Yes, and so? — Pierre-Normand

A sentence like this is perfectly valid in chemistry:

"An acid is a molecule or ion capable of donating a hydron (proton or hydrogen ion H+), or, alternatively, capable of forming a covalent bond with an electron pair (a Lewis acid)"

What do you call the framework which provides the vocabulary to express it and also the conventions used to determine its validity? And is this framework autonomous?

So, chemistry may be reduced to Quantum mechanics (specifically the Standard Model) plus initial conditions of the universe, plus several arbitrary constants, plus General Relativity (in order to provide the conditions for atom formation), plus thermodynamics, at least. Not much of a reduction! — tom

That's true, for sure. But, in addition to this, many of the laws of chemistry are valid only for some specific classes of bounded chemical systems (and presuppose specific boundary conditions, such as the total energy of the system). In that regard, such laws are akin to the unified sets of laws (or norms) of animal physiology and behavior that only apply to specific animals.

What do you call the framework which provides the vocabulary to express it and also the conventions used to determine its validity? And is this framework autonomous? — Frederick KOH

I never said anything about the autonomy of "frameworks". I argued that some theories are non-reducible when they explain some emergent phenomena and when some of their explanatory successful laws are autonomous in the sense that they are derived from the joint realization of specific sets of high-level structural features of the systems -- whole equivalence classes of them, as previously explained -- in which those laws apply. (There is an intentional circularity, here). Those high level structural features thereby circumscribe the scope of applicability of the emergent laws.

So do you agree with this

Valid claims and questions can be made within chemistry that straddles multiple autonomous laws.

So do you agree with this

Valid claims and questions can be made within chemistry that straddles multiple autonomous laws. — Frederick KOH

For sure. It's Weinberg who would object to this, not me. He can't admit of his "arrows of explanation" pointing "sideways" to autonomous laws rather than them all pointing "below" in the general direction of his "final theory"

For sure. — Pierre-Normand

But if it can straddle multiple autonomous laws, why not also admit the objects of the theories of physics?

He can't admit of his "arrows of explanation" pointing "sideways" — Pierre-Normand

Converge.

But if it can straddle multiple autonomous laws, why not also admit the objects of the theories of physics? — Frederick KOH

Why not indeed! But the pluralist/emergentist admits readily of them. Remember Ernst Mayr on "analysis"? For one merely to be admitting of the existence of such "reductive" (i.e. analytical) explanations amounts to what Weinberg downplays as mere "petty reductionism". What Weinberg's "grand reductionism" requires is that only the objects of the theories of physics be admitted, or, at least, that only the objects of theories somehow "closer" to the "final theory" of physics be admitted.

Converge. — Frederick KOH

They must converge towards a single point, according to Weinberg. They must converge towards the "final theory", somewhere underneath both the Standard Model of particle physics and General Relativity.

Why not indeed! — Pierre-Normand

So what is the term you would use when the question "why do elements have the valencies they do" is answered by a theory of quantum mechanics?

My point was that you can occasionally go sideways and still converge.

So what is the term you would use when the question "why do elements have the valencies they do" is answered by a theory of quantum mechanics? — Frederick KOH

If the explanation were complete (which I may assume it to be, for the sake of the argument), then the term that I would use is "reductive explanation". Ernst Mayr, in his book What Makes Biology Unique, offers many historical examples of successful reductive explanations in biology. I don't know how many time I must point out that for pluralists/emergentists to deny that *all* genuine explanations of scientific laws are reductive (as Weinberg would require them all to be) doesn't entail that they don't believe any explanation to be reductive. Some high level laws represent cases of strong emergence, and some are reducible. Weinberg wants them all to be reducible, because the only alternative that he can imagine is magic.

In any case, to get back to your specific example of atomic valence, it may be doubted that the explanation of such properties is reductive in kind. See the enlightening discussion of orbital hybridization in the case of the tetrahedral geometry of methane, in section 8 of Michel Bitbol's Downward causation without foundations (There is a direct link to the pdf file down the page.)

