Second, there is always the possible world that J.L. Mackie describes: beings who, through their own free will, always choose to do good. If Mackie's world is possible and God can create this possible world, then the free will defense fails. — Chany

Which goes to the question of why God created Lucifer in the first place.

now the response is to say God cannot actually create this world and that it is up to the agents within the world to make it happen, but I do not see how, without claiming that God cannot have foreknowledge of the actions of free creatures, one can avoid God's ability to foresee which possible world contains no moral evil and create that world. — Chany

Is free will supposed to be something that God cannot know about in advance? That would seem to place a limit on omniscience, and God knowing or existing through all points in time. That God is subject to time like created beings are.

here is an interesting discussion, one that I have never personally seen discussed, about God's responsibilities and morality if God cannot know the actions of free agents ahead of time, as God effectively would be creating the world blind. — Chany

That is an interesting question. So God plays dice with free will?

Again, that explains why you are having so much difficulty with the free will defense. — aletheist

I don't think free will justifies the existence of evil, regardless. Not for a perfectly good God. A different sort of God, sure.

Basically, you have to argue that a perfectly good being is willing to put up with evil to achieve higher goods, such as love. I'm not sure that works. The higher good is worth any evil that comes about as a result. Sounds like the ends justifies the means for God.

Imagine an argument justifying war is that although lots of evil comes about, some people show incredible bravery and sacrifice.

The courage and love of these individuals outweighs the evil of war.

Now, I don't think that works as a moral argument. I think the evil of war is what matters, not whether some individuals managed to be super good. So, a thousand people were incredibly brave, but 10 thousand died, including civilians, children, etc. What sort of moral calculus is that?

I don't think free will justifies the existence of evil, regardless. — Marchesk

Obviously, given your posts.

Not for a perfectly good God. A different sort of God, sure. — Marchesk

If God is real, then whatever He is, is perfectly good. Who are we to judge otherwise?

If God is real, then whatever He is, is perfectly good. Who are we to judge otherwise? — aletheist

Why suppose he is perfectly good, though?

If God is real, then who has the authority to define "perfectly good" as anything other than whatever God is?

If God is real, then who has the authority to define "perfectly good" as anything other than whatever God is? — aletheist

I don't know. Did God say he was perfect, or did human beings come up with that?

The point is that if God is real, then "perfectly good" is whatever He is. If that turns out to be different than what we humans define as "perfectly good," then we are the ones who have it wrong, not God.

The point is that if God is real, then "perfectly good" is whatever He is. If that turns out to be different than what we humans define as "perfectly good," then we are the ones who have it wrong, not God. — aletheist

In that case, we wouldn't call God perfectly good, would we? God could be perfectly evil from our point of view, but perfectly good from God's. Maybe we have it all backwards?

Which goes to the question of why God created Lucifer in the first place. — Marchesk

This is actually an issue with your argument. The theist does not need to be committed to the existence of Lucifer or believe the common tales surrounding Lucifer. You are attacking a specific subset of theists only, but not the tri-omni god of classical theism.

Is free will supposed to be something that God cannot know about in advance? That would seem to place a limit on omniscience, and God knowing or existing through all points in time. That God is subject to time like created beings are. — Marchesk

There is the issue of divine foreknowledge: Before time starts (t0), God knows all things, per omniscience. At t0, God knows the following proposition: At t1, Jane buys a red car instead of a blue motorcycle using her free will. The proposition "At t1, Jane buys a red car instead of a blue motorcycle using her free will" must be true. t1 roles around and Jane buys a red car instead of a blue motorcycle using her free will. However, did Jane actually have free will? Jane, in order to have free will, must have the ability to do otherwise; in this case, Jane must have the ability to have bought a blue motorcycle instead of a red car. But how could she have done otherwise at t1 when, at t0, God knows the outcome? "At t1, Jane buys a red car instead of a blue motorcycle using her free will" must occur because if it does not, God would be wrong, an impossibility. Because Jane must buy a red car at t1, she cannot have free will, as she cannot do otherwise.

