We can paint half of a picture of consciousness, then say that we know it, casting an illusion over ourselves; because it's a common occurrence between us, common species.

However, science, the study and exploitation of objects/subjects, must include both study and exploitation. A painting of our studies is not exploiting that subject matter, and will not suffice as knowledge.

The explanatory gap" is misinterpreted by many philosophers as an "unsolvable problem" (by philosophical means alone, of course) for which they therefore fiat various speculative woo-of-the-gaps that only further obfuscate the issue.
— 180 Proof

Not at all.

In philosophy of mind and consciousness, the explanatory gap is the difficulty that physicalist theories have in explaining how physical properties give rise to the way things feel when they are experienced. It is a term introduced by philosopher Joseph Levine.[1] In the 1983 paper in which he first used the term, he used as an example the sentence, "Pain is the firing of C fibers", pointing out that while it might be valid in a physiological sense, it does not help us to understand how pain feels.

The explanatory gap has vexed and intrigued philosophers and AI researchers alike for decades and caused considerable debate. Bridging this gap (that is, finding a satisfying mechanistic explanation for experience and qualia) is known as "the hard problem".
— Wikipedia

As I've shown already in this thread, the hard explanatory problem has scientific validation, namely, that of the subjective unity of consciousness, and how to account for it in neurological terms. This is one aspect of the well-known neural binding problem, which is how to account for all of the disparate activities of the brain and body can culminate in the obvious fact of the subjective unity of experience.

As is well known, current science has nothing to say about subjective (phenomenal) experience and this discrepancy between science and experience is also called the “explanatory gap” and “the hard problem” (Chalmers 1996). There is continuing effort to elucidate the neural correlates of conscious experience; these often invoke some version of temporal synchrony as discussed above.

There is a plausible functional story for the stable world illusion. First of all, we do have a (top-down) sense of the space around us that we cannot currently see, based on memory and other sense data—primarily hearing, touch, and smell. Also, since we are heavily visual, it is adaptive to use vision as broadly as possible. Our illusion of a full field, high resolution image depends on peripheral vision—to see this, just block part of your peripheral field with one hand. Immediately, you lose the illusion that you are seeing the blocked sector. When we also consider change blindness, a simple and plausible story emerges. Our visual system (somehow) relies on the fact that the periphery is very sensitive to change. As long as no change is detected it is safe to assume that nothing is significantly altered in the parts of the visual field not currently attended.

But this functional story tells nothing about the neural mechanisms that support this magic. What we do know is that there is no place in the brain where there could be a direct neural encoding of the illusory detailed scene (Kaas and Collins 2003). That is, enough is known about the structure and function of the visual system to rule out any detailed neural representation that embodies the subjective experience. So, this version of the Neural Binding Problem really is a scientific mystery at this time.
— Jerome S. Feldman, The Neural Binding Problem(s)

Your continual invocation of 'woo of the gaps' only illustrates that you're not grasping problem at hand. It's a hard problem for physicalism and naturalism because of the axioms they start from, not because there is no solution whatever. Seen from other perspectives, there is no hard problem, it simply dissolves. It's all a matter of perspective. But seen from the perspective of modern scientific naturalism, there is an insuperable problem, because its framework doesn't accomodate the reality of first-person experience, a.k.a. 'being', which is why 'eliminative materialism' must insist that it has no fundamental reality. You're the one obfuscating the problem, because it clashes with naturalism - there's an issue you're refusing to see which is as plain as the nose on your face.

'Speculative woo-of-the-gaps' is at bottom simply the observation that there are things about the mind that science can't know, because of its starting assumptions. It's a very simple thing, but some guy by the name of Chalmers was able to create an international career as an esteemed philosopher by pointing it out. — Wayfarer

Great post! :up: Clarified some of my doubts on the hard problem of consciousness specifically that it's about the explanatory gap between physical theories and consciousness.

The way I see it, materialistic explanations are of 2 kinds:

1. Explanatory materialism: A phenomenon/object is explained in terms of materialism e.g. lightning is an electric discharge between and from clouds.

