So, "use" plays a part in what is meaningful because, once something is said, then we can look at the expression and the context, what the concept appears to be, its criteria, the possible judgments, etc. and see what sense of a concept we are talking about. — Antony Nickles
You can refer to objects with words--say "Cat" when you see a cat; the use here could be naming, or identifying, or seeing. But this will not tell us anything about a cat's essence (what is essential to us about them) other than it is an object that can be seen, identified, and named (though even as: Fluffy). — Antony Nickles
To be kind, even charitable, the technical term (Thanks, Harry F.) for this "interpretation" is bullshit. :zip:That said, there is a certain interpretation of Wittgenstein I've warmed up to viz. philosophy, all discourse in fact, is simply symbolic manipulation, including but not limited to logic reminiscent of Searle's Chinese Room. Nobody understands a word they're saying is my point à la Wittgenstein's ladder. — TheMadFool
That said, there is a certain interpretation of Wittgenstein I've warmed up to viz. philosophy, all discourse in fact, is simply symbolic manipulation, including but not limited to logic reminiscent of Searle's Chinese Room. Nobody understands a word they're saying is my point à la Wittgenstein's ladder.
— TheMadFool
To be kind, even charitable, the technical term (Thanks, Harry F.) for this "interpretation" is bullshit. :zip: — 180 Proof
My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)
He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. — Ludwig Wittgenstein
Stop embarrassing yourself, Fool. Until you actually read at the first two works on the list I've given you, it's a waste of time for anyone to engage you on a philosopher about whom you're profoundly
ignorant. :yawn: — 180 Proof
Wittgenstein shows us that all language is essentially behavioural, social and public, so the grammar of the word "know" is based on behavioural verifications, not on inner objects. — Luke
This much is true: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself.
246. In what sense are my sensations private? — Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it.
This much is true: it makes sense to say about other people that they surmise (guess, suppose, suspect) I am in pain; but not to say it about myself. — Not Wittgenstein
There are a couple things to note about this. One is that "Don't you have a headache?" is a yes-or-no question...
— Srap Tasmaner
Wouldn't we say it is more in the sense of "Hey, I thought you had a headache."--as in confused, requesting confirmation; rather than a question (despite the question mark). — Antony Nickles
But then if "He's in pain" is not nonsense, how can "He knows he's in pain" be nonsense? Do they have the same use or not? — Srap Tasmaner
The argument seems to go like this: the trouble with "I know I'm in pain" is that you would only choose this expression over "I'm in pain" if you have a mistaken understanding of the privacy of our sensations. You may only end up saying (what amounts to) "I'm in pain", but you are trying (and failing) to say something else, and that something else is nonsense.
But that means it's something like your intention that makes "I know I'm in pain" nonsense. — Srap Tasmaner
This much is true: it makes sense to say about other people that they surmise (guess, suppose, suspect) I am in pain; but not to say it about myself. — Not Wittgenstein
Everyone seems to take this as an anticipation of On Certainty and finds it completely convincing. — Srap Tasmaner
There's a language-game that relates knowing and guessing, isn't there? It's the one he rejects, the one that pictures our sensations as secrets we know and others can only guess. When I say I'm in pain, I'm not guessing, and that makes it, as he notes, natural to say I know I'm in pain. — Srap Tasmaner
My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)
He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. — Ludwig Wittgenstein
That said, there is a certain interpretation of Wittgenstein I've warmed up to viz. philosophy, all discourse in fact, is simply symbolic manipulation, including but not limited to logic reminiscent of Searle's Chinese Room. Nobody understands a word they're saying is my point à la Wittgenstein's ladder.
What's inexplicable though is much like how we have no clue as to the existence of free will and still feel, our world is structured accordingly, we do possess free will, we have what could be described as an illusion of understanding. — TheMadFool
Anything taken out of context, especially by one ignorant of the context, can be made to seem to say anything. À la principle of explosion! Sophistry (Charlatanry) 101. In other words, one can't "throw away a ladder" that one hasn't bothered "to climb". Fool is as Fool does, no less — 180 Proof
You haven't read the TLP in full. You've no idea (sense) of what Witty means by 'nonsense'. Hint: Witty does not refute himself, rather he reorients philosophy by pointing out (only in 70-odd pp.) what 'philosophical statements' can show (re: describe, eludicate) and what they cannot say (re: explain). — 180 Proof
Why read what so many others (including me) writes about Witty and not you just read Witty's work instead ? — 180 Proof
Wouldn't we say it is more in the sense of "Hey, I thought you had a headache."--as in confused, requesting confirmation; rather than a question (despite the question mark). — Antony Nickles
(emphasis added)Which goes to my point that we often distinguish — and need to distinguish, for conversations to make any sense — the literal, conventional meaning of what we say from the use we are making of it in the circumstances. "Don't you have a headache?" does not mean "Hey, I thought you had a headache" or "I am confused about your headache status," but we can use it that way. — Srap Tasmaner
You can refer to objects with words--say "Cat" when you see a cat; the use here could be naming, or identifying, or seeing. But this will not tell us anything about a cat's essence (what is essential to us about them) other than it is an object that can be seen, identified, and named (though even as: Fluffy).
— Antony Nickles
Why not? A cat is a domesticated small species of feline. These are the essences of a cat. — TheMadFool
That said, there is a certain interpretation of Wittgenstein I've warmed up to viz. philosophy, all discourse in fact, is simply symbolic manipulation... Nobody understands a word they're saying is my point à la Wittgenstein's ladder. — TheMadFool
6.53 The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science—i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy—and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the other person—he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy—this method would be the only strictly correct one.
6.54 My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)
It's like asking if there is some standard by which we judge chess games. — Sam26
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