How we should respond to this issue is debatable. Some say that it shows an inherent problem of the concept of omniscience. Some say that this issue is resolvable such that both God's foreknowledge and human freedom can be preserved. Open theists solve the issue by saying that it is impossible for God to know these facts. In other words, God cannot know what free agents will do with their free will because it is impossible for God to do this, much like it is impossible for God to create a rock so heavy God cannot lift it.

That is an interesting question. So God plays dice with free will? — Marchesk

Again, there is a lot to be discussed about this: how much God can know if God does not know free willed actions. For example, it would have to be the case that God cannot gain knowledge via deduction about free will decisions because it would result in the same issue as before. This, of course, assumes that there is not another way to resolve the problem of divine foreknowledge.

God could be perfectly evil from our point of view, but perfectly good from God's. — Marchesk

And if that were the case, whose point of view would be correct?

Some say that this issue is resolvable such that both God's foreknowledge and human freedom can be preserved. — Chany

I am one who would say this. God's foreknowledge that Jane will buy the red car does not cause Jane to buy the red car, He simply knows beforehand that she will freely choose to do so. More accurately, God is outside of time - after all, He created time - so there is no "beforehand" from His point of view, He simply knows what she will/does/did choose.

God's foreknowledge that Jane will buy the red car does not cause Jane to buy the red car, He simply knows beforehand that she will freely choose to do so — aletheist

Knowing a free choice is a contradiction in terms, as freedom implies the ability to do otherwise. If God knows the choices we make before we make them, then we could not have done otherwise, or else he would not know the choices he allegedly knows.

He created time — aletheist

The word "create" implies an act in time. To say that time did not always exist is to say that there was a time before time, which is absurd.

Normally, knowledge does not have any metaphysical import. However, with God, this would not apply. God's omniscience is always there. The propositions God knows are not gain reflexively via observation; God simply knows all true propositions. Anything below God must adhere to the truth value of these propositions, including God's creations. God's foreknowledge does not directly cause Jane's actions like the force of gravity does. However, when God knows "At t1, Jane buys a red car instead of a blue motorcycle," it is the same as saying "At t1, Jane buys a red car instead of a blue motorcycle using her free will" is true. Because it is true, this means that when t1 roles around, Jane must buy a red car. Jane cannot do otherwise because if Jane were to buy a blue motorcycle, she would violate known and established truth that God already knows. In other words, what propositions God knows to be true must come about because of the very absolute and definitive nature of omniscience.

Per the IEP article on "Foreknowledge and Free Will," "Ultimately the alleged incompatibility of foreknowledge and free will is shown to rest on a subtle logical error. When the error, a modal fallacy, is recognized and remedied, the problem evaporates."

To say that time did not always exist is to say that there was a time before time, which is absurd. — Thorongil

Even Big Bang cosmology posits a "beginning of time." It is indeed problematic to talk about anything "before" time, but that is simply a limitation of human thought and language.

Per the IEP article on "Foreknowledge and Free Will," "Ultimately the alleged incompatibility of foreknowledge and free will is shown to rest on a subtle logical error. When the error, a modal fallacy, is recognized and remedied, the problem evaporates." — aletheist

Thanks for the article. I've struggled to find a rigorous way to show that determinism isn't entailed by foreknowledge, so that's helpful.

Although I will add that one can avoid the modal fallacy by having as a premise that foreknowledge is only possible if determinism is true (else how can one actually come to know what will happen?). Of course, if you posit some supreme being who can simply have the knowledge without explanation then this premise can be denied.

Even Big Bang cosmology posits a "beginning of time." — aletheist

No, it doesn't. Lots of science popularizers say this sort of thing, but it's not technically accurate. The Big Bang is a singularity and a singularity is just a word used to describe the breakdown of physics equations. Nothing much follows from it, other than our ignorance of it.

Ultimately the alleged incompatibility of foreknowledge and free will is shown to rest on a subtle logical error — aletheist

Can you summarize the error?

