The problem with "Materialism"

Alkis Piskas

There are all sorts of "materialisms": economic, dialectic, scientific, ...

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has not a special page on "Materialism" but one where it talks about "eliminative materialism", "Lange's materialism", "materialism of the encounter", "aleatory materialism", "dialectic materialism", "Althusser's materialism", ... The list is endless. There are 10 pages of different articles on "Materialism"! On the other hand, it has a single page on "Physicalism", which is a closely related term, but a broader one. The good thing about it is that it is much less ambiguous --more clear, I can say-- as a term.

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy has a single page on "Materialism" and this on "Indian Materialism"!!

I have never met a term more ambiguous than that!

Should we better then avoid talking about "materialism" --since it can easily produce confusion and misunderstandings in a discussion-- and use the term "physicalism" instead? Before doing that, however, we can maybe "give it a chance", by using a less specific definition of it, a reference that describes the term clearly and, most importantly, in a single sense.

This is what Wikipedia says about "materialism":
"Materialism is a form of philosophical monism which holds matter to be the fundamental substance in nature, and all things, including mental states and consciousness, are results of material interactions. According to philosophical materialism, mind and consciousness are by-products or epiphenomena of material processes (such as the biochemistry of the human brain and nervous system), without which they cannot exist."

For me, this is just fine, although I don't use the term as such, but only its derivatives, "materialist" and "materialistic", in a simple way, to refer e.g. to scientists as well philosophers who can only see and speak about the material aspects in human beings. (In fact, "materialistic", according to Oxford LEXICO, means "relating to or denoting the theory or belief that nothing exists except matter and its movements and modifications." This represents well what I'm referring to.

Now, what is strange about "materialists" is that they talk a lot about such things as consciousness, awareness, thought, imagination, love, joy, fear, and so on, none of which has been proven to be material (physical). Of course, since they are not substances. They do not consist of matter/energy. I know, there are a lot who will jump on me --a lot have done that until now!-- and say either that these are material or they do not actually exist; they are illusions. This is what a typical materialist believes, doesn't he? That whatever is not material, not physical, is not real; it doesn't exist.

I know that about 80% in here are "materialists", in the sense I described above. I know it from a poll and a lot of discussions I had with members in here up to now. But it's about the same with discussions I have gad outside this space.

So, I have this question: "Is there any meaning in talking about 'materialism' to materialists, since they can't see or think that there's anything else than matter, anyway?" That is, it is something self-evident for them. You can see this also as a paradox: "Materialism has no meaning for a materialist"!

baker

So, I have this question: "Is there any meaning talking about 'materialism' to materialists, since they can't see or think that there's anything else than matter, anyway?" — Alkis Piskas

Well, there is a meaning to such talking, if wasting time qualifies as "meaning" ...

Alkis Piskas

Well, there is a meaning to such talking, if wasting time qualifies as "meaning" ... — baker

:grin:

(Thanks for rsponding to the topic!)

180 Proof

↪Alkis Piskas

In my understanding, (as a rule-of-thumb) I distinguish between philosophical materialism and methodological materialism. The latter denotes that 'descriptions of concreta (e.g. events, things, forces, etc) which include "immaterial" (i.e. incorporeal, untestable, woo-of-the-gaps) predicates are incomplete' (or worse); the former, however, denotes that 'ontological atomism (i.e. swerving-swirling-atomic-recombinations-in-encompassing-void) fundamentally constitutes whatever objectively exists' ... in contrast to various "vulgar materialisms" (i.e. there is nothing but gross, solid, tangible, "mechanistic" stuff).

One can be any flavor of "vulgar materialist" (A); one can commit to neither the "philosophical" nor "methodological" position (B); one can be committed to either position and not the other (C1/2); or one can be committed to both positions (D). My own commitments, if you haven't guessed already, are most compatible with (D).

