Replies to Steven French’s Eliminativism about Objects and Material Constitution. (Now with TLDR)

Ignoredreddituser

I’ve been teaching myself metaphysics, it’s been pretty challenging since I don’t really have anyway to get feedback. I was wondering if you guys have an ideas how to reply to an argument Steven French makes below. It seems like a combination of the grounding problem and overdetermination to me, but I’m not sure if I’m on the right track or how to reply to it. Everything below is an excerpt from his paper.

Articulating a metaphysics for the manner in which the structure of the world yields that which we call ‘atoms’, ‘molecules’, etc. is a tricky business, but the core point remains: that which we call a ‘table’ is nothing but a manifestation of that fundamental structure.

However, leaving this aside, the non-eliminativist might appeal to the distinction between possessing a property derivatively and non-derivatively: if the table is broken up and destroyed, the sum of elementary particles that constituted it still exist, even though they no longer constitute the table; so the table is a table non-derivatively, whereas the “sum of particles is a table only derivatively (see Baker 2007, 2012). Thus, the table and the sum of particles constituting it can share the same properties but not be identical, since they have these properties in different senses.

Again, one might appeal to the relevant physics to flesh out the appropriate notion of ‘constitute’ here and that appeal will run as it did for ‘arrangement’. But note that to call that which is supposed to be a table only derivatively a ‘sum’ of particles hardly does justice to what is involved in this appeal! I suspect that, as with other metaphysical notions, what is lying in the background here is a fairly crude classical picture of billiard ball-like atoms hooking together in some obvious way, forming the sum of the respective parts. However, applying the relevant symmetries and laws does not work like this, and the non-classical nature of the relevant physics famously creates major problems for standard notions of mereology and constitution (see, for example, Paul 2012). Assuming that these problems can be overcome and that, for example, an appropriate notion of ‘part’ can be articulated (where this may be different for different accounts of mereology and constitution), any such constitutive relation will be more than just a mere ‘sum’, to the point where, as already indicated, one would want to turn the argument around and demand of the non-eliminativist, wherein lies the difference between the table, as an everyday object, and the particles-‘arranged’-tablewise?!

Now, the non-eliminativist can insist that that difference lies in different persistence conditions, say, or different causal powers (Baker 2007). Appealing to the first is unconvincing: that an aggregate of particles-arranged-tablewise has different persistence conditions from an aggregate not arranged tablewise is hardly a persuasive argument (and indeed, has a hint of begging the question about it). Obviously, if the relevant bonds are broken, then one no longer has what we ordinarily call in English ‘the table’, but that is no grounds for regarding ‘the table’ as an object. All this points to is the difference between the set of particles, dispersed across the universe say, and the set brought together into an aggregate and subject to the kinds of constraints and principles already indicated so as to form what we call a table. Again, all the work is being done by those constraints and principles and whether those are to be an object qua element of one’s ontology.

TLDR: 1. An object is an object non-deriviatively whereas a mereological sum is an object only derivatively. Objects are constituted out of mereological sums.
2. The primary difference between mere sums and objectslie is in persistence conditions.
3. The arguments against eliminativism assumes an object and begs the question against eliminativism
4. The difference in persistence conditions only points to a set of particles dispersed and those aggregated objectwise and subjected to the principles of physics like the Pauli Exclusion principle.
5. Because all the work is being done by those physical principles and constraints then it follows there is no difference between mere sums and an object.

T Clark

TLDR: 1. An object is an object non-deriviatively whereas a mereological sum is an object only derivatively. Objects are constituted out of mereological sums.
2. The primary difference between mere sums and objectslie is in persistence conditions.
3. The arguments against eliminativism assumes an object and begs the question against eliminativism
4. The difference in persistence conditions only points to a set of particles dispersed and those aggregated objectwise and subjected to the principles of physics like the Pauli Exclusion principle.
5. Because all the work is being done by those physical principles and constraints then it follows there is no difference between mere sums and an object. — Ignoredreddituser

Sorry. I tried, but even with your summary I got lost. Why does any of this matter? A table is a table by human convention. An atom is an atom by human convention. Why is there a mystery? A table is made up of atoms held together primarily by electromagnetic forces. My family is made up of my wife and children held together primarily by tradition, duty, and love.