My point was that you can occasionally go sideways and still converge. — Frederick KOH

Fair enough. But you can also fail to converge. Weinberg believes it to be an empirical fact (regarding the history of science) that actual arrows of explanation produced by the various special sciences tend to converge in the general direction of particle physics. But he focuses almost exclusively on reductive explanations and assumes without argument that non-reductive explanations that aren't pointing "down" to some underlying theory must be discounted as resting on uninteresting historical accidents (e.g. the contingent fact that an animal species has evolved in this or that way). So, his argument for "grand reductionism" is circular and the product of a lack of imagination (and, presumably also, a lack of familiarity with the analysis of the structure of non-reductive explanations.)

If the explanation were complete — Pierre-Normand

What does it mean for an explanation to be complete? We are talking about science are we not?

What does it mean for an explanation to be complete? We are talking about science are we not? — Frederick KOH

Maybe you and I are, but Weinberg isn't. He takes his observation about the apparent convergence of the arrows of explanation produced by science to furnish irresistible evidence for what he takes to be a fundamental fact about "the way the world is". This is why his "final theory" could remain just a "dream", in his view; and "grand reductionism" would still be a true characterization of the ways the world is. The complete explanation at issue amounts to "reduction in principle", not the actual production of complete reductive explanations. You and Rorty may be Deweyan pragmatists. Weinberg isn't.

What Weinberg argues for is effectively the complete determination (which is a matter of metaphysics rather than epistemology) of the principles governing higher-level phenomena (e.g. animal behavior) by the principles governing low-level phenomena (e.g. particle behavior). If this were the case, then, there would exist complete reductive explanations that are knowable in principle, even if they were only really known to God.

That's true, for sure. But in addition to this, many of the laws of chemistry are valid only for some specific classes of bounded chemical systems (and withing specific boundary conditions, such as the total energy of the system). In that regard, such laws are akin to the laws of animal physiology and behavior that govern specific animals. — Pierre-Normand

Wouldn't it be more accurate to say that SOME of the laws of chemistry are approximations?

Wouldn't it be more accurate to say that SOME of the laws of chemistry are approximations? — tom

I did not suggest that they were approximations, though some undoubtedly are. For a law not to apply universally need not entail that there must exist a more precise, as of yet unknown, "universal" law that it approximates. (This incorrect expectation lays at the root of Davidson's nomological principle of causality, I think)

My point was different. There are strong arguments to be made (on Kantian/Aristotelian grounds) that any law that purportedly governs empirical phenomena either must have exceptions (i.e. can be interfered with by something (or may fails to apply at some energy scale, etc.) or isn't really an empirically significant law but rather merely is an idealized abstract principle (a mathematical constraint, for instance). But, in the latter case, such a principle must always be interpreted in a determinate empirical context in order to be rendered relevant to the regulation of empirical phenomena that show up within specific domains of inquiry. We are then back to the first situation.

Truly exceptionless "laws" always are unreal abstractions, on that view. This possibility may be obscured by the tendency to conceive of "universal laws of nature" against the background assumption of a metaphysics of temporally instantaneous (and ontologically self-contained) "events" and Humean causation. But empirical results gathered from real experimental setups (and from ordinary human perceptual experience) always must be made sense of on the quite different background of a metaphysics of objects (i.e. traditional "substances") and their specific fallible powers.

Bohr's complementarity principle, in its wider philosophical generalization beyond the narrow scope of quantum mechanics, constitutes an explanation of this, I think. The principles of quantum mechanics determine not only the unitary evolution of pure quantum "states" (this is the abstract "universal" part of the theory) but must also specify the projections of those states onto definite "observables". And the latter always must make at least tacit reference to definite macroscopic experimental setups, as well at to definite human conceptual understandings, and/or pragmatic uses, of those setups.