2. Eliminative materialism: This is my area of interest. Depending on probably the way a theory is crafted, certain questions/concepts stop making sense of are nonsensical. Daniel Dennett's claims that consciousness is an illusion is of particular interest to me. I haven't read his original work on that topic but in the videos I saw of him conveying this point of view are more beating around the bush rather than a clear-cut statement with an argument to back it up.

An example of the eliminative method would be category mistake kinda dismissals - what does the bark of a dog taste like? This question is declared as nonsensical. Similarly, consciousness my not be amenable to a physicalist/materialistic description and so might be rejected as meaningless. This, you might already notice, is the hard problem of consciousness - forget an explanation, we can't even translate consciousness in materialistic/physicalist terms.

One intriguing facet to the problem is Wittgensteinian. His beetle-in-a-box gedanken experiment suggests that pure subjective experiences (consciousness for example) are such that we may simply be engaged with the issue at a synactic level - we can formulate grammatically correct sentences on consciousness - but when it comes to semantics (what we mean by "consciousness"), all bets are off.

Wittgenstein claims, rightly so in my opinion, that not only is it possible that there are different things in each one of our boxes but that it's possible that our personal, private boxes could actually be empty (eliminative materialism, p-zombies).

Yeah, Hawking's comment is like how atheists (still) use "OMG!" as an expression of surprise/shock.
— TheMadFool

I'm not sure I get this. When I scream OMG, to what comment of his does this correspond? — GraveItty

Either you get it or you don't.

Either you get it or you don't. — TheMadFool

How informative!Then I get it. Hawking just commented in his usual, science-indoctrinated way. Even with a mechanized voice, hiding him from an unconscious fear of gods, elevating himself to a god-like status. "God is a Mathematician". While in fact he ment: "Yo! I'm the master! The master Math. Dig that! And now listen y'all! It's me who makes the call! Time to see, that, I'm the math!" My math math math. Mad mad mad. OMM!"

@Wayfarer

Explanatory gap :point:

The 1% DNA difference between chimps and humans explains/does not explain the difference between a chimp mind and a human mind.

How informative!Then I get it. Hawking just commented in his usual, science-indoctrinated way. Even with a mechanized voice, hiding him from an unconscious fear of gods, elevating himself to a god-like status. "God is a Mathematician". While in fact he ment: "Yo! I'm the master! The master Math. Dig that! And now listen y'all! It's me who makes the call! Time to see, that, I'm the math!" My math math math. Mad mad mad. OMM!" — GraveItty

Focus on the word "God" in OMG! and Hawking's statement.

Focus on the word "God" in OMG! and Hawking's statement.
now — TheMadFool

I just did!

was just wondering about the something → (intellect) → tree thing. — jorndoe

Oh, that. Nothing more than speculative metaphysics. One man’s garden is another man’s wasteland.

Accepting a conclusion predicated on mere taste, is just lazy, wouldn’t you agree? — Mww

Would it be fair to characterize changes in embraced style, approach and sensibility over the history of the arts a matter of change in taste? If so , then Kuhn’s argument comes down to claiming that the history of science is a matter of changes in taste.

Fair assessment, yes.

Would it be fair to characterize

Would it be fair to characterize changes in embraced style, approach and sensibility over the history of the arts a matter of change in taste? If so , then Kuhn’s argument comes down to claiming that the history of science is a matter of changes in taste. — Joshs

& etc., as a matter of changes in taste?

And, only if taste in art and taste in science similar enough to justify the remark. I think they're not. One agile and capable of pivot on a dime, the other entrenched and not easily subject to change.

The most general view of science concerning the absolute presuppositions of the science - that which is given in order for the science to have the shape it has. These not a matter of taste, nor agile, nor ephemeral. Not, then, of taste.

only if taste in art and taste in science similar enough to justify the remark. I think they're not. One agile and capable of pivot on a dime, the other entrenched and not easily subject to change.

The most general view of science concerning the absolute presuppositions of the science - that which is given in order for the science to have the shape it has. These not a matter of taste, nor agile, nor ephemeral. Not, then, of taste. — tim wood

Kuhn speaks of the then-accepted view of the difference between artistic taste and scientific change.

