Do you need to consciously plan on choosing that alternative which you deem optimally beneficial, hence good, relative to your principle, momentary conscious interests in order to so choose? — javra
Biological evolution is not sentient and has no conscious plans; in this example, it yet has a telos, hence purpose, that is independent of sentience and its conscious planning. — javra
We do not intuit time or space; we intuit objects in time and space. To intuit is to follow from sensation, and the sensation proper of time or space is impossible, insofar as both are conceived as infinite and empty. — Mww
Second, the most basic mathematical principles are subsumed under the schema of quantity, not relation, or, in your terms, order. — Mww
True enough. But if it is the case we don’t function at all, in any way, shape or form, when we dismiss the basic principles of logic, then it is reasonable to suppose we couldn’t do that in the first place, insofar as we must use them in order to assume their dismissal. It follows that if we cannot assume to dismiss them, we are left with merely getting them as correct as we can. — Mww
Sorry, but the nature of logic is in judgement, not intuition. — Mww
Think of it this way: you know how when we perceive something, when we are affected by some imprint on the senses, we are never conscious of the information that flows along the nerves? We sense the beginning, we cognize what the beginning was, at the end, in the brain, but all that between, we know nothing about whatsoever. THAT is intuition, in the proper, albeit metaphysical, sense. And because we are never conscious of our intuitions, but we are certainly conscious of the judgements we make on our sensations from which the intuition is given, and logical determinations are the objects of judgements alone, it follows necessarily that intuition cannot stand in any relation to the nature of logic. It may be said intuition is the ground for the possibility of logical determinations, but that is not to say they determine the nature of logic. — Mww
Besides....there are those occasions when we employ logical principles even without an intuition, without an object making an impression on the senses. Case in point....the guy that invented the Slinky. Sure, springs and stuff falling are sensuous impressions, but you can’t get a Slinky as such, from those two intuitions. To connect those into an object that doesn’t yet exist requires more than the antecedent intuition of each. In just the same way, you cannot get to 12 if all you have is a 7 and a 5. — Mww
FWIW, I think of Evolution as bottom-up design, by contrast with the Genesis story of top-down design. From that pragmatic perspective, the world is designing itself (self-organizing), just as a computer program begins with a general definition of the desired answer, and then proceeds to calculate & construct a more specific answer. But a bottom-up question must be open-ended, as in "what would happen if . . ." So, it seems as-if the material world is following inherent laws (operating system) to calculate the best possible answer to some ultimate question (unknown to us). Hence, each form produced gives the appearance of being intentionally designed to fit its niche in the ecology. :smile:Richard Dawkins will often say that life exhibits 'apparent design'. He obviously does this to defray the age-old cliche of the 'grand designer'. But design in nature is easy to discern and to represent graphically: — Wayfarer
We must dispose of the most basic principles of logic, such as identity, and non-contradiction, and we are left with zero, nothing as a starting point. — Metaphysician Undercover
But if it is the case we don’t function at all, in any way, shape or form, when we dismiss the basic principles of logic, then it is reasonable to suppose we couldn’t do that in the first place....
— Mww
I don't agree with this at all, and I've argued it in many places in this forum. We do not need to assume replacement principles to reject principles which we find unacceptable. — Metaphysician Undercover
However, the nature of logic, and it's ground in intuition...., — Metaphysician Undercover
Sorry, but the nature of logic is in judgement, not intuition.
— Mww
That's not what I said though, I said it was grounded in intuition. — Metaphysician Undercover
And the grounding of logic, substantiation, what makes validity work for us, is fundamentally different from logic itself. — Metaphysician Undercover
The problem of course being that we cannot apply logic directly to the external world, all we have is the in between, the information received, the intuitions, to apply logic to. — Metaphysician Undercover
So even if logic is something created by human beings for the purpose of understanding the external world, we are stymied in our attempts to apply it because all we have is intuitions about the external world to apply it to. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is why we need to distinguish internal intuitions from external intuitions. This I think is very important. If we simply say that logic gets applied to intuitions, and if internal intuitions are fundamentally different from external intuitions, then we'd need different logic for internal than we need for external. — Metaphysician Undercover
Kant, I believe outlined this division, space as the condition for understanding external intuitions, and time as the condition for understanding internal intuitions. — Metaphysician Undercover
If you mean biological evolution as a scientifiç principle, then indeed it is not sentient nor does it consciously plan. In it's ultimate form, based on the, get this, central dogma of molecular biology (!), teleos is incorporated into selfish(!) genes, a most extraordinary theory of life and being. — Hillary
Are selfishness and individuality—rather than kindness and cooperation—basic to biological nature? Does a "selfish gene" create universal sexual conflict? In The Genial Gene, Joan Roughgarden forcefully rejects these and other ideas that have come to dominate the study of animal evolution. Building on her brilliant and innovative book Evolution's Rainbow, in which she challenged accepted wisdom about gender identity and sexual orientation, Roughgarden upends the notion of the selfish gene and the theory of sexual selection and develops a compelling and controversial alternative theory called social selection. This scientifically rigorous, model-based challenge to an important tenet of neo-Darwinian theory emphasizes cooperation, elucidates the factors that contribute to evolutionary success in a gene pool or animal social system, and vigorously demonstrates that to identify Darwinism with selfishness and individuality misrepresents the facts of life as we now know them.
