Neither does the absence of damage, because nobody is relieved from their absence. If absence of happiness only matters when there is a conscious feeling of deprivation, the lack of suffering also only matters when there is an actual relief. But clearly this doesn't stop some people from saying that it's still preferable to not create damage. However, by the same token, it can also be good to create goods whether or not a person is capable of feeling deprived of them.

Your points are also moot because you have deliberately chosen to ignore the fact that damages are not the only thing to consider here. Creating genuine benefits that one never had a prior interest in avoiding and which could lead to amazing experiences that one could not have solicited otherwise will always be ethical. Irrelevant examples, such as one's involving harming existing people for the sake of benefits that are quite unlikely to surpass the goods are not useful. Paternalistically judging that nobody should be able to enjoy a park when they cannot ask for going there themselves merely due to one's own perspective is also problematic.

Do you think there is such thing as a mild form of sadism? — schopenhauer1

Yes, and an extreme form.

Am I being not just a little sadistic in my paternal amusement? — schopenhauer1

I don't know. It's your story you tell it. I do love gardening, mind.

Neither does the absence of damage, because nobody is relieved from their absence. — DA671

I am not saying that.. For the last time. It is simply wrong to create collateral damage unnecessarily unto someone. That is what I am saying. Not the consequence on the non-existent person for not doing that.

f absence of happiness only matters when there is a conscious feeling of deprivation, the lack of suffering also only matters when there is an actual relief. — DA671

No, keep up dude. The point is that YOU keep saying that if the parent doesn't procreation, then there are "unhad goods" and this is bad, but it isn't for anyone. All that matters is NO HARM is taking place. I am not saying that the "alleviation is thus good" as you seem to be about unhad goods (being bad).

I don't know. It's your story you tell it. — unenlightened

To want suffering to exist because you want to see people struggle and overcome hardships, can be construed as mildly sadistic. Just because it happens to be people's stance a lot of the times, doesn't mean it still isn't a great stance to have regarding what they want to see from other people.

I don't care about your arbitrary claims anymore. For the last time, if the absence of joy doesn't matter due to an absence of an actual deprivation, the lack of damage cannot be considered good, since neither does it lead to a tangible relief/benefit. For the last time, it's simply good to bestow benefits (assuming it's wrong to create harms) onto people. Nonexistent beings and their inexistent deprivations aren't relevant here.

It's easy to say anything if one has unjustifiable and biased standards that are applied in an ad hoc manner. Merely proclaiming that unhad goods don't matter but unhad suffering matters sans an actual good does not show anything. You should be the one who should try to keep up, since you're the one who is insinuating that the lack of harms is good even though it isn't actually good for a person. And if creating harm can be bad even if not doing so isn't necessarily good for a person, then forming joys can be good even if their absence isn't problematic. If all that matters is the lack of suffering but not an actual good coming from that suffering, then I think one could also say that all that matters is the lack of joys, not an actual deprivation resulting from their absence.

For the last time, if the absence of joy doesn't matter due to an absence of an actual deprivation, the lack of damage cannot be considered good, since neither does it lead to a tangible relief/benefit. — DA671

I am saying exactly that actually. You seem to not care what I am saying, which is evident. The only thing that matters here is the parent not creating the harm. That is the moral decision. I am not saying that the non existent person is thus alleviated.

The only thing you said of any normative value is that you think creating collateral damage is not immoral. Okay then, we disagree.. BYYEEE.

It's evident that you wish to put on an intellectual blindfold when to comes to your position. I haven't done much except for arguing for a consistent view that you have been unreasonably dismissive of. I don't see any justification for the claim that preventing the harms is the only thing that matters (especially if their absence doesn't help an actual person). If this is the case, then the lack of happiness is also problematic, whether or not someone is feeling deprived due to its absence.

I said a lot more, but it can be convenient to look away from things that challenge our cherished beliefs, such as the value of happiness and the nature of forcing something in the absence of an actual violation. If an action leads to a greater good for the person by virtue of the benefits, I do think that the action can be justified. Obviously, we disagree on this. Nevertheless, thanks for taking the time have this discussion.

To want suffering to exist because you want to see people struggle and overcome hardships, can be construed as mildly sadistic. Just because it happens to be people's stance a lot of the times, doesn't mean it still isn't a great stance to have regarding what they want to see from other people. — schopenhauer1

That is a truly bizarre comment. What I or anyone wants is beside the point isn't it? Any being that lives, dies. Any being that lives, suffers harm. to live is to die, and therefore to live is to suffer harm. To notice this fact is not sadism, mild or bitter. That is an argument unworthy of you, and smacks of desperation. I'm stopping here, because it is clear that we have again reached the nub of our disagreement, and further discussion would be pointless suffering.

Your just arguing to argue now. Piss off if you can't be consructive. I've given you plenty here to loock back at.

