Yes, it appears that social existence is key to the question of morality, gives it some semblance of truth and objectivity but note this is telelogical in character - morality (justice) is needed to run society in the best way possible, its truth is secondary or irrelevant.
— TheMadFool

Yeah, you can see this if you challenge the morality of humans continuing to survive. They you can't use the argument that justice is good for society, since the existence of society is now under question, morally speaking. Which some environmentalists and anti-natalists do on grounds of hedonism or concern for other living species. What possible fact about the world would settle that dispute?

It's just for humans to survive. Is that statement truth-apt? — Marchesk

I would like to say that the statement "it's just for humans to survive" is truth-apt, it feels like that's the right thing to do but the question is, in what sense is it true? In other words, which definition of truth is being used here?

If I visit the doctor and inform him that I'm a chain smoker, he'll say "you should stop smoking (or else you'll regret it)" but how is "you should stop smoking" true?

If I visit the doctor and inform him that I'm a chain smoker, he'll say "you should stop smoking (or else you'll regret it)" but how is "you should stop smoking" true? — TheMadFool

Indeed, if a sociopath asks why they should be moral other than consequences, there is no true answer. And if we're trying to decide which moral theory is true, there is no answer.

Indeed, if a sociopath asks why they should be moral other than consequences, there is no true answer. And if we're trying to decide which moral theory is true, there is no answer. — Marchesk

I dunno! I guess we need to realize that there are certain truths involved e.g. what we value are assertions (e.g. happiness is good) in morality. From these values certain recommendations as regards what our moral theory should look like follows. These recommendations, however, are not true in the sense the values from which they're inferred from are true.

1. We value happiness
Ergo,
2. We should do x, y, z,...

An "argument" but 2 isn't true.

:chin:

Truth in this sense is more like a founding principal than a decision about what to do, how we are to decide in a moral quandary. — Antony Nickles

Nicely said. Truth is a founding principle of democracy but I don't think that is well understood today. George Washington did not brag about how great he was but was concerned about being right with the help of God. Not to preach religion but to be humble. And your post suggests that humility as well. There is far more to know than can know, so we should always be humble as proceed.

The American culture I read of in old books is so different from our culture today.

I guess we need to realize that there are certain truths involved e.g. what we value are assertions (e.g. happiness is good) in morality. — TheMadFool

But that does not mean enjoying an ice cream or other superficial pleasures. When Thomas Jefferson wrote of the pursuit of happiness he was working with Aristotle's understanding of it and it meant the goal of human thought, an enriched life following the pursuit of knowledge. Not a wild weekend of binge drinking or getting a new car.

But that does not mean enjoying an ice cream or other superficial pleasures. When Thomas Jefferson wrote of the pursuit of happiness he was working with Aristotle's understanding of it and it meant the goal of human thought, an enriched life following the pursuit of knowledge. Not a wild weekend of binge drinking or getting a new car. — Athena

Goals...pursuit...happiness...human thought...enriched life...binge drinking...a new car...Aristotle...Thomas Jefferson...ice cream...superficial...pleasures.

Happiness is evolution's devious honey trap. Aristotle and probably Jefferson - human thought - transcended all that and pleasures became superficial and not. Binge drinking, a new car, ice cream, I want all of that; no one listens to Aristotle and no one understands Thomas Jefferson.

Because then it was not the right or wrong of it, not least because who knew what that was anyway. Instead it was the good man, or the best man, and what he did or had to say, and how he did it or said it. All this under rhetoric, and there unremarkable; and the failure to properly grasp the difference from logic - supposing it a red-headed child of logic - means a failure to understand argumentation itself, supposing that to be merely a matter of demonstration, when in fact it cannot be that. — tim wood

The denigration of anything but logic and right (or the good, or rules) is to make all other discussion or claim irrational, based on authority (force), individual, "contingent". This fear of relativism is a desire to have what is right, etc. replace our (the human) part in the truth; which I am saying is categorical--not that we must play our part, but that we are answerable whether we do or do not (similar to how what you say can’t mean what you want).

The picture that what passes as truth outside of right or wrong is merely something said "persuasively", is to cast human expression as unintelligible outside the realm of certainty. That what is meaningful is larger and more complicated than we want; we do not want our actions to allow us to be seen, read into, revealed, beyond what we "intended" or what we thought ahead of time. We want to do what is right and be done with it, without any further need of responsibility because we followed a rule, etc.

This is also to take understanding as easy; but to say something, to try to get you to see it, it may need to be expressed a certain way. Some see Wittgenstein or Nietszche as unnecessarily obtuse or mysterious, but some things can not be told directly to some people. If you are going to come to it yourself, you may have to answer Wittgenstein's questions on your own, see his statements about grammar as provisional claims; you may need to ask yourself why Nietszche is forced to alienate us. Not that it is just the right words, but that a speaker must do the good work of accepting the truth themselves in a serious way, making explicit the criteria that matter, the implications of what our words do, what their saying this, now, here to you may amount to. This is not the claim of a “good” person, but that being responsible for what is said is to speak well, that my character matters more than my intellect, that knowledge is limited, and beyond that it is we who must speak for the truth.

Like the man said, ἀρετή, εὔνοία, φρόνησις. It seems you're willing to acknowledge truth-in-character, but that somehow you want that to be truth-in-true, and it is not the same thing.

