One passage:

"Anatomy tells us that the wisdom of nature has assigned the mucus membrane, and the olfactory nerves that are run to the hairy parts of this membrane, to the sense of smell; so that a body can’t be smelled when it doesn’t emit any effluvia, or it does but they don’t enter the nose, or they do enter but the mucus membrane or olfactory nerves have become unfit to do their work. Despite all this ·knowledge that we have·, it is obvious that neither the organ of smell, nor the medium, nor any motions we can conceive to be caused in the mucus membrane or in the nerve or animal spirits, have the faintest resemblance to the sensation of smelling." — Manuel

Great citation. In its careful appropriation of available empirical research, the passage reminds me of Gassendi's discussion of the perception of the taste of salt.

Reid indicates several important factors of a general analysis of exteroception in a single modality. I'll paraphrase quite awkwardly in calling them out:

--proper object (the perceived "body")
--intermediate object (the emitted "effluvia")
--sense receptor (nose, membranes, hairs)
--physiological (e.g. cognitive) processing of received signal (nerves, "animal spirits")
--subjective character (of "the sensation")

(Another key factor: the complex context or "medium", e.g. air, through which the intermediary is transmitted. In special cases we may say the distinction between proper and intermediate object collapses, e.g. when we're interested in an odor instead of its origin.)

What does Reid mean by the phrase "the sensation of smelling"? I presume he thereby indicates what I would prefer to call "the subjective character" of that sensation. As Reid's description suggests, the whole process of sensation seems to include much more than its subjective character. I'd give a similarly "holistic" treatment to similar uses of terms like sensation, perception, experience, appearance, and phenomenon. The whole perceptual process -- which in paradigm cases of exteroception may be extended to a distant object -- is the "thing" I ordinarily have in mind when I use such terms. The "subjective character" is only one feature of such things.

Perhaps we've already agreed for present purposes that, when they are distinct objects, the thing I've called the "intermediate object" is rightly said to "resemble" in some respects the thing I've called the "proper object" of perception, not only in cases of olfaction, but also in other exteroceptive modalities. I'll move on to consider the problem of resemblance with respect to the subjective character of perception.

It's hard for me to understand what it could mean to claim that "there's absolutely no resemblance" between the subjective character of an exteroceptive experience, and the objective features of that experience. That there is some such resemblance seems perhaps most evident when considering changes, variations, and other differences that appear in the course of experience.

There is "something it's like" for the smell of grass to get stronger as I move closer to the grass, or as more grass is brought near me; and "something it's like" for the odor I'm smelling to change as grass is mixed with rain, or as oat grass is mixed with wheatgrass or with manure. Likewise, there's "something it's like" for the look of an apple to change as ambient light gets bright or dim; and "something it's like" to behold variations in color along the surface of an apple, or to note changes in the look of the apple as I rotate it in my hand.

What could it mean to claim that such changes and variations are not manifest in the "subjective character" of perception? What could it mean to claim that the "subjective character" of these differences does not regularly track similar differences in the "intermediate" or "proper" objects of the very same experience? And if those differences are similar -- for instance, if they are proportionate -- how could it be said that there is no resemblance? To the contrary, it seems the coherence, significance, and reliability of perceptual experience depends on robust likeness in the subjective character and objective features of perception along such lines.

If something like my objection stands, we should unpack Reid's negative claim to more accurately express the insight he's tucked into it. I suppose we should say Reid's claim disguises a more accurate claim about what have been called the "sensory qualities" that appear to us in perceptual experiences, and through which, it seems, objective features of the same experiences appear to us. However, it's no easy matter to articulate the claim in question, as it's notoriously difficult to say anything informative about such "sensory qualities" without thereby implicating objective features of the experience in which these sensory qualities appear.

When I speak about the "redness" that appears to me in an instance of visual perception, I implicate the light that strikes my eyes. When I speak about the "grassiness" that appears to me in an instance of olfactory perception, I implicate the gas that fills my nose. And I implicate much more than that in each case, as may be discerned by following the tracks laid by appearances.

Nonetheless, it strikes me as unreasonable to deny that the subjective character of exteroceptive experience involves what may be clumsily called sensory qualities, like the sensory qualities of redness and grassiness; and unreasonable to deny that these qualities in some important respects do not "resemble" objective features of the experiences in which they appear.

Then again, I suppose any two things in the world may be called similar in some respects and different in other respects. What should we make of the claim that there are some respects in which the "sensory qualities" of an experience do not "resemble" the objective features of the same experience? What's at stake in this claim for us, or for philosophers in the bygone days of Reid?

