But how is it possible for a statement to have the 'property of truth'? — A Seagull
You have to allow for at least some statement to be true, to even say anything. Otherwise you're facing the dilemma of universal scepticism - that if every statement is false, then so to is every argument that the sceptic can offer. So the examples Tim Wood provided that you were commenting on, are text-book cases of true statements, but that in itself doesn't really say much.

However, concern with truth is fundamental. I don't know if you're following politics and current affairs, but the current President of the US is notorious for mendacity. His disregard for truth is regarded by many of his critics as not only the sign of a profound character flaw but also a threat to the institutions of democracy itself, which expect at least some level of truthfulness from their elected officials, not least the highest elected official.

The difficulty in these kinds of conversations is the open-ended nature of the question 'what is truth'? As an abstract or general question, it's almost impossible to answer. You could write an essay on the Platonic or Arisotelean or neo-Platonist views on the question, but they're situated within a culture which still had a classical regard for what you could call Capital T Truth. I think as a general tendency modernity is inclined to reject that kind of attitude. We nowadays only talk in terms of falsifiability and provisional hypotheses; maybe that's the best we can hope for! — Wayfarer

I think the problems you refer to stem from the presumption that statements can have the property of truth and the presumption that every statement is either true or false.

These problems fade away from the idea that statements are neither true nor false except where they are labelled as such by a person.

PS I learnt to sail in a wayfarer. :)

All the purely abstract concepts such as mathematical concepts are good demonstrations of such. Consider geometry, we have points, lines, right angles, circles, etc., which all have defined essences. — Metaphysician Undercover

They are all intelligible only in terms of physical things or analogues.

But that's not the meaning of "truth", that's the meaning of "true", and this distinction is the one being focused on in this thread. — Metaphysician Undercover

Truth is the property of being true; if something is true then it embodies or expresses truth.

The signs signify ideas or relations or quantities - the sign itself is physical, but what is signified is purely intellectual. — Wayfarer

This is where I disagree; what is represented is thought. 'Intellect' as I understand it pertains to the capacity for thought. We can rationally ( i.e. in a measured way) grasp the nature of finite thought and finite matter, but not the nature of infinite thought and infinite matter.

I learnt to sail in a wayfarer. :) — A Seagull

Nice. I learned that there is also a popular sunglasses line of the same name.

statements are neither true nor false except where they are labelled as such by a person. — A Seagull

That means complete relativism - that everything is simply a matter of opinion. The problems fade away, but only because you're no longer addressing them.

We can rationally ( i.e. in a measured way) grasp the nature of finite thought and finite matter, but not the nature of infinite thought and infinite matter. — John

The point I made has got nothing to do with 'infinite thought'. It has to do with the nature of concepts, the fact that concepts are real but immaterial. I think the best arguments for the immaterial nature of mind, are that the objects of thought - abstract truths, and the like - are universal and invariant; the same for any mind capable of grasping them, but only graspable by a mind.

Aristotle, in De Anima, argued that thinking in general (which includes knowledge as one kind of thinking) cannot be a property of a body; it cannot, as he put it, 'be blended with a body'. This is because in thinking, the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible. Among other things, this means that you could not think if materialism is true… . Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally.

….the fact that in thinking, your mind is identical with the form that it thinks, means (for Aristotle and for all Platonists) that since the form 'thought' is detached from matter, 'mind' is immaterial too.

Lloyd Gerson, Platonism vs Naturalism, 39:00

Consider that when you think about triangularity, as you might when proving a geometrical theorem, it is necessarily perfect triangularity that you are contemplating, not some mere approximation of it. Triangularity as your intellect grasps it is entirely determinate or exact; for example, what you grasp is the notion of a closed plane figure with three perfectly straight sides, rather than that of something which may or may not have straight sides or which may or may not be closed. Of course, your mental image of a triangle might not be exact, but rather indeterminate and fuzzy. But to grasp something with the intellect is not the same as to form a mental image of it. For any mental image of a triangle is necessarily going to be of an isosceles triangle specifically, or of a scalene one, or an equilateral one; but the concept of triangularity that your intellect grasps applies to all triangles alike. Any mental image of a triangle is going to have certain features, such as a particular color, that are no part of the concept of triangularity in general. A mental image is something private and subjective, while the concept of triangularity is objective and grasped by many minds at once.

Feser, Some Brief Arguments for Dualism

Both those arguments are Aristotelean.

The point I made has got nothing to do with 'infinite thought'. It has to do with the nature of concepts, the fact that concepts are real but immaterial. I think the best arguments for the immaterial nature of mind, are that the objects of thought - abstract truths, and the like - are universal and invariant; the same for any mind capable of grasping them, but only graspable by a mind. — Wayfarer

I don't know what you mean by "real, but immaterial". Concepts occur only, as far as I know in physical brains. They are finite thoughts that grasp finite objects in measured ways. The objects grasped are graspable only insofar as they exist in the mode of extension; the grasping is itself the mode of thought; I see no reason to posit dualism; which would introduce an unbridgeable gulf between thought and being.

So, the reality and materiality of things is grasped in thought; and thought is thus a real and material grasping. We know what materiality is in the sense that we can recognize it; but we have no idea what immateriality is except insofar as it is a logical negation of materiality. Being grasps, speaks and thinks itself. What else could we concern ourselves with; what else could there be?

So, I think the very idea of the "immaterial nature of the mind" is unintelligible, and thus of no use to us.The "universality and invariance" of truths is due to the infinite and eternal nature of God I would say; not to any incoherent "immateriality" of God or mind. Don't forget that materiality is infinite and eternal, even though individual material things are not. Likewise, thought is also infinite and eternal even though individual thoughts are not. I believe thought and materiality cannot be separated; they are the two sides of an infinite, eternal coin. I have come to think that the relation between materiality and thought is manifested as the spirit.

