Many of his terms fly in the face of conventional understandings. For instance , his use of soul, spirit , ego, intention. As is the tendency among Continental philosophers, he dipped into older uses of such words , going back as far as the Greeks. — Joshs

And that's fine.

So you do have to learn essentially a new vocabulary with Husserl and Heidegger, but once you have done so, you may come to realize that it is actually a much richer use of concepts than the flat and narrow technicalization of them that we see in analytic writing. — Joshs

I can speak about Heidegger, I was quite into him several years ago. As far as I can see, he uses an interesting type of language to understand everyday life, which often evokes a kind of mystical experience, which I find valuable.

It's quite deep in this sense. But I find more senses of depth in other writers, such as Schopenhauer or James and even Russell in parts of his analysis of common sense conception in relation to physics and physiology.


Heck I find Whitehead more deep than Heidegger (in the latter sense of depth), and Whitehead is as hard as they come in some parts. Peirce too.

But Whitehead could has been much clearer, while still retaining complexity in thought.

— T Clark

profundity and importance tend to be synonymous with a certain notion of difficulty , dont they?
— Joshs

Absolutely, positively, completely, indubitably no. — T Clark

Give me an example in your life of stumbling upon a fresh scientific idea that was profoundly important to you , and tell me why there was ‘Absolutely, positively, completely, indubitably’ no difficulty or labor leading up to you’re being prepared to recognize it.

Most of the exciting concepts in science I learned ( Darwinism, Newtonian and relativistic physics) unfolded this way.
— Joshs

As I noted previously, science is different from philosophy, with the exception, I guess, of logic. — T Clark

I think you mean that, FOR YOU, science and philosophy differ this way. Which may explain why you don’t wax enthusiastic about philosophy. For me, there is absolutely no difference between the ‘eureka’ moments I have experienced while discovering scientific concepts, and those experienced reading important philosophy( or , for that matter , some literature). Why should
there be? What is it about philosophy that could
possibly prevent such an experience?

As my favorite psychologist, George Kelly said, “the brilliant scientist and the brilliant writer are pretty likely to end up saying the same thing.”

How could an understanding of reality nailed down to concrete human behavior and understanding be obscure. — T Clark

Because it makes meaning relative to situational use , and therefore is an inherent ‘obscurity’ in that there is nothing any longer of truth to ‘nail down’ outside of pragmatic use. The problem with nailing things down is that , as a pragmatist, you can’t separate the meaning of what it is that is being nailed down from the contingent purpose for nailing it. As the purpose changes, so does what is nailed. James wasn’t prepared to go quite this far in his pragmatism, but Rorty and Wittgenstein were.

Come on, Banno. Do you really claim that this is the way philosophy works here on the forum, or in philosophy in general, for that matter. Or for you, for that matter. — T Clark

Conceptual clarification is what philosophy consists in, yes. And further, if you have an honest think about it, you will agree. And this even despite your penchant for threads that are merely making lists.

Consider:

• What is mysticism?
• What does "consciousness" mean
• Is introspection a valid type of knowledge
• What knowing feels like
• Determinism vs. Predictability
• What are our values?

,,,and so on. Your own threads. What are these if not quests for clarity?

It is simply too easy to dress up ideas that are at best half baked with difficult language. Much easier than actually coming up with novel ideas and expressing them in language. It would therefore be surprising if it didn't happen in philosophy.

And it obviously, obviously does. Not every difficult work is dishonest, obviously. Ideas can be very difficult, and so can expressing them clearly. But the rampant abuse of difficult language, in contemporary writing especially, has caused a suspicion of all difficult writing.

That Irigary quote... The fact that it can exist at all, and the author not laughed out of academia, but rather be taught and celebrated, speaks to a deep corruption and dishonesty in academic humanities.. Which ruins the discipline for everyone, and deserves all the hate it gets.

That Irigary quote... The fact that it can exist at all, and the author not laughed out of academia, but rather be taught and celebrated, speaks to a deep corruption and dishonesty in academic humanities.. Which ruins the discipline for everyone, and deserves all the hate it gets. — hypericin

:100: :clap:

The request for clarification remains cogent. — Banno

It depends on how it's formulated.

"You're not making any sense!"

vs.

"I don't understand what you mean here. Could you explain it a bit more? What is the relation between your A and B?"


But I suppose no self-respecting philosopher would ever utter the latter, at least not meaning it genuinely.