It seems to me that we learn far more about phenomena, including those "sensory qualities", by investigating all the ways in which they appear to be "connected", than we do by merely noting their "resemblances".

You are correct. We construct the resemblance and then we say that sounded like a horse or that looks solid like a wall. — Manuel

What does the term "construct" mean in this context? I might prefer to say we notice and observe similarities in the look and feel of the wall's straight surface, in the sounds of two horses, and so on.

The objects incite in us an innate capacity to react to them the way do, because we are the creatures we are. — Manuel

I'd prefer to say: The objects affect us the way they do in virtue of our disposition to be affected by such objects thus. It seems an empirical question, which of our perceptual dispositions are innate and which are acquired -- or perhaps it's better to ask, in what respect is a perceptual disposition innate and in what respect is it acquired.

We never see triangles in the world, we construct them out of imperfect figures. — Manuel

It would seem strange to say we don't "see triangles" or "see triangular things", just because none of the triangular things we see conform exactly in their shape to the ideal triangles precisely described in the mathematical science of geometry. I suspect that humans learned to recognize, construct, and speak about triangular things before they arrived at that mathematical idealization; and it seems the precise geometrical concepts were designed to help us measure, describe, and construct the real things, not to replace them. I'm inclined to say it's the original, rough and practical, concept of triangle, not the mathematically precise concept of triangle, that's ordinarily applied in perceptual judgment. I see no reason to declare that the shape of a real thing must be perfectly similar to an ideal shape in order to count as triangular -- for instance, a triangular plot of land, a triangular altar, a triangular plow.

Perhaps a similar prejudice about the role of conceptual idealizations is implicated when a disillusioned idealist concludes there's no such thing as love or justice in the world -- on the grounds that no putative instance of love or justice conforms to their ideal conception.

We don't see entire environments, but parts of it, we fill out the rest. We listen to sounds in a pattern which we call music, but which nonetheless are "just" sounds. And so on. — Manuel

Surely our conceptualized grasp of an environment on the basis of perception, and our grasp of any "object" or "region" within that environment on the basis of perception, is always partial at best, and often mistaken.

I'm no more inclined to say that music is "mere sound" than to say that speech is "mere sound", writing is "mere ink", or animals are "mere molecules".

Let me quote Leibniz:

"What is innate is what might be called the implicit knowledge of them, as the veins of the marble outline a shape which is in the marble before they are uncovered by the sculptor" — Manuel

What exactly does Leibniz characterize in that suggestive passage as "innate"? On the surface, his claim is that we have innate "implicit knowledge" even of "the deepest and most difficult sciences"; but that we do not have innate "actual knowledge" of such things. He treats "arithmetic and geometry" as exemplary cases of sciences of which we have "innate implicit knowledge".

I've learned to employ a rather firm distinction between formal and empirical sciences. I wonder if Leibniz offers any examples of "innate implicit knowledge" in the empirical sciences.

I'll agree that some quantitative concepts and judgments seem somehow "innate and implicit" in the general form of the experience of minds like ours; and that the formal science of arithmetic depends on some such concepts and judgments. Likewise I'll agree that some spatial and temporal concepts and judgments seem somehow "innate and implicit" in the general form of the experience of minds like ours; and that the formal science of geometry depends on some such concepts and judgments.

I see no reason to suppose that "empirical concepts" like "horse" and "star" are likewise "innate and implicit". To the contrary, it seems clear that we acquire such concepts only through acquaintance with instances of the corresponding objects in experience; and empirical sciences like biology and astronomy depend on the investigation of those particulars.

Of course our acquaintance with and investigation of such "empirical objects" depends on our capacity to perceive them. And it seems we must acknowledge what we might call "parameters" or "sensory qualities" in each mode of exteroception that are "innate and implicit" in the general form of the experience of minds like ours. I mean, for instance, brightness and color, loudness and pitch, sweet and salty, pressure and heat. In each case, however, it's clear that the "sensory qualities" that appear to us in perception correspond to and vary along with specific features of objective states of affairs outside our heads; and these correspondences, and those objective states of affairs, are objects for empirical investigation.

And a few from Cudworth:

" The essence of nothing is reached unto by the senses looking outward, but by the mind's looking inward upon itself. That which wholly looks abroad outward upon its object is not one with that which it percieves, but it is at a distance from it, and therefore cannot know or comprehend it. But knowledge and intellection doth not merely look out upon a thing at a distance, but make an inward reflection upon the thing it knows... the intellect doth read inward characters written within itself."