Considering the actual evolution, sentient beings are actually on the scene, and these beings have actual plans. — Hillary
Other philosophers of biology argue instead that biological teleology is irreducible, and cannot be removed by any simple process of rewording. Francisco Ayala specified three separate situations in which teleological explanations are appropriate. First, if the agent consciously anticipates the goal of their own action; for example the behavior of picking up a pen can be explained by reference to the agent's desire to write. Ayala extends this type of teleological explanation to non-human animals by noting that A deer running away from a mountain lion. . . has at least the appearance of purposeful behavior."[49] Second, teleological explanations are useful for systems that have a mechanism for self-regulation despite fluctuations in environment; for example, the self-regulation of body temperature in animals. Finally, they are appropriate "in reference to structures anatomically and physiologically designed to perform a certain function. "[49] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teleology_in_biology#Irreducible_teleology
If these are in service of some higher ideal as dogmatized in evolution theory, is highly questionable, and the new dogma is probably an attempt by lack of better or inability to understand truly. — Hillary
There's also the example of biological evolution as having a telos. Momentarily suppose this to be true. This telos pulls towards itself. — javra
That offered, can you form an argument for the logical necessity of all final causes being themselves driven by, or else dependent on, sentient agency? — javra
You've overlooked issues regarding the contradictions that unfold when considering such monotheistic deity the arbiter of purpose/telos. — javra
You've also not offered a defense of nihilism. — javra
We in fact can connect particular thoughts and feelings with particular processes. — Hillary
Living forms are shot through with designs, and patterns, at every level from the microcellular to the ecological.
But this doesn't necessarily imply a conscious designer, some being or entity that sweats away on designing such patterns (or beetles for that matter). It might simply be conceived of as an inherent drive or tendency in nature to give rise to progressively more elaborate patterns and designs as pure play or sport (Lila of Hindu mythology. However, ideas of ‘inherence’ are usually forbidden on the grounds that they are ‘orthogenetic’.)
Furthermore, if the design in nature is only 'apparent', then does that mean that only human agents can produce real designs? I mean, designing is something that humans obviously do, but do only humans do that? Put another way, are the only actual designs in the Universe of human origin? And if that's not so, then is there really no actual, as distinct from apparent, design anywhere at all in the Universe? It seems an absurd proposition. — Wayfarer
I think we are arguing for and/ or from and/ or about different conceptions of 'purpose'. I don't think of the general ways things tend to go as being purposes; I reserve the concept for those things that are either consciously planned. or at least sub-consciously driven by felt needs or wants. — Janus
OK, I think I see where you are coming from now, and I agree that telos, considered as simply denoting the seemingly invariant tendencies of things to go certain ways (what we call "laws") is everywhere to be seen in nature as we perceive it.
You still refer to these as "aims", though and that is pushing the idea further than I would. It seems the actual concrete tendencies of things do begin to look like aims when we generalize and abstract them as laws. It is easy in thought to reify the notion of a law into something which stands over and above the actual things, the phenomena and processes of nature, directing them, so to speak. — Janus
I think you are equivocating somewhat on the meanings of 'design' and 'pattern'. — Janus
I don't see the concept of design or purpose being meaningful without the inclusion of intention. — Janus
It may be metaphorically said that Natural Selection is daily and hourly scrutinizing, throughout the world, the slightest variations; rejecting those that are bad, and adding up all that are good; silently and insensibly working whenever and wherever opportunity offers, at the improvement of each organic being. — Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species
Organisms display characteristics which snowflakes and crystals do not, first and foremost homeostasis. — Wayfarer
These two comments of yours say different things, and the second doesn’t respond to mine. — Mww
First it was the ground of the nature of logic, now it is the grounding of logic itself in substantiation. — Mww
If it is the case that we are not conscious of our intuitions, in some strictly metaphysical sense, then it follows we do not apply our logic to them. — Mww
Nevertheless, we are not stymied, insofar as we do apply logic to something, so even if we do not apply logic to our intuitions, then it must be the case we do apply them to that which arises from them. Under empirical conditions, that is. Again, because we do apply logic to that which is not under empirical conditions, the ground of empirical conditions, which is intuition, does not qualify as a condition of the nature of logic, but merely the employment of it with respect to understanding the external world. — Mww
Truth be told, I don’t think it proper to say logic is something human beings create. Logical principles, yes, logical conditions, logical this or that, sure. But logic itself, I think, is just the natural modus operandi of the human being himself. We just are logical creatures, from which we can say the nature of logic just is the nature of human beings. — Mww
The importance disappears if it is the case that all intuitions are internal, which they would be if all they do is represent physical objects, and those only given by a particular cognitive system. — Mww
External intuition simply refers to the possibility of an external object... — Mww
Technically, Kant speaks of understanding from an external sense or from an internal sense. And in that formula, is found the fundamental differences in how space and time are to be understood, if only with respect to transcendental philosophy. But that stuff is deep and convoluted as hell, and requires a whole bunch of blind head-nodding I’m here ta tell ya, so...best maybe leave all that alone here. — Mww
After wading through five pages, we arrive at, in a damn footnote, of all things.... — Mww
"...Now, as I do not possess another intuition of self which gives the determining in me (of the spontaneity of which I am conscious), prior to the act of determination, in the same manner as time gives the determinable, it is clear that I am unable to determine my own existence as that of a spontaneous being, but I am only able to represent to myself the spontaneity of my thought...” — Mww
Anyway....you have great thoughts and you’re not entirely wrong. Just not quite right. But then....is anybody? And by “right” I just mean we’d agree more often than not. — Mww
Other animals and plants do not use logic and they still function. — Metaphysician Undercover
That other animals don't use logic is an implausible assumption in my view. — Janus
External intuition simply refers to the possibility of an external object...