Wayfarer

So, I have this question: "Is there any meaning talking about 'materialism' to materialists, since they can't see or think that there's anything else than matter, anyway?" That is, it is something self-evident for them. You can see this also as a paradox: "Materialism has no meaning for a materialist"! — Alkis Piskas

My view is that the Western philosophical and intellectual tradition was originally idealist or dualist in nature, grounded in the platonist tradition, which comprises more than just 'the dialogues of Plato', as it also describes Aristotleniasm and its subsequent elaborations.

The major turning point was Descartes' re-statement of dualism which had the disastrous consequence of conceiving of the mind into 'res cogitans', literally the 'thinking thing' or 'thinking substance'. At the same time Descartes was a major contributor to the scientific revolution and the 'new science' which arose out of Newton and Galileo among others.

The modern mind-body problem arose out of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, as a direct result of the concept of objective physical reality that drove that revolution. Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them. Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop. — Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, Pp35-36

And that's where it has largely remained. For the diehard materialists, what exists and can be described in terms of the objective spatio-temporal matrix is all that is real. As the mind is not part of this matrix, but actually the author of it, they cannot understand how it could be real and hence are obliged to deny it (which you see articulated most vividly in the writings of Daniel Dennett.) And that's why materialism has no meaning for materialists, as materialism defines their cognitive and epistemic horizons. It's the old 'a fish can't understand water' trope.

Of course, die-hard materialism of that kind may only be a minority view, but in my experience, many people believe in something like it, but they don't really think it through or articulate it. It's more like the accepted wisdom or reigning myth of the secular west.

Alkis Piskas

↪180 Proof

(Thanks for your response to the topic.)

You seem to have digged into the subject quite well! :smile:
Well, I, on the other hand, am not for too many or complicated concepts, much theory, etc. on a certain subject, with a few exceptions. I am rather practical and I generally talk from a practical viewpoint. On the other hand, I am very strict about definitions and clear descriptions. Both of these things have to do with real undestanding (no misconceptions), common logic, experience (experiencing) and application in life.
And this is what my description of the topic was all about! :smile:

Alkis Piskas

↪Wayfarer

(Thanks for your response to the topic.)

I think you have put the subject into a good perspective and explained well the paradox-like "Materialism means nothing to materialists". :up:

Cornwell1

Okay then. A defense for the materialist. Everything is one. The cloud, the rain, my tea, my foot that wiggles, the smile in the mirror, the thought in my brain, the pain in my neck, the sound of the Buddha gong, the talk of the master, the smoke patterns in the chaos of the cigarette smoke, the coughing outside, the fruitjuice and the the plastic bottle it's in, the laughing toy cat rolling on the floor, weird al Yankovic, Thich Nhat Hanh, the moon, the space in which the stars move, the prisons built to exploit the inmates, the taser to control the disturber of public order, the waves on the oceans, the particles zipping around in the electron, my vision of them, ideas, the processes in my brain, the connections made, the words I read, the fascist boots marching, the black and red flag, the stolen bike, the MF who stole it, and on the list goes. Is a feeling or a smile worth less if it's made of material?

sime

Materialism has no meaning for a materialist"! — Alkis Piskas

This is why i don't believe that self-avowed materialists are materialists. Their identity isn't the same as their orientation. Materialists cannot relate their perceptions of objects to their thoughts concerning 'material objects' without pain of contradiction. They are smuggling their own brand of phenomenalism into their private definition of materialism whilst being in denial about it.

Alkis Piskas

↪sime

(Thanks for your response to the topic.)

This is why i don't believe that self-avowed materialists are materialists — sime

Right. I don't believe it either. Contradictions, as you say, and also ambiguities and lack of evidences --things the physicability of which is ambiguous or has not been proven-- make it very hard to believe it.

They are smuggling their own brand of phenomenalism into their private definition of materialism whilst being in denial about it. — sime

I would like to hear such a private definition ...

