How and why do you think the LEM is self-evident to you? Do you think the fact that contradictions cannot obtain merely reflects the "structure of our language" or is it not rather that the structure of our language reflects the nature of experience and the experience of nature? — John

I'm not sure. But I am sure that the law of excluded middle isn't made true because some verification-transcendent conditions are satisfied. So, again, I don't understand the relevancy of this line of questioning.

You haven't said what it means to know "when you see this it's appropriate to say that", as distinct from merely believing it is (out of habit, convention, convenience or whatever).

Saying that you must understand the distinction because you know how to use the two phrases is a cop out; all it shows is that you know the definitions of the words in the phrases, not that you can explain the logical distinction, as it consists in your position (if it indeed does), between knowing something and believing something.

I know that if I see water falling from the sky then it is appropriate to say "it is raining". If someone else were to say "it is sunny" then I will say that they believe that "it is sunny" is the appropriate to thing to say, but that actually it isn't. What's hard to understand about this?

We're quite capable of understanding the difference between saying that something is true and saying that something is only believed to be true. We're quite capable of knowing when to say that something is true and when to say that something is only believed to be true. And this is "despite" the fact that we do not have access to these supposed verification-transcendent conditions. So your very claim that verification-transcendence is required to make a distinction between truth and belief is refuted by the fact that every day we do make this distinction. Clearly empirical and linguistic contexts are sufficient.

1.I'm not sure. But I am sure that the law of excluded middle isn't made true because some verification-transcendent conditions are satisfied. So, again, I don't understand the relevancy of this line of questioning.

2. I know that if I see water falling from the sky then it is appropriate to say "it is raining". If someone else were to say "it is sunny" then I will say that they believe that "it is sunny" is the appropriate to thing to say, but that actually it isn't. What's hard to understand about this?

So your very claim that verification-transcendence is required to make a distinction between truth and belief is refuted by the fact that every day we do make this distinction. Clearly empirical and linguistic contexts are sufficient. — Michael

1.The issue is not about whether the LEM is "true", but about the originary, pre-linguistic nature it codifies, about the way that structures experience and language itself.

2. You only think you understand (in the sense of being able to explain) how it is that you know it is appropriate to say "it is raining" when you "see water falling from the sky".

Try to explain how it is that you know you are seeing water falling from the sky and you may get the point.

Clearly "empirical and linguistic contexts" (intersubjective conditions) are necessary, but not sufficient. You are leaving out the other half of the equation. In any case if you want to continue to reduce human experience and discourse to a bloodless linguistic equation, then I will leave you to it; it's becoming distinctly boring to hear repetitions of the same unargued assertions.

You are missing that the linguistic and empirical contexts involve states of the world. You are treating the "independent" objects, the things-in-themsleves, as if they are separate from the linguistic context (what may be spoken about) and the empirical context (what may be observed). They are not.

That which cannot be verification (i.e. the object, as opposed to experience of an object) is NOT outside the linguistic or empirical realm, but rather within in it, which is how our experience provide understanding and verification of any state of existence. Some meanings expressed by that which is never verification (the car) is are the SAME as an linguistically or empirical context (the perception of a car).