No, no. I am saying that you are saying that because we humans fear death and avoid it, then death must be bad.
But we humans believe death to be bad therefore we avoid it.

So, your conclusion that Death is bad is not ok because it is already assumed to be true beforehand

Yes, but I didn't say that - i asked you to provide a quote and you couldn't. You don't seem to understand the difference between saying 'you have a reason to do x' and saying 'you fear doing x'. The first is a normative claim, the latter a psychological one.

Anyway, I suggest you re-read the OP and try and discern the argument contained in it. Then try and challenge a premise.

Even if death does not end our consciousness, it does not mean that it would be better for one to not exist. — DA671

I provided an argument for that very claim. You are just ignoring it.

Obviously it is possible for death to benefit us. If death is a portal to heaven, then it benefits us. I said this! But then we would not have reason to avoid it, would we? And we do have reason to avoid it under virtually all circumstances. Even if our lives are moderately miserable and show no sign of improving, we still have reason to avoid death. So, it isn't a portal to heaven, is it? It is a portal to hell.

Then you propose a deprivation account of the harmfulness of death - an account I refuted in the OP.

I'll do it again. If the deprivation account of the harmfulness of death is correct, then if your life is so-so and you die, then your death is not a harm and you have no reason to try and avoid it (for it would be depriving you of nothing worth having). Yet if your life is so-so, you still have reason to avoid death. If death is something you have reason to avoid - and thus is something harmful (for that is the best explanation of why we have reason to avoid it) even when it deprives you of nothing worth having, then it does not harm you by depriving you of anything. It harms you by altering your condition - for the worse.

And again: if the deprivation account is correct, then death can never be the lesser of two evils. Yet it is often the lesser of two evils - if someone is in unending agony, then it is best that they die. But their death is still a harm. Yet if the deprivation account is correct, it would not be a harm at all under such circumstances. Again: so much the worse for the deprivation account.

Yes, although it is the other way around. Suicide is intuitively irrational under most circumstances. That's not a conclusion, but a premise. So, it is clear to our reason that it would be irrational to kill oneself to avoid mild discomfort - irrational to kill oneself to escape a so-so life here. We have reason to avoid death until or unless our lives become unbearably painful and undignified. These are not claims that I am arguing for, rather I take them to be self-evident. (Any argument for them would have premises no more plausible than the claims themselves and Aristotle counselled against arguing for the more certain by means of the less).

The best explanation of why we have reason not to kill ourselves (and others) under all but the most extreme circumstances is that death is exceedingly harmful. And furthermore, that it is not a one-off harm whose gravity can just be factored into our utility calculations, but rather that it permanently changes ones condition for the worse.

Thus, our reason tells us, in so many words, that death is a portal to a worse world.

Suicide was always irrational under most circumstances - but now we have an explanation of why: if you kill yourself, chances are you will be making your situation worse.

And feeling sorry for those who have died or been killed (not just feeling sorry for oneself) - which was always rational - can now also be explained: those who have died have been made worse off. Things are going badly for them.

And feeling moral outrage at killers - which was always rational - also makes sense: they have made their victim's situations much worse.

And of course, now it is clear that procreation is wrong - among the most wicked things one can do. For it is to bring another person into our unenviable predicament.

@Bartricks

No, I'm not getting it. Why is it reasonable to avoid death (save to avoid missing out on a good life and causing grief to our loved ones)?

The reason we avoid death is because of our selfish genes, same reason we reproduce.

No, you're not getting it.

I am not arguing that it is reasonable to avoid death. That'd be like arguing that 1 + 2 = 3. It is self-evident to reason that we have reason to avoid death.

I am then extracting the implications of this.

If you resist my conclusion by denying that we have reason to avoid death, you lose.

I actually don't believe in the deprivation account; I merely said that we disvalue death because it can cut short potentially good experiences. Personally, I don't think that it has any positive/negative value (aside from the process). I did not ignore anything you had said, but I apologise if I did so accidentally.