Per the IEP article on "Foreknowledge and Free Will," "Ultimately the alleged incompatibility of foreknowledge and free will is shown to rest on a subtle logical error. When the error, a modal fallacy, is recognized and remedied, the problem evaporates." — aletheist

Please explain, in your own words, the modal logic and how the problem of divine foreknowledge I presented is solved.

Keep in mind that the people who write these articles are philosophers and thinkers who already have opinions on the topic. Appealing to a IEP article, I guess I can show that the evidential problem of evil escapes criticism.

The Big Bang is a singularity and a singularity is just a word used to describe the breakdown of physics equations. — Thorongil

This is true, and (as you say) often overlooked or misunderstood. In fact, it is a rarely acknowledged assumption that the so-called "laws of nature" have operated throughout the past exactly as we observe them operating today, all the way back to that singularity or very shortly thereafter. Are you saying, then, that we can meaningfully talk about something that was before the Big Bang?

Can you summarize the error? — Thorongil

Please explain, in your own words, the modal logic and how the problem of divine foreknowledge I presented is solved. — Chany

Basically, the mistake is thinking that the actuality of P entails the impossibility of not-P, or that God's (or anyone else's) knowledge that P entails that P is necessarily true; P remains contingent in both cases. It is not the case that Jane buys the red car because God knows that Jane will buy the red car; rather, God knows that Jane will buy the red car because Jane (freely) buys the red car.

Can you summarize the error? — Thorongil

Please explain, in your own words, the modal logic and how the problem of divine foreknowledge I presented is solved. — Chany

The error is to go from ¬◇(A ∧ ¬B) to A ⊃ □B.

A is "I know that you will turn left" and B is "You will turn left". Determinism requires □B, but □B isn't entailed by A.

The error is to go from ¬◊(A ∧ ¬B) to A ⊃ ☐B. — Michael

Right, ¬◊(A ∧ ¬B) entails ☐(A ⊃ B), not A ⊃ ☐B. Likewise, "if x knows that p, then p must be true" is properly formalized as ☐(Kxp ⊃ p), rather than Kxp ⊃ ☐p.

I don't think free will justifies the existence of evil, regardless. Not for a perfectly good God. A different sort of God, sure. — Marchesk

Do you think it would have been better to be an object without the capacity to choose, like a rock or something, than to be a human being with the capacity to choose, but with the possibility that the choice might be the wrong choice? Because that's what you're arguing, that God would have been a better God if He created us without the capacity to choose.

Are you saying, then, that we can meaningfully talk about something that was before the Big Bang? — aletheist

I'm saying we can't meaningfully talk about there being something or not something before the Big Bang. All such talk is by definition meaningless unless and until we know more about it. The proper response is agnosticism, especially as scientific theories can and do change. The philosopher is free to speculate, certainly, but the scientist in his capacity as a scientist is not.

It is not the case that Jane buys the red car because God knows that Jane will buy the red car; rather, God knows that Jane will buy the red car because Jane (freely) buys the red car. — aletheist

I think I knew this. My issue is with the parenthetical "freely" you included. What is that adding? What does it even mean?

that God would have been a better God if He created us without the capacity to choose. — Metaphysician Undercover

I would say there is a third option that people in this debate rarely talk about: that it could be better had God not created us or anything at all. The framing of your question is such that it makes God create either way, it's just a matter of what he creates. Well, I don't think we can assume that. If God was free to create, why did he choose to do so?

People use the free will define as an explanation of how God is good and must remain hidden, but there is literally no difference in terms of causality. Whether God is hidden or not doesn’t change either God’s knowledge or God’s action in causing this particular world over another. For God to appear to us, for example, is no less “coercive” with respect to causality than getting some people to believe through a threat of eternal damnation.Either way, people are caused, and a present with a situation (scripture telling of God, God presenting in for to them) where they must make a choice with their free will.

In any case, God knowingly creates a system of forces which results in people who choose to follow or not. With respect to God’s causal and moral responsibility, it actually makes no difference whether God is hidden or not. Either way, God knowing creates people who will be damned for eternity rather than not (when God could have easily done otherwise).


