I've generally found that 'cause' is one of those words so beloved of apologists and their cosmological arguments. I rarely see it elsewhere, except when people are talking about wars... — Tom Storm

Oh, yes. A hangover of Aristotelian physics, used with ulterior motives. — Banno

I think the idea of cause has a very strong, intuitive power. People in general think that the fact that events are caused is self-evident. I feel the attraction of that attitude.

What value is there in loosey-goosey causality. — T Clark

But how could you define your deterministic efficient cause except counter-factually in relation to that which it is not.

This is Metaphysics 101. Precision is the double negative. A is defined by being not not-A.

So to have efficient cause, you must counterfactually define it in terms of its Hegelian "other".

The irony of the Aristotelean systems view is that this defines efficient cause to sit at the pole that is locally contingent rather than globally necessary. It is the free variable that you want to plug into your equation expressing a constraining symmetry.

The determinism in any causal situation owes everything to the downward acting constraints. And that rather precisely defines the accidents, the randomness, the freedoms, the causal particularity, as the upward acts of individual and constructive action.

The force applied could have been anything. And yet the number measured was x. So that is what I plugged into the differential equation that could compute the outcome to any number of decimal places.

You are hoping to project an intuitive notion of efficient cause onto the physical account - one where, as you say, you can ignore the rest of Aristotle's holistic account. Yet the physics will always let you down. — apokrisis

Well, I'll try out a little literary foreshadowing... It isn't my plan to do it in this thread, but I want to be able to convincingly argue that the idea of causation is a metaphysical principle that is not of great value in any but the simplest situations. Many, most of the responses so far have seemed to be in that vein, and it surprises me. I thought that the idea of cause was fairly universal.

Efficient cause can't explain anything all on its lonely ownsome. A holism which can provide the context is always going to be the other half of the story that completes the causal picture. — apokrisis

All of the issues you raise in your post are what I'm trying to get clear in my own mind.

Bertrand Russell wrote an essay called "On the Notion of Cause — T Clark

Ah, good call - . Here it is. I find the essay is also in "A free man's worship", which was my bible while in my late teens, so doubtless I've stolen the observation from Russell.

But how could you define your deterministic efficient cause except counter-factually in relation to that which it is not. — apokrisis

That's what I was trying to do in my billiard ball example.

The determinism in any causal situation owes everything to the downward acting constraints. And that rather precisely defines the accidents, the randomness, the freedoms, the causal particularity, as the upward acts of individual and constructive action. — apokrisis

I'll need to think about this.

...but I want to be able to convincingly argue that the idea of causation is a metaphysical principle that is not of great value in any but the simplest situations. — T Clark

I mean good luck trying. That would be a counterfactual approach. Deny the obvious, and when that fails, you have no choice but to accept the obvious. :up:

The Aristotelean scheme is meant to show that even the simplest simplicity must have the irreducibly triadic complexity of hylomorphism. And therefore all later notions of causality - like the reduction of all causes to just efficient/material cause - could at best be regarded as modelling conveniences.

Simpler models of causality do work if you can take the stability and indifference of a holistic context for granted.

So that is why atomism was the stimulus that got science started. Newton could start things off with an a-causal void. And that little ruse allowed him to treat all the busy contents as a collection of atoms.

This was a stroke of genius in that other famous minds like Descartes couldn't let go of the idea that space had to be full of something causal at every point.

Einstein did the same stunt at a more abstract level in getting rid of Maxwell's ether.

So to imagine that the context is a "nothingness of perfect stability" is the way to model reality as just some local play of material/efficient causal atoms. But physics has only had to keep returning to the void to re-fill it with the missing holism.

Quantum field theory filled the vacuum with a sea of virtual particles. Even general relativity made spacetime floppy unless filled with some energy density at every point.

So you have this dialogue by which physics keeps moving itself forward. First make things too simple by getting rid of Aristotle's formal/final causes. That moves you a step forward. Then take another step by re-filling the void just created, except now define it at as an "emptiness" at an even more abstract level.

Many, most of the responses so far have seemed to be in that vein, and it surprises me. I thought that the idea of cause was fairly universal. — T Clark

Pfftt. Who has studied metaphysics, physics or philosophy of science?

Causality must be the hardest subject there is. And that is because it is the most abstract and fundamental level of metaphysical analysis.