"For knowledge is not a knock or thrust from without, but it consisteth in the awakening and exiting of the inward active powers of the mind." — Manuel

How should we interpret these passages from Cudworth?

I'm wary of such uses of the term "essence". I'm not sure what Cudworth might mean in saying that the "essence" of any thing is "reached unto… by the mind's looking inward upon itself". I'm not sure what he means by "intellection".

He seems to suggest that a "mind" must be "one with that which it perceives" in order to "know or comprehend it". That mysterious criterion is fleshed out by the accompanying claim that a mind cannot "know or comprehend" anything "at a distance". This sounds way off the rails to me. Perhaps the passage puts egregiously unwarranted spin on the term "comprehension". I'm tempted to conclude that these extraordinary formulas are signs of Cudworth's ignorance of the integrity of the physical connections, revealed by empirical investigation since Cudworth's time, which link perceivers to distant objects in exteroception.

On the other hand, Cudworth is quite right to emphasize that our knowledge of the world on the basis of exteroception does not consist merely in "looking outward". And he's right to suggest that exteroceptive knowledge is not produced in us merely by dint of each "knock or thrust from without". Careful introspection makes us more reliable and astute perceivers. Empirical investigation of the objective factors of perception, in coordination with our introspective reports, informs us about ourselves, about our perceptual processes, and about the world as it appears to us on the basis of perception. And our culturally mediated conceptual capacities play an extremely important role in determining the character of the perceptual judgments we're disposed to make on the basis of perception.

It seems to me that I say all this on purely phenomenological grounds, without extraneous "metaphysical" commitments or implications.

Wow. That's some reply. I currently don't have the puzzlement that caused me to create this over a week ago, nevertheless I have to answer some of the things you bring up. :cool:

Reply 1/2

It's hard for me to understand what it could mean to claim that "there's absolutely no resemblance" between the subjective character of an exteroceptive experience, and the objective features of that experience. That there is some such resemblance seems perhaps most evident when considering changes, variations, and other differences that appear in the course of experience. — Cabbage Farmer

Though Reid was generally critiquing Hume, in this area I think he has in mind Locke, but I'm not certain. Locke's primary qualities suggested that these properties belonged to the object, that is, they were essential to the objects existence. Secondary qualities are inessential to the object existence.

Odor would be an inessential property of an object, not existing if we did not exist to smell them. The only reply I can come up is what I've said before, beforehand, it would not be evident that grass would smell the way it does when one looks at grass. When we look at grass, I can't imagine another way it could look, other than what appears to me. It could smell like bacon for all I know, but it couldn't look like a pig.

On the other hand, if I only smelled grass, having my eyes closed, and not having seen it before, I might be surprised it looks as it does, though perhaps I would associate that smell with some kind of plant.

there's "something it's like" for the look of an apple to change as ambient light gets bright or dim; and "something it's like" to behold variations in color along the surface of an apple, or to note changes in the look of the apple as I rotate it in my hand. — Cabbage Farmer

Yes, absolutely. Our sight of the colour will depend on lighting conditions, seasons, etc.

However, it's no easy matter to articulate the claim in question, as it's notoriously difficult to say anything informative about such "sensory qualities" without thereby implicating objective features of the experience in which these sensory qualities appear. — Cabbage Farmer

Most of the times, yes. How about hallucinations or dreams though? In these cases there's literally nothing external in the world to point to and say "this tree is the cause of my seeing it as brown and green."

Nevertheless, it will be pointed out, that dreams take stuff from the world, so we are reproducing it without extraneous help in these instances.

Then again, I suppose any two things in the world may be called similar in some respects and different in other respects. What should we make of the claim that there are some respects in which the "sensory qualities" of an experience do not "resemble" the objective features of the same experience? What's at stake in this claim for us, or for philosophers in the bygone days of Reid? — Cabbage Farmer

What's at stake? Not much by the way of practical affairs. For me it's more about being quite puzzled as to why we interpret the objects the way we do. We take our "world-building" as a given. It's only when we are puzzled that we got into modern science. Once you notice that what seems evident is problematic, then everything can be quite surprising. Which is an appropriate philosophical attitude to have, at times.

It seems to me that we learn far more about phenomena, including those "sensory qualities", by investigating all the ways in which they appear to be "connected", than we do by merely noting their "resemblances". — Cabbage Farmer

Absolutely.

