Except for the forms and matter which make such beings possible. — Paine
There is also the problem of whether the affections (πάθη) of the soul are all common also to that which has it or whether any are peculiar to the soul itself; — ibid, 403a3-7, Greek terms included by Eugene T. Gendlin
Hence old age is not due to the soul's being affected in a certain way, but this happening to that which the soul is in, as in the case of drunkenness and disease. — ibid, 408b 18, emphasis mine
They are not separated in the generated individual, but Aristotle distinguishes between the soul as form and the individual repeatedly as the bulk of my quotes demonstrate. De Anima begins with the distinction: — Paine
The soul is the cause and first principle of the living body. But these are so spoken in many ways, and similarly the soul is cause in the three ways distinguished; for the soul is cause as being that from which the movement is itself derived, as that for the sake of which it occurs, and as the essence of bodies which are ensouled. — De Anima, 415b8, translated by D.W. Hamlyn
But the intellect, as a potential (from the passage I quoted), is posterior to the material body, dependent on it, just like every other power that the soul has. — Metaphysician Undercover
It must, then, since it thinks all things, be unmixed, as Anaxagoras says, in order it may rule, that is in order it may know; for the intrusion of anything foreign to it hinders and obstructs it; hence too, it must have no other nature than this, that is potential. That part of the soul, then, called intellect (and I speak of as intellect that by which the soul thinks and supposes) is actually none of the existing things before it thinks. Hence too, it is reasonable that it should not be mixed with the body; for in that case it would come to be of a certain kind, either cold or hot, or it would even have an organ like the faculty of perception; but as things are it has none. Those who say, then, that soul is a place of forms speak well, except it is not the whole soul but that which can think, and it is not actually but potentially the forms. — ibid, 429a 18
part from the question of whether causes and first principles exist outside of the individual beings they bring into existence, they can be distinguished from each other during the inquiry into their nature. What, after all, is an inquiry into causes if one cannot make that distinction?
The soul is the cause and first principle of the living body. But these are so spoken in many ways, and similarly the soul is cause in the three ways distinguished; for the soul is cause as being that from which the movement is itself derived, as that for the sake of which it occurs, and as the essence of bodies which are ensouled.
— De Anima, 415b8, translated by D.W. Hamlyn
But the intellect, as a potential (from the passage I quoted), is posterior to the material body, dependent on it, just like every other power that the soul has.
— Metaphysician Undercover
The potentiality of the intellect in III.4 is not described as a dependency upon the "material body" but as a condition that allows it to think "all things": — Paine
I am still no closer to understanding your interpretation and you report the same consternation about mine. — Paine
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