Thanks. I don't see that Garrett Travers is addressing the article - he's not the only one. A year or so ago one could start a thread around an article with some expectation of having it's content addressed. It seems no longer to be the case. — Banno

I actually went ahead and read it, my arguments are relavent to the descriptions of "freedom" provided in the article, such access to healthcare (someone else's labor), and government covid mandates (force imposed to impede free action).

Arendt's point here is that "it must appear strange indeed that the faculty of the will whose essential activity consists in dictate and command should be the harborer of freedom." In doing so she shows the tyranny of following one's will, and hence that will is contrary to freedom. The will, therefore, cannot be the source of freedom. — Banno

And Arendt is wrong because the source of those dictates and command is actually the very mind that is also producing perception that allows for superior-pattern-processing, which is the mechanism that notices one's own impulses. Meaning, to argue against the idea that the mind is not free to determine its own course of action, if left free from coercion, is question begging and makes no sense otherwise. The individual is the sum total of all aspects of his/her being, including their mind, impulses, and limited domain of agency - all of which is contained in the workings of the brain.

I confess I don't understand why she claims that freedom is identified with sovereignty to begin with, — Ciceronianus

It is clear to me that she thinks freedom is not to be identified with sovereignty... Do we at the least agree here? That Arendt, for better or worse, thinks freedom is to do with choice and novelty within the re publica? As opposed to the capacity to achieve what one wills without regard for the public space?

The discussion of "inner freedom" at about p146-7 seemed to be an oblique reference to stoicism. The implication is that Stoic ideals such as control of one's passions or acting in accord with nature morphed under the influence of Augustin and Paul into something closer to modern ideas of freedom as acting in accord with one's will. I take the change to which she refers to be between a more ancient notion of the freedom to choose within a polity to a supposed freedom to chose despite a polity.

I actually went ahead and read it, my arguments are relavent to the descriptions of "freedom" provided in the article, such access to healthcare (someone else's labor), and government covid mandates (force imposed to impede free action). — Garrett Travers

Cheers - the article is indeed apropos of our times.

So for you freedom is lack of coercion?

"In all practical and especially in political matters we hold human freedom to be a self-evident truth...." from Arendt's paper, referenced in the OP. I wonder how many of us understand the significance of "self-evident"? I understand it to mean that the ground of such a thing - this freedom - is itself and nothing else. Boot-strapped if you will, but not anything the less for that. It remains only to work out what it means. And it would seem that for most and for most here, this freedom merely means having desires to which one is subject that one is "free" to attempt to satisfy. No one seems to question, "Gotta have it!" - only the ease with which one can try to get it.

And perhaps there is no freedom from need except in the choice of freedom from life itself. To be alive is to have at least some needs. So as a practical matter, meeting needs in itself is not a matter of freedom.

But wants and desires? What do these have to do with freedom? Only that they hinder, constrain, and restrict it, and only in being able to dismiss them may one return him- or herself to a state of optimized practical freedom.

Supposing ourselves optimized with respect to this freedom, what is it for? The short Kantian answer is that freedom is simply a measure of our ability to do our duty. If free, we get to do it, and if not free, then not. Of course the slave howls at this: insisting on his "freedom" to be a slave. Which to be sure almost all of us are to some extent.

And duty? There are some things we can do, that would be good for us to do, and some things we ought to do, if we can. And reason can tell us what they are (and are not), if we're any good at reasoning. Which some of us can do some of the time. And what is reasoning but a kind of raw capacity absent something to reason about. So it would seem that freedom in this practical sense is about our reasoning about those things near and far that concern us, and our ability to act in accord with what (careful) reason tells us is good and right to do.

Or more specifically - other's goals. Ethics is the relationship between one person's goals and another person's goals in whether they come into conflict or agree. — Harry Hindu

If you prefer. One thesis of the article is that, as a result of this, freedom has it's being in the shared space in which we live rather than in the privacy of what one wills.

No one seems to question, "Gotta have it!" - only the ease with which one can try to get it. — tim wood

Well put.

But wants and desires? What do these have to do with freedom? Only that they hinder, constrain, and restrict it, and only in being able to dismiss them may one return him- or herself to a state of optimized practical freedom. — tim wood

And again! :fire: Here's @Ciceronianus' Stoic. The question is where freedom fits in relation tot his Stoic enterprise of overcoming unreasonable or unnatural desire. I don't know enough of the topic to be sure, but at first blush freedom does not look to be of great significance to the Stoics.

I've never quite reconciled with the notion of freedom as doing one's duty.

If nothing else the article gives us pause to consider if there can be a coherent notion of freedom.

It’s like you did something impossible and read the very words from my mind.

No one seems to question, "Gotta have it!" - only the ease with which one can try to get it. — tim wood

It’s not something that has to do with distinguishing will from something that opposes it. It is part and parcel with will. That is an aspect of how human will emerges from the brain.