The free will defence is a contradiction. It’s used to account for a situation free will makes impossible. Free will absolves causality from being responsible for the logical definition of of an act. An action is not the responsibility of that which caused the person who acts (e.g. God, a parent, etc.), but of the individual themselves. Within deterministic causality, they freely chose to act in this way. When will is free, causality no longer predetermines any act, no matter how it was caused. If there is free will, any causal act (including God’s) cannot violate it. God may know of and deliberately cause anything without violating free will (as God does in creating this particular world).

So the free will defence of God is actually based on denying free will. It desperately wants to put all the power in God’s hands, to make the casual acts of God logically necessary, as if they were predetermined and didn’t have to deal with other beings with their own being and agency. The move is a self-serving one, made to put God beyond other possibilities and moral responsibility for actions.

If what God does is logically necessary, God had no other ways of acting— it’s the only way to resolve the problem of omnipotence, omniscience and God’s nature of being necessarily good. All other (and possibility moral better!) courses of action must be logically incoherent, such that they don’t constitute a possibility that an omnipotent being could have easily performed instead.


Rather than being a defence against the argument God is evil, free will is really the killing blow. If there is free will, then what God knowingly causes does not take away the fact people choose. God may be resolved of the responsibility of defining the evil acts of humanity, but this also means how God acts does not violate free will. Being omnipotent and omniscience, God could have easily chosen to create only people who would choose to follow God’s authority. Or chosen not to burn people who did not follow God’s authority for eternity.

The freedom of will is what defines the moral abhorrence of this God.

My issue is with the parenthetical "freely" you included. What is that adding? What does it even mean? — Thorongil

God's knowledge that Jane will buy the red car does not entail that Jane will necessarily buy the red car, such that buying the blue motorcycle instead is impossible. The latter is thus still an alternate possibility, and Jane freely chooses to buy the red car (in the libertarian sense), rather than being (deterministically) compelled to do so.

By giving pain to others. doctors feel honor and satisfaction, while a criminal self degradation. What we feel becomes us, and builds character. Our character makes us gravitate to the place in the life accordingly. The doctor creates a peaceful world for himself, while the criminal lives in fearful world.

The free will allows us to make the choice. Some can say that the free will lets us choose between defiance and cooperation with God.

I would say there is a third option that people in this debate rarely talk about: that it could be better had God not created us or anything at all. The framing of your question is such that it makes God create either way, it's just a matter of what he creates. Well, I don't think we can assume that. If God was free to create, why did he choose to do so? — Thorongil

I guess I can add that to the list of assumptions made by the free will defense.

God's knowledge that Jane will buy the red car does not entail that Jane will necessarily buy the red car, such that buying the blue motorcycle instead is impossible. The latter is thus still an alternate possibility, and Jane freely chooses to buy the red car (in the libertarian sense), rather than being (deterministically) compelled to do so. — aletheist

Something seems off about this. Then again, most things regarding the existence of free will seem off to me, so what do I know.

God's knowledge that Jane will buy the red car does not entail that Jane will necessarily buy the red car, such that buying the blue motorcycle instead is impossible. The latter is thus still an alternate possibility, and Jane freely chooses to buy the red car (in the libertarian sense), rather than being (deterministically) compelled to do so. — aletheist

Like Chany, there's still something fishy about this. For God to know her action before she chose it may not mean that God proximally caused the action, but it does mean her action isn't free, or else he couldn't know of it in advance. Perhaps you will say that God is not in time and so doesn't know anything in advance. He knows everything all at once. But the notion of "knowing everything at once" is completely beyond our kin, perhaps even incoherent. If so, then the free will defense isn't even necessary to make. The best response to the problem of evil is God's in the book of Job, as Marchesk pointed out, which is effectively, "I hear your complaint, but you can't know with much or indeed any clarity what I am, why I do the things I do in the ways I do them, and why I permit certain things you perceive as evil." This is not a satisfying response, because it's effectively a cop out, but it's better than concocting philosophically untenable theodicies.