What? My view is that every actual contradiction is false. Is that inconvenient to you?

Dummo logic says that there are necessarily no centaurs if there are actually no centaurs - yes? Or no?

If no, then why does Dummo think that if there are actually no true contradictions it is necessarily the case that there aren't?

Please locate for me my thickness and bring it into the light. It is the only way I will learn. FOr at the moment I am quite convinced you're the thick one, yet surely you are not for you can squiggle and squoggle (not that i could tell if you were squiggline and squoggling properly, of course, for I do not speak squiggle-squoggle).

Please locate for me my thickness and bring it into the light. — Bartricks

It's here:

And how is that a contradiction? — Bartricks

But as I already said, I do not see why this:

it is not possible that a proposition not be contingent. — Banno

follows from this:

If it is true, then every proposition is a contingent proposition. — Banno

You are just saying again the very thing I want explained, yes?

I deny that there are any necessary truths. So I deny that it is necessarily true that there are no true contradictions.

Thus, I hold that all actually true propositions are true contingently. By which I mean, of course, simply that they are not necessarily true.

Now, how does it follow from that, that it is not possible for a proposition to be anything other than just plain true?

Again, I hold that as there are no centaurs, no proposition that asserts their existence is true.
Does it follow from that that I am committed to the view that necessarily no such proposition is true? No. So why do you think it does follow when it is true contradictions that we are talking about?

Explain. Explain without assuming any necessary truths. Come on. (Time to throw your arms up in exasperation, yes? I'm thick, yes?)

But as I already said, I do not see why this:
it is not possible that a proposition not be contingent.
— Banno

follows from this:

If it is true, then every proposition is a contingent proposition.
— Banno — Bartricks

Indeed; you can't see this.

You asked me to show you your thickness. There it is.

But that does not show it. That is just you asserting it.

Look, this argument is not valid:

1. If a proposition is true, then it is contingently true
Conclusion: Therefore, necessarily if a proposition is true, then it is contingently true

Put some squiggles and squoggles in if it helps. I'm sure there's a squoggle for necessity, and it'll be turning up in the conclusion, but it won't be in the premise.

Indeed, without being able to squiggle and squoggle, it seems plain that the reverse follows. For if 1 is true, then 1 itself is contingently true, not necessarily true.

Here:

1. If a proposition is true, then it is contingently true
2. Premise 1 is a true proposition
3. Therefore, premise 1 is contingently true.

So how do you get to the conclusion that it is not possible for a proposition to be anything other than contingent? That is, how do you get to 'necessarily, all true propositions are contingently true' from a premise that makes no mention of necessity? It's still looking for all the world like you're the thick one. Odd.

"And time itself The magic length of God ." 1966 Leonard Cohen

God is alive, Magic is Afoot Recited by Leonard Cohen



God is alive, Magic is Afoot sung by Buffy St. Marie

William Lane Craig style arguments only. You must reformat your post. :monkey:

William Lane Craig will not avail. Nor prevail. He'll derail in the loathsome vale. He'll suffer much travail which no one will curtail. He'll vomit in a pail. I'll spare us all detail.

Neither will @Bartricks.

An event becomes more past, not by 'flowing' further down the river of time, but by the sensation of pastness becoming more intense in God. — Bartricks

(1) Why do the sensations of futurity and pastness become less and more intense in God? Why does their intensity change? Is it so because this just is the nature of time (as God created it)?

(2) Is this what you mean when you say that God is subject to time, that these sensations change in intensity? Or that they change in a specific way, futurity always lessening, pastness always increasing? Or is just that God has these sensations at all?

Dummo thinks that if it is possible for there to be true contradictions, then there are some. Do you agree? — Bartricks

Yes! To say something is possible means that that something is in at least one possible world.

What's a possible world?

May I talk with the same right about toity worlds? Have you read Toity Worlds by Professor Boule Sheet?

There's a toity world in which there is a centaur. And there's a toity world in which there is a true contradiction. Might that centaur come and get me from the toity world in which it is living? Should I be afraid? Will it bring the true contradiction with it?

