To briefly summarize Kastrup’s metaphysics in my own words and from my own understanding of it: all that exists is one (inherently spaceless and timeless) consciousness, and each metabolizing organism is a dissociated localization of this one consciousness. He uses the analogy of dissociative identity disorder (DID) from psychology to express how the one consciousness localizes (dissociates) itself into seemingly many subjects. The inanimate universe as a whole that we all perceive is simply what the one consciousness looks like from our dissociated perspectives. As a naturalist, Kastrup does not believe that the one consciousness in its “pure” form is intrinsically self-reflective like we are, since it did not undergo the evolutionary process that we did. — Paul Michael

There is a myth about one of the Hindu gods that I like a lot. @Wayfarer wrote about it in a previous thread. This god was lonely, so to create someone to play with, he split himself up into all the myriad things in the world and then made them all forget they were part of him. Did I get that right, Wayfarer?

Kastrup's idea is a myth just like the one described above. You don't need to disprove it. There's no way to test it one way or another. That's what metaphysical positions all have in common. They're not true or false. You pick the one that works best for you.

I'm no expert here but it seems to me Kastrup - who is a very articulate communicator and does a great road show - is essentially riffing off Schopenhauer's idealism and updating it. K argues that humans are dissociated alters of cosmic consciousness and matter is what consciousness looks like when viewed from a certain perspective. Mind is all that exists. Importantly, like Schopenhauer, K argues that cosmic consciousness (Will) does not have a plan for existence, it is instinctive, does not communicate and is not a god surrogate. Much of Kastrup's model involves demonstrating how materialism is incoherent.

Other than creating a flurry of rebuttals or anxieties in the so called scientific physicalist community, what does the model give us? Does Kastrup straw man naturalism by reducing it to materialism? He's clearly benefiting enormously from the current gaps in the understanding of consciousness and quantum physics.

So I am you?

Yeah, at the end of the day you’re absolutely right. I think I just need to accept that metaphysical positions cannot really be falsified and that we don’t (and probably can’t) have all the answers.

I'm no expert here but it seems to me Kastrup - who is a very articulate communicator and does a great road show - is essentially riffing off Schopenhauer's idealism and updating it. K argues that humans are dissociated alters of cosmic consciousness and matter is what consciousness looks like when viewed from a certain perspective. Mind is all that exists. Importantly, like Schopenhauer, K argues that cosmic consciousness (Will) does not have a plan for existence, it is instinctive, does not communicate and is not a god surrogate. Much of Kastrup's model involves demonstrating how materialism is incoherent. — Tom Storm

Considering Kastrup wrote a book that attempts to “decode” Schopenhauer’s idealism and show how his own model is very similar, I would say you absolutely nailed it here.

Other than creating a flurry of rebuttals or anxieties in the so called scientific physicalist community, what does the model give us? Does Kastrup straw man naturalism by reducing it to materialism? He's clearly benefiting enormously from the current gaps in the understanding of consciousness and quantum physics. — Tom Storm

Kastrup’s public display is of someone who is absolutely convinced of his position, granted I don’t know how certain anyone can actually be when it comes to metaphysics.



I hope not.

I hope not — Paul Michael

He says I am though, right? If we're all one, then I'm you and you're me.

There. Doesn't that refute it?

1. If Katsick's view is true, then I am you and you are me.
2. I am not you and you are not me
3. Therefore Katsick's view is false.

Technically he says we’re the same universal consciousness or “core subjectivity” but we’re unique dissociated alters or localizations of it.

Technically he says we’re the same universal consciousness or “core subjectivity” but we’re unique dissociated alters or localizations of it. — Paul Michael

Yes, but that's just a convoluted way of saying that you're me and I'm you. He can't just say "You're me and I'm you" because then everyone would know immediately that his view is false. He needs to say it more obscurely so that it's falsity isn't quite so obvious.

But he is saying that I am you and you are me, yes? (or is he saying that I am you and you are me and I am not you and you are not me? In which case that's a contradiction and his view is false for that reason instead).

And that is false.

And so his view is false.