Metaphysician Undercover

So, I have this question: "Is there any meaning talking about 'materialism' to materialists, since they can't see or think that there's anything else than matter, anyway?" That is, it is something self-evident for them. You can see this also as a paradox: "Materialism has no meaning for a materialist"! — Alkis Piskas

I think that the same prejudice which constitutes the materialist attitude closes an individual's mind to the reality of how vast and truly unknown the unknown actually is. In other words, the proposition 'anything real is material' applies an artificial closure to the extent of the unknown, which limits a person's logical capacity to the confines of one's own conception of matter, and this restricts the person's capacity to learn. This act of restricting the unknown by assuming that a proposition like this, describing the unknown, is truthful, is very unphilosophical. Since this prejudice has become very deeply rooted in our society, and those who hold it are fundamentally unphilosophical, it is in most cases rather pointless to be talking to a materialist about materialism.

Alkis Piskas

↪Metaphysician Undercover

(Thanks for your response to the topic.)

the proposition 'anything real is material' applies an artificial closure to the extent of the unknown, which limits a person's logical capacity to the confines of one's own conception of matter, and this restricts the person's capacity to learn. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree.

it is in most cases rather pointless to be talking to a materialist about materialism. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree.

It's good that you brought up prejudice, which I believe has no place in philosophy, since it refers to lack of reason (logic, critical thinking) and experience, which are essential in philosophy and also vital in the creation, development and support of one's personal reality.

Tom Storm

Now, what is strange about "materialists" is that they talk a lot about such things as consciousness, awareness, thought, imagination, love, joy, fear, and so on, none of which has been proven to be material (physical). — Alkis Piskas

I've assumed that naturalism had replaced the term materialism. Naturalists generally argue that to the best of our knowledge all we can know is the product of natural processes. The six things you listed above are really one thing - the subjective experience of consciousness - and this may well be the by product of our physical brain. It's an ongoing question awaiting a definitive answer.

In other words, the proposition 'anything real is material' applies an artificial closure to the extent of the unknown, which limits a person's logical capacity to the confines of one's own conception of matter, and this restricts the person's capacity to learn. — Metaphysician Undercover

Some dogmatic folk argue like this. Responsible naturalists would put it differently. They would say that the time to believe non-natural explanations - idealism, gods, reincarnation, that only consciousness exists, whatever it may be - is when there is good evidence for them. These concepts then become knowledge and presumably, a part of naturalism. There's a Noble Prize as yet unclaimed.

It's good that you brought up prejudice, — Alkis Piskas

When it comes to prejudice, it resides as comfortably in the land of woo woo as it does on the continent of scientism.

sime

Responsible naturalists would put it differently. They would say that the time to believe non-natural explanations - idealism, gods, reincarnation, that only consciousness exists, whatever it may be - is when there is good evidence for them. These concepts then become knowledge and presumably, a part of naturalism. There's a Noble Prize as yet unclaimed. — Tom Storm

Idealism isn't an explanation and shouldn't be associated with superstitious beliefs in the supernatural. Rather, Idealism is a subjective interpretation of the concepts defined by naturalism, in terms of the experiences of the observer. In other words, Idealism is a form of phenomenalism, but without necessarily implying the possibility of a phenomenalist theory of meaning.

To view naturalism as being ideologically opposed to idealism is to imply that naturalism isn't an empirically grounded belief system.

NOS4A2

↪Alkis Piskas

So, I have this question: "Is there any meaning in talking about 'materialism' to materialists, since they can't see or think that there's anything else than matter, anyway?" That is, it is something self-evident for them. You can see this also as a paradox: "Materialism has no meaning for a materialist"!

All this is true, at least in my own case. I prefer the concrete and physical to the abstract and immaterial. But it’s more a preference for dealing with a thing rather than a nothing. One I can point to, the other I can only find in the pure wind of idealist literature. So there is some thrift to holding on to the position: one needn’t waste his metabolism on what amounts to fiction and fairytale.

