Hmmmm. Brentano 1874 is certainly pre-1905. Sartre, 1943...oops...too late. Husserl 1900....cuttin’ it close there.

To be honest, I haven’t spent a lot of time on intentionality. Not enough to judge the idea as an absolute presupposition.

What about it makes it attractive as a presupposition, do you think?

don’t think “underlying basic assumptions”, being merely suppositions, count as metaphysics.

I’ll wait for something to actually qualify as an absolute pre-supposition, which a metaphysics of anything, would surely demand. — Mww

Husserl , Rorty and Heidegger wrote a fair bit on absolute presuppositions underlying the sciences prior to the 20th century, including res extensia as the notion of a self-identical object with intrinsic content ,
attributes and properties persisting in time. The natural is thus thought of as restricted to such objects and their measurable movements in a mathematizable space

I am blurring the lines here between conceptions and absolute presuppositions, I'm aware of this.

Nevertheless, along with space and time, I cannot imagine consciousness (experience as I prefer to call it) without intentionality. If we lacked this capacity of our experience being directed at objects, there would be no way for individuation of objects in our conception of them.

It's not clear to me that say, Kant's comments about intuitions are the same or different from intentionality. They appear similar to me, but am not sure yet.

Nevertheless, I think such a component must be a factor in the possibility of objects, otherwise we would be stuck with entire "landscapes" (so to speak), instead of objects.

Put in another way, if you remove it, you can't even state presuppositions being about anything.

Intentionality seems to me to be an active component of cognition, which cannot be done away with. But this may be my own peculiarity.

res extensia — Joshs

I can dig Rene’s res extensa and res cogitans as absolute presuppositions. Opposing ends of a methodological duality, natural on one, intellectual on the other.

If we lacked this capacity of our experience being directed at objects, there would be no way for individuation of objects in our conception of them. — Manuel

Not sure why we would need to individuate objects when they individuate themselves and we merely recognize the differences.

I mean....it’s logically possible all objects are exactly the same in themselves, but if they are we can’t explain why we don’t perceive them all as possessing the exact same uniform identity. Probably why Mother gave us multiple sensory devices, to prove to ourselves objects are individuated already.

It's not clear to me that say, Kant's comments about intuitions are the same or different from intentionality. They appear similar to me, but am not sure yet. — Manuel

In Kant, the generation of phenomena arising from intuition is sub-conscious, so doesn’t seem conducive to intentionality, which I agree with you as being a conscious inclination. Again.....I don’t know enough about the history of it, so I speak uninformed.

Would intentionality have an anterior name I might be more familiar with?

Not sure why we would need to individuate objects when they individuate themselves and we merely recognize the differences. — Mww

I don't think this is the case. That's something we do to objects. There is no reason to think that absent us, there is any difference between a mountain and a plain, yet we clearly distinguish these.

I'm aware that speaking of mountains and plains absent people is speaking of "things in themselves", nevertheless, I think the thought experiment can be done as an illustration, while not denying the very real, insurmountable problems, associated with things in themselves.

I mean....it’s logically possible all objects are exactly the same in themselves, but if they are we can’t explain why we don’t perceive them all as possessing the exact same uniform identity. — Mww

That's what Schopenhauer thought, that it made no sense to speak of thingS in themselves, but the thing-in-itself. Doesn't mean he's right, of course, but it sounds persuasive to me.

Probably why Mother gave us multiple sensory devices, to prove to ourselves objects are individuated already. — Mww

Sensations do not give us reasons to invoke individuation, that's what the intellect does.



Ah, well, could it be that intentionality is the continuation of intuition, say, it's conscious aspect? The point of intentionality as I see it, is that it can't be eliminated from thought.

Neither can intuition be eliminated from our cognitive constitution, without us losing the ability to make sense of the world we have.

I think we experience space and time, extension and duration, and we also experience materiality, simply in being embodied, So, they all presuppose one another; they are codependently arising, as the Buddhists say.

