metaphysical positions are neither true nor false. They have no truth value. They are more or less useful in a particular situation at a particular time. — T Clark
wouldn't we treat someone who has done something wrong but does not have free will differently that one who does have free will — T Clark
Are our actions different if we assume no free will is involved than if we assume there is? — T Clark
Criminal law takes the first person perspective, I experience free will, so assume you do too. — Tobias
I took a very straightforward interpretation of free will as my point of departure. There are others of course. The most sophisticated I have seen is the compatibiism of P.F. Strawson. — Tobias
Makes sense. Like axioms. — pfirefry
What considerations would we apply to distinguish between someone with free will and someone without? — pfirefry
You see, I wouldn't say, technically speaking, that "punishment" is the right term but, rather, "prevention". However, I would also so that "justice", or "retaliation", is perfectly justifiable under a deterministic worldview. — Bob Ross
We're not punishing them, we're trying to stop them from offending again. — T Clark
My stated assumption is that there is no free will. In that case, we would assume that all actions are determined — T Clark
That sounds very similar to our existing criminal justice system. Its goal is not to punish people, but to prevent future offences in the society. What's important is to establish law—the likelihood of being punished—in the society, but not punishments themselves. — pfirefry
I'd call this metaphysical position less useful, because I think the existence of free will is not relevant for justice. Even if all actions are determined, the justice system still needs to deal with a lot of uncertainty. I.e. we know things have happened the way they were supposed to happen — pfirefry
So to ask if there is "free will" is to be caught between asking if one can be free from the determinations of one's will, and asking whether one can determine one's determinations before one has determined them. Neither make sense, and so there can be no resolution, and we are, alas, bound forever to revisit the topic in a vain attempt to understand nonsense, until a fuller understanding liberates us. — unenlightened
I venture that the “free will” upheld by the people which endorse it is to be minimally understood as a semi-determinate process of effecting decisions wherein different outcomes / effects can be generated in identical situations — javra
So define freedom, such that it encompasses the available choices, tea and coffee, and will as the choice one makes... — unenlightened
Stalemate. — unenlightened
That was my current intended point. This in opposition to the position of free will being nonsensical to begin with. — javra
different outcomes / effects can be generated in identical situations — javra
One more time...
A chess player on her turn is free to make any legal move. Her will is to make the best move she can.
The only sense I can make of her 'free will' is not that she can make a poor move, but that she can stop playing chess.
The following is a simplification:-
Freedom is 'you can have what you want'
Free will is 'you can want what you don't want', or, 'you can not want what you want'. This contradiction is built in to your definition as...
different outcomes / effects can be generated in identical situations — javra — unenlightened
You are conflating “choice” (common standard English synonym for “will”) with “desire” (archaic synonym for “will”). — javra
Free will is the partly-determinate ontic ability to actualize different outcomes in those self-identical situations wherein one deliberates between two or more possible outcomes – this such that the decision one makes between said alternatives will be partly determined by, at the very minimum, one’s momentarily held goal (i.e., long term intent; long term desired outcome). — javra
Where is the ability to actualise a different outcome, viz. tea? My fixed desire is for coffee. — unenlightened
This " ability to actualize different outcomes" is where all the difficulty hides. — unenlightened
For instance, is the universe accurately described by physicalism, and are the innumerable consequences in respect to ourselves of the universe’s so being (or not being) thereby true (or untrue)? — javra
Problem is that you can never know. — Janus
Is there any point entertaining a question, the answer to which could never be determined (beyond entertaining it just once in order to realize what alternative possibilities are imaginable)? — Janus
Is there any point entertaining a question, the answer to which could never be determined (beyond entertaining it just once in order to realize what alternative possibilities are imaginable)?
— Janus
With what I just said in mind, imo, sure there are substantial points to entertaining non-physicalist systems of ontology. — javra
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