A Wittgensteinian answer to this question would that there is no such thing as physical causation as is generally understood in modern science, but that physical causation is an a priori intuition, which is useful for hypotheses, but which tells us nothing about the world in-itself or its meaning.
Hume recognized that there are two categories of knowledge: empirical and mathematical/logical. He called the former “Matters of Fact” and the latter “Relations of Ideas.”
They are independent. Cause and effect in science is really a constant juxtaposition of events. We observe A followed by B. If this happens uniformly through Custom we infer causation, but we have no reason to justify this.
That is all we have in the sciences. Kant tried to save metaphysics from Hume but modern science has largely sided with Hume over Kant.
Logic generally belongs to maths department founded upon axiomatic set-theory and symbolic algebra/category theories. Physics has a narrower and more concrete focus on phenomena experienced of this world. Thus their relation is same as math and physics in general. You may define and invent your own logical system, it may not be restricted by any physical laws, but still cannot be arbitrary and shall be self-consistent and useful to other applied areas ultimately. However, this by no means imply that there's no relationship between logic and physics.
So, I have a deep confusion about why philosophy sees this disconnection between logical necessity and physical causation. — Wayfarer
Physical causation has a problem dealing with the contingency and spontaneity found in the world. — apokrisis
It seems to me that the widespread scepticism about this issue all goes back to David Hume's questioning of inductive reason. — Wayfarer
There is no causation involved. — T Clark
But what about when it is applied to (for example) computing? Then there is plainly causation involved, as it produces a physical outcome. The fact that such-and-such is the case causes a particular result. I can't see how causation is not involved. — Wayfarer
Just a side note, since I am perhaps personally involved in that P getting to the screen. The engineering of those tiny computer components needs to go to substantial lengths to get that P consistently on the screen. It takes what is essentially a random process (say electrons tunneling across a barrier) and walks the tight wire between sufficient dice rolling to get a consistent behavior, and reducing the number of dice rolled to get sufficient performance. It has to work all the time, but not more than that. This is sort of an effort to hammer out hard predictable causal behavior from randomness.I touch particular keys and lo! the corresponding character appears on the screen (to take only the most simple of examples). It appears seamless but in reality the appearance of those characters is the result of predictable causal chain which generally operates with extremely high degrees of consistency; I don't press P and get Q, not unless there's a fault or configuration error. — Wayfarer
It's arguably one of the many causes. I mean, the thing probably wouldn't have shown up there just then had your finger not pressed that spot just then. But per my comment above, fundamentally the two are not directly connected. It's just really useful to make that connection.I can see saying that my finger caused the P to show up — T Clark
Just saying that the seemingly causal behavior of your machine is not necessarily the result of any fundamental causality, but rather a lot of effort to make it so. Per Wittgenstein quoted in your OP, it is useful for hypothesis. — noAxioms
If I push on the keyboard and a P shows up on the screen, I can see saying that my finger caused the P to show up. But isn't that what you are calling physical causation. — T Clark
As I understand it Hume claims that on account of "constant conjunctions" of events we come to habitually assume that the preceding event causes the constantly observed attending subsequent event — Janus
The question was not whether the concept of cause was right, useful,
and even indispensable for our knowledge of nature, for this Hume had
never doubted; but whether that concept could be thought by reason a
priori, and consequently whether it possessed an inner truth,
independent of all experience, implying a wider application than
merely to the objects of experience. This was Hume's problem.
But to satisfy the conditions of the problem, the opponents of the
great thinker should have penetrated very deeply into the nature of
reason, so far as it is concerned with pure thinking,—a task which
did not suit them. They found a more convenient method of being
defiant without any insight, viz., the appeal to common sense.
The question was not whether the concept of cause was right, useful,
and even indispensable for our knowledge of nature, for this Hume had
never doubted; but whether that concept could be thought by reason a
priori, and consequently whether it possessed an inner truth,
independent of all experience, implying a wider application than
merely to the objects of experience. This was Hume's problem. — Wayfarer
Yes - but physical causation doesn't have to be all powerful, does it? I'm the last person who would argue that it is - I accept the reality of karma, for instance, — Wayfarer
But it also suggests an invariable and causal relationship between cause and effect. — Wayfarer
And actually I think this is getting close to Kant's answer to Hume. — Wayfarer
It takes what is essentially a random process (say electrons tunneling across a barrier) and walks the tight wire between sufficient dice rolling to get a consistent behavior, and reducing the number of dice rolled to get sufficient performance. It has to work all the time, but not more than that. This is sort of an effort to hammer out hard predictable causal behavior from randomness. — noAxioms
So, I have a deep confusion about why philosophy sees this disconnection between logical necessity and physical causation. — Wayfarer
But it seems to me that materialism or physicalism must presume that logical laws are dependent on physical principles, because, in the physicalist view, everything is dependent on those laws (even if only by supervenience) — Stack X link
Bringing Hume and Kant into this is just turning the ontological issue into an epistemic debate. — apokrisis
But since Kant, we've had the quantum and relativity revolutions, — apokrisis
The point is just to dump the hardest bit of the metaphysical puzzle in some dark corner that no one any longer wants to talk about. — apokrisis
We know the sun will rise tomorrow. But we can never deduce that it will do so from any description of the universe today. — Cuthbert
This is a philosophy forum, so it is apt. — Wayfarer
Kant and Hume were talking about what we could know. — apokrisis
I understand the distinction between inductive and deductive reasoning. — Wayfarer
Nevertheless scientific principles such as the second law of thermodynamics are presumed to entail necessary consequences, i.e. we will expect them never to be contradicted.
However, a posteriori deductive arguments for causality are the stock-in-trade of science (re the laws of nature and induction). — Agent Smith
What woudl such a thing be like? Can you show us one? — Banno
But that uses induction - what would a deductive argument for cause look like? — Banno
The laws of thought are organised to arrive at the counterfactuality of the Law of the Excluded Middle. — apokrisis
These devices are built around microelectronics, devices comprising millions (even billions) of minute components, unfathomably complex to the untrained (including myself). These generally operate with quite astonishing degrees of precision and predictability through the mediation of sequences of billions of separate logical steps carried out at lightning speed and providing instantaneous results — Wayfarer
The point is just to dump the hardest bit of the metaphysical puzzle in some dark corner that no one any longer wants to talk about. — apokrisis
I understand the distinction between inductive and deductive reasoning.
— Wayfarer
Doesn't that resolve the deep confusion you mentioned? — Cuthbert
I think the Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics is the same problem restated more clearly. — unenlightened
The miracle of the appropriateness of the language of mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics is a wonderful gift which we neither understand nor deserve. — Eugene Wigner
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