— Mww
OK, now if we can say external intuition refers to the possibility of an external object, can we say that "internal intuition" refers to the possibility of an internal object? And if these two types of "objects" are fundamentally different, then the two types of intuitions will be fundamentally different. And if the two types of intuition are fundamentally different, then we need two types of logic. — Metaphysician Undercover
If our goal is to understand, why leave the best part alone? — Metaphysician Undercover
Just not quite right.....
— Mww
..... the person who doesn't agree with you, as not right. — Metaphysician Undercover
It may be metaphorically said that Natural Selection is daily and hourly scrutinizing, throughout the world, the slightest variations; rejecting those that are bad, and adding up all that are good; silently and insensibly working whenever and wherever opportunity offers, at the improvement of each organic being. — Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species — Wayfarer
The passage you quoted from Darwin is metaphorical, as he acknowledges. and again it's not clear what you intended it to address. — Janus
But not all intuitions represent physical objects, some represent internal feelings, like emotions. — Metaphysician Undercover
Any particular cognitive system, when directed inward, needs different principles of understanding, from when it is directed outwards...... — Metaphysician Undercover
......The two types of "objects" to be understood by these two different directions are so vastly different, that I think they require fundamentally different forms of "logic". — Metaphysician Undercover
Other animals and plants do not use logic and they still function. — Metaphysician Undercover
That other animals don't use logic is an implausible assumption in my view. — Janus
the merely sensory psychology of animals, especially of the higher vertebrates, goes very far in its own realm and imitates intellectual knowledge to a considerable extent. ....
For Empiricism there is no essential difference between the intellect and the senses. The fact which obliges a correct theory of knowledge to recognize this essential difference is simply disregarded. What fact? The fact that the human intellect grasps, first in a most indeterminate manner, then more and more distinctly, certain sets of intelligible features -- that is, natures, say, the human nature -- which exist in the real as identical with individuals, with Peter or John for instance, but which are universal in the mind and presented to it as universal objects, positively one (within the mind) and common to an infinity of singular things (in the real).
Thanks to the association of particular images and recollections, a dog reacts in a similar manner to the similar particular impressions his eyes or his nose receive from this thing we call a piece of sugar or this thing we call an intruder; he does not know what is sugar or what is intruder. He plays, he lives in his affective and motor functions, or rather he is put into motion by the similarities which exist between things of the same kind; he does not see the similarity, the common features as such. What is lacking is the flash of intelligibility; he has no ear for the intelligible meaning. He has not the idea or the concept of the thing he knows, that is, from which he receives sensory impressions; his knowledge remains immersed in the subjectivity of his own feelings -- only in man, with the universal idea, does knowledge achieve objectivity. And his field of knowledge is strictly limited: only the universal idea sets free -- in man -- the potential infinity of knowledge.
Such are the basic facts which Empiricism ignores, and in the disregard of which it undertakes to philosophize. The logical implications are: first, a nominalistic theory of ideas, destructive of what ideas are in reality; and second, a sensualist notion of intelligence, destructive of the essential activity of intelligence. In the Empiricist view, intelligence does not see, for only the object or content seen in knowledge is the sense object. In the Empiricist view, intelligence does not see in its ideative function -- there are not, drawn form the senses through the activity of the intellect itself, supra-singular or supra-sensual, universal intelligible natures seen by the intellect in and through the concepts it engenders by illuminating images. Intelligence does not see in its function of judgment -- there are not intuitively grasped, universal intelligible principles (say, the principle of identity, or the principle of causality) in which the necessary connection between two concepts is immediately seen by the intellect.
....we may be sorrrounded by objects, but even while cognizing them, reason is the origin of something that is neither reducible to nor derives from them in any sense. In other words, reason generates a cognition, and a cognition regarding nature is above nature. In a cognition, reason transcends nature in one of two ways: by rising above our natural cognition and making, for example, universal and necessarily claims in theoretical and practical matters not determined b nature, or by assuming an impersonal objective perspective that remains irreducible to the individual I.
Such behaviours can all be explained in terms of stimulus and response, without any requirement to introduce logic. — Wayfarer
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