They are true because of the role that each plays in a wider activity [ ... ] We might call the activities institutions, and hence call our target statements institutional facts. They are ubiquitous. Your spouse, your driver's licence, the money in your account, the job you have, the club you belong to, the school your children attend - all only exist as a result of such institutional facts.

And they are deontic. Each implies an obligation. — Banno

So much for "Hume's Guillotine" ...

How to do things with words.

The presumption here will be that we do things with words. Words are not just names used to passively set out how things are. We make statements, we ask questions, we give commands - much more than just saying something, our utterances are acts.

Consider:

• "I now pronounce you husband and wife"
• "I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth"
• "I give and bequeath my watch to my brother"
• "I bet you a fiver it rains tomorrow"

These are not mere descriptions. They are what Austin called performative utterances. Each makes something the case; that the couple are married, the ship named, the ownership of the watch passed on and the bet offered, if not accepted.

Notice that such utterances are not either true or false; if they misfire, it is in some other way than by truth value.

Searle studied with J. L. Austin.

Next: Promising

Promising

"I promise to meet with you next Tuesday."

With that very utterance, the promise is made, and the obligation created. Uttering the sentence "I promise to meet with you next Tuesday" counts as placing myself under the obligation to meet with you next Tuesday.

Promises are an example of a type of performative utterance that makes something the case. Searle posits that the general form of such utterances is "X counts as Y in C", were C is the circumstances of the utterance. The notion extends beyond utterances. Further examples would be:

• A king in check with no legal move out of check counts as checkmate in a game of chess
• A candidate who has the majority of votes in the Electoral college counts as the president-elect in US constitutional law.

That one ought keep one's promises is, on this account, not the result of some virtue on the part of the promiser, not an agreement between the promiser and the promisee, not something one is obliged to do because of the negative consequences that would ensue if folk broke their promises, not the result of convention or expectation, but simply what is done in uttering the word of a promise in suitable circumstances.

There is more on this at How to Derive "ought" from "is" and Promises as Speech Acts.

So much for "Hume's Guillotine" ... — 180 Proof

Indeed. A better analysis of the is/ought problem is found in sorting out the direction of fit of "is-" and "ought-" statements. The salient thing about commit statements such as those discussed here is that they commit one to bringing about a state of affairs. They have the word-to-word direction of fit, the same direction of fit as "ought-" statements.

Next: Five types of speech acts

Notice that such utterances are not either true or false; if they misfire, it is in some other way than by truth value. — Banno

All these sentences imply their own truth-apt corresponding statements. For instance "I now pronounce you husband and wife" means "you two are married" and that statement can be true/false.

they are not true for the sort of reasons that

The bishop is made of wood — Banno

Just an enquiry - but isn't "the bishop is made of wood" institutional too by virtue of the institutional fact that "that's the kind of thing 'wood' is". We institutionally collect certain material types and group them, then name those groups. That's not done for us, it's not some state of affairs that these materials ought to be grouped and have a single name and that name ought to be 'wood'. It is our institutions of object categorisation and language that have done that, no?

To put it another way. If Zelensky being president is an institutional fact, is the Queen bee being the Queen bee an institutional fact by virtue of the the institution of bees, or does it cease to be such because we're not bees and are just reporting the fact (that one of these bees is the breeding one)? Would an alien report on Zelensky's role as a fact of nature (these humans have acted such as for us to give this man this label)?

Indeed, with some complications, that is where this line of thinking leads; language itself becomes liable to this analysis. But not until the structure of speech acts is shown to reflect the structure of our intentionality.

Spoilers.

But for our purposes now, the queen is not a "queen" in virtue of some act of commission, in the way Zelenskyy is. She is Queen because of biology, not because of a social activity. But we do use the word "queen" to talk about her as a result of the social activity of language.

not until the structure of speech acts is shown to reflect the structure of our intentionality. — Banno

Not sure I understand this. It's exposition is coming later though? I'm happy to wait.

She is Queen because of biology, not because of a social activity. — Banno

Well, yes, but hence my example of aliens. Would they not have some cause to look at us and say "allocating presidents is the kind of thing this species does - it's in their biology"

Not sure I understand this. — Isaac

Truth is, I'm not sure I do either, which is part of why I am writing this. For now the point might be that the aliens would presumably agree that allocating presidents is done using language.

For now the point might be that the aliens would presumably agree that allocating presidents is done using language. — Banno

Ah, yes. Meaning they could no less make a separate study of 'human speech acts' than we can. Or than we can make a separate study of 'bee social status acts' (as opposed to just bee biology as a whole). That makes sense (to me at least).