Again, I wanted to respond to your post in the terms you laid out, but I got lost.

Ignoredreddituser

You could make a case for tables. An atom is an atom by convention because presumably there would still be atoms without people.
Yeah you’re basically saying there’s things are grounded, whereas he just says they don’t exist only the grounding stuff exists, if that.

T Clark

there would still be atoms without people. — Ignoredreddituser

Would there be? Would there also be cells, and trees, and forests, and ecosystems without people? Would there be hydrogen and oxygen, and water, and runoff, and brooks, and creeks, and tributaries, and rivers, and oceans?

Yeah you’re basically saying there’s things are grounded, whereas he just says they don’t exist only the grounding stuff exists, if that. — Ignoredreddituser

I'm not sure what this means.

Ignoredreddituser

Yes, unless you’re an idealist and anti-realist.

It means those facts exist because of other facts

Wayfarer

Why does any of this matter? — T Clark

C'mon TC. This is a philosophy forum, and it's a perfectly valid philosophical question. It's a lot better thought-out than many of the one-liner OP's that are posted. Not seeing the point of an OP is not a constructive criticism.

That which we call a ‘table’ is nothing but... — Ignoredreddituser

I can't see exactly what you're getting at, but it seems to be an argument against the idea that 'the whole is more than the sum of its parts'. Or put another way, that what something is, can be explained without residue in terms of it primitive physical constituents and the principles that bind them.

So it seems to me you're trying to argue for a pretty simple form of physical reductionism (sometimes parodied as 'nothing but-ism').

But there's a few things that I don't understand. I understand 'eliminativism' to usually refer to 'eliminative materialism' associated with Dennett and Churchlands, in respect of philosophy of mind. I can't really see how it applies here.

Also, you haven't provided any details the arguments you provide references to in passing (Paul, Baker, etc) so you can't assume that the reader will know anything about them (I certainly don't).

But the basic difficulty I sense with your proposal is that it is essentially physicalist, and so I'm naturally inclined to disagree with it. You want to provide an account of objects purely in terms of their physical constituents without the need to appeal to higher-level concepts such as form. Am I right in saying that?

T Clark

C'mon TC. This is a philosophy forum, and it's a perfectly valid philosophical question. It's a lot better thought-out than many of the one-liner OP's that are posted. Not seeing the point of an OP is not a constructive criticism. — Wayfarer

I think it's a good OP. The addition of the summary was a good move. I read the whole OP, including the summary. As I noted, I tried hard to figure out a way to respond in the terms laid out, and I failed. I don't understand the point being made, but I put effort into it. At least it gave you a chance to kick me in the pants.

Wayfarer

At least it gave you a chance to kick me in the pants. — T Clark

Never mind TC, no hard feelings, I just felt it deserved a bit more of a constructive criticism.

Although I will say, @Ignoredreddituser, you've picked an absolute stinker of a Forum name, I believe the forum software allows you to change your handle once (unless I'm mistaken), so I'd urge you to consider that. :wink:

Ignoredreddituser

It wasn’t me making this argument, it’s a philosophy we named Steven French. I just took the excerpt straight from him because it’s possibly clearer than my paraphrasing.

There’s elimintivism in theory of mind, but also metaphysics of objects, usually it’s contrasted with permissivism which entail arbitrary combinations of objects such as Trogs, which tree-dogs.

Yeah, so you something like hylomorphism?

Yeah, it’s clunky name, but it reflects how hard it is to find people who like metaphysics like the OP.