I think the idea of cause has a very strong, intuitive power. People in general think that the fact that events are caused is self-evident. I feel the attraction of that attitude. — T Clark

I agree and it seems clear to me that we are generally socialized to view the world as a vast realm of cause and effect. It's part of our 'commons sense' heritage.

I think the idea of cause has a very strong, intuitive power. People in general think that the fact that events are caused is self-evident. I feel the attraction of that attitude. — T Clark

Sure, there is clearly a habit of explanation in terms of setting out sequences of events, the earlier in the sequence being named the "cause". At issue is whether the notion of cause can stand interrogation. The utility of that habit might suit a pragmatists, but does it suit a philosopher?

We may want to claim something like that if A causes B, then in any case in which A occurs, B must follow; but a moment's consideration will show that not to be the case. It seems from SEP that the present thinking leans to probabilistic accounts rather than modal accounts; that A caused B means B will follow A on most occasions. But I share your concern that such an account seems unduly complex.

We might avoid sophisticated accounts with profound "philosophical explanatory power" if what actually occurs is no more that just "loosey-goosey causality."

So we have the traditional dichotomy. On the one hand we have the empiricist Hume puzzling over how it can be that we call one event the cause of another, when all we have are our observations of those events; and here sits the problem of explaining induction; how we move from a limited number of specific cases to a general law. On the other hand we have Kant supposing that we must already, a priori, have a notion of cause available to us in order that we bet able to attribute cause and effect.

Perhaps the error here is to suppose that there might be a way to firm up our talk of causes to anything more than a colloquial way of speaking, of a habit.

We know force = mass * acc and it's valid necessarily and therefore never changes. Whether it's sufficient enough for everything that goes on is tangential because we can derive force from mass (through the mass formula, which imports volume from math) and acc. If a proper reduction is done then we get more than probabilities and in any case probabilities are a pretty low bar in any science. It's literally when the particles are too convoluted or it's just efficient but statistical mechanics similarly doesn't imply emergentism except in an epistemological sense and it doesn't preclude regular causation.

There comes the giant ball. In slooow moootion. It approaches another giant ball. Then, when really close, the outer layer of the balls get squeezed. Reaeaeal slow. A force is l in both balls. Two opposite forces. Momentum transfer, dp/dt and all that. The incoming ball is stopped (if they have equal mass, the collision is head on, and energy is conserved, which is is all approximately true), the second gains momentum. Action and reaction. Conservation of momentum. Impulse force.

Now think about this fast forward.

Salmon wrote a book on causation. Causal forks, statistical laws, etc. I got so bored reading that. I can remember still its creative uniform brown cover. Correlations, causal connections, statistics, etc. Is the excessive use of toiletpaper in philocity caused by the the consumption of rotten stuff accidentally sold in the supermarket in the etymology part of town?

On the other hand we have Kant supposing that we must already, a priori, have a notion of cause available to us in order that we bet able to attribute cause and effect. — Banno

In other words, cause is ideal. Which is nonsense since all dogs shake out in the same way.

We may want to claim something like that if A causes B, then in any case in which A occurs, B must follow; but a moment's consideration will show that not to be the case. It seems from SEP that the present thinking leans to probabilistic accounts rather than modal accounts; that A caused B means B will follow A on most occasions. But I share your concern that such an account seems unduly complex.

We might avoid sophisticated accounts with profound "philosophical explanatory power" if what actually occurs is no more that just "loosey-goosey causality."

So we have the traditional dichotomy. On the one hand we have the empiricist Hume puzzling over how it can be that we call one event the cause of another, when all we have are our observations of those events; and here sits the problem of explaining induction; how we move from a limited number of specific cases to a general law. On the other hand we have Kant supposing that we must already, a priori, have a notion of cause available to us in order that we bet able to attribute cause and effect.

Perhaps the error here is to suppose that there might be a way to firm up our talk of causes to anything more than a colloquial way of speaking, of a habit. — Banno

That's a useful and nicely written summary. It fascinates me that such an apparently simple concept could be a kind of trick of usage.

A multitude of different causal chains gan cause the same event. One causal chain can cause a multitude of events. Causal connections can be established or discovered (not being merely correlations). What is it you actually wanna know about causation? Even ideas can cause. Are ideas caused? Yes. By other ideas. Can the gods cause things to happen?