Whether or not we have a "reason" (in the sense of something being preferable for us) to avoid death depends on the framework one has. If they believe that nonexistence isn't valuable/disvaluable, they don't necessarily have a reason to fear death itself, but they could still prefer to avoid unnecessary harm as well as appreciate the good that life has (and also be a source of joy for others). If one believes in the deprivation account, then they would have to see if the harms in their life would outweigh the good. If the answer is yes, then perhaps they would indeed have a reason to prefer nonexistence over a valueless one. But, by the same token, an ultimately positive existence, even one that's "so-so" in many ways, could give one more reason to prefer existence over the void. Here, it would be important to distinguish between desires (which are ephemeral and dynamic-there are many people who switch between wanting to exist and wanting to not do so) and a "reason" for doing something (which would be the "right" thing to do that would be in our interest and lead to greater fulfillment, even if we currently don't feel like that). Unless one cannot find any sufficient source of value in their life, I don't think that dying/death can be preferable. But while death isn't desirable, the goods of life can certainly be, and I don't think that the mere existence of cessation implies that the positives aren't deeply potent. I already gave reason for taking the good into account:

1. The badness of dying (which isn't the exact same as being dead) is about experience. It could involve pain and also discomfort resulting from fear. Fortunately, it is still a small part of most people's lives (which numerous people find to be immensely meaningful) and it also doesn't seem to affect people to a degree that they cannot enjoy the goods. I would say that this is the right perspective because the fear is mostly counter-productive.

2. The badness of death itself might only be about the loss of potential life. But nobody prefers life in isolation without considering the positives/negatives. In view of this, it could be said that an inability to live long is bad due to the absence of goods that could have existed. But the alternative to perfect goodness is some good, not nothingness ;)
And the prevention of a "loss" cannot be "good" if there's no gain in the first place.

We could still have reasons to delay it if a certain kind of life is necessary for heaven. But aside from that, we do have a desire to avoid death. It might have a lot to do with an instinct to propagate and to avoid terrible pain, but it's also about a need to prevent a perceived loss of future good. Some would, however, argue that this fear isn't necessary because nothingnes cannot benefit/harm a person (unless there's some specific form of heaven/hell)

Having a desire to cherish goods and avoid harm doesn't have much to do with hell. The reality is that "so-so" lives might also have small satisfactions that matter more to a person than a potentially painful death. There's also a lot of fear associated with it from our environment and culture.

Once again, I don't think that non-existence would have any value. But as as as the deprivation account is concerned, I think that a "so-so" life which is still good (overall) would be better than nonexistence. But if someone truly has a negative life and wish for it to end, then a momentary need to avoid death migh not be too important to consider, since they could rationally see that their potential future existence would mostly be bad, which would be prevented by their death. Death might still be a smaller harm if they continue to have a desire to avoid it, but it could also (and I hope that people don't have to be in such a situation) be good for them if it proves to be a source of relief for someone in pain (and the relief outweighs the negative feeling generated by the aversion). I don't think that death "alters" anything. It does cause pain, but this doesn't mean that the good experiences a person has had throughout their life don't matter. It could lead to fear, but I think that it can be mitigated by accepting its reality and cherishing the precious goods while they do exist. Nonexistent beings cannot be in an altered state of affairs, and I don't think we can be sure that the void isn't some terrible state that can only be relieved by existence either.

I also think that you've made some hasty generalisations that aren't justifiable. "So-so" lives is a vague term that matters differently for different people. I've met many people with such lives who don't feel that they have a strong need to avoid death (aside from fear of pain or cultural/societal influence). And of course, there are others who don't have the best lives, but still cherish existence in general over nonexistence. This comes down to personal values of the individual, not some nonexistent "altered" state that death supposedly brings us in. And, as I have already mentioned multiple times, I don't think that the moment of death has to negate all the positive experiences a person has in their life. Sometimes, the true reason for seeking to avoid the door is not (just) the door itself, but the majestic room just behind us. Whether or not we want to acknowledge that and recognise the diversity of the sentient experience is a different matter.

Once again, I am not saying that the deprivation account is necessarily true. All I am suggesting is that there are many biological/philosophical factors involved regarding death, and it isn't clear that its mere existence negates the strength of a good aspects of life.

In light of this, I don't think that the existence of death is an argument in favour of antinatalism. Thanks for this post, and I hope you have a wonderful day!

It's just sad you're allowing your DNA to control your beliefs. Especially considering that it's responsible for reproduction, the greatest con of all time.

In any event, doesn't your premise assume the conclusion? The premise that it is self-evidently reasonable to avoid death, assumes the conclusion that death is worse.