Cuthbert

Why does any of this matter? — T Clark

C'mon TC. This is a philosophy forum, and it's a perfectly valid philosophical question. — Wayfarer

I think T Clark's question is also a valid philosophical question, if we read it as a question rather than a rhetorical dismissal of the OP's question. Why does it matter? What is the discussion about? If we want to know about tables, their history and uses, then the discussion will give us nothing new. If we are seeking information about quarks and atoms, then the debate will yield no information beyond what we already know or think we know. If we are uncertain what is a single object as distinct from, for example, a pile of objects stuck together, then we need only play with lego to get the idea. If we want to know whether one thing is 'nothing but' another then we can try substituting the concepts in various contexts and see how we get on. It looks to me as if we cannot even pin down what question we are trying to answer before leaping to the safety of an answer. We cannot say why it matters. We cannot even say clearly what we are talking about.

Ignoredreddituser

The real underlying question is basically if anything we typically think of as existing actually does, including ourselves. So it may be an empty question depending on your philosophical views.

The Lego example is pretty contentious because you can recover an individual Lego from a block as opposed to say an atom which cannot, in principle, recovered from a molecule.

Cuthbert

The Lego example is pretty contentious because you can recover an individual Lego from a block as opposed to say an atom which cannot, in principle, recovered from a molecule. — Ignoredreddituser

This objection shows that lego will help me learn the difference between single objects and stuck-together objects but that molecules and atoms will not help me. So one example is helpful for the purpose of learning a distinction. A different example is not helpful. That is what I would expect from examples and learning in general.

Also, what is electrolysis? Now that is worth learning.

Cuthbert

The real underlying question is basically if anything we typically think of as existing actually does, including ourselves. — Ignoredreddituser

Oh, ok. Well, let's suppose that the answer to the underlying question is - "No, nothing that we typically think of as existing does actually exist." So I don't actually exist and neither do you. At least that saves us the bother of worrying about metaphysics......

Perhaps T Clark's question did not go far enough. Not only does the question not matter - it doesn't even make sense. (I'm thinking partly of logical positivism's criticism of metaphysics.)

T Clark

I think T Clark's question is also a valid philosophical question, — Cuthbert

I agree with your explanation, but I think Wayfarer's criticism was that I wasn't responding in the terms that the OP laid out. I don't disagree with him.

Olivier5

I think Wayfarer's criticism was that I wasn't responding in the terms that the OP laid out. — T Clark

To OP is extremely confused, and responding in the same terms would only add more confusion.

T Clark

To OP is extremely confused, and responding in the same terms would only add more confusion. — Olivier5

I was confused, but I don't think that means the OP was. After all, it wasn't @Ignoredreddituser's writing, it was Steven French's.

RussellA

how to reply to an argument Steven French makes below. — Ignoredreddituser

A whole is a particular relation between its parts, in that a table is a particular relation between its atoms. If the whole is more than the sum of its parts, then relations must have their own ontological existence over and above the ontological existence of the parts (putting to one side the question of what exactly is a part).

To argue against Steven French and argue for the non-eliminativist view, one will also need to argue that relations ontologically exist.

As the SEP on "Relations" notes: "Some philosophers are wary of admitting relations because they are difficult to locate. Glasgow is west of Edinburgh. This tells us something about the locations of these two cities. But where is the relation that holds between them in virtue of which Glasgow is west of Edinburgh? The relation can’t be in one city at the expense of the other, nor in each of them taken separately, since then we lose sight of the fact that the relation holds between them (McTaggart 1920: §80)"

I know that Glasgow is west of Edinburgh, but does Glasgow know that it is west of Edinburgh !

IE, the non-eliminativist must also argue for the ontological existence of relations - not an easy task.

Olivier5

it wasn't Ignoredreddituser's writing, it was Steven French's. — T Clark

Nevertheless, I find the OP quite confused. For instance, Steven French is not presented, nor is his argument FOR eliminativism of tables. Instead the OP goes straight into some putative objections to French's thesis, but how are we to make sense of the objections to a thesis we know next to nothing of?

Cuthbert

the non-eliminativist must also argue for the ontological existence of relations - not an easy task — RussellA

Indeed, but let's have a go. First, let's distinguish ontological existence from other merely everyday kinds of existence. Now 'ontological' means, roughly, 'pertaining to existence'. So we are looking for a category of existence that is related to existence. Well, perhaps that's not too hard, after all. I guess every category of existence will qualify. If it is a category of existence then it pertains to existence. In the same way, if we go looking for canine dogs, feline cats and primate humans we will not be disappointed. We can tuck them into our metaphorical hunting sack along with the ontological existence.

