I think that there is a definite resemblance between Schopenhauer's idea of will and the idea of intentionality. I have begun reading his, 'The World As Will and Idea' recently. His particular interpretation of Kant is also interesting in thesense that he suggests that our experiences are 'the thing in itself.' However, his whole phenomenological approach is fascinating, especially how he perceives perception of reality and how the 'whole world, is only object in relation to subject, perception of a perceived, in a word, idea.'

Schopenhauer is very interesting. I read him a long time ago, and phenonemologcally I am on thin ice, so if I am not up to speed bear with me. I do think that the phenomenological notion of intentionality is much more modern than Schopenhauer's notion of will. Schopenhauer's will represents an answer to the problem Kant foisted on us, the problem of the Thing in itself. It leads to all kinds of dualisms, antinomies that needed to be solved by the generation of German idealists. Hegel's soution represents an answer and Schopenhauer's radically dfferent answer is an answer as well.

I think the phneomenologists dealt with the question in a rather different way. They did not try to answer the problem of the thing in Itself, or the antinomies that it created, Phenomenology shifted the method of analysis. Instead of asking why or how our knowlege of the worl conforms to the world, they analysed how certain objects appear and how consciousness then made leap of consstructing an object at all. They would not ask the question of what the object is, but only how it appears. Here intentionality has its function. The insight thatconsciousness is always consciousness of something. One can never question consciousness in abstracto, but it always has a concrete something in mind. That shifted attention away from the Kantian table of categories and Hegels' concepts to a philosophy of consciousness 'in the world'.

Schopenhauer does not do away with the question of the thing in itself in that modern veign. He keeps the Kantian insight that the world is idea in the sense of that which comes for consciousness, (Vorstellung in german, literally, 'that which puts itself in front') However that is only an aspect of the world. Our experience is not the thing in itself, that is 'vorstellung', however, everything that as such presents itself has a common characteristic, namely that it displays a certain 'will'. When we try to analyze the world as it is represented to cosnsciousness (rational, mental) we do not get there, but when we shift our focus we may see that every object, whatever it is, is the thing that it is because of will.

I read Schopenhauer more platonically / metaphysically. Will permeates everything and instantiates itself more or less strongly in each thing. In all our boily features will might be discerned, but even in our walls, in our houses, they all bare the hallmarks of a certain will. Even the lowliest rock keeps itself in its place. Will as this energy, or drive is what is the thing in itself in Schopenhauer.

Of course everyone is right to point out I think that he is a forerunner in the turn away from rationality and towards everyday being in the world. That might well be true. The turn to will in any case influenced Nietzsche and through him Heidegger and the latter postmodernists I guess.

I find a lot of similarities with the contemporary concept of intentionality. — Raul

Of course there are a lot. Simply put:
Will is the power with which we can decide on and initiate an action.
Intention is a condition of the mind or force directing us towards deciding on and initiating an action.
They are very closely related.
(There's no need for much pondering on that! :grin: )

Hi Alkis, your definitions are coming from ordinary-language ones, not the philosophical ones.
The sense and meaning of will for Schopenhauer has nothing to do with your definition above.
The same applies yo intentionality. Intentionality in philosophy is not coming from the ordinary use of intention.:snicker:
Read the comments from Tobias and Jack or study a bit more on Schopenhauer and Searles intentionality to better understand.

thanks Tobias

Right, I agree. Thanks Jack.

The sense and meaning of will for Schopenhauer has nothing to do with your definition above. — Raul

I see. In that case, I was wrong to respond to your topic. Sorry.

(BTW, I have read some works of Schopenhauer a very long time ago. I have grown up a lot since! :grin:)

Hegel thought the thing in itself was Absolute Knowledge, a kind of Platonic ideal. Schopenhauer loved Plato too but his thing in itself was Will instead of knowledge. They both thought matter was real but was subsumed by a greater mental form (kinda like Plato). Phenomenology to me seems much less Platonic than these thinkers and I think it's because of the influence of Nietschze

thanks Gregory. My point is not about what "will" for Schopenhauer was but more about its paralelism with contemporary "intentionality".
I find myself a lot of similirarities as noted by Jack above too.
And I find this fact as very interesting and worth revisiting Schopenhauer read with this intentionality-favor. Could it be he was the original precursor of this idea?

Intentionality infers free will, but one can intend to do something but one cannot intend the intention. All creatures are reactionary creatures, one can choose to react in a given way, but one cannot choose to not react, because the nature of the organism is reaction, the physical world's nature is to be cause. Intentionality is a rather shaky concept, considering one does not know what one's next thought is going to be. Free will is dulusional, intentionality just arrives unbidden upon which time we make it our own. To some degree, what one can do today depends upon what one has done in the past, can I intend to be a doctor today if unexperienced and illiterate? If I missing something here, I would appreciate a heads up.

Will for Schopenhauer was perfect pure autonomy and this is important in considering it's relation to phenomenology. I would be interested in knowing whether Hursserl read Schopenhauer directly although I feel like he wanted to start philosophy anew instead of just following the previous thinkers. "Intention" to me means understanding and will working together to ponder what phenomena means to our direct experience of it

Schopenhauer's will is blind, which fits comfortably with the fact that there is no such thing as free will. One should suspect something amiss with the concept of intentionality, which infers the autonomy of an agent. When one has no idea of what one's next thought is going to be, intention meaning full autonomy is more than a little suspect. When intention is talked about here, is it inferred that it must be by definition utterly conscious? Personally, I do not believe in free will, read intention, nor do I believe in fate. It all seems much less orderly to me.

Personally, I do not believe in free will, read intention, nor do I believe in fate. It all seems much less orderly to me. — boagie

Fate is not necessarily orderly. Free will seems very disorderly... Even less orderly? You believe you might be a pink fluffy elephant named FuFu tomorrow?

Not necessarily orderly, free will even more not necessarily orderly, please expand on your profound insights, I am all ears Tobias.

Well, fate might dictate that I die tomorrow because (parts of) a satellite came down from the sky. That was not in my or anyone's plans, actually a rather rare and random freak accident, yet fated. Free will is even more disorderly. Suddenly someone might decide to change plans and crash the airpane in which I was flying into a mountain range. Again not part of anyone's plans but the pilots and probably causing massive disruption to all kinds of neatly ordered time tables. Very disorderly this free will is.

The topic is, will versus intentionality. To me they are the same thing, like subject and object they cannot be separated. In order to move without, affecting the outer world, one must make intentionality one's will through reaction to outer stimulus. Intention is made the property of the will. via reaction to outer stimulus, so, there is an orderly process going on here. One might say that one can intend, but one cannot intend the intention. So, fate to you is what has happened, pastence, as in life was fated to die, so temporality is the same thing as fate to you.

You stated that the satelite hiting you was a random freak accident, YET FATED. Through what process, through what entity, does this fate come into being, is fate intended, your not getting biblical on me? Actually, after pondering this a little more I don't believe we are far apart on this. I stated somewhere that I didn't believe in free will nor fate but rather a bouncing around like a pin ball from one happenstance to another. It seems to me that is what you are describing, but it is inconsistent with there being free will at all. The other possibility is that chaos is so grand, that it is impossiable to find the order within.