No more need be said on the matter, for as Aristotle counselled, one should not support stronger claims with weaker ones. And that I am not you and you not me is about as strong as it gets.

If you are interested in Idealism then you should read Berkeley, not a hack like Katsick.

Kastrup’s view does indeed essentially boil down to open individualism (the view of personal identity according to which there exists only one numerically identical subject, who is everyone at all times). There have been points in time where I took it seriously as a possibility, but now I’m more of an “empty individualist” in that I don’t think there even is a persisting self.

Do you think that convicted criminals should be released as there is no persisting self for us to punish and so, in effect, the person in prison is not the same person who committed the crime?

The self and its persistence are among the most self-evidently real of existences, and so the job of work is to explain, not deny such matters. And if one cannot explain such matters, it is fallacious to infer on that basis that no such persistent self exists. I cannot explain how my computer works, but that is not evidence against it working - it is clearly working.

Not being able to explain how something is the case is not evidence against it being the case. And as Descartes emphasized, you should not reject the more self evident on the basis of the less. Any argument against the self will have premises less self-evidently true than the self-evident existence of the self and will thus violate Descartes' dictum

Perhaps I should have gone into more detail about my view of the self. I essentially believe that the notion of a permanent, unchanging self or soul is misguided. We are temporary, changing “patterns” who should be held responsible for our actions, because each individual pattern has its own tendencies regarding action.

If we just let every violent criminal go free, those patterns are often likely to continue their destructive behavior in society. Whether or not there is a core, persisting self that has free will is irrelevant to the issue of responsibility, in my opinion. Maybe we’re not *morally* responsible in an ultimate sense, but for practical purposes we need to hold each pattern responsible for harmful actions they perform, ideally for deterrence and rehabilitation (although in the US this is rarely the case).

We are temporary, changing “patterns” who should be held responsible for our actions, because each individual pattern has its own tendencies regarding action. — Paul Michael

That's semantics - what you're calling a 'pattern' is just 'the self'. Or you mean it literally, in which case it seems you are making a category error. I am not a pattern. Maybe I 'have' a pattern - there may be a pattern to my attitudes for instance. But 'having' a pattern is not the same as 'being' one.
Note too, that if patterns change, then there needs to be something that is undergoing the change or you're once more back with releasing criminals and escaping debts and so on (phone up your bank and explain to them that the pattern to whom they lent the money no longer exists and thus that you - this current pattern - owe them nothing and see how that goes).

Why start with a view of the self? Why not just follow what reason tells you and I about the matter? If you start out with a view, then all you're going to do is look for reasons to believe it and reject refutations of it for no better reason than that they are refutations of it.

It is clear that you are not me and I am not you. So we are distinct things. And it is clear that you are not your mental states, for those can be very different at one time to another time, yet they are no less your mental states for that (and that remains true whether they instantiate a pattern or not). And it is clear that you are not your sensible body, for every molecule of it can be replaced - and is commonly believed to be replaced every 7 years - without that meaning that you have been replaced. And your sensible body can be divided, whereas your self cannot be.

And so it is clear, if one listens to what one's reason and the reason of others tells us about our selves and resists the temptation to start out with a view about it, that our selves are distinct existences and are not our sensible bodies, but something else entirely.

And as it makes no sense to think the self can be divided, we can conclude further that the self is a simple thing (for if it had parts it could, in principle, be divided into them). And as a simple thing does not occupy space - for were it to do so, then it would be divisible and thus not simple - the self is thus an immaterial thing.

This view, note, is not one that I have started with, but rather it is a conclusion. And needless to say, it is entirely compatible with idealism and actually leads to it.

This god was lonely, so to create someone to play with, he split himself up into all the myriad things in the world and then made them all forget they were part of him. Did I get that right, Wayfarer? — T Clark

Well, considering that it is a cosmological mythology that is the subject of some of the lengthiest Hindu epic poems, it might be a tad difficult to convey it in a single sentence. It was condensed and paraphrased by Alan Watts in many of his books, particularly his last, The Book: on the Taboo against Knowing who you Are. And yes, there's considerable resonances between it and the theme of the OP.

