In my view an aesthetic judgement always carries a discursive dimension, and I don't see a discursive dimension being involved in simply liking or disliking foods. ( — Janus
David Chalmers: 'First-person experience is such that it cannot be fully described in third-person terms. Experience is inherently subjective, it has a quality of "something it is like to be...", and that quality is inherently irreducible to an objective description.'
Daniel Dennett: 'No, it isn't. A properly elaborated third-person description will leave nothing out. So there is no "hard problem" at all.' — Wayfarer
What about when a group of top international
chefs get together for some food tasting? — Joshs
(That is not to say there cannot be more complex culinary judgements that do involve some discourse, of course—first course, second course or main course :wink: ). — Janus
Is that an actual quote from Dennett: did he actually say that?
If he did say exactly that, then the obvious critique would be that a third person account is not a first person account; so by definition a third person account cannot include a first person account without being something more or other than just a third person account. So, I cannot see how Dennett could be claiming that a third person account could include a first person account; I doubt he would claim something so obviously absurd, so I conclude that he must mean something else, and we would need to see the context to find out what that is. — Janus
Are you suggesting that we experience the effects of things prior to cognitive experience. If so, that would not be conscious experience, though. Sorry, beyond that guess, I'm not sure what you're getting at; can you explain a little? — Janus
Then, are you an observer or the perceiver? Mental states, as a phenomena, are supposed to be latent (in philosophical term) to the perceiver, but an objective account by an observer, if it could be observed at all.I'm saying there is a class of things (mental states) that cannot be described by observers other than oneself. — RogueAI
So, objects exists, if and only if we perceive them. — Caldwell
Nonsense. If I don't perceive you, you still exist. — DecheleSchilder
Are first-person experiences a thing? I think they are. If they are, then you are admitting there is some thing in the universe that cannot be described by another observer. — RogueAI
According to our investigations there are electromagnetic wavelengths that give rise to seeing coloured things in suitably equipped percipients, but those wavelengths are not themselves consciously experienced, obviously. — Janus
I think I understand what you are saying but I'm not seeing how it relates to what you originally were responding to, here:
According to our investigations there are electromagnetic wavelengths that give rise to seeing coloured things in suitably equipped percipients, but those wavelengths are not themselves consciously experienced, obviously. — Janus — Janus
You were - in consequence - saying that, when I play guitar, that I am not hearing my play. That is what I deemed objectionable. The form of hearing what I play has the activity of my fingers, the vibration of the strings and the sound-waves as content. — Heiko
I think I understand what you are saying but I don't see how it relates to
what what you were responding to here:
According to our investigations there are electromagnetic wavelengths that give rise to seeing coloured things in suitably equipped percipients, but those wavelengths are not themselves consciously experienced, obviously. — Janus — Janus
Okay, another try: You take the synthesis of form and content and say the content was not experienced, as if we were talking cause-and-effect. But that is not the relation between form and content. — Heiko
All I was saying was that wavelengths of electromagnetic energy are not consciously experienced; meaning that we don't see wavelengths, we see coloured things. To put it another way, prior to scientific investigations people had no idea that colour was the result of different electromagnetic.wavelengths. — Janus
But that is the same as saying when looking on a piece of paper (form) with a text written on it (content), the content was not experienced. It doesn't matter if you are able or unable to translate the text as we are not dealing with it's meaning. — Heiko
In any case in your example what distinction are you making between content and meaning? If I'm reading text in an unfamiliar language I would surmise that there is a content or meaning there, but I don't know what it is. How then could I be said to have experienced it? — Janus
Do you know what the paper is called, and who wrote it? — Wayfarer
David Chalmers first formulated the problem in his paper Facing up to the problem of consciousness (1995). — Wikipedia
As I would like to say so myself -- I did not create a bullshit account so I could log in to this nonsense! — Caldwell
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.