But wants and desires? What do these have to do with freedom? Only that they hinder, constrain, and restrict it, and only in being able to dismiss them may one return him- or herself to a state of optimized practical freedom. — tim wood

You really mean to say that pursuing one’s desires is an example of a lack of freedom? Where are you people generating these absurdities. Pursuing desires is a fundamental element of freedom. You denying your natural desires is the opposite of freedom. That’s an example of you suppressing your desires for the sake of appearances, or dogma, best case scenario for health.

If nothing else the article gives us pause to consider if there can be a coherent notion of freedom. — Banno

Of course there is, I brought it up numerous times. There is nothing fallacious or inconsistent in defining freedom as the ability to act, think, or speak without coercion. That’s completely coherent.

You really mean to say that pursuing one’s desires is an example of a lack of freedom? Where are you people generating these absurdities. — Garrett Travers

Blame it on Nietzsche:

“As far as the superstitions of the logicians are concerned: I will not stop emphasizing a tiny little fact that these superstitious men are loath to admit: that a thought comes when “it” wants, and not when “I” want. It is, therefore, a falsification of the facts to say that the subject “I” is the condition of the predicate “think.” It thinks: but to say the “it” is just that famous old “I” – well that is just an assumption or opinion, to put it mildly, and by no means an “immediate certainty.” In fact, there is already too much packed into the “it thinks”: even the “it” contains an interpretation of the process, and does not belong to the process itself.”

“In every act of will there is a commandeering thought, – and we really should not believe this thought can be divorced from the “willing,” as if some will would then be left over! Third, the will is not just a complex of feeling and thinking; rather, it is fundamentally an affect: and specifically the affect of the command. What is called “freedom of the will” is essentially the affect of superiority with respect to something that must obey: “I am free, ‘it' must obey”…

But now we notice the strangest thing about the will – about this multifarious thing that people have only one word for. On the one hand, we are, under the circumstances, both the one who commands and the one who obeys, and as the obedient one we are familiar with the feelings of compulsion, force, pressure, resistance, and motion that generally start right after the act of willing. On the other hand, however, we are in the habit of ignoring and deceiving ourselves about this duality by means of the synthetic concept of the “I.”

“All willing is simply a matter of commanding and obeying, on the groundwork, as I have said, of a society constructed out of many “souls”: from which a philosopher should claim the right to understand willing itself within the framework of morality: morality understood as a doctrine of the power relations under which the phenomenon of “life” arises.”

There is nothing fallacious or inconsistent in defining freedom as the ability to act, think, or speak without coercion. — Garrett Travers

The mere assertion will not do. One ought first to set out the objections found in the Arendt article, then address each of them.

SO if freedom is lack of coercion, you are not free if you act in accord with the coercion of reason.

SO if freedom is lack of coercion, you are not free if you act in accord with the coercion of will.

Finding an all-purpose definition of freedom would not be a valuable use of brain cells.

You can explore its meaning in various contexts. For an American take (obviously the most important one) I would point you towards Abraham Lincoln and Thoreau.

What context interests you?

Arendt's point here is that "it must appear strange indeed that the faculty of the will whose essential activity consists in dictate and command should be the harborer of freedom." In doing so she shows the tyranny of following one's will, and hence that will is contrary to freedom. The will, therefore, cannot be the source of freedom. — Banno

Tyranny in my faulty imagination is absolute rule. Rule that is self-serving. Making others do what they don't want to do in order to satisfy the tyrant's hunger for control. The tyrant is motivated to make others do what he wants them to do. It makes the tyrant happy to be successful at this.

Will makes man act in any which way. If there is no will, there is no action.

But the tyrant and the people s/he controls are all humans.

The will does not control other wills. When viewed within the perspective of an individual's will and actions. Will controls actions, that are not wills.

Now, when you say that the will can't be the source of freedom... that goes for actions. Is a person, with a will, defined FOR HIMSELF by his actions? And by his actions alone? No, he is not reduced to mere will-action sequences. He has motivation, and needs, and feelings. Feelings of happiness and feelings of sadness; feelings of elation and feelings of despondence; feelings of pleasure, feelings of pain.

The will is controlling the action to help the person attain happiness, elation and pleasure, and to avoid sadness, despondence and pain.

Where does freedom come into play here? Who is not free although we had thouth was free? This is very convoluted when one brings in the concept of freedom. I think it is absolutely unnecessary, superfluous and in essence a non-sequitur.

It is a causal chain, in which will is one part. Why worry about freedom? I really, but really, don't understand why it is important for Arndt to bring freedom into play in this mechanism of motivation, will, action, and result.

In doing so she shows the tyranny of following one's will, and hence that will is contrary to freedom. The will, therefore, cannot be the source of freedom. — Banno

The freedom... of what? the freedom of the will? the freedom of action? the freedom of the person to whom these are components? The freedom of motivation, the freedom of needs, or the freedom of result of actions?

What the hey is freedom trying to achieve here, for what purpose, and in what way? I still say introducing freedom is not a good idea, for it does nothing to the mechanism of will-action, but convolutes it, and in doing so it only creates an illusion of a problem, which is actually non-existent.