What Weinberg argues for is effectively the complete determination (which is a matter of metaphysics rather than epistemology) of the principles governing higher-level phenomena (e.g. animal behavior) by the principles governing low-level phenomena (e.g. particle behavior). — Pierre-Normand

He is more equivocal:
" Sometimes things can be explained by studying their constituents—sometimes not."
pg 111 Facing Up

Later:
Reductionism may or may not be a good guide for a program of weather
forecasting, but it provides the necessary insight that there are no
autonomous laws of weather that are logically independent of the
principles of physics. Whether or not it helps the meteorologist to
keep it in mind, cold fronts are the way they are because of the
properties of air and water vapor and so on, which in turn arethe
way they are because of the principles of chemistry and physics.
We don’t know the final laws of nature, but we know that they are
not expressed in terms of cold fronts or thunderstorms.

You read "complete determination" into "the way they are". I don't.

He takes his observation about the apparent convergence of the arrows of explanation produced by science to furnish irresistible evidence for what he takes to be a fundamental fact about "the way the world is". — Pierre-Normand

Nothing wrong with that. That's how hypotheses are formulated sometimes. You don't need the word irresistible to qualify the evidence you use to form hypotheses.

He takes his observation about the apparent convergence of the arrows of explanation produced by science to furnish irresistible evidence for what he takes to be a fundamental fact about "the way the world is". — Pierre-Normand

Do you find the abandonment of vitalism in the life sciences equally unwarranted?

I did not suggest that they were approximations, though some undoubtedly are. For a law not to apply universally need not entail that there must exist a more precise, as of yet unknown, "universal" law that it approximates. — Pierre-Normand

OK, but the list of laws that underlie chemistry are universal, plus there are the universal constants and the non-universal initial conditions of the universe. Chemists might be remiss in not specifying that certain reactions on earth can't happen in a plasma or prior to the formation of super-novae, but that's not the point of chemistry.

It is quite simply a fact of history that there are levels of approximation to true explanations, and it is a fact of epistemology that the true laws of nature must be able to be approached in this way. That the laws of nature permit this is a something that requires an explanation in itself.

My point was different. There are strong arguments to be made (on Kantian/Aristotelian grounds) that any law that purportedly governs empirical phenomena either must have exceptions (i.e. can be interfered with by something (or may fails to apply at some energy scale, etc.) or isn't really an empirically significant law but rather merely is an idealized abstract principle (a mathematical constraint, for instance). — Pierre-Normand

But the laws of nature don't "govern empirical phenomena". They are explanations of what exists in reality, how it behaves, and why. From these explanations, certain empirical phenomena may be deduced, which is how we test the laws.

And, it is a deep sin in science to protect one's theories by ad-hoc means.

Truly exceptionless "laws" always are unreal abstractions, on that view. This possibility may be obscured by the tendency to conceive of "universal laws of nature" against the background assumption of a metaphysics of temporally instantaneous (and ontologically self-contained) "events" and Humean causation. — Pierre-Normand

Not sure where this is going, mostly because Causation and Physical Law are indeed abstractions, they are not physical objects.

It might be worth noting that Causation and our best Physical Laws (both abstractions) are under some tension, if not completely incompatible ideas.

Bohr's complementarity principle, in its wider philosophical generalization beyond the narrow scope of quantum mechanics, constitutes an explanation of this, I think. The principles of quantum mechanics determine not only the unitary evolution of pure quantum "states" (this is the abstract "universal" part of the theory) but must also specify the projections of those states onto definite "observables". — Pierre-Normand

Then decoherence happened.

Reductionism may or may not be a good guide for a program of weather
forecasting, but it provides the necessary insight that there are no
autonomous laws of weather that are logically independent of the
principles of physics. Whether or not it helps the meteorologist to
keep it in mind, cold fronts are the way they are because of the
properties of air and water vapor and so on, which in turn arethe
way they are because of the principles of chemistry and physics.
We don’t know the final laws of nature, but we know that they are
not expressed in terms of cold fronts or thunderstorms. — Frederick KOH

I think this is a bit cheap. Any decent theory of cosmology will, in the long run, have to take account of what sentient knowledge-bearing entities, found in the viscinity of stars, decide to do do. That cannot be achieved by String Theory alone.