There is no reason to think that absent us, there is any difference between a mountain and a plain, yet we clearly distinguish these. — Manuel

If that were so, how would we explain the fact that, when in front of one or the other no one will disagree as to which they are looking at?

I think we experience space and time, extension and duration, and we also experience materiality, simply in being embodied, So, they all presuppose one another; they are codependently arising, as the Buddhists say. — Janus

Yes, that's what I'm trying to get as. Having read the CPR, it seems to me that the "the a-priori sensible intuitions", include more than space and time. Schopenhauer adds causality, I think something along the lines of what you mention is more on the mark.

For even if we assume these to be true (which I think they are), if we lacked say, embodiment or continuity in consciousness, space and time would be moot.

Granted, Kant likely says that these other things mentioned are explained by some other faculty we have, but, I'm not convinced that space and time exhaust these intuitions.

If that were so, how would we explain the fact that, when in front of one or the other no one will disagree as to which they are looking at? — Janus

Because people make that judgment as to what a mountain or a plain is, and we share the same cognition (as dogs do with other dogs and birds with other birds, etc.), so there is no reason why they should disagree.

In the world absent us, there is no differentiation, nature doesn't care. Or so it looks so to me.

Because people make that judgment as to what a mountain or a plain is, and we share the same cognition (as dogs do with other dogs and birds with other birds, etc.), so there is no reason why they should disagree.

In the world absent us, there is no differentiation, nature doesn't care. Or so it looks so to me. — Manuel

But it would seem there must be something in nature which reliably leads to the perceptions of humans and animals being of the same things. My dog sees the walls, doors and the steps in the house at the same locations I do, judging by the fact that I don't see him trying to walk through, or climb, the walls. When I throw the ball for him he obviously sees it going in the same direction as I do, since I don't see him running in other directions. So, It seems clear to me that our differentiation of objects cannot be arbitrary or entirely dependent on us.

Not sure why we would need to individuate objects when they individuate themselves and we merely recognize the differences.
— Mww

I don't think this is the case. That's something we do to objects. — Manuel

Ahhhh, mon amie....I submit we don’t do anything to objects, but only to their representations. Objects do things to us, by the affect they have on our sensibility, which gives us those representations. This is how they individuate themselves, by affecting us differently. If we did things to objects, there wouldn’t be any ding an sich.

I think the thought experiment can be done as an illustration, while not denying the very real, insurmountable problems, associated with things in themselves. — Manuel

What if it isn’t a mere illustration, but a given necessity pursuant to the kind of intelligence in play? In fact, why couldn’t the ding an sich be a Collingwood-esque absolute presupposition?

But all that aside....what would a list of these problems entail?
————-

The point of intentionality as I see it, is that it can't be eliminated from thought. — Manuel

If it can’t be eliminated from thought, and thought is a part of a system, and all parts of systems have a dedicated function....what would the function of intentionality be, such that the absence of it makes the system untenable at best, and thought impossible at worst?

intentionality is the continuation of intuition, say, it's conscious aspect? — Manuel

OK, that would seem to be a function of some kind. What is the result, or, what is its contribution to the system?
————-

Sensations do not give us reasons to invoke individuation, that's what the intellect does. — Manuel

Agreed, sensation does not invoke reason or reasons.

How do you feel about equating individuation with conceptualization?

Strictly speaking, your dog sees phenomena which he can't pass through, we call it a "WALL" or a "STEP". If the object can be moved by a certain motion and then pushed or pulled, we call that a DOOR.

The best I can guess, is that a dog puts together an association of ideas: something like PRESS, PULL and the the idea of an OPEN AREA: the garden or the street, etc.

They lack linguistic concepts, so I have to assume that whatever goes in inside the skull, is an extremely watered down version of what we do.

Yes, I think most animals have an idea of orientation, which is why many newborn animals don't jump off a nest or off a table as soon as they're born, or why sea turtles known exactly where to go as soon as they are born.