I'd suggest that the apparent way to cash out the notion that A caused B, where A and B are considered to be two distinct events, is something like that in each and every case in which A occurs, B follows. Implicit in this are modal considerations, the is, necessarily, A causes B if and only if every event A is followed by event B. We thus arrive at counterfactual theories of causation, which, despite having all the apparatus of possible world semantics at hand, fail to produce a coherent account. — Banno

This is dependent on the scope of your measured causality. If you say, "That cue ball is now traveling at X velocity because it was hit Y seconds ago," then of course we cannot state, "The ball cannot ever travel at X velocity if it is never hit by a cue ball Y seconds ago." But we can reword it to state, "If the ball has a counter balance of forces to ensure force Z is in A direction, it will have a velocity of X every time." Take away all forces on the ball, and it will not travel at X velocity, because it cannot by definition.

The alternative, for which I have great sympathy, is that the notion of cause cannot be cashed out in any great depth, to follow Hume in concluding that cause is more habit than physics. — Banno

I believe the strength of Hume's argument is misinterpreted here. Hume cannot argue against taking all of the data in an experiment and determining why an outcome occurred.

What Hume argued against was the notion that everything would act that way again in the future. And to this, he is correct. The future is always an induction. The laws of physics may not remain the same 5 seconds from now. It is a matter of habit and faith that we believe the causality of today will be the causality of tomorrow.

And secondly, it is well worth noting that scientists, especially physicists, rarely if ever make use of the word "cause". — Banno

Banno, is this really a good argument? I've taken advanced physics courses in college, the word causality was used all the time. Typically this is noted by the entity with the initial acting force on the object. Just follow a basic Newton's law.

Law 1. A body remains at rest, or in motion at a constant speed in a straight line, unless acted upon by a force.

So what causes a body to cease remaining at rest? A force acting upon it. Words describe concepts, and concept of causality is very much alive in science. Now causality can be considered a large word, more generic such as "good" or "tree". Science might try to use words that are more specific parts within the concept of causality, but that is not a negation of the word, or its usefulness in day to day communication.

So what causes a body to cease remaining at rest? A force acting upon it — Philosophim

Don't you mean a force not working on it. Absence of force is the cause of remaining at rest. The absence of force is the absence of cause, though absence of cause as a force can cause as a non-force.

I mean good luck trying. That would be a counterfactual approach. Deny the obvious, and when that fails, you have no choice but to accept the obvious. — apokrisis

Pfftt. Who has studied metaphysics, physics or philosophy of science?

Causality must be the hardest subject there is. And that is because it is the most abstract and fundamental level of metaphysical analysis. — apokrisis

At first, I was thinking you were agreeing with me that causality is not normally a useful metaphysical idea. Now I'm not sure.

Your comments have been interesting and helpful, especially the ideas about how we keep conceptually emptying and then refilling the void.

At issue is whether the notion of cause can stand interrogation. — Banno

That's what this thread is about for me.

The utility of that habit might suit a pragmatists, but does it suit a philosopher? — Banno

I don't see the idea of cause as having much pragmatic use except in the simplest situations or in ethical theories about human responsibility.

We may want to claim something like that if A causes B, then in any case in which A occurs, B must follow; but a moment's consideration will show that not to be the case. It seems from SEP that the present thinking leans to probabilistic accounts rather than modal accounts; that A caused B means B will follow A on most occasions. But I share your concern that such an account seems unduly complex. — Banno

Not only is it unduly complex, but it loses it's explanatory power if when you make the relationships too convoluted.

here sits the problem of explaining induction; how we move from a limited number of specific cases to a general law. — Banno

I hadn't thought of the two, causality and induction, as being connected. I've never really understood the whole "problem of induction." Induction seems defensible and useful to me. Actually, it's indispensable.

Perhaps the error here is to suppose that there might be a way to firm up our talk of causes to anything more than a colloquial way of speaking, of a habit. — Banno

I have no trouble with that approach, but it takes cause out of the realm of philosophy and science.

I agree and it seems clear to me that we are generally socialized to view the world as a vast realm of cause and effect. It's part of our 'commons sense' heritage. — Tom Storm

I think maybe its use in physics and philosophy is metaphorical. I have read the idea arose in the context of human responsibility for human actions and spread by analogy. That makes sense to me.