“The creative idiom of a Rembrandt, Bach, or Shakespeare resolves all its aesthetic problems and prohibits the consideration of others. Fundamentally new modes of aesthetic expression emerge only in intimate conjunction with a new perception of the aesthetic problem that the new modes must aim to resolve. Except in the realm of technique, the transition between one stage of artistic development and the next is a transition between incommensurables. In science, on the other hand, problems seem to be set by nature and in advance, without reference to the idiom or taste of the scientific community. Apparently, therefore, successive stages of scientific development can be evaluated as successively better approximations to a full solution. That is why the present state of science always seems to embrace its past stages as parts, which is what the concept of cumulativeness means. Guided by that concept, we see in the development of science no equivalents for the total shift of artistic vision – the shift from one integrated set of problems, images, techniques, and tastes to another.”

Kuhn goes on to critique the above view:

“Often a decision to embrace a new theory turns out to involve an implicit redefinition of the corresponding science. Old problems may be relegated to another science or may be declared entirely “unscientific.” Problems that, on the old theory, were non-existent
or trivial may, with a new theory, become the very archetypes of significant scientific achievement. And, as the problems change, so, often, does the standard that distinguishes a real scientific solution from a mere metaphysical speculation, word game, or mathematical play. It follows that, to a significant extent, the science that emerges from a scientific revolution is not only incompatible, but often actually incommensurable, with that which has gone before. Only as this is realized, can we grasp the full sense in which scientific revolutions are like those in the arts. (Kuhn M1, pp. 17)

Of course it's easy to see the rough equivalence of 'meta' and 'super' and 'natural' and 'physical, and etymology may show an even closer ancient equivalence, but is not a good guide to current usage, which is what is at issue.

One agile and capable of pivot on a dime, the other entrenched and not easily subject to change. — tim wood

Yep. Different kinds of judgement. Or, judgements predicated on different kinds of conditions.

I'm not sure what you are aiming at here. But whatever, bear in mind when I referred to the idea that the world is always already conceptually shaped or logically structured that is by no means advocating pan-psychism.

So when I say "operate the same way we do; I am not referring to nature 'having a mind' whatever that could mean, but to its being logically structured.

We don't have any way to find out the answer to that by scientific investigation, obviously, so we are left with what would be the more plausible or coherent view in light of our experience and understanding. So, the problem that McDowell was concerned with was how our sensorially apprehended world could possibly justify our assertions about it if it were not always already conceptually shaped. So, he wants to collapse Kant's distinction between sensibility and understanding, claiming that our intuitions (in the Kantian sense of the term) are conceptually shaped through and through.

When I say "matter of taste" I mean it in the sense of judgement; analogous to the way that aesthetic judgement is not merely like preferring apples to oranges.

As I said, I don't hold a firm position on the matter, but if pressed I would lean towards McDowell's view.

Yep. Different kinds of judgement. Or, judgements predicated on different kinds of conditions. — Mww

The conditions can’t be all that different. Otherwise, scientific and artistic movements ( Renaissance , Enlightenment, Modern and postmodern) wouldn’t be interwoven in the interdependent way that they have been throughout history. If one really were ‘agile and capable of pivot on a dime’, and the other ‘entrenched and not easily subject to change’ they would create entirely independent cycles of change , which they dont.

If one really were ‘agile and capable of pivot on a dime’, and the other ‘entrenched and not easily subject to change’ they would create entirely independent cycles of change , which they dont. — Joshs

You beat me to it! Of course aesthetic taste does not change that way, but is driven by gradually shifting paradigms, even more obviously than scientific movements are.

I don't understand though why he says that God is a mathematician. — GraveItty

Because maths has been so uncannily powerful at predicting the structure of the Universe. It's a well-known trope in Western philosophy even amongst those who are otherwise atheist.

Daniel Dennett's claims that consciousness is an illusion is of particular interest to me. — TheMadFool

I've always thought Daniel Dennett's claims so patently nonsensical that I can't understand why anyone entertains them. But whenever I say that I'm told I don't understand it or haven't read him so I don't bother any more.

gradually shifting paradigms, — Janus

There's been nothing 'gradual' about the pace of development since the industrial revolution. Back in the Old Stone Age, it took half a million years for the form of the stone ax to evolve.