A neat piece of research, — Banno

Yes. I went to Google, typed "how many people are afraid of dying," and picked the link at the top of the page. I am exhausted from all the work.

My question was whether we generally have reason to avoid death — Bartricks

No. You wrote:

Our reason tells us to do virtually anything to avoid it. — Bartricks

Generally having reason to avoid is different from doing virtually anything to avoid. As I said, I'm enjoying my life; I'd like to live longer, but there are many things more important.

Agreed. We may have reasons for avoiding death (which include aversion to pain and a fear of losing potential good), but life cannot be seen in a myopic way. We also have reasons to appreciate joys and partake in ethereal experiences that serve as a source of great joy. It might be true that these reasons aren't present for all, but this doesn't mean that they don't matter for billions of sentient beings. We don't just have a reason to "avoid death"—we also have reasons to view life as a magnificent desideratum that, despite the harms, deserves to be celebrated to the greatest extent possible whilst also mitigating harms. Universal antinatalism remains unjustifiable.

I disagree with the idea that procreation is a con. But yeah, I think that unbridled reliance on certain instincts can lead to irrational conclusions.

So, just to be clear, you are claiming that, in general, we do not have reason to avoid death? That is such a lame and absurd objection - you're welcome to it. You're denying a premise that is obviously true. It's just silly.

The reason we avoid death is because of our selfish genes, same reason we reproduce — Down The Rabbit Hole

Are we ordered by our selfish genes? I think it's the other way round.

What are you on about? Why are you talking about DNA? Try and focus on the argument I made and resist the desire to express controversial and irrelevant theories about what causes us to behave as we do.

No, my argument does not assume the conclusion. It leads to it. That's what arguments do - they extract the implications of their premises.

Now, the premises of my argument are uncontroversial. The conclusion is alarming. But the premises are hard sensibly to deny. That's what makes it a good argument.

Here's one of my premises: we have powerful reason to avoid death, extreme unending agony aside - indeed, we have reason to avoid death even when our lives are so-so or mildly miserable.

That's not a controversial premise - not remotely. Anyone who denies it owes an argument - and their argument better have premises that are obviously true, otherwise they would be rejecting a powerfully self-evident claim on the basis of a less self-evident claim, which is dumb.

Here's another claim: the reason you have reason to avoid death under virtually all circumstances bar extreme unending agony is that it harms you. That is, it is contrary to your interests to die - extreme unending agony aside.

Do you dispute that? There's some room to dispute it - it is a more sensible premise to dispute than the previous one. For it is at least in principle possible that we have reason to avoid death for reasons unrelated to harm. However, once more, you'd need an argument. For on the face of it, death is harmful - that is, the claim that death is harmful seems no less self-evident to reason than the claim that we have reason to avoid death. Note as well that a whole range of attitudes towards another's death would be irrational if death was, contrary to what our reason tells us, not harmful.

The best explanation of why we have reason to avoid death under most circumstances is that it harms us.

Now the gravity of that harm must be immense. If we have reason to avoid death even when our lives are mildly miserable - and show no prospect of being anything other than mildly miserable - then it is clearly really harmful. And not just a one off harm either.

That's all I need for the antinatalist conclusion. For if death is such an immense harm, then it operates to make lives that feature it - that is, all lives - not worth starting.

you are claiming that, in general, we do not have reason to avoid death? — Bartricks

No, I am claiming that most of us won't "do virtually anything to avoid it." You are changing the basis of this discussion in the middle.

Jeez, can't you people understand the difference between a normative claim - a claim about what we have reason to do - and a psychological claim - a claim about how we behave? No, it seems.

Now, once more Clarky boy, try and answer the question: do you think we have reason to avoid death under most circumstances?

Don't answer a different question. Don't tell me your recipe for mushroom soup. Don't give me your theory about human psychology. Answer the question I asked.

I'll do it for you to save time - the answer is 'yes'.

Now read the OP again and address something I argued.

We don't try that hard to avoid death. We border on seeking it out. Your premise that we avoid death because "it must be really bad" is plain old dumb.

What an excellent point. Yes, definitely the weak point in my argument is my claim that we have reason to avoid death under most circumstances. It's a really controversial claim. Good job.