So we do indeed have quite a wide category of institutional facts sensu lato, but because we're embedded in some of them (language, object recognition) and not in others (marriage law, electoral rules) they can have quite meaningful sub-categories.

Maybe going on too much of a tangent to what you wanted to explore, but it does perhaps leave moral obligations in something of a no-man's land. There's obviously a considerable non-embeddedness in social mores, but a lot of moral obligation arises out of a rather deeper, more visceral sensation, far more (I imagine) like the bee gets when responding to the pheromones which make the queen-bee the queen-bee?

Anyway, don't let my rambling disrupt you. I'll look forward to your next scheduled instalment.

moral obligations — Isaac

The essay above, 'How to Derive "ought" from "is"', was pretty controversial for a while. There's moral implications, but small steps.

Thanks for your interest.

The essay above, 'How to Derive "ought" from "is"', was pretty controversial for a while. — Banno

I'm pretty sure I've read it, but I'm having another look at it over the morning tea.

If you like - it's not central to the argument here.

The bishop always stays on the same coloured squares.
This laptop belongs to me
Zelenskyy is Ukraine's President.

These statements are true. Yet they are true not in virtue of a "state of affairs" in the world;

They are true because of the role that each plays in a wider activity: chess; property; and Ukrainian government. — Banno

Chess, ownership of property and the Ukrainian government are not states of affairs in the world?

Outside of those social activities, these facts have no life. Outside of those social activities, they do not become false, so much as nonsense.

We might call the activities institutions, and hence call our target statements institutional facts. — Banno

Then we agree that there are natural facts and facts invented by humans. As the inventor of certain states-of-affairs like democracy, we determine the nature of those states-of-affairs and the relationship between those states-of-affairs and the scribbles we use to refer to them. Different languages use different scribbles and sounds to refer to the same state-of-affairs - natural or social (I could argue that social states-of-affairs are natural states-of-affairs but that is for another thread).

And they are deontic. Each implies an obligation. Someone might move the bishop along a row, but it would no longer be a Bishop. To play Chess you are obliged to move only diagonally. I can do as I wish with my laptop, in a way that is distinct from you doing what you wish with my laptop. An officer in the service of the Ukrainian government is obliged to follow instructions from Zelenskyy in a way that they are not so obligated by any other Ukrainian. — Banno

Not following the rules of playing chess means that playing chess is no longer the state-of-affairs. The same can be said about someone stealing your laptop and revolting against the Ukrainian president - all states-of-affairs.

The presumption here will be that we do things with words. Words are not just names used to passively se tout how things are. We make statements, we ask questions, we give commands - much more than just saying something, our utterances are acts.

Consider:
"I now pronounce you husband and wife"
"I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth"
"I give and bequeath my watch to my brother"
"I bet you a fiver it rains tomorrow"

These are not mere descriptions. They are what Austin called performative utterances. Each makes something the case; that the couple are married, the ship named, the ownership of the watch passed on and the bet offered, if not accepted.

Notice that such utterances are not either true or false; if they misfire, it is in some other way than by truth value. — Banno

Uses and acts are manifestations of our goals. What is our goal in using scribbles and sounds? What is our goal in acting in ways that produce scribbles and sounds? If your goal is not to refer to some state-of-affairs then what are you saying?

You have to account for the short-cuts that we make with language use. Giving commands is basically a reference to someone's wants and needs (their goals). A command isn't about the person being commanded, but about the one making the command, as the one being commanded can ignore the command.

.

Promises are an example of a type of performative utterance that makes something the case. — Banno

An object becoming a bishop or a combination of letters becoming a word are historical events
A combination of letters or a piece on a chess board don't have intrinsic meaning, but have been given a meaning at some time in the past during a performative act.

The inventor of chess (simplifying history) in a performative act said that a piece having a rounded top with slit cut into it would be named a "bishop" and could only move diagonally. If, perchance, a piece on the chess board does not move diagonally, then it is not a bishop.

Language has developed in a series of performative acts, such that the combination of letters "p-r-o-m-i-s-e" means that that the person who has used it is obliged to carry out what they said they would do. If, perchance, the person does not carry out what they said they would do, then whatever word they used was not a promise - even if they had used the word "promise".


The situation for the subsequent user of language or player of chess is different.
The statement "the Bishop moves diagonally" is true, part of the "state of affairs" of the world, is an institutional fact, is part of a collective intentionality and is constative.

The statement "I ought to move the bishop diagonally" is incorrect use of language, as bishops must be moved diagonally.

As the statement "I promise to move the bishop diagonally" refers to a future event, it is nether true nor false and therefore performative.