I don't know what you mean by "real, but immaterial". Concepts occur only, as far as I know in physical brains. — John

I have to be very blunt at this point: this is what you have to get past. Nothing is really or purely material, and the brain is certainly not only a material object. No concepts are material in nature, the idea that they can be understood or mapped against neural configurations is incorrect, because concepts and neural configurations are different kinds of things. The whole point about a concept is that it can be realised in many material forms, which shows that it is not in itself material. The point is that the meaning of a concept is independent of its material form, not dependent on it. When a rational intelligence creates a symbol, it represents the concept in material form, but the material form is in some sense arbitrary, i.e. the same symbol can be made out of any kind of material, or the same concept can be represented by different types of symbols. Otherwise, languages would not be possible. As that quote from Gerson says, language and thought are 'inherently universalising'. And universals rely on forms.

You think it's unintelligible, because there's something you're not getting about it, which means it's unintelligible to you. But what I am saying is the original meaning of the term 'intelligibility', which I think has been progressively lost since Descartes. Your notion of the physicality of concepts is actually basic to modern materialism and 'brain-mind identity'.

. I have come to think that the relation between materiality and thought is manifested as the spirit. — John

What you're saying about the 'infinite nature of thought' is really not part of the Western philosophical tradition - you have probably gotten those ideas from popular mysticism. There's nothing inherently the matter with them but it's not the point at issue .

I think you really need to do more work to map your thoughts against some authentic sources. The above quotation of yours is in some ways an echo of 'the interdependence of the transcendent and immanent', but I don't think you've really gotten that either. The spirit is not 'a manifestation' of anything, but the uncaused cause.

Unfortunately you are showing that you have no clue what I have been saying or how it relates to the Western canon. And you are making unwarranted and somewhat patronizing assumptions about the sources of my ideas, and also about what I have "gotten".

Perhaps you should consider the possibility that I simply don't agree with you, and that maybe there are many ideas I think you have not gotten and others that you need to "get past"; but that I have refrained from saying so because I don't want to be patronizing. Perhaps you should read some Spinoza?

One thing I have noticed is that you don't seem to like it when others disagree with you. I, on the other hand, don't mind others disagreeing; what I do mind is others making unwarranted assumptions about me and/or misreading or, even worse, deliberately distorting what I have said.

If you can explain to me what immateriality is, then you will make it intelligible to me and to yourself. Until then...there is nothing more to be said, I would think.

I understand, as I said, I have to be blunt. We have reached this exact point in a number of different threads, and I sincerely think there's something you're not seeing. So I know it sounds patronising and that I probably come across as arrogant.

In regards the question at hand, I have tried to illustrate the point with quotations from Loyd Gerson (which is linked to a video lecture of his. "Platonism vs Naturalism") and also essays by Edward Feser. So it's not simply a matter of my being annoyed because you're disagreeing with me - I expect almost everyone with disagree with me. The whole point of philosophical debates is to disagree.

I agree that the point of philosophy is to address different ideas, which is to say disagreements. And I can accept that you sincerely think there is something I am not seeing. If that "something" is of a rational nature, then it should be explicable, and it can be thrashed out if there is sufficient good will on both sides. If, however it is "something" of a purportedly spiritual nature; then it may not be explicable at all.

The thing about 'spiritual' intuitions, though,is that they do vary from one person to the next; and that fact itself is inexplicable if the presupposition is that there is, spiritually or metaphysically speaking, just one truth, unless it is supposed that there could be rational reasons for such disagreements, and that many people's intuitions are necessarily somehow misguided in their relation to rational discourse.

That's why I ask for an account of immateriality; because I personally think that any intuition which suggests it is misguided. I think this just because the idea does not seem to be amenable to being made intelligible. Now, I don't deny the possibility that some spiritual intuitions are beyond intelligibility; but in that case no propositional concussions, whether of materiality or immateriality, can be drawn form them, and they are outside the range of philosophical discourse.

If that "something" is of a rational nature, then it should be explicable, and it can be thrashed out if there is sufficient good will on both sides. If, however it is "something" of a purportedly spiritual nature; then it may not be explicable at all. — John

But you say on one hand:

Concepts occur only, as far as I know in physical brains. — John

That is a canonical statement of philosophical materialism, in that it reduces mind to neural activity. When I studied at Uni of Sydney, the head of philosophy was D M Armstrong, who was a materialist of exactly that kind, so I am familiar with it. Other notable proponents of such a view are Francis Crick, who discovered DNA, and Daniel Dennett.

We have to be very clear about what 'philosophical materialism' is. I'm not referring to social materialism, i.e. putting high value on possessions. Philosophical materialism is the view that ultimately only matter is real, and that mind is an evolved by-product of matter. It is the de facto view of nearly all the philosophy departments in Western university system; it is generally assumed to be the case. So it's deeply embedded in our culture, in fact in order to question it, one has to be somewhat 'counter-cultural'. That's why I acknowledge that a lot of what I say would not be agreed with by many people.

So from what you say, I think that you basically take that view for granted - but in saying that I'm not accusing you of anything, many or even most people would also take it for granted, It seems to be the common-sense view.

But then the other thing you often say is:

If, however it is "something" of a purportedly spiritual nature; then it may not be explicable at all. — John

I don't deny the possibility that some spiritual intuitions are beyond intelligibility; but in that case no propositional concussions, whether of materiality or immateriality, can be drawn form them, and they are outside the range of philosophical discourse. — John

So, this I take as a reference to the ineffable nature of spiritual experiences. Again, nothing the matter there - it is often said that such states are beyond words or beyond discursive analysis,

But what I have been talking about is neither of those - neither 'evolutionary materialism', on the one side, or 'the ineffable spiritual' on the other. It is this: there is a philosophical argument for the immaterial nature of mind, that is part of the broadly Platonist/Pythagorean philosophy, It is based on the premise that concepts are real but not material. Such a view is broadly called 'Platonic realism'. It was modified by Aristotle and again by the scholastics, but it is still a recognisable philosophy. That is what I'm on about.