Reply 2/2

What does the term "construct" mean in this context? I might prefer to say we notice and observe similarities in the look and feel of the wall's straight surface, in the sounds of two horses, and so on. — Cabbage Farmer

We take the sense data from the world and represent it as a wall. We don't experience how we do this, we automatically do so. It's after this process that we can speak about noticing similarities and differences.

I'd prefer to say: The objects affect us the way they do in virtue of our disposition to be affected by such objects thus. It seems an empirical question, which of our perceptual dispositions are innate and which are acquired -- or perhaps it's better to ask, in what respect is a perceptual disposition innate and in what respect is it acquired. — Cabbage Farmer

That's a good formulation.

I'm no more inclined to say that music is "mere sound" than to say that speech is "mere sound", writing is "mere ink", or animals are "mere molecules" — Cabbage Farmer

This is the difference between what science says about "sounds" and "molecules" vs our experience of them as intelligent, sentient creatures. If we describe the phenomenon of music such as Beethoven's 9th, then we speak about sound waves and amplitudes. The property "sublime", "creative", "moving" and so forth, should not figure in a scientific description of facts, I think.

I suspect that humans learned to recognize, construct, and speak about triangular things before they arrived at that mathematical idealization; and it seems the precise geometrical concepts were designed to help us measure, describe, and construct the real things, not to replace them. I'm inclined to say it's the original, rough and practical, concept of triangle, not the mathematically precise concept of triangle, that's ordinarily applied in perceptual judgment. I see no reason to declare that the shape of a real thing must be perfectly similar to an ideal shape in order to count as triangular -- for instance, a triangular plot of land, a triangular altar, a triangular plow. — Cabbage Farmer

We may say the word "triangle" before we have a clear conception of what it is. But if we did not have an innate concept of triangle, we would see three lines connecting and often not very well. We could call it that a "triangle", but I think that wouldn't tell us anything about them any more than calling a group of people a "nation" tells us about people.

I see no reason to suppose that "empirical concepts" like "horse" and "star" are likewise "innate and implicit". To the contrary, it seems clear that we acquire such concepts only through acquaintance with instances of the corresponding objects in experience; and empirical sciences like biology and astronomy depend on the investigation of those particulars. — Cabbage Farmer

This is an extremely difficult topic to talk sensibly about, in my opinion, one that could very well lead to an entire different thread. The best way I can talk about this topic briefly would be to ask you to consider at an early age, when you found out what a "horse" and a "star" was, how many times did you have to see it and for how long did you have to be experiencing such objects such that you could see another one of its kind and call that other thing a "horse" and a "star"?

I think that if we attach "learning" or acquaintance with experience, it would take us forever to walk through a hallway, much less a beach or a forest.

The things science studies are postulated as being mind-independent. Our ordinary notion of "star" and "horse" do not apply to the science. I think this video explain the outline rather well, you may want to see all of it on 2x speed, but the relevant idea begins at minute 4:38:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ozZdrFQfTU&t=127s

He seems to suggest that a "mind" must be "one with that which it perceives" in order to "know or comprehend it". That mysterious criterion is fleshed out by the accompanying claim that a mind cannot "know or comprehend" anything "at a distance". This sounds way off the rails to me. Perhaps the passage puts egregiously unwarranted spin on the term "comprehension". I'm tempted to conclude that these extraordinary formulas are signs of Cudworth's ignorance of the integrity of the physical connections, revealed by empirical investigation since Cudworth's time, which link perceivers to distant objects in exteroception. — Cabbage Farmer

He's very wordy and can often be obscure. What I think he says is that by just sensing the object, we don't get any ideas from them. It's only when we think about the phenomenon carefully, that we're surprised to discover things about them. We see apples falling down, we use to believe that this meant "apples going to there natural place". But when Newton became puzzled by this and started thinking "why do apples fall instead of going up" he discovered important things about the world, through his experiments and calculations.

We can only experiment on what we have available to us as inquiring creatures, for instance, we could not do physics if we had no mathematical capacity, which is innate. That's the rough idea.

And our culturally mediated conceptual capacities play an extremely important role in determining the character of the perceptual judgments we're disposed to make on the basis of perception. — Cabbage Farmer

They certainly do to an extent, especially in folk psychological explanations of the world. It's quite interesting.

It seems to me that I say all this on purely phenomenological grounds, without extraneous "metaphysical" commitments or implications. — Cabbage Farmer

Yes. We can do most things in philosophy without metaphysical commitments. We can put that aside for these discussions.