Now, once more Clarky boy, try and answer the question: do you think we have reason to avoid death under most circumstances? — Bartricks

As I noted, that's not the claim you made originally. You're changing the rules of the game in the middle of play. No need for us to continue this any longer.

That's not your claim. Your claim is that death is totally horrendous so people instinctively try desperately to avoid it, ergo it must be awful. Which is total rubbish.

No, from the beginning I have argued that we have 'reason' to avoid death in all but the most extreme circumstances.learn to read and then read the op.

Learn to read and then read the op.

I merely said that we disvalue death because it can cut short potentially good experiences. Personally, I don't think that it has any positive/negative value (aside from the process). I did not ignore anything you had said, but I apologise if I did so accidentally. — DA671

I am not talking about why people disvalue death. That's a sociological question, not a philosophical one.

Our reason tells us to avoid death under most circumstances. That implies it is harmful, yes?

The deprivation account is demonstrably false. If it was true, then death would not be a harm if your life is drab or if you are in agony and death is the only escape. The death is still a harm in those circumstances, is it not? It is the lesser of two evils. But the lesser of two evils is still an evil. So, the deprivation account is false. It does not matter that many people 'think' it is true. So what? Have they thought about it carefully, as I have? No. Have they noticed that if the deprivation account is true, then death is good, not bad, when it is visited on those whose lives are slightly drab or on those whose lives are agony. No.

So, the deprivation account is false.

Whether or not we have a "reason" (in the sense of something being preferable for us) to avoid death depends on the framework one has. — DA671

No it doesn't. That's like thinking that whether the world is spherical or flat depends on your framework. No it doesn't. It depends on what shape it is.

Christians think they're going to heaven when they die. Do you think that means they are? Is that all one needs to do? If you think it, it will be so? Have you not noticed that this is not at all how the world works?

You also mischaracterize what a 'reason' is. A reason is not a personal preference. A reason to do something is known as a 'normative reason'. Our personal preferences can inform what we have reason to do - if I really want to do x, then probably that will generate a reason for me to do it - but a reason to do something is not made of our personal preferences. Tom has a reason not to kill Jane even if he really wants to, yes? Well, if 'reason to' just meant 'prefers to' then that would make no sense. But Tom has a reason not to kill Jane even if he wants to - so clearly reasons to do things are not made of our own preferences and talk of reasons to do things is not just a convoluted way of talking about what we prefer to do.

Let's say you wake up one morning and you happen to want to kill yourself. Does that mean you now do have reason to kill yourself? That, magically, it is now rational for you to kill yourself? No, obviously not. It would depend. If you wanted to kill yourself with such intensity that frustrating that desire would mean the rest of your life here would be a torment, then - perhaps - you might now have reason to kill yourself. But just having a passing desire to kill yourself does not entail that one has reason to kill oneself. So reasons to do things are not a disguised way of talking about our preferences, even though our preferences can inform what we have reason to do.

We have reason to avoid death. The evidence for that? The reason of virtually everyone says so.

That's the evidence that 2 + 3 = 5. The reason of virtually everyone represents 2 + 3 = 5. It is the evidence that this argument is valid:

1. If P, then Q
2. P
3. Therefore Q

The reason of virtually everyone represents it to be valid.

And so on. All appeals to evidence are appeals to reason.

And the reason of virtually everyone represents us to have reason to avoid death in all but the most extreme circumstances.

That does not mean that we do have reason to avoid death in all but the most extreme circumstances, but it is overwhelmingly good evidence that we do and the burden of proof is squarely on the person who would insist that we have no reason to avoid death in the main. And if all they can do in the way of defence is appeal to some bonkers worldview that has nothing to be said for it apart from taht it was believed by vikings or americans, then they have not discharged the burden.

Now, if our reason represents death to be something we have reason to avoid and only relents when our situation has become characterized by intense suffering, doesn't this imply that death is a harm, and a very serious one?

Typically, if we have reason not to do something it is because a) doing it will harm us, or b) because doing it will harm someone else, or c) because doing it is intrinsically immoral.