There are many versions of materialism. I don't really think of myself as a materialist, except insofar as I see no justification for positing an ontological separation between matter and thought. As far as I know Aristotle denied the transcendent nature of the forms as conceived by Plato,

There are many subtleties and convolutions in Western thought; and I think the mistake you are making consists in glossing over those subtleties, and demonizing materialism toute court ( although I also recognize that certain brands of materialism deserve to be rejected).

I don't think there is any ontological transcendence, which means there is no duality of substances, although of course some things are transcendental to us, due to their infinite nature. I follow Spinoza in thinking that the very idea of a duality of substances is incoherent. Ontologically, or metaphysically, speaking, I see the infinite as being wholly immanent in the finite, and visa versa. To me this makes the most sense (and I have thought a lot about it). I am not claiming that I am right and that everyone who disagrees is wrong (although I do indeed think that, but I recognize that others may think the opposite and that no one is infallible).

statements are neither true nor false except where they are labelled as such by a person. — A Seagull
That means complete relativism - that everything is simply a matter of opinion. The problems fade away, but only because you're no longer addressing them. — Wayfarer

Not at all! The grounds for your assertion are baseless. The problems you referred to diminish to nothing. What other problems are there?

PS

I learnt to sail in a wayfarer. :) — A Seagull
Nice. I learned that there is also a popular sunglasses line of the same name. — Wayfarer

Is that where your name comes from?

I don't really think of myself as a materialist, except insofar as I see no justification for positing an ontological separation between matter and thought. — John

That is materialism, and the point at issue. What does 'ontological' mean to you?

It's actually not materialism, because I do not impute any primacy to materiality over thought. This is akin to Spinoza's position, which could be said to be a kind of neutral monism.

Although I am at the same time reluctant to speak in terms of 'one' because without 'an other' the notion has no real meaning.

The puzzling thing is that I'm quite sure I've explained my position to you more than once previously.

The particular point at issue, however, was whether 'concepts are physical'. That is what I am taking issue with, from something like a dualist position: that concepts are real, but not physical. I won't repeat the arguments I've given for that, but will say I don't think anything you've said since then addresses that point. Again - 'objects' such as natural numbers and geometric shapes are the same for any observer, but they can only be grasped by a rational intelligence.

From one perspective, of course concepts are not physical entities they are mental entities. But from that, which is really just a matter of definition, I don't believe the conclusion that conceptuality is 'something' substantively other than physicality should be drawn.

That has really been the only point I have been trying to emphasize.

I think the fact of their difference really is a ontological distinction - 'ontological' meaning 'belonging to a different order'. That concepts or ideas are real in their own right, and in quite a different way to the reality of tables and chairs, is a fact of profound importance.

if the mental things arising from the minds of living things are a distinct realm of existence, then strictly physical theories about the origins of life, such as Darwinian theory, cannot be entirely correct. Life cannot have arisen solely from a primordial chemical reaction, and the process of natural selection cannot account for the creation of the realm of mind. Biology, in this view, becomes a variety of science that is radically distinct from physics—it deals with a vast and crucial realm of phenomena that physics doesn’t and can’t encompass, precisely because they’re aspects of living things that are not physical:

subjective consciousness, if it is not reducible to something physical, … would be left completely unexplained by physical evolution—even if the physical evolution of such organisms is in fact a causally necessary and sufficient condition for consciousness.

Since neither physics nor Darwinian biology can account for the emergence of a mental world from a physical one, Nagel contends that the mental side of existence must somehow have been present in creation from the very start.

Thomas Nagel: Thoughts are Real.

Yet, we have no 'science' of this fact. It's astounding when you start to realise the implications. Our whole culture is founded on a clear and unmistakeable illusion or inversion. It's philosophy's task to shake people out of such delusions.

I tend to think that the order of ideas reflects the order of things; there is really nothing else for it to reflect. If they are two completely different orders then no sense can be made of any connection between them. This is really the Cartesian problem of the interaction between res extensa and res cogitans expressed in a different way.

Also I think it pays to remember that we construct orders ourselves (although not consciously or of our own volition, of course); the order of worldly things as much as the order of our ideas. There is no 'pre-fabricated' order given to us.

I agree that it is philosophy's task to help us become free from the grip of superficial fashionable nonsense. An example of that is the ridiculous idea that everything about human life can be explained in the reductive terms of a genetic engine geared only towards survival.

I would ask you now, can we give truth independent, separate existence? There are many things which competent minds working together create in the world, and these things have independent existence. We can start with physical objects, there are many buildings and things like that. But then we can move into things which have less of a physical existence, like mores, laws, and social structures. Can truth be one of those things, created by honest, competent minds working together, yet somehow existing independently of those minds? Where would we find it? We've already determined that it is not within statements or propositions. If it is within the honest mind, then how is it also independent of the honest mind? — Metaphysician Undercover

Some details first. As I read the history of truth (although not specifically so named), I find in it first that "honesty," as the ethos of the speaker, comprising his arete, phroneses, and eunoia, as judged by his auditors, is the test of truth, and it thereby becomes an historical truth. Not that his arguments are true, because they are in fact contingent ("shall we build a wall?" shall we attack at dawn?" and their respective answers could be either true or false). This kind of truth is the province of rhetoric and usually concerns an action to be undertaken.

Then comes the disinterested, a priori argument that is universally and necessarily so - true - that is demonstrated in a proof (of some sort - perhaps geometrical) that is in no way connected to the ethos of the speaker; indeed, the speaker is mere vehicle in this case and the proof is more appropriately denominated a visual proof - a matter of viewing and coming to understand and agree with the proof - as opposed to the auditory rhetorical "proof" in which the character of the speaker moves the listener to action.

Earlier I tried to set rhetorical truth aside, which division if accepted makes the speaker's honesty irrelevant. Whether we include it or not, I believe that it and demonstrative truth require separate consideration.