You beat me to it! Of course aesthetic taste does not change that way, but is driven by gradually shifting paradigms, even more obviously than scientific movements are. — Janus

great minds think alike

maths has been so uncannily powerful at predicting the structure of the Universe. It's a well-known trope in Western philosophy even amongst those who are otherwise atheist. — Wayfarer

But not an accepted trope among many atheists, specifically those who understand the inseparable relation between empirical objectivity, logic and mathematics and their genesis in constructive activities of an intersubjective community. For them saying that math is uncannily powerful at predicting the structure of the universe is like saying that a musical
score is uncannily powerful at predicting the sound of the music it scores.

There's been nothing 'gradual' about the pace of development since the industrial revolution. Back in the Old Stone Age, it took half a million years for the form of the stone ax to evolve. — Wayfarer

You're probably thinking more about technological advancement than changes in scientific theories. Changes of aesthetic paradigms in the arts have been gradual in comparison to fads and fashion for example.The point is, in any case, that "taste" as I was using the term, does not "change on a dime".

Daniel Dennett's claims that consciousness is an illusion is of particular interest to me. — TheMadFool

It is tedious to see the same misunderstandings of Dennett's standpoint from people who haven't read his work. He does not claim that consciousness is an illusion, but that our sense that our intuitive understanding of what it is soundly based is illusory. Can you see the distinction there?

So, the problem that McDowell was concerned with was how our sensorially apprehended world could possibly justify our assertions about it if it were not always already conceptually shaped. — Janus

I don't have anything of my own, here, but I point back to the notion of absolute presuppositions as presented by Collingwood. That is, the "always already conceptually shaped" is simply a misstatement not justified by any history of science or of thought, but rather itself an absolute presupposition of (apparently) McDowell's thinking. E.g., the Greeks thought nature imprecise, and various, never quite right, not a candidate for anything we might call an exact science, taking refuge in the caprice of the gods, or respectively in numbers for Pythagoreans and qualitative description with Aristotle. You and I of course see nature as precise, consistent, subject to universal laws, the which we-all try to deduce. And while these all establish their own theoretical frameworks which can evolve, the underlying presuppositions, which tend to hold for a long time, are themselves subject to stress and can and do over a long time change.

Styles of English Lit. and hem-lines, on the other hand, even within a relatively short time can change markedly.

That is, the "always already conceptually shaped" is simply a misstatement not justified by any history of science or of thought, but rather itself an absolute presupposition of (apparently) McDowell's thinking. — tim wood

Hmmm. This is "the given".

I mean, would you say that sense-data or "qualia" aren't "already shaped"? I don't know if I'd call seeing blue or listening to a flute playing conceptual, but it seems to be a given.

That is, the "always already conceptually shaped" is simply a misstatement not justified by any history of science or of thought, but rather itself an absolute presupposition of (apparently) McDowell's thinking. — tim wood

I have no idea what you mean by "a misstatement not justified by any history of science or of thought", but in any case it is not an "absolute presupposition" but rather a conclusion. Go and read McDowell if you want to find out about his idea.

Styles of English Lit. and hem-lines, on the other hand, even within a relatively short time can change markedly. — tim wood

Changes of style do not equate to changes in aesthetic judgement, obviously. People, variously, still like ancient, medieval as well as modern art and literature. This is even true in the world of fashion, although it may be less so.

Yep. Different kinds of judgement. Or, judgements predicated on different kinds of conditions.
— Mww

The conditions can’t be all that different. Otherwise, scientific and artistic movements ( Renaissance , Enlightenment, Modern and postmodern) wouldn’t be interwoven in the interdependent way that they have been throughout history. — Joshs

They’re not all that different; they’re only different in two ways.

If one really were ‘agile and capable of pivot on a dime’, and the other ‘entrenched and not easily subject to change’ they would create entirely independent cycles of change , which they dont. — Joshs

Of course they do. Aesthetic judgements switch at the drop of a news cycle, or the newest gadget, or supposed slight from a passer-by; discursive judgements are bound by the knowledge relative to the times. Two different kinds of cycles of independent change.