Next problem. We have to show that relations exist. We already know (from above) that, if relations exist, then they have the special ontological kind of existence required - because everything that exists has that special kind of existence. But we don't yet know whether relations exist.

Let's borrow an example from the opposing camp. Glasgow is west of Edinburgh - so we are told. We are further led to believe that 'being west of' is a 'relation'. Now, what would it mean for such a relation to exist? It could mean that if we turn over the whole universe item by item we will find at least one thing that is to the west of another thing. On the other hand, if we get to the end of all the items in the universe and have not encountered a single thing that is to the west of any other thing then we can say that such a relation does not exist. If 'a relation exists' does not mean that, then I will need to confess I do not know what it does mean. OK so far. That leaves us with the small problem of turning over every item in the universe. But hold on! We just picked an example of the very thing we are looking for. There is a case - at least one case - of something being to the west of something else. From which it follows that there is at least one case of something being in relation to something else. From which if finally follows that relations exist. Putting this conclusion together with our earlier one, we can see that relations have ontological existence.

"But which of the two cities does the relation 'being west of' exist in?" Well, relations do have ontological existence. But they are not objects that we can lug around with us. We can turn over every object in Glasgow and Edinburgh and we will not find any such thing. That's not because it's very small or particularly elusive. It's because it's not a kind of thing. It's because - oh, gosh, see Ryle and anyone who has written about category mistakes for the last 70 years....

Need I go on? (No, Cuthbert. Not only need you not go on. You need not even have started.)

Olivier5

I know that Glasgow is west of Edinburgh, but does Glasgow know that it is west of Edinburgh !

IE, the non-eliminativist must also argue for the ontological existence of relations - not an easy task. — RussellA

Thanks, that makes the thesis -- at least your interpretation -- a bit clearer.

Still, I am not quite sure why Glasgow should be aware of its geographic position respective to Edinburgh. And I still wonder what's so great about "ontological existence", or if you prefer, why anyone should be worried about a table not existing "ontologically".

As long as I can eat and work on it, and occassionally climb on it, the table is real enough for me. It is a dependable and stable object, a tool ready for use. Note that in this pragmatic perspective a table is NOT JUST a set of atoms arranged tablewise. It is first and foremost a means to an end.

But for the sake of the argument, let us agree that ontological existence is the best thing since sliced bread. So the challenge is to prove that relations do exist "ontologically". That is to say (I guess) that they exist objectively "out there", and not just as ideas in our minds.

A chemist would answer yes to this question. She would say that a molecule of water is not just the sum of one atom of oxygen and two atoms of hydrogen regrouped conceptually in one mental set.

For one, the chemical reaction (at ambient temperature etc) is not O + 2 H --> H2O but precisely O2 + 2 H2 --> 2 H2O, i.e. the combustion of two biatomic molecules of hydrogen with one biatomic molecule of oxygen. The original molecules of hydrogen and oxygen are broken in the reaction but they are the starting point of it, not atomic hydrogen and oxygen. What exist "out there" are the molecules of oxygen and hydrogen and water. The atoms are conceptually constructed (by deconstructing the molecules).

For two, the combustion of hydrogen releases significant energy in the form of heat. This energy is objectively measurable. Therefore the chemical reaction is an objective process, not just some view of the chemist's mind. And what is a chemical reaction, if not a series of relations between ingredients?

A medical doctor would answer positively as well. A living man is very different from her perspective from a dead corpse. And yet what is life if not a series of chemical reactions and ecological relations and interdependencies?

An economist would say that markets exist 'ontologically', or she wouldn't study them. A mechanic would tell you that a functional car is far more than a concept. It takes work and money to put it together or to repair it. Etc. Etc.

RogueAI

From which if finally follows that relations exist. Putting this conclusion together with our earlier one, we can see that relations have ontological existence. — Cuthbert

It seems like the relations are mind-dependent. Doesn't it require a mind to determine whether something is West of something else?