Rhetorical truth, it seems to me, comes with an expiration date. It is an historical truth within and bounded by a time frame. "Shall we build a wall?" (Pericles's, not Trump's) is a question answered in the moment, and the answer is the truth of the moment. Whether in hindsight the correct action was taken is a separate question. Indeed, that question is not "Shall we build a wall," but instead, "Was the decision taken as to whether or not build a wall the correct decision?" In as much as this question is answered historically, and historical methods are not universal, there can be no general form of historical truth.

A priori truth, on the other hand, is always and universally true, taking in math, science, arguably ethics, each with it's own criteria for truth.

Mathematics certainly has standards for what constitutes truth. Somewhere in here - I'm not sure where - we may find a candidate for your independently existing truth. It may lie in provability.

Science, similarly, with replicability the standard.

Ethics, with maturity of thought. And so forth for any possible class of inquiry.

Your question becomes, then, is there anything these differing kinds of truth have in common, beyond the answers they give being true?

An answer occurs to me: their fitness and rightness.

"Under which king, bezonian?" This of course is the outcry of the relativist. The bedrock of the relativist argument, though few argue in this way, is that understanding, and what is understood, is based and built on beliefs so fundamental they stand as axioms, unquestioned. The idea is that we could have different absolute presuppositions, which is what these axioms are called, and consequently have different, even opposed "truths." A logically trivial but socially significant example is in the two "axioms," "all men are created equal," and "we're better than you."

Kant destroyed all but the deepest forms of relativism with his three categorical imperatives, based in reason, humanity, and a heavenly ideal. This establishes reason as his prime axiom, not a bad foundation. And if you throw out reason, you throw out everything.

The possibility of throwing out reason makes relativism just the shock-troop of nihilism. I do not know if or where Kant expressly argued against nihilism - I can imagine he thought it too silly to be worth considering - but we have a different argument, grown from Heidegger's Sorge, care. We care. Our form of care allows us to modify our notion of truth as being the fitness and rightness of propositions. Care, as I understand it, is a temporal function. It moves, grows, in one direction, towards a maturity of thought that will, I suppose and hope, that will weld all truth together. Fitness and rightness - truth - is always already on the path to perfection, even if the progress along the way is sometimes bumpy. (And your "honesty" finds its way back in, here.)

This, then: truth is the fit and right comportment of propositions with respect to their proper subject matter, as apprehended by competent minds of reason and good will.

Let's hammer on this to see if it stands, or not, or can be improved.

Some details first. As I read the history of truth (although not specifically so named), I find in it first that "honesty," as the ethos of the speaker, comprising his arete, phroneses, and eunoia, as judged by his auditors, is the test of truth, and it thereby becomes an historical truth. Not that his arguments are true, because they are in fact contingent ("shall we build a wall?" shall we attack at dawn?" and their respective answers could be either true or false). This kind of truth is the province of rhetoric and usually concerns an action to be undertaken. — tim wood

Honesty must be considered in relation to the attitude of the interpreter as well as the attitude of the speaker. This encompasses what is sometimes called "the principle of charity". So when a proposition is judged for truth or falsity, it must be honestly interpreted. This is why it is useful to have multiple auditors, like a jury, to ensure that there is a true interpretation of the proposition.

Then comes the disinterested, a priori argument that is universally and necessarily so - true - that is demonstrated in a proof (of some sort - perhaps geometrical) that is in no way connected to the ethos of the speaker; indeed, the speaker is mere vehicle in this case and the proof is more appropriately denominated a visual proof - a matter of viewing and coming to understand and agree with the proof - as opposed to the auditory rhetorical "proof" in which the character of the speaker moves the listener to action. — tim wood

So I would argue that even when a logical argument is being made, honesty is a factor, because the one judging it must interpret it honestly. Agreement is dependent on honest interpretation, just as much as it is dependent on honest expression. The point is that any such logical demonstration requires agreement in defining and use terms. Without honesty there is no agreement, we may decline definitions at will. This is not simply a matter of what you have described as "rhetorical truth", it is relevant to all truth.

A priori truth, on the other hand, is always and universally true, taking in math, science, arguably ethics, each with it's own criteria for truth.

Mathematics certainly has standards for what constitutes truth. Somewhere in here - I'm not sure where - we may find a candidate for your independently existing truth. It may lie in provability.

Science, similarly, with replicability the standard.

Ethics, with maturity of thought. And so forth for any possible class of inquiry. — tim wood

So all these different truths rely on definitions. The definitions must be agreed to, or accepted, in order that there is truth. If one rejects the definitions, one denies the truth.

The possibility of throwing out reason makes relativism just the shock-troop of nihilism. I do not know if or where Kant expressly argued against nihilism - I can imagine he thought it too silly to be worth considering - but we have a different argument, grown from Heidegger's Sorge, care. We care. Our form of care allows us to modify our notion of truth as being the fitness and rightness of propositions. Care, as I understand it, is a temporal function. It moves, grows, in one direction, towards a maturity of thought that will, I suppose and hope, that will weld all truth together. Fitness and rightness - truth - is always already on the path to perfection, even if the progress along the way is sometimes bumpy. (And your "honesty" finds its way back in, here.) — tim wood

Yes, I have a limited acquaintance with Heidegger's notion of "care", and I think I would be somewhat in agreement, though I think it has a much broader application for Heidegger. Also, I am in agreement with your designation of "fitness and rightness". A proposition is a proposal, and acceptance implies that one judges the definitions, and use of terms as "right". If not, we reject the proposition. Again though, I'll remind you, that such judgement must be made with an attitude of honesty, and this why we can refer to this attitude with words such as "care", "fair", and "charity".

This, then: truth is the fit and right comportment of propositions with respect to their proper subject matter, as apprehended by competent minds of reason and good will.

