Arguments from pluralism oppose theism, they assert that due to the wide disagreement across many world religions, we shouldn't believe any of them. The specific argument that I will be outlining and objecting to comes from Philip Kitcher. He addresses the fact that religions are passed down primarily via cultural norms and teaching to young children. Even those who convert to other religions not shared by their family members usually do so because of promises of psychological peace or to give their lives meaning. None of these methods are particularly concerned with whether the doctrine being carried on is true or not. And so, Kitcher concludes, we shouldn't believe in any religion.

His argument can be formatted like this:

1. The world’s many religious doctrines disagree about who or what god is.
2. So, they cannot all be right about who or what god is.
3. None of the world’s religious doctrines can correctly claim that they are more trustworthy than the others.
a. All the world’s many religious doctrines evolve through socialization and early teaching, ways
that are not conducive to preserving truth.
b. If multiple doctrines have all evolved through ways not conducive to preserving truth, then none
of them can correctly claim that they are more trustworthy than the others.
4. If two or more doctrines disagree, and none can correctly claim to be more trustworthy than the others, then we shouldn’t trust any of them.
5. So, we shouldn’t trust any of the world’s religious doctrines regarding who or what god is.

I have a few problems with this argument. I'll begin with a brief comment on premise 3. This premise looks highly controversial to me. I am not a theologian in any particular religion, but I'm sure that Muslim, Christian, Jewish, and Aboriginal scholars would all disagree vehemently that their beliefs are no more trustworthy than the others', and provide ample evidence. Admittedly, not all of these scholars can be right but asserting that none of them can be any more trustworthy than any other without first studying each doctrine seems highly contestable.

Next, I think premise 4 is mistaken. It seems like even in a case where two options are equally trustworthy we can still have reason to pick one rather than neither. Imagine the following scenario.

You're on a game show. In front of you are two black boxes, one contains a million dollars, the other contains two cups of skim milk. Each box has a spokesperson and both are trying to convince you that their box has the million dollars. You have to pick one box and you get the contents, but despite the spokespeople's efforts you can no reason to believe either box is more likely to contain the money.

In a case like this, the two spokespeople disagree, neither is more trustworthy than the other, but still you ought to trust one of them and pick a box rather than pick neither. And so, in the face of two or more equally trustworthy options, it is not always the case that we should pick neither.