You're confident I'm wrong, yes? Odd. Why so confident? — Bartricks

Because what you write is moronic. As I was reading your last response I couldn’t go 3 words without thinking of a paragraph in response to your stupidity. I don’t want to write a book just to convince a muppet, especially if I’m getting berated the whole way for trying to help it.

You seem to equate someone giving up on responding to you with proof that you are right. When in reality the reason people stop responding to you is that they lose patience and can no longer deal with your attitude, and sheer stupidity. You should publish this nonsense. Then when everyone tears it to shreds you might want to rethink your position. Though I bet if the whole world was convinced you’re wrong you still wouldn’t budge. You’d argue with each person individually until you tire them all out, then think you’re right.

I hope for the sake of everyone that you’re just trolling.

What's a possible world?

May I talk with the same right about toity worlds? Have you read Toity Worlds by Professor Boule Sheet?

There's a toity world in which there is a centaur. And there's a toity world in which there is a true contradiction. Might that centaur come and get me from the toity world in which it is living? Should I be afraid? Will it bring the true contradiction with it? — Bartricks

It appears that the idea of possibility is more nuanced than I thought.

A possible world: A world that can be real. There's nothing about a possible world that makes it impossible. So a centaur world is a possible world - nothing about centaurs is impossible.

Two different senses of possible:

1. Possible 1: It's possible there'll be light rain tomorrow. Not true that it has to rain tomorrow.

2. Possible 2: It's possible that God exists. God has to exist in one possible world. Hey!, we've just proved that God exists.

:chin:

2. Possible 2: It's possible that God exists. God has to exist in one possible world. Hey!, we've just proved that God exists. — TheMadFool

Yes, that's an argument that Dummo would - or should, if he had a clue - be impressed by. Whereas I think it's stupid.

Yes, that's an argument that Dummo would be impressed by. Whereas I think it's stupid. — Bartricks

Why is it stupid?

Good post.There's far more variations than one might suppose. See Varieties of Modality.

Modality had a very bad press up until Kripke used possible worlds to give us a semantics that makes coherent argument possible. So we see things like Geech's scepticism toward modality in the article I cited above.

A possible world is no more than a way of saying that something might have been different. So saying god exists in some possible world is just saying there might have been a god.

Bart's particular flaw is that he doesn't see the link between possibility and necessity - as mentioned previously.

Now you've started a new thread, with a question. Contrast that to Bart's insistence that he is correct, despite numerous, varied and cogent arguments against his position.

Kudos, Mad.

You seem to equate someone giving up on responding to you with proof that you are right. — khaled

Argumentum ab lassitudine?

it would be an error to think there is some chance of changing Bart's mind.

Two reasons. First, God is omnipotent and so does not 'have' to exist. Ontological arguments of that kind appeal to necessity, and thus seek to show that God exists by showing that he is forced to exist by a strange force of necessity. But nothing forces an omnipotent being to exist - anyone who thinks otherwise is just confused.
Second, if something possibly exists, then it does not have to exist. I mean, that's what one is expressing by saying that it possibly exists. And so go from 'possibly exists' to 'must exist' seems obviously fallacious.

Here's an ontological argument for moral realism. If it is possible for Xing to be wrong, it is wrong. For if it is possible for it to be wrong, then there is a possible world in which it is wrong. But it is a necessary truth that if two situations are identical non-morally, then they are identical morally as well (this is known as the supervenience thesis). Thus, if it is possible for an action to be wrong, it 'is' wrong. Somehow the mere possibility of an act being wrong, makes it actually wrong.

Now I take it that this argument is not persuasive. It is possible that morality not exist. Moral realism is true: some acts are wrong. But morality does not 'have' to exist, it just does. Moral nihilism is not incoherent. False, yes. Necessarily false, no.

Note, the recognition that virtually all of us have that there is something dodgy about ontological arguments for God - or indeed, morality - is just a dim recognition that it is fallacious to go from 'possibly' to 'actually' (I don't say 'all' ontological arguments are like this - Descartes' Cogito is an ontological argument and it is fine - but most are).