I'm not a continentalist at all but I believe the distinction was between phenomenology (there are objective ways to understand viewpoints, so requiring an external to communicate perspectives) vs psychologism as you've explained.
I can't speak to what Heidegger said particularly.

Nice

This is my understanding of Heidegger’s position about it, but I am not 100% sure I am correct.

Considering that the alternative is between

- logic depending just on unrealiable states of mind and
- logic depending on how things actually work in reality

we cannot think that Heidegger would ever criticize psychologism by choosing the second chance. Choosing the second chance would mean considering reality as objectively independent, which Heidegger didn’t think: for Heidegger being is not being, for Heidegger being is being there, which is, being somewhere, in some time context, which makes reality not stable and independent.
I think that Heidegger criticized psychologism because he perceived it as equivalent to the realistic option: thinking that everything depends on our mind appeared to him just like another realism, which is, the realism of our mind.
In order to escape from the trap of 1) realism of reality and 2) realism of our mind, he refused both, psychologism and realism, choosing instead a unified idea of being conceived as relative not mechanically to our mind, but relative in itself, which is, being depending from its relationship to time, being conceived as something that is relative even if we as subjects do not exist.