However, that I made the statement ""I promise to move the bishop diagonally" is either true or false, and is therefore constative.

Summary
A word in language or a piece on a chess board have a meaning because they have been given a meaning in the past in a performative act. If a piece on a chess board does not move diagonally then it is not a Bishop. If a combination of letters does not result in what the speaker said they would do, then it is not a promise.

As Searle said "One can begin to answer this question by saying that for me to state such an institutional fact is already to invoke the constitutive rules of the institution".

Interpreting Searle, we naturally assume that we live in a social group that shares fundamental beliefs. In such a social institution, if someone has made a promise then this commits me to a view about what they ought to do, because if I had no committent to a view about what they ought to do, then that person had not made a promise - even if they had used the word "promise".

Yeah, that's pretty much it so far. A few quibbles that I will let slide.

Five types of speech acts

So we've established that there are more things to be done with words than just make statements. Searle claims that there are five distinct types of speech act. These are:

• Assertives, such as statements, descriptions, assertions.
• Directives, such as orders, commands, requests.
• Commissives, such as promises, vows, pledges.
• Expressives, such as apologies, thanks, congratulations.
• Declarations, in which we make something the case by declaring it to be the case.

Assertive speech acts serve to set out how things are, and so the words of the act are modified to match the what is the case. Assertives have a truth value. when they misfire, we say they are false.

Directives have the reverse direction of fit. When an order is issued, the commander is telling the subordinate to make it so; the direction of fit is such that the world is to be made to fit the words. A directive might misfire because it is issued by someone without authority, or because the state of affairs is already the case or is impossible. When an order misfires, it is not false.

Commissives commit the speaker to making some state of affairs the case. Hence they have the same direction of fit as directives, they commit to changing the world to match the words. Again, a misfire will be insincere or impossible, but not false. They differ in that while directives apply to others, commissives apply to oneself.

Expressives set out how one feels, or one's attitude or intent and so on about some state of affairs. They differ from assertives in that they do not set out the state of affairs but the attitude. Their direction of fit is the same as an assertive, the words match what is the case. We may call a misfire here false, but in a somewhat different sense to assertives - the falsehood is usually insincerity.

Declarations make something the case. "I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth", in the appropriate circumstances, makes to the case that the ship is now the Queen Elizabeth. The direction of fit here is twofold; a declaration sets out how things are, yet how things are changes to match the declaration.

There is much detailed analysis of each of these in Searle's writing, mostly in his book Speech Acts. While there are issues with details, the list of speech acts at least provides the beginnings of a nomenclature, an indication of the variety of acts, and shows how they vary by direction of fit and application.

Next: Propositional content

What about suppositions? Is this a missing category? Suppositions cut across reasoning ("Suppose the following is true, then what follows?") and storytelling ("in a world where...").

Are these directives? ("entertain this thought in your head"). But this is an order that has no force. It is an activity the listener may take up, at their choice. Are they declarations? The speaker is declaring a suppositional reality into existence? Or do we really need a separate category?

Well, Searle says his list is complete. I'm open on the issue. But on first glance I think you are right that suppositions are declarations.

But on first glance I think you are right that suppositions are declarations. — Banno

After thinking about it, by Searle's scheme there must be a missing category:

There are assertives, and inward assertives, which are expressives.
There are directives, and inward directives, which are commissives.

But that leaves declarations as the odd man out. Mustn't there be corresponding category of inward declarations?

There is, and it is precisely: suppositions. Declarations declare something into existence in the world, suppositions declare something into existence in the mind.

Not sure what you mean by "inward".

Direction of fit is about whether the words are changed to match the world, or the world changes to match the word. So the assertion "the cat is inside" is taken as a group of words intended to be arranged to match the world, but the suggestion "put the cat outside" is taken as intending that the world be arranged to match the words.

"Inward" might be taken as private, which would be an error; in both the cases above, the words are public, shared.

Rather than working with inward an d outward, Searle works with intentional states, which is where my posts are headed.

An inward declaration would make no sense in the same way a private rule would make no sense. A declaration is a public event, creates a public rule.

I think you are right that suppositions are declarations. — Banno

I think there's a sense in which they're assertions too. All stories might be preceded by the unspoken "in the story...", and so it becomes a declaration about a fictitious story. It is false that 'in the Lord of the Rings' Aragorn takes the ring to Mordor.

There's a crossover with previous declarations. It's the same as "I name this ship QE2" being a declaration. From then "this ship is called QE2" becomes an assertion.