Cuthbert

Doesn't it require a mind to determine whether something is West of something else? — RogueAI

I did not mention minds. Perhaps I should have. I think if anyone tries to determine something in the sense of 'decide whether something is or is not the case' and that person does not have a mind then they have a bigger task ahead of them than the previous one I tackled. Determining entails thinking and thinking without a mind is perhaps not possible for any person. But such a supposed person's difficulties - struggling, mindless, to position cities in Scotland - will not affect the geography of Scotland. How could it?

Cuthbert

Still, I am not quite sure why Glasgow should be aware of its geographic position respective to Liverpool. — Olivier5

It isn't. Ask any city what it's aware of - if you can work out how to ask things of cities - and you will draw a blank. Perhaps I did need to go on about category mistakes. But here's someone who went on about it at greater length and in more detail than I can manage: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/category-mistakes/

RogueAI

↪Cuthbert

But how do relations exist in the universe if they're mind-dependent? Can X be West of Y in a universe with no minds?

Ignoredreddituser

↪RogueAI

I too cuthberts claim about the geopgraphy of Scotland to say that relations were not mind-dependent. Though I think cities aren’t the clearest example because they’re more constructed/abstract than say the moon and the sun which relationship would be there even without a person to perceive it.

Olivier5

Ask any city what it's aware of - if you can work out how to ask things of cities - and you will draw a blank. Perhaps I did need to go on about category mistakes. — Cuthbert

Yes.

Thinking about it some more: if relations do not exist, then what can possibly exist? The concept of "the world" or "the universe" implies interconnectivity between the elements of the world. Otherwise, if relations do not exist, then each element of the world is entirely alone; each elementary particle is its own independent world. And thus "the world" does not exist.

For the world to exist, relations must exist.

Wayfarer

Why does it matter? What is the discussion about? If we want to know about tables, their history and uses, then the discussion will give us nothing new. — Cuthbert

The use of the word 'table' or 'apple' or 'chair' is invariably a stand-in for objects in general. So the question is about, what are things, really? Are they simply aggregates of material particles, or are they something over and above that? And that matters as one of the fundamental questions of philosophy. So if you're in a philosophy forum, and someone asks that question, I don't think 'yeah so what?' is much of a response.

Yeah, so you something like hylomorphism? — Ignoredreddituser

I can see that English syntax is not amongst your strengths, but yes.

Let's borrow an example from the opposing camp. Glasgow is west of Edinburgh - so we are told. We are further led to believe that 'being west of' is a 'relation'. Now, what would it mean for such a relation to exist? — Cuthbert

Actually I believe this is from a Bertrand Russell text:

Consider such a proposition as 'Edinburgh is north of London'. Here we have a relation between two places, and it seems plain that the relation subsists independently of our knowledge of it. When we come to know that Edinburgh is north of London, we come to know something which has to do only with Edinburgh and London: we do not cause the truth of the proposition by coming to know it, on the contrary we merely apprehend a fact which was there before we knew it. The part of the earth's surface where Edinburgh stands would be north of the part where London stands, even if there were no human being to know about north and south, and even if there were no minds at all in the universe. ...We may therefore now assume it to be true that nothing mental is presupposed in the fact that Edinburgh is north of London. But this fact involves the relation 'north of', which is a universal; and it would be impossible for the whole fact to involve nothing mental if the relation 'north of', which is a constituent part of the fact, did involve anything mental. Hence we must admit that the relation, like the terms it relates, is not dependent upon thought, but belongs to the independent world which thought apprehends but does not create.

This conclusion, however, is met by the difficulty that the relation 'north of' does not seem to exist in the same sense in which Edinburgh and London exist. If we ask 'Where and when does this relation exist?' the answer must be 'Nowhere and nowhen'. There is no place or time where we can find the relation 'north of'. It does not exist in Edinburgh any more than in London, for it relates the two and is neutral as between them. Nor can we say that it exists at any particular time. Now everything that can be apprehended by the senses or by introspection exists at some particular time. Hence the relation 'north of' is radically different from such things. It is neither in space nor in time, neither material nor mental; yet it is something.