Alkis Piskas

I've assumed that naturalism had replaced the term materialism — Tom Storm

This is an interesting point. But then, naturalism is contrasted with supernaturalism --or, in a simpler way, natural is contrasted with supernatural-- which is not want we actually need, is it? And this rises questions like whether e.g. consciousness is natural or supernatural. If yes, it belongs to the realm of scientific methods, which I don't think have been much applied to it until today. From what I know, there are very few scientists who have been involved in the subkect of consciousness, like Menas Kafatos, Bernardo Kastrup, et al. (They do have some interesting, even exciting, ideas on the subject.) On the other hand, if we consider consciousness as something "supernatural", we enter in the field of religion --which is a very vast area, with a lot of truths but also plenty of misconceptions and other traps. Or we get into the world of angels, demons, spirits and other creepy entities! :scream:

No, I prefer the term "physicalism". It's much more clear and it draws a line --not always clear-- between physical and non-physical. The first one is open and offered for scientific study; the second one, for philosophical study.

The six things you listed above are really one thing - the subjective experience of consciousness - and this may well be the by product of our physical brain. — Tom Storm

Even as a subjective experience, how can a physical thing like the brain produce something non-physical? And even if that were possible, wouldn't that then consist an acceptance that non-physical things exist too? Which, of course, is something the scientists, materialists, physicalists, naturalists, etc. don't believe exist. Doesn't this consist a self-contradition?

The subject of human conscicouness is open for too long a time for scientists, materialists, physicalists, naturalists to come up with tangible, persuasive and workable scientific results. I'm afraid they have lost their chance! :smile: The subject is offered only philosophical study.

"An explanation of consciousness will have to go beyond the usual methods of science. Consciousness therefore presents a hard problem for science, or perhaps it marks the limits of what science can explain."
-- "The Hard Problem of Consciousness" (https://iep.utm.edu/hard-con/)

When it comes to prejudice, it resides as comfortably in the land of woo woo as it does on the continent of scientism. — Tom Storm

True.

Alkis Piskas

↪NOS4A2

(Thanks for your response to the topic.)

All this is true, at least in my own case. I prefer the concrete and physical to the abstract and immaterial. — NOS4A2

Me too.

the other I can only find in the pure wind of idealist literature — NOS4A2

It's good that you brought up "idealism". I din't want to do it myself for not "overloading" the subject and my description of the topic!

Well, exactly, one more bad or wrong thing with "materialism" is that it is often contrasted with "idealism", in which reality is asscociated with ideas and the activity of the mind in general. And this can bring us back to Plato and his "Ideas". But I think this is an obsolete subject ... Anywhay, it gets us into a foggy landscape and far from what one can simply consider as and call "non-physicality", which is much more clear and what we are usually looking for, I think.

Real Gone Cat

↪Alkis Piskas

I am young and new to philosophy, so please forgive my naivete. Without examining the ideas involved, I have always lived as a carefree materialist. I knew no better - raised by wolves, you will assume yourself a wolf.

But if I am to leave my foolish childhood behind, I feel a burning need to learn more. So I begin with a simple question, no doubt long answered by those who have argued these points before : One may assume you believe that we experience quale. Where do they come from? Not what are they - What is their source?

ssu

Should we better then avoid talking about "materialism" --since it can easily produce confusion and misunderstandings in a discussion-- and use the term "physicalism" instead? — Alkis Piskas

Yes.

If that is the issue we want to discuss.

Tom Storm

Idealism isn't an explanation and shouldn't be associated with superstitious beliefs in the supernatural. — sime

Idealism is a philosophical tradition for which naturalists (and others) generally hold there is no evidence. I have not used the word supernatural but I can see how it might be an irresistible inference.

Tom Storm

But then, naturalism is contrasted with supernaturalism --or, in a simpler way, natural is contrasted with supernatural-- which is not want we actually need, is it? — Alkis Piskas

I have not introduced 'supernatural' as a concept. But I guess that is the inference one can make. Do you have good evidence for any well known supernatural beliefs - disembodied consciousness, god, reincarnation, ghosts? Those are fair questions. I understand the word supernatural is unpalatable to many people but words in this area are often loaded and people's reactions to them often say more than the terms themselves.