To briefly summarize Kastrup’s metaphysics in my own words and from my own understanding of it: all that exists is one (inherently spaceless and timeless) consciousness, and each metabolizing organism is a dissociated localization of this one consciousness. — Paul Michael

It is similar to neoplatonism (the One, Ta Hen) and Hindu Vedanta (Brahman). There is of course the stream of thought associated with perennialism (or the perennial philosophy) of which Kastrup's is arguably an iteration, with the useful feature that he a PhD in computer science and has worked as a physicist at CERN, so is very much part of contemporary culture. The perennialist view is that there is a core of perennial truth of which the various higher spiritual traditions (Greek, Indian, Chinese, Persian) are offshoots or tributaries. Think for example of Alduous Huxley's book The Perennial Philosophy, which will contain many of the same over-arching themes.

Considering Kastrup wrote a book that attempts to “decode” Schopenhauer’s idealism and show how his own model is very similar, I would say you absolutely nailed it here. — Paul Michael

I've been listening to Kastrup's Schopenhuaer via audio book. I don't completely agree with his take on Schopenhauer's intepretation of the Platonic ideas but overall I think it's excellent.

Hey, I've got no arguments against Kastrup - some differences, some criticisms, but overall his is a voice that is sorely needed. Just browse the articles published by Scientific American or his ever-growing list of published books. My view is that he's emerging as an important voice in philosophy, science and culture. I think he's doing a much better job of what Ken Wilber tried to do a couple of generations ago. I'm intending to read a great deal more in the time ahead.

As a naturalist, Kastrup does not believe that the one consciousness in its “pure” form is intrinsically self-reflective like we are, since it did not undergo the evolutionary process that we did. — Paul Michael

I think he's stretching the boundaries of naturalism. I mean, one of the fundamental assumptions of naturalism as usually understood is the mind-independent nature of observables, that the world exists independently of any and all observers whereas that is the very first thing that Kastrup jettisons. That said, I myself think the boundary between naturalism and the supernatural is mainly a product of the specific intellectual history of European science, philosophy and religion, which grew up around the demarcation between the proper objects of the sciences and metaphysics. And furthermore as Kastrup himself will say, the idea of strict subject-object separation has been challenged from the 1920's by quantum physics. But overall, I think his profession of being a naturalist is a trojan horse maneuvre, because if you say you're anything but, then you're immediately relegated to the fringe, where no doubt many of his critics would like to put him.

I think his profession of being a naturalist is a trojan horse maneuvre ... — Wayfarer

As I've pointed out many times, a scientist's methological position in no way is indicative of – or entails – any specific metaphysical (ontological) commitment.

... Kastrup's is arguably an iteration, with the useful feature that he a PhD in computer science and has worked as a physicist at CERN ... — Wayfarer

It must be the quixotic mathematics of field equations, tensors, matrices, lie groups or Calabi–Yau manifolds which, like catnip spiked with crack, hooks so many particle physicists to Neoplatonism / Vendata -like constructs (mandalas) :sparkle:

I received a telephone call one day at the graduate college at Princeton from Professor [John]Wheeler, in which he said, "Feynman, I know why all electrons have the same charge and the same mass" "Why?" "Because, they are all the same electron!" — Richard Feynman

all that exists is one (inherently spaceless and timeless) consciousness — Paul Michael

I think one should take a closer look at Kastrup's arguments leading to this thesis. It is a bold thesis, and he alone bears the burden of proof.

But what could these arguments be? Kant starts with the transcendental aesthetics, which are supposed to show that space and time are rooted in the subject. Schopenhauer takes this argument and comes to the conclusion of a single eternal subject. Both the transcendental aesthetics and Schopenhauer conclusion are highly problematic and controversial.

George Berkeley argues in such a way as to bring Locke's primary qualities on the same ontological plane with the secondary ones. But even this is questionable.

Or does Kastrup have an entirely new approach?

He uses the analogy of dissociative identity disorder (DID) from psychology to express how the one consciousness localizes (dissociates) itself into seemingly many subjects. — Paul Michael

Has DID really found wide acceptance among experts? If not, his analogy is shaky in its explanatory power.