You keep wanting to drop my earliest statements on state of affairs.
In on state, there is collateral damage. In the other there is not.
Should you create the state with collateral damage? That is the question. That is all. Anything else you say is straw manning me, and the fact you keep doing it, makes it now a red herring.. So stop.

To notice this fact is not sadism, mild or bitter. That is an argument unworthy of you, and smacks of desperation. I'm stopping here, because it is clear that we have again reached the nub of our disagreement, and further discussion would be pointless suffering. — unenlightened

I am sorry Un, but I don't really get what point you are trying to make.
Are we not in agreement that another life can come about if a parent decides to procreate?
And thus, if life has suffering, which we both agree it does, why, as the parent would you want to procreate and have a person who will suffer, as we both agree they would?

I thought you were trying to say that you think that "Yes, procreation is good despite suffering, because suffering isn't bad".. And I was responding to that. If I am not getting your argument, please explain.

You've given me many empty assertions and double standards, which is something I had predicted before.

I only want a consistent view regarding state of affairs.

In one state, there is benefit. In the other state, there are no benefits.

If the goods are high enough to allow the person to live a truly happy life, it's indeed justifiable to create the person. As long as you don't attempt to derail the conversation by talking about nobody being deprived due to an absence of suffering and falsely accusing me of straw manning you whenever I point out the fact that nobody is benefitted from the lack of harms either, there's not much left to say. Red herrings regarding straw mans are impertinent here.

As always, have a wonderful day!

In one state, there is benefit. In the other state, there are no benefits.

If the goods are high enough to allow the person to live a truly happy life, it's indeed justifiable to create the person. As long as you don't attempt to derail the conversation by talking about nobody being deprived due to an absence of suffering and falsely accusing me of straw manning you whenever I point out the fact that nobody is benefitted from the lack of harms either, there's not much left to say. — DA671

Right, so the disagreement is always with whether causing harm is immoral. It is never because of "unhad" anything for the "no one" that exists. And so, characterizing the "not causing suffering" as "not causing benefit" either, is mischaracterizing the states of affairs.. Do you want to cause this or not cause this state of affairs..

You can surely make the same case for benefits.. Do you want to cause "benefits" or not cause "benefits", but that isn't the full story which is why I phrase it all encompassed as "collateral damage". It is the acknowledgement that with one, comes the collateral of the other. Is this right/just to cause on behalf of another unnecessarily? The answer is no.

It wasn't a mischaracterisation. It was merely a response to the claim that the absence of happiness does not matter because nobody is feeling deprived of it. Moving on.

For me, when one takes into account the innumerable positive experiences that countless people experience throughout their lives that act as a source of inimitable value even in the face of harms, I believe that the creating the benefits can be ethical. Therefore, in my view, the correct answer is, usually, yes. I hope that we can live in a world where this becomes even more likely.

It wasn't a mischaracterisation. It was merely a response to the claim that the absence of happiness does not matter because nobody is feeling deprived of it. Moving on. — DA671

And that was a response to the idea that there was some "loss" to "someone" going on- that there is no "downside" for any "one", only a projection of a downside (just as there would be as you pointed out to the joy of being alleviated from suffering). What matters is not creating a situation of X taking place. Not that X is good for someone.

For me, when one takes into account the innumerable positive experiences that countless people experience throughout their lives that act as a source of inimitable value even in the face of harms, I believe that the creating the benefits can be ethical. Therefore, in my view, the correct answer is, usually, yes. — DA671

I've stated my case contra this here before:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/643425

Which, in turn, was only a response to the idea that it's necessary to prevent harms but not important to create goods. Again, it's quite important to have a consistent view. What also matters is creating a state of affairs wherein a good X will take place, not that it's absence would lead to a deprivation.

I've seen that before. I don't think that the potency of the joys can be ignored either. Many of the happiest people I've met were often those who didn't have a lot. A lot of beings can find great happiness in their lives even in the presence of harms. Resilience cannot be underestimated. However, it's true that suffering is a serious problem, which is why thoughtless procreation must be opposed.

I already said that I don't think that it's unethical to change the initial conditions to a positive one even if it has some harms. Many people also find their lives to be precious yet also resilient.

If anybody is interested, here's my response to that comment:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/643434

if the absence of joy doesn't matter due to an absence of an actual deprivation, the lack of damage cannot be considered good, since neither does it lead to a tangible relief/benefit. — DA671

I’m not particularly interested in the topic, but I think this is a good inconsistency to have found.

Which, in turn, was only a response to the idea that it's necessary to prevent harms but not important to create goods. Again, it's quite important to have a consistent view. What also matters is creating a state of affairs wherein a good X will take place, not that it's absence would lead to a deprivation. — DA671

I know and I wonder if you don't keep harping on this (non) point that I am not making as you know I have been careful not to make it. As if to just bug the hell out of me you keep bringing this idea of consistency when this whole time, you know that I have been careful to always say X state of affairs or not X state of affairs. But I'd like to just not talk about it. I just need you not to bring it up as if I am.