I think this nails it. These kinds of relations are only meaningful to an observer who can consider the relation between Edinburgh and London; there's nothing in London or Edinburgh which comprises that relationship, but it's the case for any and all observers.

He goes on:

It is largely the very peculiar kind of being that belongs to universals which has led many people to suppose that they are really mental. We can think of a universal, and our thinking then exists in a perfectly ordinary sense, like any other mental act. Suppose, for example, that we are thinking of whiteness. Then in one sense it may be said that whiteness is 'in our mind'.... In the strict sense, it is not whiteness that is in our mind, but the act of thinking of whiteness. The connected ambiguity in the word 'idea', which we noted at the same time, also causes confusion here. In one sense of this word, namely the sense in which it denotes the object of an act of thought, whiteness is an 'idea'. Hence, if the ambiguity is not guarded against, we may come to think that whiteness is an 'idea' in the other sense, i.e. an act of thought; and thus we come to think that whiteness is mental.

But in so thinking, we rob it of its essential quality of universality. One man's act of thought is necessarily a different thing from another man's; one man's act of thought at one time is necessarily a different thing from the same man's act of thought at another time. Hence, if whiteness were the thought as opposed to its object, no two different men could think of it, and no one man could think of it twice. That which many different thoughts of whiteness have in common is their object, and this object is different from all of them. Thus universals are not thoughts, though when known they are the objects of thoughts.

I've underlined a couple of sentences for emphasis, which I think are of high significance. Notice his use of the word 'subsists' for such relations, rather than 'exists'. I think that is signficant also.

Cuthbert

OK, let's suppose the position to be defended is that 'being west of' is a relation and it exists and it is not to be found in any city. That's not a problem. Ryle's example of how it's not a problem was about a university. You show a person round all the colleges, campuses and administrative buildings, then they turn to you and say: "Very interesting - but you have not yet shown me the university." They have misunderstood the concept of 'university'. If you treat a relation as a kind of object or thing then you will get dizzyingly confused - because it isn't.

I think there might be a thought in this thread that 'If the relation "being west of" isn't in the cities then it must be in our minds'. I don't think that's true, either. I cannot explain compass points by referring to minds. I would need to refer to cities, for example, but not (as explained) to a particular object in a city called 'being west of'. What kind of thing is a relation? Is it a physical object like a building? No. Then is it a mental construct like a perfect circle? No. But it must be one or the other. Why? It may be in a category of its own, separate from physical objects and also separate from mental constructs. The category in question may be 'relation' and it works in a way different from either.

So if you're in a philosophy forum, and someone asks that question, I don't think 'yeah so what?' is much of a response. — Wayfarer

True. If someone had written that then I think they would just not have been joining in properly. Thankfully the person who might have said that has not pitched up in the thread yet.

Cuthbert

Can X be West of Y in a universe with no minds? — RogueAI

If some X had not been west of some Y on an earth with no minds, then there would not have been a suitable environment for terrestrial mammals with minds to evolve.

Cornwell1

Articulating a metaphysics for the manner in which the structure of the world yields that which we call ‘atoms’, ‘molecules’, etc. is a tricky business, but the core point remains: that which we call a ‘table’ is nothing but a manifestation of that fundamental structure. — Ignoredreddituser

True atoms have no mass like a table. On the fundamental level matter is kinetic only. With a will to reach out. The table is an example of satisfied will. Love and hate are almost perfectly balanced in the table. The balance can be disturbed in time. An evil black hole, the great annihalitor of love and hate, can pass, or a thermonuclear disaster befall on it.

The love and hate at fundamental level will all be annihilated in the end, and only vague remembrances will linger into oblivion. And then, bang, a new catharsis. Love and hate reappear in those rare, most turmoilical and vibratical happenings.

Olivier5

Thankfully the person who might have said that has not pitched up in the thread yet. — Cuthbert

Yeah? So what?

Replies to Steven French’s Eliminativism about Objects and Material Constitution. (Now with TLDR)

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