Now you are simply appealing to authority. Some famous philosopher said it, therefore it must be true... It seems to me that you've ran out arguments, so I'm out. — Fafner
Funny thing is that Cuthbert's last point was spot on. The name for a thing is not necessarily the same as the thing. We talk about things we invent/create. We talk about things we discover.
This interpretation, then, is a kind of selection from among possible, and contingent, meanings.
— tim wood
This is where we have to proceed with caution, and not jump to conclusions. You say this as if there are possible meanings, in existence, like possible worlds in existence, but if the interpreter chooses from possible meanings, these possible meanings are produced within the interpreter's mind, just like possible worlds are produced by the logician's propositions. — Metaphysician Undercover
For a guess. For present purpose it's enough note there's an act of interpretation. In the sense you argue, all interpretation is faulty; which is to say, exactly, that all interpretation is interpretation. In short, I do not think we're here much concerned with quality of interpretation.When an interpreter chooses a meaning, one does so on the assumption that there is a correct meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover
But what is being punched in the nose but a more general form of thinking about being punched in the nose? I'm thinking they're plain different.But what is perception other than a much more general form of interpretation? — Metaphysician Undercover
In the case of interpreting reality, we are not guided by this assumption, so we produce the assumption that there is a way that reality "is", a type of logical basis, the law of identity. The problem is that this "the way that the world is" is inconsistent with the way that the world reveals itself to us through our senses. The world presents itself to us as continually changing through time, with no such thing as "the way that the world is". — Metaphysician Undercover
The world presents itself to us as continually changing through time, with no such thing as "the way that the world is". — Metaphysician Undercover
No, the funny thing is he wasn't spot on at all, as I never said the name for a thing is necessarily the same as the thing.
Your and Cuthbert's problem is you think when you use the word for the thing you are actually successfully representing the thing itself instead of more words referring to that thing.
And Cuthbert wasn't even saying what you said he was saying. He was trying to explain the difference between a word in scare quotes and one without them, which wasn't the issue I had been discussing...
"S knows that P" is just an informal schema. It is a stand-in for a proposition formed by concatenating the name of a subject, the phrase " knows that " and a proposition. — Srap Tasmaner
S knows that P" is also informal in the sense that it is designedly neutral on what sorts of things S and P are -- remember, there is no specified domain of discourse -- except that they would be considered appropriate on the LHS and the RHS of " knows that ". — Srap Tasmaner
Do you agree that, assuming sincerity in speech, that calling a statement "true" displays belief that the statement is true(corresponds to reality, if you like)? — creativesoul
Can one's definitions be wrong? If so, how so? — creativesoul
If existence alone makes something meaningful, then it is not the case that meaning depends upon interpretation and judgment, for existence doesn't require either. — creativesoul
And...
Meaningless marks exist. — creativesoul
And yes, thought/belief and statements thereof come through a subject, however the ability to form thought/belief requires something other than the subject. — creativesoul
We(mankind) have had plenty of historical agreements as to what constituted being true, and have been wrong. We've later found out that that which we once thought/believed and agreed was true, was not. Rather much of what we thought/believed was true was false. Truth cannot be false. Agreement about what is true can be. Therefore, agreement is insufficient for truth. — creativesoul
Thanatos Sand
No, the funny thing is he wasn't spot on at all, as I never said the name for a thing is necessarily the same as the thing.
He was spot on by virtue of describing something agreeable to my words, not yours. You were arguing against mine earlier, by virtue of misunderstanding. He chimed in earlier in order to share that bit of knowledge with you, seeing that I was quite unsuccessful at it.
"Your and Cuthbert's problem is you think when you use the word for the thing you are actually successfully representing the thing itself instead of more words referring to that thing".
Why would you mistakenly conclude that I conflate conceptual meaning with the unknown realm?"
And Cuthbert wasn't even saying what you said he was saying. He was trying to explain the difference between a word in scare quotes and one without them, which wasn't the issue I had been discussing...
Cuthbert was pointing out differences between a plurality of different uses/meaning for using quotes. In other words, he set out the the use of quotes two different ways. The bit about the word not being the thing is akin to the map/territory distinction.
Are you familiar with it?