Propositional Content

Speech acts are, one way or another, about how things are. In philosophical terminology, how things are is set out in a proposition, so a philosopher would say that speech acts have propositional content.

Consider the proposition: The cat is outside. This proposition can be used in a range of speech acts, so:

• Assertive: "I declare that the cat is outside"
• Directives: "Put the cat outside!"
• Commissives: "I promise to put the cat outside"
• Expressives: "Thankfully, the cat is outside".

Each of these has the same propositional content, but varies as to the speech act performed; as to what Austin called the illocutionary force of the utterance.

Speech acts are innumerably varied, so there are variations and exceptions to this. A question, for example, need not have as its content a complete proposition - that's rather the point. So "Where is the cat?" is a directive, seeking a response that completes the proposition "the cat is..." with "inside" or "outside" or something else. But generally speaking, and in many cases, the illocutionary force and the targeted propositional content can be presented as

F(p)

where F is the force and p the propositional content.

The point of the exercise is to seperate the content from the force, so we can now ask about the nature of the illocutionary force involved in each speech act.

Next: Intentionality

Yep. There's a way in which a declarative is like both an assertive and a commisive at the same time; it's that dual direction of fit. "I declare the building open" both makes it that the building is open and commits us to the building's being open.

I think it was decided to keep it seperate, rather than suggest that two acts were being performed at once. It's clearer.

Not sure what you mean by "inward". — Banno

Assertives and Expressives are quite similar. The difference is that assertives assert about the outer world, expressives assert about the inner world of the speaker.

Similarly, a Directive and a Commissive are quite similar. Directives direct out, at someone other than the speaker, while a Commissive directs in, to the speaker himself.

And in the same way, I propose that Declaratives by fiat create an external reality, in the world, while Suppositions by fiat create an internal reality, in the minds of the listeners.

An inward declaration would make no sense in the same way a private rule would make no sense. A declaration is a public event, creates a public rule. — Isaac

Every speech act is public, that goes without saying (leaving aside self talk). The distinction is, what is the domain of this rule? Where does it happen? Declarations happen in the world: a naming assigns a name to a being or object. Suppositions on the other hand, happen purely in the mind, of the listener and speaker.

I think it was decided to keep it seperate, rather than suggest that two acts were being performed at once. It's clearer. — Banno

Makes sense, thanks.

Declarations happen in the world: a naming assigns a name to a being or object. Suppositions on the other hand, happen purely in the mind, of the listener and speaker. — hypericin

I see the distinction, but it's less clear with something like "the ratio of the diameter of a circle to it's circumference is Π" This doesn't apply to any object in the external world (unless you want to posit the existence of perfect circles), but it declares rather than supposes.

I see the distinction, but it's less clear with something like "the ratio of the diameter of a circle to it's circumference is Π" This doesn't apply to any object in the external world (unless you want to posit the existence of perfect circles), but it declares rather than supposes. — Isaac

This is neither declaration nor supposition. It is an assertion, of a geometric fact. Not an expressive, because geometry, like the physical world, is something external to the speaker.

Every speech act is public, that goes without saying (leaving aside self talk). The distinction is, what is the domain of this rule? Where does it happen? Declarations happen in the world: a naming assigns a name to a being or object. Suppositions on the other hand, happen purely in the mind, of the listener and speaker. — hypericin

Minds, listeners and speakers are not in the world?

It seems to me that every speech act is an assertion because every speech act about some state of affairs, which include mental states like feelings, wants and needs.

Dualistic thinking is what creates the unneccsessary complexity of Banno's own assertions that there is some difference in how scribbles and utterances are used ither than asserting something to be the case. All language use asserts something to be the case.

I think there's a sense in which they're assertions too. All stories might be preceded by the unspoken "in the story...", and so it becomes a declaration about a fictitious story. It is false that 'in the Lord of the Rings' Aragorn takes the ring to Mordor. — Isaac

Just as every command can be preceded by, "I want...". A command refers to the demanding party's wants. The person being commanded can refuse the command, so the actual command couldnt have been used to make someone do something. Its use only displays what the person making the command wants.

It is an assertion, of a geometric fact. — hypericin

What, that we refer to the ratio with the sixteenth letter of the Greek alphabet? That's a geometric fact?

Just as every command can be preceded by, "I want...". A command refers to the demanding party's wants. The person being commanded can refuse the command, so the actual command couldnt have been used to make someone do something. Its use only displays what the person making the command wants. — Harry Hindu

I'm afraid I don't see the relevance. Searle is not saying "this is how it must be", he's giving a (hopefully useful) account. A counterargument would be that it wasn't useful, not that alternative accounts are also plausible.