Let's hammer on this to see if it stands, or not, or can be improved. — tim wood

Now you've hit, with your hammer, a whole new can of worms, what you call "proper subject matter". We've been discussing the use of words, composition and interpretation, in relation to truth. Where do we find "subject matter" here? Isn't the real subject matter represented by this word, "proper"? Without proper use, there is no subject matter, and proper use is what creates subject matter. Don't you agree, that without proper use, the proposition is meaningless (having no subject matter), but with proper use there is meaning, and therefore subject matter? This implies that subject matter is itself the manifestation of truth, which is dependent on honesty and proper use. Can we find the essence of "subject matter", because this might be the material existence of truth?

"...but with proper use there is meaning, and therefore subject matter? This implies that subject matter is itself the manifestation of truth, which is dependent on honesty and proper use. Can we find the essence of "subject matter", because this might be the material existence of truth?"

I think even you might agree that "manifestation" has derailed the train of your thought. Subject matter - everything whatever that is - just is. If anything it is the ground of the possibility of truth, but in no way truth itself or any "manifestation" of it.

I can see that part of the problem is my trying to use fancy words above when I should have kept it simple. Second try: truth is the name of a kind of relationship that can exist between subject matter and propositions. The relationship comes into being when a proposition says something true about a subject matter, to the extent that it is true.

I argue this is not circular because "true" and "truth" are different words with different meanings. We all get the two confused and use them almost interchangeably because they sound and look nearly the same. And most of the world's work gets done notwithstanding. Or maybe in spite of. If we could reverse and undo every reification of truth into something it is not, then history would be far different, and probably almost infinitely gentler.

Second try: truth is the name of a kind of relationship that can exist between subject matter and propositions. The relationship comes into being when a proposition says something true about a subject matter, to the extent that it is true. — tim wood

I'm not so sure about this because neither of us has provided any formal definition of "subject matter". Now your definition of "truth" requires "subject matter", but you say of subject matter, "whatever that is - just is". So you don't appear to have definition of subject matter. What I have stated is that subject matter is the manifestation of truth, and you have stated that subject matter is required for truth. Do you agree with this assessment? I have proposed that truth is somehow equivalent to subject matter, or perhaps even more fundamental than subject matter, while you have proposed that subject matter is prior to truth, truth is something built upon subject matter.

So let's analyze this concept for a moment. I propose that "subject" refers to the thinking human being, and "matter" refers to the content of thought. Whenever there is a thinking subject, there must be content, what is being thought, and this is subject matter. This content may be memories, beliefs, ideas, words, etc.

You have proposed as "truth", a relationship between the content and the proposition. Can we agree that the act of thinking, and the decision made, gives the content some sort of order, and this comes out as the proposition? So you would say "truth" is this ordering process which is the act of thinking. This act of thinking is the relationship between the content and the proposition. I assign "truth" to the content itself, which is the memories, beliefs, ideas, words, etc..

The relationship comes into being when a proposition says something true about a subject matter, to the extent that it is true. — tim wood

I don't think that we try to say something about the subject matter. The subject matter, as you say, "just is". We take it, formulate it in different ways, to say something. But what the proposition says something about, is not the subject matter itself, it says something about something else.

My argument is that the content, or subject matter, must already say something about something, before we formulate the proposition, and this is where we find truth. If the subject matter didn't say something about something, then thinking would be random, and propositions would be nonsense. So no matter how you break the proposition down into compositional parts, seeking the subject matter, there must be an element of truth in each part or else we get lost in random nonsense. Subject matter then is like a sign, it signifies or represents something. Truth is in the relationship between the sign and what it represents.

As I wrote my post I was wondering if you meant by "subject matter" a content of mind, while I meant simply brute matter - that which is there whether we are here or not. Let's follow it though your way and see if it works (and if I get it).

Presumably this rock is just here, even if no mind ever existed. Do we agree on this? Then you, or someone,comes along, and before you can talk about the rock, you must have something that grounds your talking about the rock. Let's call it perception, apperception, synthesis, knowledge, idea, whatever. I agree that rock somehow has to be in mind before we can talk about it. This mental content is what I understand you to mean by "subject matter." We ought to step carefully here: it is possible that you hold that the mental content, the subject matter, is all there is and is merely a sign of itself - after all, if it's all mental content, etc., then we need an account of how we get to the rock, which is not easy to come by.

My position is that the rock is real. Likely all we can know about it comes through synthesis of whatever, as above, but that synthesis is grounded in the separate thing we call a rock. I defend this through our ability, basically, to question the rock. We can test it. "If you're a rock, you'll react this way to my test." Granted, when it comes to most rocks, the tests applied can be primitive. But the same approach, with appropriate sophistication, works (eventually) for anything and everything.

On your idea of truth, then, if truth is to be anything more than mere tautology (A=A), the mental content must refer to something outside of and apart from itself.

This mental content authors a proposition about the rock. Perhaps it says, "This is a rock"; let's call this P1, for proposition 1. Question one might well be, "Is P1 true?" Let's suppose it is. Question two might be, "In what, exactly, inheres the truth of P1 (assuming it is meaningful to question the nature of the truth of a true proposition)?" This seems the same question as, "What, exactly, makes a true proposition true?"

Well, exactly not in correspondence with mental content, it seems to me. After all, we agree that truth is more than mere tautology. Yet all that we can say about the rock is just correspondence with our ideas of the rock.

Two paths diverge, here. The first way is to suppose that truth inheres in the possibility of the proposition not being in accord with our thoughts. That is, the truth of P1 lies in the possibility of P1's being a lie - and nowhere else but in this possibility. (Aristotle, here.)

The second way is to suppose that the truth inheres in P1's being verifiable. (Science, here.)

And how do we escape from the truth being mere tautology? By recognizing that science is about more than just the contents of mind. (Kant, finally.)

In sum, it seems to me that truth cannot lie in the relationship between subject matter, understood as mental contents, and what it represents. I still, then, like my definition better than yours. Please hammer again!