No, I prefer the term "physicalism". It's much more clear and it draws a line --not always clear-- between physical and non-physical. The first one is open and offered for scientific study; the second one, for philosophical study. — Alkis Piskas

It's not so much about what you prefer but which terms are currently in use for the idea you are discussing here. Naturalism is the term most educated skeptics and atheist philosophers would use. They would generally hold to methodological naturalism - that science is the most reliable tool we can use to understand the natural world and not hold to philosophical naturalism - that the natural world is all which exists. This latter claim being too totalising and unjustifiable.

he subject of human consciousness is open for too long a time for scientists, materialists, physicalists, naturalists to come up with tangible, persuasive and workable scientific results. — Alkis Piskas

No. Knowledge takes as long as it takes. Uncovering knowledge does not run to a timetable. What you would be better off saying is that the amount of time it has taken to establish the nature of consciousness suggests it is much less straight forward than the naturalists have often hypothesised. But frankly modern neuroscience is still in its early days.

Even as a subjective experience, how can a physical thing like the brain produce something non-physical? — Alkis Piskas

I'm not a neuroscientist or philosopher so you are best asking someone with real expertise. In the mean time have a look into Thomas Metzinger's work and explanation of consciousness. There are naturalist explanations for what we think is non-physical. My view is that even if we could prove that thoughts are to mind what digestion is to the stomach (Searle) there would be people who wouldn't accept it as so many of us want to believe humans are transcendent.

god must be atheist

So, I have this question: "Is there any meaning talking about 'materialism' to materialists, since they can't see or think that there's anything else than matter, anyway?" — Alkis Piskas

Materialists don't say nothing else exists beside matter. They say that whatever exists, is based on matter. For instance, consciousness, feelings, emotions, beliefs.

If you keep on coming up with Strawman fallacies, you can win any argument -- until you are caught doing it.

god must be atheist

Even as a subjective experience, how can a physical thing like the brain produce something non-physical? — Alkis Piskas

Nobody knows that, and that's the current state of knowledge.

It happens. That's all that the materialists can say.

Metaphysician Undercover

Naturalism is the term most educated skeptics and atheist philosophers would use. They would generally hold to methodological naturalism - that science is the most reliable tool we can use to understand the natural world and not hold to philosophical naturalism - that the natural world is all which exists. This latter claim being too totalising and unjustifiable. — Tom Storm

Let's reject the latter claim then, being to totalizing and unjustifiable. Now we are able to allow the possibility that there is more to reality than the natural world. And, if there is non-natural aspects of the world, we would probably be using something other than science to understand them, science being the means for understanding the natural aspects of the world.

So here's a proposal. The artificial aspects of the world are distinct from the natural aspects of the world, because they are created by human activities rather than by nature. And we know that these artificial things are not natural because they are caused through intention, which we understand through philosophy and ethics rather than science.

Does this work for you? Since there are these aspects of reality, intentional acts, which we understand through means other than science, does this give you sufficient evidence that the natural world is not all that exists?

Tom Storm

if there is non-natural aspects of the world, we would probably be using something other than science to understand them, science being the means for understanding the natural aspects of the world. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, this is the point of challenge.

The artificial aspects of the world are distinct from the natural aspects of the world, because they are created by human activities rather than by nature. And we know that these artificial things are not natural because they are caused through intention, which we understand through philosophy and ethics rather than science. — Metaphysician Undercover

Interesting.

we know that these artificial things are not natural because they are caused through intention, which we understand through philosophy and ethics rather than science. — Metaphysician Undercover

Naturally occurring versus the product of intention hence artificial - interesting. I've always assumed human activities are a subcategory of naturalism. Are you drawing on a particular source for this?

Metaphysician Undercover

Naturally occurring versus the product of intention hence artificial - interesting. I've always assumed human activities are a subcategory of naturalism. Are you drawing on a particular source for this? — Tom Storm

As a source, look up artificial in the dictionary. The point though, is that if science is the way toward understanding the natural, then if we use something other than science, like moral philosophy, to understand intentional acts, shouldn't we conclude that these are not natural? Or would you say that we completely misunderstand intention, and we ought to use science to understand it, rather than moral philosophy. If so, I'd say that you suffer from the prejudice, "that the natural world is all which exists".

