is it possible to make a straightforward categorical distinction between philosophy, no matter how pyrrhonian it purports to be, and cognitive-behavioural therapy? What is their relation? — sime

"Therapy means change, not adjustment." (Motto of the Radical Therapist)

philosophy as the passive analysis of signs, language and human behaviour — sime

“The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it." Karl Marx

How can philosophy leave everything in its place if philosophy is supposed to have therapeutic value? — sime

Possibly by producing a gestalt shift in one's perspective on philosophical problems, to break free from the "picture" that "held us captive". For example, via a reminder of the normal use of a (philosophically problematic) concept within a particular context.

Is it really the case that a therapeutic philosophy can be qualitatively different from classical approaches to philosophy that unashamedly advance metaphysical doctrines? — sime

In terms of Wittgenstein's approach, "our considerations could not be scientific ones", "we may not advance any kind of theory", and "There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its light, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize those workings [...] The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known."

This is obviously at odds with the antiquated view of philosophy as the "queen of the sciences" or with the traditional attempts to advance metaphysical theories, including the younger Wittgenstein's attempt to express the foundation of all propositions, or some such thing.

is it possible to make a straightforward categorical distinction between philosophy, no matter how pyrrhonian it purports to be, and cognitive-behavioural therapy? What is their relation? — sime

There might be a family resemblance in "therapy" here, perhaps. I think that one can probably find more than a few similarities between philosophy and CBT, but as for the differences, I would say that it is one of content or aims. For example, I don't believe that we would class the attempts to alter the behaviours of someone with an eating disorder as philosophy. Wittgenstein's focus, especially, saw philosophy as the dissolution of conceptual difficulties or confusions, rather than behavioural ones.

Therapeutic is not so passive. To do philosophy is a form of training, like physical training in sports. It can make you more fit and qualified to change the world.

this style of philosophy claims to be both

I) Resolutely pyrrhonian in being explicitly against advancing controversial or speculative metaphysical doctrines and "leaving everything in its place", making no attempt to interfere with how humans behave, communicate or form beliefs, and refusing to take sides in philosophical disagreements.

II) Therapeutic and hence normative with cognitive and behavioural implications.

My questioning concerns this apparent tension within this conception of philosophy.

How can philosophy leave everything in its place if philosophy is supposed to have therapeutic value?
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I think the analyst role in therapy should not be an attempt to interfere or change with how the analysand behaves. The analyst aim, which is difficult, is to mirror what the analysand says so the analysand recognizes what he said. The aim it is not to change it, only the analysand can do that. The problem here is that the patient expects the analyst to solve their issues, and they tell their deepest secrets to a stranger. The analyst becomes an authority figure, one that the analysand tries to please, which hinders the process.

Psychoanalysis, CBT and other therapeutic approaches are talk therapies, dialogues in which the analysand explains their problems and together they search for a solutions. Typically in psychoanalysis the analyst searches for origins and enables the patient to understand these origins, many times the understanding of source of issues points to ways to resolve them. CBT is different in that is not so much concerned with origins as it is to develop a structured approach to problems, by helping the analysand to construct normative goals which help lead the analysand out of their problems.

These approaches work, they achieve results for people with psychological problems, some are more effective on certain problems than others, but they all work.

CBT is highly regarded for a few reasons. It is short, while Psychoanalysis can take years, CBT is typically takes less than a 6 months, the fact that it is quick, highly structured, makes its results much easier to be objectified by data which lends to its scientific status. It is also typically much cheaper and it can even be combined with online sessions.

I think it is tougher for the analyst in CBT to maintain a passive attitude.

the Wittgensteinian conception of philosophy as the passive analysis of signs, language and human behaviour as they naturally occur in their respective forms of life, for the modest purpose of dispelling psychological confusion and misunderstandings relating to the ordinary use of language. — sime

How is an analysis passive?

Sometimes, also, language 'goes on holiday' - then I think other work comes into play, where we try and understand quite what has gone on vacation.

Also: 'There is not a single philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, different therapies, as it were.' The PI is pluralist.

A problem with Wittgensteinean quietism is one that infects basically any attempt to disavow philosophy as we know it ("anti-philosophy") - that the very position itself is "philosophical", i.e. of the same general nature of that of which is attempts to repudiate. It's the exact same thing that makes statements like "Everything I say is a lie" paradoxical. There's always that annoying "dangler" proposition that escapes its own encompassing.

How can philosophy leave everything in its place if philosophy is supposed to have therapeutic value? — sime

I think, if we are going to take this literally, that such a therapeutic philosophy keeps everything in place while creating new relations between that which is. New paths, new connections. In other words, you can keep everything in its place while coming to a new understanding of what it is you are keeping in place. By disentangling yourself, you end up getting a better perspective on everything as a whole. In some sense, philosophy is a disease of the mind, if not treated properly.