We know force = mass * acc and it's valid necessarily and therefore never changes. — Shwah

I think the reason it is "valid necessarily" is because it is a definition. Force is defined as the product of mass and acceleration.

statistical mechanics similarly doesn't imply emergentism except in an epistemological sense and it doesn't preclude regular causation. — Shwah

I think they call the results of statistical mechanics "weak emergentism." I think you're right, though. Emergentism, weak or strong, doesn't address causation one way or the other.

an apparently simple concept could be a kind of trick of usage. — Tom Storm

Aren't all concepts tricks of usage? Not trying to be funny.

Yeah I agree. Validity is just falling from axioms to a derivation but it's all we can meaningfully check anyways.

Here’s what Wikipedia says about philosophical causality — T Clark

Wiki gives a very classic definition of causality, and I'm willing to concede that the whole cause-effect relationship is a classical one that doesn't necessarily carry down to more fundamental levels.

Different quantum interpretations have different definitions of causality. The ones that hold to the principle of locality would probably put cause before effect like wiki does, but counterfactual interpretations (Bohmian in particular) does not, with delayed-choice experiment blatantly putting effect arbitrarily amounts of time before cause,. They've demonstrated it with millions of years between cause (a choice made on Earth) and effect (which direction a photon is emitted at the distant emission event).

So sure, you kept it simple and classical at first with the billiard ball example, but when one gets down to the fundamentals, the definitions become interpretation dependent, which is the point I want to convey.

Wiki gives a very classic definition of causality, and I'm willing to concede that the whole cause-effect relationship is a classical one that doesn't necessarily carry down to more fundamental levels. — noAxioms

That's how I approached it. I think you're right, cause is classical mechanics if it has any meaning at all. I've purposely stayed away from quantum mechanics in this discussion because I think it muddies the metaphysical water.

I think you're right, cause is classical mechanics if it has any meaning at all. I've purposely stayed away from quantum mechanics in this discussion because I think it muddies the metaphysical water. — T Clark

OK, so we keep it to classical since cause is a classical concept, but just keep in mind the earlier comment about making the example so simple (billiard balls) that it hides the deeper analysis, preventing thorough investigation.

At issue is whether the notion of cause can stand interrogation.
— Banno
That's what this thread is about for me. — T Clark

How can the interrogation take place while avoiding the more fundamental level? There seems to be a disconnect between what you say the thread is about and where you're steering it.

I had pointed out that cause is something subject to interpretation and one is not likely to come to a conclusion without making some assumptions, the soundness of which cannot be demonstrated.

How can the interrogation take place while avoiding the more fundamental level? — noAxioms

Maybe I misunderstand what you mean by "more fundamental level." For me, whether or not we use the concept "causality" is a metaphysical question that doesn't really come up except in classical mechanics. I think it's a very simple and straight-forward idea. The only question to me is whether or not it is useful.

At first, I was thinking you were agreeing with me that causality is not normally a useful metaphysical idea. Now I'm not sure. — T Clark

Let me be clear then. I couldn’t disagree more. Being able to give reasons for why things are and why things change is the entirety of metaphysics in my opinion.

But you say you understand causality to only mean efficient cause. And that to apply only in classical physics.

That is bonkers as far as I am concerned.

Of course scientists talk of causes, in just the same way as non-scientists. But "cause" plays little if any part in their explanations. As your own examples show, scientists use force and calculation, not cause.

I hadn't thought of the two, causality and induction, as being connected. I've never really understood the whole "problem of induction." Induction seems defensible and useful to me. Actually, it's indispensable. — T Clark

And yet induction is logical invalid, since no series of instances is sufficient to imply the general case. It is evident that the problem of induction is at least coextensive with that of causation. The naive response is that our induced scientific laws set out cause and effect - as other posters have posited. But we might agree that account is far from unproblematic.

↪Philosophim Of course scientists talk of causes, in just the same way as non-scientists. But "cause" plays little if any part in their explanations. As your own examples show, scientists use force and calculation, not cause. — Banno

Banno, in Newton's law, what causes an object at rest to move?

...in Newton's law, what causes an object at rest to move? — Philosophim

Well, thank you for the example, and the opportunity it offers. You see, Newton's laws do not make mention of cause. That's the point made by Russell, and subsequently by myself. Phrasing them in terms of cause is removing them from their usual playing field and putting them into the language of our everyday interactions.