It had occurred to me that the essence of truth was to be found in definition. A definition is not itself false, because it must be judged as such, by comparing it to reality, and reality is inductive principles drawn from common usage. So if it is not an acceptable definition according to inductive conclusions, one might try to argue that it is "false". But since usage varies and changes, these inductive principles cannot rule out any possible uses or definitions as impossible, so none can accurately be said to be false. If definitions are the type of thing which cannot be false, and truth is the type of thing which cannot be false, then we have correspondence between truth and definition. That is, if one is assuming that truth is the type of thing which cannot be false, then we find truth as corresponding to definition — Metaphysician Undercover
When we say "Bob knows the sky is blue", what is meant is "Bob knows that the sky is blue", — Metaphysician Undercover
not "Bob knows this proposition "the sky is blue'". If we add "that", to say "Bob knows that the sky is blue", what we are saying is Bob knows the proposition "the sky is blue", as true. What is added then, by adding "that", is that "the sky is blue" now signifies a proposition which is designated as true, instead of a state of affairs. So by adding "that" to "knows", such that we say "knows that", we change what follows (the sky is blue), from signifying a state of affairs to signifying a proposition. — Metaphysician Undercover
Less complicated. "Third door on the right," requires consideration and rejection of other doors, acceptance of the right door, and the question (which does not cease to be a question, even when answered, and certainly not when answered provisionally), "Is this the right door?" Any question of material existence is out-of-court. If you mean exists as ideas, that's iffy, because my idea of a possible world is no possible world, it is merely my idea of a possible world. In this case, "my idea of a possible world" is a noun substantive and cannot be broken into pieces without destroying the original meaning. — tim wood
For a guess. For present purpose it's enough note there's an act of interpretation. In the sense you argue, all interpretation is faulty; which is to say, exactly, that all interpretation is interpretation. In short, I do not think we're here much concerned with quality of interpretation. — tim wood
I can see an argument in favor, but at the expense of being able to talk about reality, because it's all interpretation. We're back to my question: Is this the substance of your argument, that everything is interpretation? Or not? — tim wood
Too many unexamined presuppositions. Let's try this. You encounter a tree - no mystery or confusion, it's a tree. For me, it's a tree. For you its an act of interpretation. Question, why don't you "interpret" it as a car? — tim wood
And why would you say that there is no such thing as the way the world is, because it's continually changing? If your idea is that the world does not change, then I can see where you have a problem, but why have that idea? What compels you to it? — tim wood
Hi MU. If your post, that I've spread out here, is an argument, would you please append to this a clear statement of your conclusion, if it isn't included above. I suspect your argument is a piece of extended irony, intended to give some folks a rash. — tim wood
I would invite you to consider the Toy Story example I presented earlier. Buzz and Woody actually mean exactly the same thing by the word "flying" and falling, with or without style, is excluded from that meaning. Buzz applies the word to events Woody doesn't only because Buzz has a mistaken belief that these are cases of what he and Woody agree is flying. — Srap Tasmaner
So it is with your treatment of the word "knowledge." — Srap Tasmaner
The invariance we pick out with words is actually there. We have words like "leaf" in our language because leaves are relatively persistent. Even in death, they are still leaves for quite a while before they finally decay enough for us to stop calling them leaves. That boundary is vague and nevertheless useful and effective. What leaves never do is spontaneously turn into mushrooms or fruits or rocks. — Srap Tasmaner
Believe it or not, "S knows that P" is just an ordinary piece of Anglo-American philosophical shop talk. It is not, for instance, itself a theory of knowledge. You seem to be under the impression that it is. You seem to think it amounts to a claim that knowledge is knowledge of propositions being true, or assenting to them, or holding them true, or whatever. This little shorthand is no such theory; if any claim is made in using this schema, it is only that it is reasonable for us to describe some examples of people knowing things in this way. (And that it can be distinguished from things like knowing how to ride a bike, knowing John Kennedy, knowing the way to San José.) — Srap Tasmaner
I have only responded to how "S knows that P" has been used in this thread. It is quite clear that P stands for a proposition. If your claim is that "S knows that P" may be used in many different ways from this, that fact is irrelevant, because you are just taking "S knows that P" out of the context from which it was used here, then basing your defence in this unrelated usage. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't quite understand this example. It is clear to me that Buzz and Woody don't mean the same thing with the word "flying". On what basis do you assume that they do? — Metaphysician Undercover
What I am trying to impress upon some members of this discussion who are inclined to insist that true is opposed with false, is that we will not ever get to the true essence of truth without looking at how "true" is actually used. And, when we do this, we are forced to give up on this necessity.