What I think tim wood, is that we need to distinguish between true and justified. Modern epistemology clearly assumes a distinction between these two, claiming that knowledge is both true and justified, but the distinction between them is often confused, conflated, vague, or ill-defined.

Presumably this rock is just here, even if no mind ever existed. Do we agree on this? Then you, or someone,comes along, and before you can talk about the rock, you must have something that grounds your talking about the rock. Let's call it perception, apperception, synthesis, knowledge, idea, whatever. I agree that rock somehow has to be in mind before we can talk about it. This mental content is what I understand you to mean by "subject matter." We ought to step carefully here: it is possible that you hold that the mental content, the subject matter, is all there is and is merely a sign of itself - after all, if it's all mental content, etc., then we need an account of how we get to the rock, which is not easy to come by. — tim wood

I don't believe that we can start with the assumption that the rock is just here even if no mind ever existed. This assumption needs to be justified. Imagine if there were no living things. There would be no distinction of this or that period of time, or individuation of this or that place. There would be the entire universe throughout all time, if we could even assume the universe, throughout all of time, and no one to separate out "the rock" as having existence independent from this mass of eternal time and infinite space.

However, I do think that the assumption of something independent from living minds is reasonable, but we must start with the assumption that whatever it is is indeterminate, until we justify the existence of actual distinct forms like the "rock". The question though, is does this assumption of something independent from living minds, even if it is indeterminate, require an assumption of truth? And I think that this is where we find the fundamental distinction between justified and true. We have a fundamental assumption, you that "the rock is just here", I that there is something indeterminate there. But neither of these assumptions is really justified, they are just assumed to be true. Remember, "true" is what we assign to the premises of a logical argument, the propositions which are accepted simply by assumption. The logic provides justification of the conclusion. The argument is sound when it has true premises and valid logic.

My position is that the rock is real. Likely all we can know about it comes through synthesis of whatever, as above, but that synthesis is grounded in the separate thing we call a rock. I defend this through our ability, basically, to question the rock. We can test it. "If you're a rock, you'll react this way to my test." Granted, when it comes to most rocks, the tests applied can be primitive. But the same approach, with appropriate sophistication, works (eventually) for anything and everything. — tim wood

What I think you have to pay respect for, is the fact that there are two sides of this issue. Not only do we test the "thing" to see if it is a rock, but we also adjust our definition of "rock" to ensure that it corresponds to the thing which we are testing, because this is the thing we call "rock". So the thing which we are testing may not prove to be a "rock", as we thought what "rock" meant, but we have always been calling this thing a rock, and will continue to do so, so now we have to change what it means to be a "rock", instead of saying "this is not a rock". It is not an insistence of "if you are a rock you will react this way to my test", it is an instance of "I know you are a rock, because that's what we call you, and I thought you would react this way to my test, but you didn't". That doesn't mean that it's not a rock, it means that I didn't have a good understanding of what it means to be a rock when I devised my test

This is where I think we can notice the difference between "truth" and "justification". Remember how we outlined the possibility that truth refers to a type of attitude. Let's say we have isolated and identified a thing which we're going to test. The "true approach" is to say that we are calling this thing which we have individuated, a "rock", though its essence, what it is, is indeterminate. We have no true definition of "rock". That's why we are testing it, we know not "what" it is, but we call it a rock. The other approach, is like you suggested, we have a definition, "rock =...", and we are testing this thing to see if it is a rock. The test determines whether or not we are justified in calling this thing a rock. The former method assumes as "the truth", that we do not know what it means to be a "rock", the latter method assumes as "the truth", the definition of "rock". Of course our definition of "rock" may be incorrect, so we are actually not justified in this latter assumption.

On your idea of truth, then, if truth is to be anything more than mere tautology (A=A), the mental content must refer to something outside of and apart from itself. — tim wood

So rather than tautology, "truth" refers instead to the unknown, that which cannot be justified, but is still assumed. When the assumption can be demonstrated to be unjustified, such as I explained with the assumption that the definition of "rock" is necessarily correct, then we cannot accept these assumptions as truth. Then the truth is that the fundamental assumptions are really unknowns.

The tautology then, which you express as A=A, is actually the fundamental form of justification, it is not truth. Behind this fundamental justification is still basic assumptions, such as the meaning of "=". In order for the justification to work, we must assume the truth of the meaning of "=", and this is not justified, it is simply assumed, and therefore it is not known.

In sum, it seems to me that truth cannot lie in the relationship between subject matter, understood as mental contents, and what it represents. I still, then, like my definition better than yours. Please hammer again! — tim wood

Actually, it was you who said that truth lies in such a relationship. I said that truth lies in the subject matter itself, that subject matter is a manifestation of truth. I do not believe that mental content (subject matter) represents anything, it, as you say "just is". It's only when we take subject matter and formulate an idea, or a proposition, that we put it into a form which represents something.

So "truth", as these fundamental assumptions which are essentially "unknowns", because they cannot be justified, do not actually represent anything. They are just assumptions of meaning. So the symbol "A", and "=", and "+", and "4", all mean something to me, and these are fundamental "truths", having the function of assumptions in my thinking, but they are not representations, as they do not represent anything. Nor can we properly say that there is "a relationship" here, because they are simply "particles" of meaning.

Hi MU. We're a bit at sixes and sevens, but I'm not sure if it's a real disagreement or just a lack of clarity. I'm going for clarity. Also brevity. You packed in a lot. If I try to answer all of it, the posts very quickly become unwritable and unreadable.

1) I think justification is out of court, here. P1 (above, "this is a rock") is true by assumption (i.e., the assumption that rocks exist and this here thing is one).

2) I call it a rock for convenience. The real question is if you believe it a whole-cloth creation of my mind. You seem not to, that "the assumption of something independent from living minds is reasonable." But you want to call it the indeterminate. Why? Is it your argument that while an indeterminate may exist that there is no way that we can from indeterminate to rock? If yes, then there's nothing that truth can be true about, because we cannot get from the indeterminate to the rock.