Not even the weather can be in-principle predicted by the principles of physics and chemistry alone. On Venus it can, but not on Earth. What humans will do to affect the weather cannot be predicted.

Why not indeed! But the pluralist/emergentist admits readily of them. — Pierre-Normand

This means that areas of inquiry with autonomous theories are not themselves autonomous. Given a question, explanations do not have to stay within a theory, autonomous or not. So this gives a sense to the word "fundamental" as used by Weinberg whether you agree with his choice of word. The more "fundamental" a theory is, the more widespread the possibility and actuality of its use becomes (especially if you include the theories underwriting the instruments of observation).

This means that areas of inquiry with autonomous theories are not themselves autonomous. — Frederick KOH

No, it doesn't entail that. The autonomy of whole theories almost always is merely partial, since broad theories encompass both emergent laws and reducible laws. As applied to individual laws, then the autonomy can be total.

Given a question, explanations do not have to stay within a theory, autonomous or not.

They may not need to but they very often do.

So this gives a sense to the word "fundamental" as used by Weinberg whether you agree with his choice of word. The more "fundamental" a theory is, the more widespread the possibility and actuality of its use becomes (especially if you include the theories underwriting the instruments of observation).

Weinberg's "final theory" only is fundamental, then, in the sense that its scope of application is allegedly wider. But it is only wider than the scope of high-level theories owing to the fact that it explains laws that govern either the parts of the entities explained by those theories, or the parts or their parts, or the parts of the parts of their parts, etc. So, it is merely concerned with the ultimate "parts" (or quantum fields or whatever) while abstracting away from emergent structures that don't depend on intrinsic properties of their parts (or of whatever laws govern the phenomena of the "underlying" theories), and that generalize across multiply-realizable domains (and hence actually have wider explanatory scopes than theories merely applying to a bunch of small particles!).

So, Weinberg's preferred arrows of explanations all point towards the smallest parts. He ignores the arrows that point to structural relationships between parts at the same level of mereological composition. His explanation of what is "fundamental" then fails to justify his view of reductionism, since this view is premised in the idea of the convergence of the arrows explanation but he has simply ignored all the arrows that don't ultimately lead to his preferred "fundamental" level.

No, it doesn't entail that. The autonomy of whole theories almost always is merely partial, — Pierre-Normand

I was making a claim about areas of inquiry. We saw a stark example with a simple statement about acids.

I was making a claim about areas of inquiry. We saw a stark example with a simple statement about acids. — Frederick KOH

What I said about broad theories, as opposed to individual laws, is also true of wide areas of inquiry. The explanation of the properties of acids and bases may make reference to both emergent laws and reductive laws. Maybe it is a stark example of the scientific fruitfulness of reductive explanations (Ernst Mayr's "analysis"). So? There are also stark examples of the scientific fruitfulness of non-reductive explanations.

So? — Pierre-Normand

It means that "fundamental" theories have two means of being "transported" from their original birthplace to other areas of inquiry.

It means that "fundamental" theories have two means of being "transported" from their original birthplace to other areas of inquiry. — Frederick KOH

I don't follow. What are those two means?

I don't follow. What are those two means? — Pierre-Normand

Could be more than two - depending on how you use your terminology.

I have two sets of questions in this regard. I have put them in different comments to make clear their separation.

When the discussion touched chemistry, you used the term "autonomous law" instead of "autonomous theory".

Suppose this question was asked in 1835:

Are the following what you consider to be autonomous laws:

Coulomb's Law
The Biot-Savart Law
Oersted's Law
Faraday's Law of Induction