Which plausibly applies to our reason not to die? Well, not b, for my reason represents me to have reason not to die even when my death would not affect anyone else. So it is only plausibly a or c. I think c is fairly implausible as we generally do not have moral obligations to ourselves, but only to others. If I smack you in the face, that's wrong; but if I smack myself in the face, that's just stupid, but not immoral. Yet if I have reason to avoid death even when my death would not affect others, then if that's a moral reason it'd express an obligation to myself. Plus, in the unlikely event that I really do have a moral, rather than prudential, obligation not to kill myself, it would be because of the harm it would visit upon me. And so really 'a' seems to be the most plausible explanation of why we have reason not to kill ourselves and to avoid death.

So, we have overwhelming evidence that we have reason to avoid death in all but the most extreme circumstances, and we have good evidence that this is because death will harm us.
And we know that the deprivation account of the harm of death is false.
So, it harms us becasue it does something to us - it harms us because it alters our condition, not because it deprives us of anything.

1. The badness of dying (which isn't the exact same as being dead) is about experience. — DA671

Irrelevant, as my point is about death. Not the process of dying. Death. Death is a harm, as I have argued and as appears self-evident to the reason of most. Pointing out that other things related to death are also harmful only adds to my case, but does not challenge it.

The badness of death itself might only be about the loss of potential life. — DA671

No, that's the deprivation account again. And it is false.

I also think that you've made some hasty generalisations that aren't justifiable. "So-so" lives is a vague term that matters differently for different people. — DA671

By a so-so life I mean a life characterized by mild pleasures and pains and in which the balance of mild pleasure over pain is either slightly negative or even. If it was a company, it would be a company that was not turning a profit or was turning a slight loss and had no prospect of a profit in the future. If it was a company, a sensible business person would, other things being equal, close it down. But it is not a company, it is a life. And we have reason not to shut such lives down.

To extend the company metaphor, imagine that there is a huge company that is turning a slight loss, year on year. There is no prospect of it turning a profit - the accountants and analysts deliver the same verdict: this company is going to keep turning a slight loss. Yet its billionaire owner doesn't shut it down. Why? Well, what if closing it down would mean incurring huge redundancy pay-out costs? That is, it is losing $1m a year, but closing it would mean having to pay out $1billion in redundancy payments. Well, now it is in the billionaire's best financial interest to keep the company running, even though it is not making a profit. So, if a billionaire owns a giant company that keeps making a loss - and shows no prospect of making a profit - and yet the billionaire does not close it down, you can reasonably infer that something like the situation I just described is the case. That's the more sensible inference - more sensible than, say, inferring that the billionaire is stupid with money or just enjoys wasting it.

Our reason is the billionaire. It tells us to keep the company that is our life here going even when it is turning a slight loss and shows no prospect of turning a profit. What should we infer from that? We should infer that shutting our lives down will incur huge costs that far outweigh the costs we are incurring by keeping them going. That is, death is a harm of such magnitude that it eclipses all the harms we keep incurring by continuing living.

Personally, I don't think that it has any positive/negative value (aside from the process). — DA671

As Woody Allen said - I'm not afraid of death, I just don't want to be there when it happens.

I don't agree with the deprivation account, but I also don't necessarily believe in your view. Many people are averse to death, but this doesn't mean the same thing as us having a rational reason to avoid it.

In terms of people's averseness to death, I do think there are parallels. Someone who holds to a deprivation account might feel worse about death than one who does not. In my reply, I distinguished between desires and reason (something being the "right" thing to do). I believe that you missed this point.

Of course people do wish to avoid death. However, their reason for believing that are varied and also differ in intensity (even on a day-to-day basis, though the change there might not be easily perceptible, I think). You already said that us preferring something is not the same as us having a reason to avoid it (differentiating between what is desired and what is true), but then you claim that everybody saying that they wish to avoid death is evidence that it is something terrible (where you do end up conflating personal views with what one needs). You also disregard the fact that most people also say that they cherish their lives, even "so-so" lives. Part of the reason they wish to not die is because they want to continue living and experience the positive aspects of life that they value, and it would be terrible if someone with an extreme emphasis on death prevented the opportunity of all joy ;) Things aren't black and white.

Once again, fear is not the same as something being true. Many people might have feared that thunder was some punishment from the gods, but the majority deeply believing that does not make that a reality or give us a "reason" to pray to the thunder god the moment we get out of our homes. Of course, it's true that we want to avoid death. But if not existing has no value, then fearing is not rational (and neither is loving it). And if the deprivation account is true, then it would still be preferable to live a good life than incessantly worrying about one's demise.