You denying your natural desires is the opposite of freedom. — Garrett Travers

Can you indicate what some of these "natural" desires are? Keeping in mind that we're distinguishing between need and desire. I'm asking after having spent a fair amount of time gratifying so-called natural desires, only to finally recognize they weren't really natural in the first place. But who knows, perhaps you're the wiser of us. Examples for the terminally curious: a Zenith El Primero Chronograph, the cost burning my wrist so that I eventually sold it back for what I paid for it. Or exotic steel for a hunting knife, finally learning that a basic 1075 - 1095 carbon steel is best for most people and most applications, and a whole lot less expensive.

will is contrary to freedom. The will, therefore, cannot be the source of freedom. — Banno

Anything contrary to a concept could be the source of the manifestation of that concept, AS LONG AS IT IS NOT IN THE SAME RESPECT.

And thereby lies the absolute fault of Randt's reasoning. She says something that is contrary of freedom1 can't be the source of freedom2. In other words, she mixes up freedom with freedom.

I admit I don't know what she covers as the domain1 over which freedom1 presides, and what she covers as the domain2 over which freedom2 presides. I know one thing for sure: she does not mean that domain1 = domain2.

I hope this is clear.

I just hope that my comments here won't be ignored.

Finding an all-purpose definition of freedom would not be a valuable use of brain cells. — frank

Yes, indeed. We could also look to see how the notion grew from nescient in ancient philosophical contexts and map the were's and why's of it's progress, as well as consider critically how this family of ideas might fit together.

Which is what this thread is about.

We could also look to see how the notion grew from nescient in ancient philosophical contexts and map the were's and why's of it's progress — Banno

Umm. That's a tall order. Happy trails.

We could also look to see how the notion grew from nescient in ancient philosophical contexts and map the were's and why's of it's progress, as well as consider critically how this family of ideas might fit together.

Which is what this thread is about. — Banno

Why did you not say so, ever, in the OP? I thought the thread was about this:

Arendt's point here is that "it must appear strange indeed that the faculty of the will whose essential activity consists in dictate and command should be the harborer of freedom." In doing so she shows the tyranny of following one's will, and hence that will is contrary to freedom. The will, therefore, cannot be the source of freedom. — Banno

Oh I wish people wouldn't adjust the goalposts when they are cornered.

Not to say you are cornered, Banno, but you did move the goalposts. Why?

I had my say in earlier posts, I'll await your reply to it, and if you ignore it, to me it signifies one or both of two things:

- you don't respect me enough to give serious thought to my points or
- you can't respond to defeat my points.

Umm. That's a tall order. Happy trails. — frank

:100:

I'm asking after having spent a fair amount of time gratifying so-called natural desires, only to finally recognize they weren't really natural in the first place. — tim wood

Hm. Is this an admission of trying to satisfy unnatural desires?

(Sorry - couldn't resist...)

Following on with Arendt's strategy, is one free to not do as one desires? Or are we subject to the tyranny of desire? A somewhat facetious question, but it indicates that it is not clear what freedom consists in, in the way @Garrett Travers supposes,

I just hope that my comments here won't be ignored. — god must be atheist

I've read them. I've not seen anything in them to which i might reply.

And yet it is the task in hand. Something to fill in time on a cloudy morning.

And yet it is the task in hand. Something to fill in time on a cloudy morning. — Banno

So maybe remember that Aristotle held slavery to be a necessary evil. Giant respect to him for declaring it to be evil. It's a weight on the heart that he thought it was necessary, tho.

This is one aspect of the problem of trying to apply Aristotle to present concerns.

I agree with you to this point, Janus, but when you are forced, you are given a choice too, and you will follow the path of what you will. — god must be atheist

I guess it depends on how you define 'will', gmba. There is a sense in which it might be thought that being a slave to the passions is not freedom. If one is threatened with death unless one does something against their will, then I would say they are not freely doing their will but acting under the constraint of fear.

But you cannot act against your own will.

If you held a gun to @god must be atheist and threaten to shoot unless he pats his nose three times, and hence he is forced to pat his nose, hasn't he willed himself to pat his nose?

This by way of making no further point than that the notion of will is somewhat fraught.

Yes, as I said, it depends on how you define 'will'. So, since the idea has no clearly definitive, unambiguous application I agree it is fraught.

SO if freedom is lack of coercion, you are not free if you act in accord with the coercion of reason.

SO if freedom is lack of coercion, you are not free if you act in accord with the coercion of will. — Banno

I addressed this, yes I AM free because I AM the source of said reason. I AM also the source of MY will. I AM the sum total of ALL things ME, just as YOU are. To say that MY reason or will is an example of MYSELF not being free, is to be beg the question. It is fallacious reasoning. Will, reason, and choice are all centrally located and centrally governed. One cannot coerce themselves, they can only act in accordance with the sum total of their own thought. Which is why I said there is no such thing as "free" will. There is only limited agency, that of which arises for the brain's capacity for perception and superior-pattern-processing. We recognize that patterns in the expression of our will through time, and can make limited adjustments to those patterns. More on superior-pattern-processing here: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4141622/

Yes, as I said, it depends on how you define 'will'. So, since the idea has no clearly definitive, unambiguous application I agree it is fraught. — Janus

Which was, among other objectives, the point of Arendt's essay.