3) I suggested testing the rock as a way to validate the claim it's a rock Because it's a rock by assumption, no test is necessary: your remark about the testing I'm glad to have, but while interesting, it's irrelevant.

4) You're concerned with the truth of the assumption. Truth,just here, is irrelevant. There always has to be some assumptions (in this case, assumption = "taken to be true"). "It's not the business of assumptions to be true; it's their business to be assumed" (paraphrase from a book not at hand). If you don't concede this, then it's a fair challenge to you to do anything without making some assumptions. Assumptions, called hypothesis, are the base of the scientific method. As presuppositions they guide and facilitate thought; as absolute presuppositions, they ground thought.

5) Maybe here you can agree or clarify: I think by "subject matter" you mean mental contents. By the same expression I mean the thing spoken of, called here the rock. You misread me above - or, always possible, I misspoke: 6) For there to be truth, for truth (as proposition) to mean anything substantive, it must relate to the thing itself, and not the mere idea of the thing.

7) Clearly 6) is problematic. How do we get from idea to something that seems like a ding an sicht selbst? Answer: the problem with the thing-in-itself-(as-it-is-in-itself) was always a technical problem. Not, "We don't know it!" Rather, practical knowledge tells us of course we know it. Knowing it isn't the question; the question is instead, "Knowledge we have, but how do we have it?

8) But again we've slipped to the question of knowledge.

The question before us is, given that there are true propositions, is there a single genus we can identify that captures in a single notion what makes all of them true, that we can reasonably call truth? My answer from above, that I think you have actually not addressed, for being distracted by tangential questions, is, "...truth is the name of a kind of relationship that can exist between subject matter (things, understood broadly) and propositions (by reference, one to the other). The relationship comes into being when a proposition says something true about a subject matter, to the extent that it is true."

The affective attitudes of either the speaker/demonstrator or the auditor/viewer are irrelevant, except in some special cases where attitude determines truth.

To facilitate our exchanges, let's simply let the peripheral and tangential issues go and focus instead on the question of truth. And let's try to keep it short. Long posts are hard to write, and even harder to make coherent.

Hi MU. We're a bit at sixes and sevens, but I'm not sure if it's a real disagreement or just a lack of clarity. I'm going for clarity. Also brevity. You packed in a lot. If I try to answer all of it, the posts very quickly become unwritable and unreadable. — tim wood

OK, let's see if we can clarify the difference between us. I think we both agree that what is "true", is true by assumption. That's what you say in 1), the proposition "this is a rock" is "true by assumption". My claim though is that we do not assume the truth of a proposition though, we ask that it be justified. This justification involves defining the terms, so real truth is deeper than the proposition, it is within the terms of the proposition. Otherwise, any proposition could be assumed as true, and we do not just assume as true, any old proposition..

So, we take "this is a rock", and we have two elements which need to be analyzed, and justified, before we can assume this proposition to be true. We need to analyze what it means to be a rock, and we need to analyze the thing being referred to by "this". With respect to the thing itself, we can test it, as you said, and I agree. But with respect to what it means to be a "rock", what I've tried to impress upon you, is that there are two distinct approaches.

We could start with a proposition, "a rock is ...", or, we could point to an object, and assume the proposition "this is a rock", is true. The latter is the "true" way, it is what produces the true assumption of "this is a rock". From this perspective, we need no testing of the thing, it is really true by assumption, because we've established that the very thing pointed to is the thing which is called by the name "rock". Therefore "this is a rock" cannot be false. If we choose the former perspective, and refer to a proposition "a rock is ...", in order to justify calling this a rock, then this proposition (this definition) itself needs to be justified and we risk the possibility of infinite regress in justification. Therefore at some time we have to turn to the thing itself, and say "this is a rock", stipulate so that we can agree, that this is the thing called "rock". We have undeniable truth because so long as there is nothing else called "rock", it is completely unreasonable not to agree to call the thing "rock". "Rock" has no definition, it is just the pointed to thing.

But now we have a problem if we want to call other things by the same name, "rock". This is when we have to test the thing, and test other things, determining principles of consistency, continuity between the thing we have called "rock", and other things, such that we can designate them all of the same family, and call them all "rocks". So it is only when we have two distinct things, and we want to say of them both "this is a rock", then we need justification. We cannot simply assume both propositions as true, because contradiction is implied when we want to call two distinct things by the same name. Therefore we need some reason, justification, to call them both by the same name.

2) ...
But you want to call it the indeterminate. Why? Is it your argument that while an indeterminate may exist that there is no way that we can from indeterminate to rock? If yes, then there's nothing that truth can be true about, because we cannot get from the indeterminate to the rock. — tim wood

The thing is indeterminate until it has been individuated, pointed to, or named. Once we name it, and agree on the name, then we have truth. The thing is called "rock". Naming it is a type of determination, but in another way it allows that the thing named is still indeterminate. It gives no concept, or form, to the named thing, no description or idea of what it means to be the thing which bears that name. The pointing to the thing indicates that the thing bears the name, but what it means to be that thing remains indeterminate. Therefore we allow that any concept whatsoever may be attributed to that thing which is pointed to, but we still have truth without conceptualization, truth by agreeing on the name. That is why I associate truth with the unknown, because we can have truth concerning the thing without knowing anything about the thing at all, just by having a name for it.

3) I suggested testing the rock as a way to validate the claim it's a rock Because it's a rock by assumption, no test is necessary: your remark about the testing I'm glad to have, but while interesting, it's irrelevant. — tim wood

Right, this is the key point, no testing is necessary. We have called the thing "rock", agreed that it is rock, and it is true that it is "rock", therefore no testing is necessary. The proposition "this is a rock", is not even properly called a proposition, because it's not saying anything about an item, it is pointing to an item.