180 Proof

Materialists don't say nothing else exists beside matter. They say that whatever exists, is based on matter. For instance, consciousness, feelings, emotions, beliefs.

If you keep on coming up with Strawman fallacies, you can win any argument -- until you are caught doing it. — god must be atheist

:up:

One may assume you believe that we experience quale. Where do they come from? Not what are they - What is their source? — Real Gone Cat

'Qualia' are adaptive, cognitive outputs peculiar to the kind of CNS-brains with which natural selection has endowed us.

↪Tom Storm

:up:

Agent Smith

I'm going to talk about physicalism/nonphysicalism vis-à-vis existence.

---

Existence: That which can be detected/perceived by our senses/instruments.

---

Physicalism: Everything is physical.

Physical: That which can be detected/perceived by our senses/instruments.

---

Nonphysicalism: Some things are nonphysical.

Nonphysical: That which can't be detected/perceived by our senses/instruments?

---

The way existence has been defined, physicalism has to be true. There's no difference between existence and physical.

Something's off, oui?

Options for nonphysicalists:

1. Redefine existence so that something can exist but be undetectable/unperceivable (re: neutrons, neutrinos, dark matter, etc.)

2. State that not all detectable/perceivable things are physical (re: the ethereal quality of electromagnetic fields).

Wayfarer

Materialists don't say nothing else exists beside matter. They say that whatever exists, is based on matter. For instance, consciousness, feelings, emotions, beliefs.

If you keep on coming up with Strawman fallacies, you can win any argument — god must be atheist

It's no straw man. How is saying 'whatever exists is based on matter' different from saying 'nothing exists beside matter'? If something is based on matter then it can be reduced to it, which is basically what all materialism says.

Materialists cannot relate their perceptions of objects to their thoughts concerning 'material objects' without pain of contradiction. They are smuggling their own brand of phenomenalism into their private definition of materialism whilst being in denial about it. — sime

:100:

I've assumed that naturalism had replaced the term materialism. Naturalists generally argue that to the best of our knowledge all we can know is the product of natural processes. The six things you listed above are really one thing - the subjective experience of consciousness - and this may well be the by product of our physical brain. — Tom Storm

I don't think naturalism and materialism are necessarily synonymous. In practice, naturalism often ends up meaning commitment to natural science as the only reliable source of knowledge. The problem then becomes what is considered as natural or part of nature. There are many things that occur in nature that seem to defy explanation in terms of what we know about nature, and the 'nature of nature' is something that is constantly being re-thought. 'Miracles are not against nature, but against what we know of nature', said Augustine.

Nonphysicalism: Some things are nonphysical.

Nonphysical: That which can't be detected/perceived by our senses/instruments? — Agent Smith

What about numbers? What about physical laws, like the laws of motion? These are predictive, and the predictions based on them are tested against observation. But in what sense do they exist? Is the probability wave physical, mathematical, epistemological or ontological? (Don’t try and and answer that, because it’s still an open question.)

180 Proof

How is saying 'whatever exists is based on matter' different from saying 'nothing exists beside matter'? — Wayfarer

The latter is reductive (categorical) and the former is not. "Based on matter" does not entail nothing-but-matter. A step further: "matter" – materiality – also connotes what matters publicly (i.e. distinctions which make measurable differences objectively) and not just what matters privately, imaginatively, subjectively, spiritually ... Democritus' void compensates (or covers) a few sins; to wit: "Whatever exists is based on matter" and maybe whatever else that doesn't / cannot matter in any objective sense.

Wayfarer

↪180 Proof

But if something can be reduced to matter, then matter is all that is real, right? If thinking really is the output of neurotransmitters, as materialists say, then the neural chemicals and their reactions are what is real, whereas thinking is derivate from that, is it not?

As for ‘what matters’, that is a fallacy of the equivocation of two meanings of ‘matter’. And you can’t say such equivocation doesn’t matter, whether you’re materialist or not.

The problem with "Materialism"

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