I've seen that before. I don't think that the potency of the joys can be ignored either. Many of the happiest people I've met were often those who didn't have a lot. A lot of beings can find great happiness in their lives even in the presence of harms. However, it's true that suffering is a serious problem, which is why thoughtless procreation must be opposed. — DA671

I said my thoughts in that earlier post so you can look back for reasoning why suffering created is not good to do.

I’m not particularly interested in the topic, but I think this is a good inconsistency to have found. — AJJ

But if it were even my argument. My whole point to him was that he keeps pretending I am talking about the nonexistent nobodies when I am just talking about states of affairs of creating collateral damage or not creating it. You sir, are perpetuating his endless straw man with this.. Encouraging it.

No, I’m just here to pronounce @DA671 the winner of the argument.

Ah, so no reply. Good one.

My point was that if it can be good to prevent harms, it can also be problematic to not create any joy. The response of absent joys not leading to a deprivation was what led to this. I have addressed all the relevant points to the best of my abilities.
As for states of affairs, I already said that I don't agree with the idea that benefits should not be created for the sake of preventing damage.

And you can also look at my comments (or the world in general) to see why, though it's not necessarily good to create harm, it's certainly ethical to create joys. I've read through the replied, and I am not convinced by the claim that the truly meaningful experiences of life and the effulgent smiles of billion of sentient beings don't give us adequate reasons for creating a person. Thanks for the discussion and have a good day!

I appreciate your kind words. It was just a thought-provoking discussion, and in general, Schopenhauer 1 knows a lot about life and philosophy as a whole than me. I don't think I straw manned him or pretended anything, because my responses about nonexistence not causing a relief were in response to the claim that the lack of benefits isn't problematic due to the fact that nobody is deprived of them. If the discussion should be about states of affairs that contain damage and ones that don't, ir should also be about states of affairs that contain benefits and the ones that don't. In this case, talking about nobody being "deprived" of happiness before existing doesn't seem apropos to me. Overall, this was quite an informative discussion. May you have a nice day!

This thread has lost its focus and become about antinatalism rather than hypothetical consent. I simply pointed out that given hypothetical consent has to be about what a person would consent to 'prior' to the act and not after it, then it does not apply to procreative acts. That does not amount to an argument 'for' antinatalism. Rather, I was simply pointing out that a common defence against antinatalism does not work.

It was an extension of the same argument you were having. DA671 was claiming that X (suffering, imposition, negative) cannot be alleviated for the unborn as there is no "one" who is alleviated. I was simply arguing what I think is the same idea, which is that it is about states of affairs of what happens if someone is born. Do you (the parent) create a state of affairs of X (imposition in this case) or don't you? It's not about whether the non-existent nobody is alleviated.

An "imposition" cannot exist if there isn't a person whose already existent interests are being violate. In addition, one could also point out the fact that nobody can solicit a life they could value before they exist either. It seems like pessimism's ultimate "insight" remains an inherently restricted worldview.

As for hypothetical consent, I think that the whole concept is inapplicable, so the discussion is irrelevant. Yet, if an act can somehow be immoral by virtue of a lack of consent despite of the absence of alternative interests, then appealing to hypothetical consent for something valuable that one cannot ask for at a particular point of time doesn't seem wrong to me. Anyway, this was a good discussion.

How do we consent?

Most people believe that the first step is to do a cost-benefit analysis (weigh the pros and cons).

This, prima facie, seems generalizable i.e. it gives one the impression that one could think for someone else and give/withhold consent on their behalf. Unfortunately or fortunately, no, we can't for the simple reason that we all differ in our values, sometimes only in small ways but at other times we could all be thought of as living on separate planets.

That said, there are some core values we all share and these then amount to a strong justification for hypothetical consent,

How do we consent? — Agent Smith

How is that relevant to the OP?

In the OP I outlined what I took - and still take - to be a set of conditions on when hypothetical consent might count for something. I argued that the fact Rachel would have consented to have X done to her only counts for something, ethically speaking, when:


a) the hypothetical consent is informed and not a product of ignorance;
b) the actual informed consent is not practically possible;
c) when not doing X to Rachel would either result in her being harmed, or deprived of a significant benefit;
and d) when the hypothetical consent can be considered to be present prior to the performance of the act.

I defended each condition. I would only add to it that b should include 'not normatively possible' too, as sometimes getting someone's actual consent may be something we have powerful normative reason not to do. And c should include 'undeserved' harm and 'deprived of a significant benefit that she did not positively deserve not to receive'.

My point is that the method employed in re accepting/rejecting a proposal matters to hypothetical consent. One thing's for sure - it involves an examination of risks & benefits. The catch is these are value-dependent and one man's meat is another man's poison if you catch my drift.

No, I don't know what you mean. How is what you're saying not covered by my conditions a-d?