and the ditto claim appears in the course.

Can you prove the statement "one cannot know something that is not true"? — TheMadFool

To my own satisfaction, yes: "I know it, but it's not true" is a contradiction. Hence if you know it, you know it is true.

that it is true is part of what one says when one says one knows.

I know it, but it's not true" is a contradiction — Banno

How?

"I know it (is true) but it is not true" is a contradiction.

IF you can't see that, then you are on your own.

"I know it (is true) but it is not true" is a contradiction.

IF you can't see that, then you are on your own. — Banno

It can only be a contradiction if,

1. To know p implies p is true. That p is not true then contradicts I know p.

However, that's begging the question, no? Whoever defined know decided that to know a proposition p, p must be true. This is precisely what the issue is - can/can't we know a falsehood?

You are equating faith with belief. — Nickolasgaspar

You had said believe "in". I'll take it that was a mistake.

Belief is the act of accepting a claim. — Nickolasgaspar

If you want to choose to discuss the sense of "believing" as in accepting, that's fine, but it is not the only sense of belief. And we also say "I believe you", that is: accepting what they say without evidence, on faith, as in trusting the person enough not to question the claim (their authority, our relationship, etc.) This is not bad, neither is it, therefore, not knowledge. Again, if you want to limit things to make it easy, that's fine, but it doesn't make it a complete picture.