But not an accepted trope among many atheists, specifically those who understand the inseparable relation between empirical objectivity, logic and mathematics and their genesis in constructive activities of an intersubjective community. — Joshs

Right. But Hawking is famous for saying in his Brief History of Time, that science was seeking to 'know the mind of God' (it's practically the only thing a lot of people remember about that book, which was famous for being bought but not read.) Einstein likewise - and he wasn't atheist, but certainly not conventionally religious. He frequently referred to 'the old one' or 'Spinoza's God'. Even Dawkins acknowledges a scientific or philosophical conception of God, although it's obviously of little existential significance to him.

I'm interested in Husserl's philosophy of arithmetic, but I've never gotten around to studying it. (But I have just ordered this courtesy an Amazon birthday gift card.)

(Dennett) does not claim that consciousness is an illusion, but that our intuitive understanding of what it is is illusory — Janus

He says that our normal understanding of ourselves as agents is an illusion generated by the unconscious cellular processes operating according to the demands of adaptation. 'Unconscious competence', he calls it. He says it over and over, it's hard not to understand it.

How the mind brings order to observation:

Picture a tranquil mountain meadow. A stream meanders peacefully through the middle, and a small herd of cattle graze contentedly upon the lush pasture not far from a stand of stately firs.

Butterflies flit back and forth amongst the bluebells and daisies, and off in the distance, a snow-capped mountain peak provides a picturesque backdrop. The melodious clunk of the cow-bells, the chirping of crickets, and the calling of birds provide the soundtrack to the vista, but with not a human to be seen.

Now picture the same scene - but from no point of view. Imagine that you are seeing it, from every possible point within it, and also from every point around it. Furthermore, imagine seeing it from every possible scale: as if you were seeing it as a mite on a blade of grass, in every location, and then also, as a creature of various sizes, up to a creature the size of the mountain peak, and from every possible vantage point.

Then subtract from all these perspectives, any sense of temporal continuity - any sense of memory of the moment just past, and expectation of the one about to come.

Having done that, describe the same scene.

Obviously impossible. This thought-experiment throws into relief the way the mind organises conceptions even in the apparent absence of observers. Usually this role is implicit but it doesn't mean it's not operative.

he wants to collapse Kant's distinction between sensibility and understanding, claiming that our intuitions (in the Kantian sense of the term) are conceptually shaped through and through. — Janus

Do you think he was successful?

is by no means advocating pan-psychism. — Janus

Wouldn’t matter either way; it’s beside the point.

so we are left with what would be the more plausible or coherent view in light of our experience and understanding. — Janus

And that’s the point. In light of our experience and understanding. But I understand what you’re saying.

As I said, I don't have a settled view on the matter. Perhaps I am not as concerned with whether the world warrants our understanding of it as McDowell is. What I do like is the implicit dissolution of the realist/ idealist polemic, which seems to be based on folksy understandings of what it means to be physical, what it means to be concrete, what it means to be mental, what it means to be conceptual and what it means to be logical; that is based on the conviction that we really do understand what these things mean.

I'm not convinced that McDowell's idea that the world is always already conceptually shaped can be exhaustively understood, but then neither can the idea that it is fundamentally physical or mental . So, I see McDowell's conclusion as a kind of deflationary minimalism that says that if we want to claim that our judgements about the world and our understanding of the world must be somehow warranted by actuality, then we are committed to the view that the world must be fundamentally conceptual in some way that exceeds our grasp or at least our ability to explicate.

He says that our normal understanding of ourselves as agents is an illusion generated by the unconscious cellular processes operating according to the demands of adaptation. 'Unconscious competence', he calls it. He says it over and over, it's hard not to understand it. — Wayfarer

Right, you're just repeating what I have said in different words. Our understanding of ourselves as agents (or of what consciousness is) is an illusion. That is not to say that consciousness is an illusion, but that our intuitive "folk" understanding of its nature is. Likewise it is not to say that our agency is an illusion, but that our intuitive understanding of what it consists in is. Do you see the distinction now?

I am not sure what the purpose of the quoted passage was meant to be (or where it came from). The fact that the environment can be seen from different viewpoints and at different scales doesn't seem to speak to anything but the reality of a perception-independent environment to be seen from different viewpoints and scales.