When we say that something is true, in accepted usage, we do not imply that it is absolutely impossible that it is false, because we never achieve absolute certainty. So to oppose "true" with "false" with that form of necessity, is a type of ideal, which exists in theory, but it isn't practical. Therefore it fails to provide us with a practical understanding of truth.
I wasn't asking about what you call it, but what you interpret it as being. That is, there has to be something by which you know it's a tree and not a car. And for so long as it is just interpretation and nothing more, then you can't know, and my question stands.I don't interpret the tree as a car, because I learned when I was young, and consequently my habit, is to call it a tree. I don't see the point you're trying to make, someone might call it a bush or a shrub, in different languages they would call it by things other than "tree". — Metaphysician Undercover
The issue is the assumption of "correct interpretation". In our approach to reality, there is no question in my mind, that we are interpreting reality, that's what sensing, perceiving, and apprehending is. The question is whether reality consists of a kind of substance or something like that, which can ground our assumptions of a correct interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover
As I said, the assumption of a "correct interpretation" is supported by the assumption that there is a "context". We assume that we can produce a correct interpretation by putting the thing being interpreted into the appropriate context. In the case of interpreting reality, the context is time and space. The spatial context alone is very simple, "third door on the right", is direct and straight forward. But if in time, I move to the other end of the hall, "third door on the right" means something completely different. — Metaphysician Undercover
...if [truth is opposed] to falsity by definition, then... this would form the complete essence of "true" and therefore truth. The necessity created by that definition would disallow that truth is anything other than this.
...we will not ever get to the true essence of truth without looking at how "true" is actually used. And, when we do this, we are forced to give up on this necessity. When we say that something is true, in accepted usage, we do not imply that it is absolutely impossible that it is false, because we never achieve absolute certainty. — Metaphysician Undercover
Read again what I said. We may, as theorists, describe something using propositions, without claiming that what we so describe has propositional form. It's practically the point of indicative speech.
For instance, when early Wittgenstein made the additional claim that reality has something like proposition form, most demured, but went on describing reality using propositions. Simply saying "S knows that P" doesn't commit you to thinking S herself entertains the proposition P. — Srap Tasmaner
I don't know how you could think that if you've seen the movie. — Srap Tasmaner
The above concluded that since thought/belief can be false, so too can truth.
That would be the case if, and only if, thought/belief were equivalent to truth. It's not. — creativesoul
One can have unshakable conviction that 'X' is true, and yet 'X' can be either true or false. — creativesoul
I wasn't asking about what you call it, but what you interpret it as being. That is, there has to be something by which you know it's a tree and not a car. And for so long as it is just interpretation and nothing more, then you can't know, and my question stands. — tim wood
Of course, my understanding of interpretation is assigning or providing meaning. — tim wood
In short, something has to be out there, or you got nothing. — tim wood
Context and interpretation of texts is problematic, the difficulties of which are not our topic. — tim wood
This is what doesn't make sense, not my insistence on a spatial-temporal context. What could you possibly mean by "reality just is"? "Is" references the present time. But "the present time" gives us no meaning, it is meaningless, without the context of the past and future. So your claim "reality just is", is meaningless without this context.There is no context for reality: reality just is. — tim wood
We don't perceive the scientist's space and time: we perceive, we experience, the world and things as being in the world. The idea of the world or the things in it being constituted through contextualization is incoherent on its face. — tim wood
Given complete specification, then the true proposition is always true. — tim wood
You wrote:
I am going by the evidence. It is quite evident that when we say "X is true" we do not have absolute certainty, and some times the belief which was said to be true turns out to be false. We know that it could be false, and we have respect for that fact, but we still say "X is true".
I wrote:
One can have unshakable conviction that 'X' is true, and yet 'X' can be either true or false.
You replied:
Yes, this is exactly the point. Either we define truth according to how it is used, the unshakable conviction which inclines one to say "X is true", or we define truth according to the logical principle principle "either X can be true or X can be false". If the latter, then we need to look no further to understand the nature of truth, because there is nothing more to it other than this definition. But I believe that this is an incorrect definition of truth, to oppose it with false, because this is not reflective of the way that we commonly use the word "true", it only reflects how epistemologists would like us to use "true". How we really use "true", is more like the former definition, having a firm conviction. But even when we have such a conviction, we recognize that what we hold as true may end up being false. So truth does not exclude falsity. We might say that it is improbable that something which is true is false, or something like that.
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