5) Maybe here you can agree or clarify: I think by "subject matter" you mean mental contents. By the same expression I mean the thing spoken of, called here the rock. You misread me above - or, always possible, I misspoke: 6) For there to be truth, for truth (as proposition) to mean anything substantive, it must relate to the thing itself, and not the mere idea of the thing. — tim wood

Now we have the distinction of subject matter. This is where we have our biggest difference of opinion. How could subject matter be the thing itself? It is matter of the subject. We could assume that the thing exists of matter, but the thing is the object, not the subject. So subject matter must be mental content. And we have objective matter which is the substance of the object.

I don't see how we could be dealing with anything other than mental content here. We have an object pointed to, and we assume the name "rock", but that this object is named "rock" is purely mental content. What more can it be? It appears like you want to bring truth outside of the mind, but this is impossible. There is a name "rock", within our minds, and there are associations with that name, memories of pointing, etc., but it's all within the mind, the associations are assumed. It is an assumption that the object is "rock", there is nothing about the object itself which necessitates it being "rock".

It appears to me, like you want to say that the name "rock" necessarily refers to some object outside the mind, and this is truth. But that's not reality. The name "rock" does not necessarily refer to any object whatsoever, it was arbitrarily chosen. So truth is entirely dependent upon this arbitrary choice, made by the mind to call that thing "rock". It is only when we move forward, to justify through testing and theories, that a specific object ought to be called "rock", that we establish such a necessary relationship. But that is why we need to keep justification and truth separate.

The question before us is, given that there are true propositions, is there a single genus we can identify that captures in a single notion what makes all of them true, that we can reasonably call truth? My answer from above, that I think you have actually not addressed, for being distracted by tangential questions, is, "...truth is the name of a kind of relationship that can exist between subject matter (things, understood broadly) and propositions (by reference, one to the other). The relationship comes into being when a proposition says something true about a subject matter, to the extent that it is true." — tim wood

So we each have a slightly different idea of what truth is. You say that truth is a kind of relationship between things (objects) and propositions. I reduce this, and say that such a relationship is just an arbitrary assumption, like the assumption which attaches the name to the object. That it's anything more than an assumption would require justification, but this justification would be based in the assumption of a more fundamental relationship, and this will now be the "truth" upon which the justification is based.

I call this fundamental relationship "subject matter", because it exists only within the mind. These relationships, that this word relates to this object, are completely arbitrary, existing only within the minds which assume them. In my last post I believe I called this a particle of meaning. It is an assumed association, existing within the mind, and it doesn't have to involve a word, or words, it could be simply memories and feelings, but these associations, particles of meaning, are "truths" because we accept them without the necessity for justification. They just are, just like memories just are.

So we each have a slightly different idea of what truth is. — MU

We sure do, and not a slight difference either. "...completely arbitrary,...assumed, ...existing only in the minds which assume them." As I read you, this is your bottom line. The ultimate reality of truth is just no reality at all. And if you're hit by the rock (or like Johnson you hit the rock), you're stuck with the total subjectivity of every aspect of the event, from impact to pain to recovery.

How do you square this with any notion of reality? Let's look a little deeper: a rock hits you. You're angry (say), at what, at whom, for what? It's all just completely arbitrary assumptions on your part that exist only in your mind.It must needs be that you are angry at, and can be angry only at, yourself (never mind the problems with that notion). Nor are you rescued by the possibility of the existence of indeterminacies; after all, such indeterminacies can only be conjectural.

I say, on the other hand, that true-ness is a real property, of propositions. The exact nature of that true-ness, how it works, depends upon the proposition itself. The question is left if there is a genus that captures all these species of true-ness. We certainly have a name for it: truth.

Perhaps a way out is this: there are minimal requirements for anything to be. Water, for example, exists at the level of molecules of H2O. You can talk about hydrogen and oxygen all day long, but it's not water. Gold exists at the atomic level, but not at the subatomic level. To have gold, a configuration of sub-atomic particles is necessary, without which there is no gold. For things, maybe minimal space and time are all that are needed. Actions too. Running, it seems to me, requires legs and a certain minimal duration, lacking which or short of which it ain't running.

True-ness would seem to require a proposition; a proposition requires (roughly) a subject and predicate. There then must be minimums of meaning. You can continue here.

So we come to an elemental recognition: true-ness is a function of meaning. Probably we knew this all along, but just failed to make it explicit. Where I think you have gone astray is by descending into sub-minimal considerations. I'm thinking that a sign of that confusion is when the real becomes unreal, it's "turtles all the way down," or when the ordinary becomes impossible. Does this put us on one page?

I think I'll stick with my definition of truth, which is this:

‘P’ is true for S iff S judges ‘P’ to have relation R to either S’s phenomenal P, and/or S’s stock of previously adjudged true propositions, depending on the relation R. Relation R is whatever truth theory relation S feels is the appropriate one(s)—correspondence, coherence, consensus, pragmatic, etc.

So, truth is whatever works? "Relation R is whatever truth theory relation S fells is the appropriate one."

I was reading about universals just a few hours ago. (Greek Thought, a Guide to Classical Knowledge, pp. 355 - 385). Apparently it's understood that universals, while meaningful, do not denote anything. Which explicitly says what I think most people understand in a vague way. There is no such thing as the truth. All that's possible is to try to gather the different kinds of true, see how they work, and see if they share anything in common - beyond being true - that might stand for truth. At this time I do not see how we can make much progress on the question - unless someone posts a new idea.

So, truth is whatever works? "Relation R is whatever truth theory relation S fells is the appropriate one." — tim wood

The idea is that truth-value is a judgment that individuals make about the relation of propositions to something else. The something else can vary, because it depends on what that individual counts to be the pertinent information for making the judgment. It can be facts in the world per their perceptual faculties, it could be the set of propositions that are judged to be true by consensus (again per their perceptual faculties), it could be the set of other propositions that they've assigned truth-values to. And so on.