This fear of relativism is a desire to have what is right, etc. replace our (the human) part in the truth; which I am saying is categorical — Antony Nickles

And that is exactly not categorical, or if it is, then categorically uncategorical. For the categorical, truth is true. For the not categorical, truth is contingent. But this division in our understanding is either itself deep, or just words. Let's try for common ground.

Will you accept that not all propositions are susceptible of proof? That is, those of the form, (shall) we attack at dawn, as opposed to, e.g., the Pythagorean theorem, which itself is just a matter of demonstration/proof. Difference?

For the categorical, truth is true. For the not categorical, truth is contingent. But this division in our understanding is either itself deep, or just words. Let's try for common ground. — tim wood

Well I don't want to sidetrack into Kant but what I meant was that our responsibility to the truth is not a matter of our choice, it is the structure of it. You don't have to respond in that way, but that doesn't mean you are released from that relationship.

It seems you're willing to acknowledge truth-in-character, but that somehow you want that to be truth-in-true, and it is not the same thing — tim wood

I'm saying that the standard of true (or false) is not the only standard that matters--proof only provides certainty. Even without that criteria we still have rationality, specificity, history, and the possibility of agreement, which comes from our ongoing relationship to our moral claims. It is not (only) "contingent" on me but I am implicated. This is not the truth of me (my character) but the necessary condition of this sense of truth.

I'm saying that the standard of true (or false) is not the only standard that matters--proof only provides certainty. — Antony Nickles

Sure it is, in some matters. Is North that way? Is my car on Oak St.? Is dinner ready? 7+5=12? Answers to these true or false and provably so, the proof a matter of demonstration (if needed). Nothing contingent, and person, character or ethics irrelevant.

And many similar questions that would be similarly answerable but for a lack of information. Will it rain on my vacation can stand for these.

And then there are the should and ought questions. Should Bob marry Alice? Should Smith or Jones be promoted? Should we attack at dawn? Build triremes or city walls? And here there is no true-false, but instead a reliance on testimony and the man who gives it, so that a decision can be made as to a course of action. Not, "I agree," or, "I see it," in assent to a demonstration, but instead, "I will (or won't) do it!"

And what of the true is discernable in these latter questions themselves? None, excepting as conditioned by possibility, and that assessed through the lens of good testimony. And here I agree with,

we still have rationality, specificity, history, and the possibility of agreement, which comes from our ongoing relationship to our moral claims. — Antony Nickles

And now we might get into the prior existence/possibility of the good. That is, does the good man access the good and align and comport himself with it? Or does he create it in himself? Is it timeless or a matter of the moment? Or abstract or particular? A pocket guide and instruction lies in Book 9 of the Iliad (225 - 429), Odysseus's speech to Achilleus and his reply. Odysseus, in this case, the bad man unable to make a good speech, to find the common ground needed between himself and Achilleus - implying that rhetorical appeal is at least in part a matter of moment and the man who makes it!

Or, and this I can paste here, Mr. Collin's proposal to Elizabeth in "Pride and Prejudice," a train-wreck of romantic - rhetorical - appeal.
"``My reasons for marrying are, first, that I think it a right thing for every clergyman in easy circumstances (like myself) to set the example of matrimony in his parish. Secondly, that I am convinced it will add very greatly to my happiness; and thirdly -- which perhaps I ought to have mentioned earlier, that it is the particular advice and recommendation of the very noble lady whom I have the honour of calling patroness. Twice has she condescended to give me her opinion (unasked too!) on this subject; and it was but the very Saturday night before I left Hunsford -- between our pools at quadrille, while Mrs. Jenkinson was arranging Miss de Bourgh's foot-stool, that she said, "Mr. Collins, you must marry. A clergyman like you must marry. -- Chuse properly, chuse a gentlewoman for my sake; and for your own, let her be an active, useful sort of person, not brought up high, but able to make a small income go a good way. This is my advice. Find such a woman as soon as you can, bring her to Hunsford, and I will visit her." Allow me, by the way, to observe, my fair cousin, that I do not reckon the notice and kindness of Lady Catherine de Bourgh as among the least of the advantages in my power to offer. You will find her manners beyond any thing I can describe; and your wit and vivacity I think must be acceptable to her, especially when tempered with the silence and respect which her rank will inevitably excite. Thus much for my general intention in favour of matrimony; it remains to be told why my views were directed to Longbourn instead of my own neighbourhood, where I assure you there are many amiable young women. But the fact is, that being, as I am, to inherit this estate after the death of your honoured father (who, however, may live many years longer), I could not satisfy myself without resolving to chuse a wife from among his daughters, that the loss to them might be as little as possible, when the melancholy event takes place -- which, however, as I have already said, may not be for several years. This has been my motive, my fair cousin, and I flatter myself it will not sink me in your esteem. And now nothing remains for me but to assure you in the most animated language of the violence of my affection. To fortune I am perfectly indifferent, and shall make no demand of that nature on your father, since I am well aware that it could not be complied with; and that one thousand pounds in the 4 per cents, which will not be yours till after your mother's decease, is all that you may ever be entitled to. On that head, therefore, I shall be uniformly silent; and you may assure yourself that no ungenerous reproach shall ever pass my lips when we are married.''