Many people "think" they have a reason to avoid it. This is why their framework (the view they hold about the nature of death) matters. Many people who fear it believe that they would be left in some sort of dark void of misery after existing, but they also often avoid investigating these issues. I've experienced this a lot because I support the right to a graceful exit. People usually start off in a fearful way, but after a long discussion, many genuinely start to view death as something mostly irrelevant in their life (apart from the pain, but that's more about dying). The business owner chooses the lesser evil. Some billionaire might indeed enjoy wasting his money. The burden of proof was on you to prove that mere beliefs give us a rational reason for avoiding something, and I don't think you were able to defend your case successfully. But as you said, life is not a business. In life, things aren't about just avoiding something bad; things are also about gaining something valuable.

If "p" means the intuition that death is bad and q is the conclusion that death is bad, then you have failed to show the soundness of your argument. The problem is that it simply does not follow that if we think that we want to avoid death (which is not the same as believing death itself to be bad) that death actually becomes bad. All our beliefs and intuitions deserve to be scrutinised to ensure that we have a rational reason to trust them. Many intuitions that our ancestors might have shared, such as natural disasters being an evil force, have now been discarded by most of us once we realised that we did not have enough information to believe them. Therefore, "p" does not have to lead to q, which is why your argument is not sound.

No, we should infer that many people "think" that they have a reason to avoid death at all costs. There's a subtle but crucial difference there. But there are many things to infer besides just a single-minded focus on death. As I have already pointed out, most people wish to avoid death because they are afraid it would take away the things they value (and this is based upon the discussions I've had with countless people). Many also conflate death with a painful way of dying, and this is something that's often missed. A more accurate description would be that the fear of death sometimes eclipses our other desires. But yet again, it would be pertinent to point out that fear is not always rational, and even if it is, it only forms a component of life which also includes appreciating and seeking the ineffably meaningful moments that exist and hold such value that it fuels an extreme desire to prevent their (perceived) loss. The desire for the good, in turn, shows that innumerable individuals find their lives to be quite significant, even in difficult times. And so if the fear of death gives us a "reason" to think it's bad, the inimitable proclivity towards living and experiencing the positives also demonstrates that we have a reason for continuing life, which could be extremely potent. And I don't think that preventing the "harm" (I don't think that it is necessarily a harm, even if many think so) at the cost of all positives is justifiable, which is why antinatalism remains indefensible.

Anyway, thanks for sharing your insightful views. I hope you have a fantastic day ahead!

Didn't he also say "I do not want to live on through my children, I want to marry one" or have I got that wrong? Oh, yes, I have. "I do not want to live on through my children, I want to live on in my apartment".

Many people are averse to death, but this doesn't mean the same thing as us having a rational reason to avoid it. — DA671

I never said otherwise. I did not say people are averse to death - that's a psychological claim that others keep attributing to me. I said we have reason to avoid death. That does not mean the same thing at all.

Again, my claim - which is uncontroversial - is that we have reason to avoid death under all but the most extreme circumstances. That is not - not - a psychological claim. It does not mean the same as 'most people don't want to die' or 'most people are averse to death'. 'Reason to' and 'want to' are not synonymous expressions.

In terms of people's averseness to death, I do think there are parallels. Someone who holds to a deprivation account might feel worse about death than one who does not. In my reply, I distinguished between desires and reason (something being the "right" thing to do). I believe that you missed this point. — DA671

I don't know why you are continuing to talk about why people may be averse to death. You're not engaging with what I have argued. You're just making psychological claims - they're irrelevant. Again, my claim is not the psychological one "people are averse to death". My claim is that we have 'reason' to avoid death.

Do you believe that we have reason to avoid death under all but the most extreme circumstances? Forget what other people think and forget psychological analysis. Does it strike you as obvious that if drinking x will kill you, you have reason not to drink x?

I am not talking about psychology. You yourself had said that reason and desire are different, but then you simultaneous suggest that something most people believe to be bad based upon an uncritical perspective of it gives us a rational reason for thinking it's genuinely bad and that appears to make no sense.

They're quite relevant, my friend ;) I already distinguished between the two. I merely said that the alleged "reason" is far too diverse in character to make uniform claims.

Once again, thanks for the discussion, and I hope you have a great day/night ahead!

:up: