The existence of ethics

Astrophel

I think before we can talk about Mill or Kant, or the nature of moral obligation or how moral attitudes figure into morality itself, and so on, we have to ask a more fundamental question: what IS ethics? What is an ethical exemplar's essential features that are required to say it is ethical at all? This is reductive: actual ethical affairs are variable in content and matters at stake. The philosophical question is, how do we talk about ethics at a level where these incidentals are suspended so as to identify the "what is it?" of an ethical matter? Suspended are the book that is stolen, the value of the book, the intent to steal, the rationalization, and, of course, the search for a principle of determining what to do (categorical imperative and duty, principles of utility and hedonic measuring: not that these are unimportant, but that they are not about the question I am asking here).
What is a proper analysis of the "parts" of an ethical problem? A geologist will observe a stone, identify mica, feldspar, quartz, determine age, the crystalline structure, and so on. What is "in" an ethical case?
Why do this? Well, it is philosophically interesting, nay, important. All this talk about how attitudes vary and cultures cannot agree and the popularity of ethical nihilism seems to beg the question: What is it, exactly, that is "annihilated"?

SophistiCat

↪Astrophel

Good question, but it probably shouldn't come as a surprise that it's been given some attention already.

The topic of this entry is not—at least directly—moral theory; rather, it is the definition of morality. Moral theories are large and complex things; definitions are not. The question of the definition of morality is the question of identifying the target of moral theorizing. Identifying this target enables us to see different moral theories as attempting to capture the very same thing. And it enables psychologists, anthropologists, evolutionary biologists, and other more empirically-oriented theorists to design their experiments or formulate their hypotheses without prejudicing matters too much in terms of the specific content a code, judgment, or norm must have in order to count as distinctively moral. — The Definition of Morality

Astrophel

Good question, but it probably shouldn't come as a surprise that it's been given some attention already. — SophistiCat

It is not the definition of moral theory I am after. Note how this "definition" puts the burden of analysis on the "target", then proceeds to defer to psychologists, anthropologists and the rest. I ask, in order tp have a moral theory at all, you have to have something before you to theorize about. What is it there, in the reduced analysis of actual moral affair, that can make moral theorizing possible? If an anthropologist is going to proceed with an anthropological take on ethics, she is going to have a tendential perspective. I want to know, a tendential perspective about what? Does this yield yet another perspective that is deferred to? Or, if not this, then what?

Banno

↪Astrophel

Isn't ethics about deciding rationally what you ought to do?

hypericin

What it is is a codification, elaboration, ossification, (and in some cases, perversion),of innate concepts and feelings of fairness and justice that are inborn in most of us, and in most social species.

Consider, after all, the first moral utterance of every child: "It's not fair!" This is an untaught appeal to fairness and justice.

SophistiCat

It is not the definition of moral theory I am after. Note how this "definition" puts the burden of analysis on the "target", then proceeds to defer to psychologists, anthropologists and the rest. — Astrophel

No, you got the wrong idea. Read on.

SophistiCat

What it is is a codification (and in some cases, perversion) of innate concepts and feelings of fairness and justice that are inborn in most of us, and in most social species. — hypericin

This answer seeks to smuggle a specific position on metaethics into the very definition of the subject matter. This is all too common in discussions such as this.

Mww

what IS ethics? — Astrophel

Ethics in general, is the nature of man.

A theory on the nature of man gives a ethical doctrine related to it.

Same as it ever was.....

Banno

Ethics in general, is the nature of man. — Mww

As if there were an "essence" which all men had in common and which could be set out in a book...

The problem of ethics is not "what is the case" but "What do we do"?

hypericin

This answer seeks to smuggle a specific position on metaethics into the very definition of the subject matter — SophistiCat

And this specific position is?

Astrophel

sn't ethics about deciding rationally what you ought to do? — Banno

Of course. But oughts are about normativity and they are everywhere. One ought to put on socks before shoes. But all oughts have their terms of engagement. At the basic level, what are the "terms" of ethics? Of course, there is a long history here, but Mill or Bentham, say, begged this question.

Rationality follows these terms rather than dictating them.

Banno

↪Astrophel

Sure. So much wind.

But the distinction I pointed out to @Mww seems pivotal: ethics is not about what is the case but what to do. It is not to be found by looking around at the world, but in deciding what actions one will take.

SO there's a start.

john27

ethics is not about what is the case but what to do. — Banno

How can you lift an arm without knowing what an arm is?

180 Proof

↪Astrophel

Ethics seems to me the study of how to discern adaptive conduct which optimizes – from maladaptive conduct which fails to optimize – habits/customs of (i.e. individual preferences/social priorities for) non-reciprocally giving others help and care.

The problem of ethics is not "what is the case" but "What do we do"? — Banno

I think that's backwards. The latter is decided on the basis of the former: "what do we do?" is the question of morality which is variously answered by (naive, banal or reflective) ethics.

Banno

↪john27

No.

Astrophel

What it is is a codification, elaboration, ossification, (and in some cases, perversion),of innate concepts and feelings of fairness and justice that are inborn in most of us, and in most social species.

Consider, after all, the first moral utterance of every child: "It's not fair!" This is an untaught appeal to fairness and justice. — hypericin

What you describe is a structured event whereby "inborn" feelings of fairness and justice are taken up in fixed systems of thought. I am sure this is somewhere close to right. But those inborn concepts and feelings, how inborn are they? what is the separation between what is acculturated and what is "natural"? And even if something natural is discovered, ain't this at best a prima facie part of the normativity? That is, if I have a feeling, a pang of conscience, isn't this to be brought up under review to see if it's right? And this applies as well to way we apply the established code: we have laws, rules, legally determined or otherwise, but the ethical correctness of these is complicated.
Of course, we all see where this goes: These complications are what underlies any given determination, prescription, decision. One has to work things out if one is to go beyond the reflexive obedience of a traffic light, and this leads to interpretative trouble. But beneath this trouble (which is beneath the reflexive act) isn't there something more analytically fundamental?
I think there is. I think ethics is Real, not just a construct. All constructs are constructs OF something. All meaningful affairs are meaningful only to the extent that there is a material basis for them.

john27

No. — Banno

Well in any case, it would seem that "how" needs a "what". (i.e What is the plan, how are we going to execute it). Unless good and evil is universal amongst mankind.

Banno

↪john27

Can you explain this? It's hard ot see what you might be suggesting.

john27

Can you explain this? — Banno

If good is not known to be a universal, then how one acts "good" is relegated to subjective standards, which kind of defeats the point of making a list on "how" to do things.

Astrophel

No, you got the wrong idea. Read on. — SophistiCat

Note how the definition is supposed to identify " the target of moral theorizing. So, social theory, e.g., finds this target and then can organize its theorizing with this as its objective. It enables "empirically-oriented theorists to design their experiments or formulate their hypotheses without prejudicing matters." Well said, I say. Alas, if one is looking for something substantive about the nature of ethics, one is directed toward what it is these disciplines tell us.
Calling ethics the target of all thinking that deals with ethics is vacuous. This is a philosophical problem, not an empirical one.

Banno

↪john27

Is it? How odd.

Astrophel

This answer seeks to smuggle a specific position on metaethics into the very definition of the subject matter. This is all too common in discussions such as this. — SophistiCat

Why, metaethics? Whatever cold you mean by this?

Astrophel

This answer seeks to smuggle a specific position on metaethics into the very definition of the subject matter. This is all too common in discussions such as this. — SophistiCat

Keep in mind, there are metaethical answers to this question that vary wildly.

john27

Is it? How odd. — Banno

Er, is what odd? Sorry, I just didn't know which part of what I said you were referring to.

Astrophel

Ethics in general, is the nature of man.

A theory on the nature of man gives a ethical doctrine related to it.

Same as it ever was..... — Mww

Well, this just a tad general, don't you think? Reason could be here substituted for ethics and it would still be true. What kind of doctrine would an ethical doctrine be? And once you have that doctrine, what are the assumptions built into it that would expose a deeper understanding of ethics?

john27

Reason could be here substituted for ethics and it would still be true. — Astrophel

Meh. Ethical actions tend to betray rationality more often then not, I'd think.

Astrophel

Meh. Ethical actions tend to betray rationality more often then not, I'd think. — john27

But then, it is certainly a different matter using a conditional logical form to talk about the weather, on the one hand, and talking about assaulting Mrs. Griswald for her cookies. Reason is omnipresent. Perhaps, so is ethics, in a way. But one cannot call ethics an exercise in reason and think the matter done.

god must be atheist

↪Astrophel

I wrote the following two papers explaining why ethics can't be defined. The thrust of my thesis was that ethics in fact comprises two separate and irreconcilable systems, each of which can be defined, but the two are always lumped together into one, and that causes a lot of confusion for philosophers. There are distinct similarities and differences between the two systems which I tried to describe in the papers.

Everyone on this site poo-pooed on these papers, those who criticized them, but mainly those who never even bothered to look at them.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/10744/ethics-explained-to-smooth-out-all-wrinkles-in-current-debates-neo-darwinist-approach/p1

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/10903/shortened-version-of-theory-of-morality-some-objected-to-the-conversational-style-of-my-paper

john27

But then, it is certainly a different matter using a conditional logical form to talk about the weather, on the one hand, and talking about assaulting Mrs. Griswald for her cookies. — Astrophel

Sorry, I couldn't make sense of this.

god must be atheist

Sorry, I couldn't make sense of this. — john27

I think Apostrophel talks about logic and truth; how logical speech does not ALWAYS concern itself with ethics, so restricting ethics as a subset of reason is a bit of a useless exercise, is what I think he is saying. If he says that, I agree.

john27

I think Apostrophel talks about logic and truth; how logical speech does not ALWAYS concern itself with ethics, so restricting ethics as a subset of reason is a bit of a useless exercise, is what I think he is saying. If he says that, I agree. — god must be atheist

Ohh. I would agree as well if that's the case.

The existence of ethics

Welcome to The Philosophy Forum!

Categories

More Discussions