I'll say this: Your way of describing philosophy can be very useful for communication on the Philosophy Forum, but there's no god-like figure that can decree that this way is the correct way of doing philosophy. — Wheatley

Hence this should be the preferred method of philosophizing:

Many people think in black-and-white terms. They are not interested in understanding things, but in taking sides. So even when they read a (would-be) philosophical text, they do so with an intention of taking sides. If it turns out that they can't do so easily (because they agree with some things in the text, while disagree with others, and some they don't understand), they take this as a cue to oppose the text/the author.
— baker
How do you deal with such people? — Wheatley

You throw rocks at them, or shoot Hellfire missiles at them, whichever is more handy for you. Barring that, you leave their presence.

You've got to hide your love of wisdom away.

Conceptual clarification is what philosophy consists in, yes. And further, if you have an honest think about it, you will agree. And this even despite your penchant for threads that are merely making lists.

Consider:
What is mysticism?
What does "consciousness" mean
Is introspection a valid type of knowledge
What knowing feels like
Determinism vs. Predictability
What are our values?
,,,and so on. Your own threads. What are these if not quests for clarity? — Banno

This seems like typical Banno snarky insulting bullshit, which is much more common than any search for clarity. So, in the interests of clarity, am I right about that?

I very much think Kant was extremely profound, but the dense verbiage used and the fact that he (often) did not refer to ordinary objects to elucidate a conceptual difficulty, makes it harder. — Manuel

Kant actually says in the Preface to the First Edition of the CPR that he eschews from using examples because it would make the text longer than it needed to be, and distract from understanding the whole:

As regards clearness, the reader has a right to demand, in the first place, discursive or logical clearness, that is, on the basis of conceptions, and, secondly, intuitive or aesthetic clearness, by means of intuitions, that is, by examples or other modes of illustration in concreto. I have done what I could for the first kind of intelligibility. This was essential to my purpose; and it thus became the accidental cause of my inability to do complete justice to the second requirement. I have been almost always at a loss, during the progress of this work, how to settle this question. Examples and illustrations always appeared to me necessary, and, in the first sketch of the Critique, naturally fell into their proper places. But I very soon became aware of the magnitude of my task, and the numerous problems which I should be engaged; and, as I perceived that this critical investigation would, even if delivered in the driest scholastic manner, be far from being brief, I found it unadvisable to enlarge it still more with examples of explanations, which are necessary only from a popular point of view. I was induced to take this course from the consideration also that the present work is not intended for popular use, that those devoted to science do not require such helps, although they are always acceptable, and that they would have materially interfered with my present purpose. Abbé Terrasson remarks with great justice that, if we estimate the size of a work, not from the number of its pages, but from the time which we require to make ourselves master of it, it may be said of many a book that it would be much shorter, if it were not so short. On the other hand, as regards the comprehensibility of a system of speculative cognition, connected under a single principle, we may say with equal justice: many a book would have been much clearer if it had not been intended to be so very clear. For explanations and examples, and other helps to intelligibility, aid us in the comprehensibility of parts, but they distract the reader, and stand in the way of his forming a clear conception of the whole; as he cannot attain soon enough to a survey of the system, and the colouring and embellishments bestowed upon it prevent his observing its articulation or organization - which is the most important consideration with him, when he comes to judge of its unity and stability. — Kant, Meiklejohn transl.

Elsewhere, Kant also says that it is the deserving right of other minds to elucidate his transcendental philosophy in this secondary aesthetic way. He also remarks that examples can be more easily criticized and thus turned against the theory, so it is best to avoid accidentally exposing your theory to criticism that can make it appear to be false.

Yes. I remember reading that part.

I find it ironic that he thought that giving examples would make his thought more difficult to criticize. As if his thought isn't already criticized (and interpreted) in thousands of ways by all kinds of people, not only philosophers.

But I think Schopenhauer proved him wrong in this respect, he gives plenty of lucid examples and writes beautifully. Granted, they differ in several respects.

There's is some merit in that he was trying to articulate some difficult ideas, but others before him who said very similar ideas, weren't much clearer.

This seems like typical Banno snarky insulting bullshit, — T Clark

Nice.

You, TClark, create two sorts of threads. Lists and conceptual analysis.

Only one of these is philosophy. The other is stamp collecting.

If philosophy is not about conceptual clarification, then it is nothing.

Hence if supposed discussion muddies things further, requesting further explication is good practice.

So it would be wrong, as you say, to reject outright a discussion that is unclear. But it would be worse to accept it. Demanding clarification is then the best response.

If clarification is not forthcoming, or if the reply is equally obscure, then it is reasonable to move on; indeed, in not pursuing an obscure line of discussion, one is not rejecting anything, since nothing has been presented. — Banno

:fire: