Perhaps the largest philosophical obstacle for the theist to overcome in asserting their view is the problem of evil. It seems like as it is commonly portrayed, the problem of evil holds suffering and pain to be evil. It intuitively assumes that suffering would not exist in the best of all possible worlds. I don't claim to be solving the problem of evil in this post, but I think this intuition about suffering may be dubious.

One way to outline the problem of evil is like this:

1. In many sad events, we can't see what good features would outweigh the bad features. There are some apparently gratuitous evils.
2. Therefore, it's likely that there are unjustified sad events. Probably, there are gratuitous evils.
3. Therefore, it's likely that: if God exists, then he allows unjustified sad events, gratuitous evils.
4. God would never allow unjustified sad events or gratuitous evils.
5. Therefore, it's likely that God does not exist.

I am arguing that the terms "sad events" and "bad features" should not include physical or emotional pain, only moral evils. And I don't consider suffering to be a moral evil. My hope is that this distinction will at least take some of the sting out of the problem. My argument in support of this conclusion is a simple modus tollens.

1. All evil things are blameworthy.
2. Suffering physical or emotional pain is not blameworthy.
3. So, suffering physical or emotional pain is not evil.

But my work isn't done yet. Suffering may not be evil, but it is still sad, and so why would God allow it to occur? I think we ought to resist the urge to claim that events that are sad, or that we wish wouldn't have happened, are bad. In other words, I am rejecting premise 4 in the problem of evil argument above, I think God would allow some unjustified sad events.

I wish I were never sad, but there are times when it is appropriate, like at a funeral. I wish I wouldn't have lost my soccer game, but I don't blame God for allowing the game to happen. In fact, it seems like a world void of things that I don't want would be worse than our current world. If God had simply not included things with the potential to make us sad, we would be missing out on valuable emotional experiences, as well as the virtue of sympathy.

All of this to say, it seems like God would allow unjustified sad events, just as he would allow happy, surprising, and whimsical events. For that reason, the problem of evil should make us wonder why there are morally wrong acts rather than pain and suffering. I suspect it will help the theist's case to only have to explain why God allows humans to commit evil, rather than explain why God allows diseases, broken bones, and hurricanes to exist.