So, It seems clear to me that our differentiation of objects cannot be arbitrary or entirely dependent on us. — Janus

I agree that it is not arbitrary: far from it. The "entirely dependent" part is very tough. It depends on what we assume the object must have, absent us.

What I would stress is, regardless of the world, what matters is how the creature reacts to the stimulation, more so than the actual world: moths flying to lamps (instead of the moon), dogs mistaking toys for food, tigers mistaking mirrors for other tigers, etc.

Granted, I am giving examples of deviation from the norm, but what I think this shows is animals react to stimulations, regardless of if the trigger is the one the animals thinks it is.

You can reply that the tiger is reacting to a property of the mirror and the moth to a property of the lamp. And in a sense it is true, yet we would not want to say that a mirror is another tiger, nor a lamp the literal moon. So we may say certain properties of light, are mind-independent.

That' the difficult area for me.

I think to reduce further: the principle property of matter, is simple extension, the one thing impossible to abstract from matter, and still have matter identifiable as such. — Mww

I don't think I'd agree with this, because I don't think that "extension" is a well defined term. In a sense, it means to be extended in a specific way, but that way is left unspecified. So, what does it mean to be extended in a specific unspecified way?

If we say that temporal extension, to be extended in time, is the defining property of matter, then this would be reducible to inertia, as inertia can be conceived of, as the cause of being extended in time. But if we stipulate that matter is defined by having spatial extension, then this may not be supported by empirical evidence. It appears like fundamental particles may not have any spatial extension at all.

So, I think that if we define matter with "extension", it must be temporal extension, and this is consistent with "inertia". "Mass" is a more difficult concept, because it relates the temporal inertia to spatial presence, through a value, a quantity which is equivalent to its inertia, which is assigned to a place, or thing with a spatial position. So mass is, generally speaking, a quantity of inertia. The problem is that there is no requirement for any specific shape, or size (in the sense of spatial extension). So mass is a quantity which can be assigned to a dimensionless point in space. This is evident in the practise of marking the centre of mass.

Strictly speaking yes, "stuff" and "matter" are different things. But to signify something that is independent of us, these terms can be used loosely to point out this general idea. — Manuel

The issue I see is the question of whether "matter" actually is something independent of us. When I start to analyze the concept, I find that it is only that, a concept. And there really doesn't seem to be anything real, independent from us, which corresponds with this concept. We could say that it is a useful principle, but nothing in the world corresponds with it, it's just a principle which helps us to do things in the world, and better understand the world.

Strictly speaking, your dog sees phenomena which he can't pass through, we call it a "WALL" or a "STEP". If the object can be moved by a certain motion and then pushed or pulled, we call that a DOOR. — Manuel

I agree that obviously the dog does not conceptualize walls or doors in just the ways we do due to our linguistic capacities, but the dog sees the door as an "affordance" and the wall as an obstruction. What we can conclude, though, from the dogs basic experience of walls and doors and balls as being pretty much the same as ours is that there are mind-independent attributes of the environment which are perceived or cognized in various similar ways by other animals as well as humans.

Granted, I am giving examples of deviation from the norm, but what I think this shows is animals react to stimulations, regardless of if the trigger is the one the animals thinks it is. — Manuel

I think what that shows, though, is that there are things there which resemble, in ways that we can understand because we also see resemblances, what the animals "think" they are responding to. I think the most plausible explanation is that there are real mind-independent "structures" that constrain the ways we perceive things. We can't say what they are completely "absent us", because anything we can say is not absent us.

only to their representations. — Mww

Yes. Thanks for the correction.

Objects do things to us, by the affect they have on our sensibility, which gives us those representations. This is how they individuate themselves, by affecting us differently. If we did things to objects, there wouldn’t be any ding an sich. — Mww

Here it becomes tricky. Yes, objects-as(the grounds of)-representations do things to us - provide stimulation. I would stress that the effects given by the representation is extremely slight given the richness of the reply we offer said stimulation.

Well, I mean, we do add colours, sounds and textures to the representations (which are anchored to objects as things in themselves). So we do do something to them, or we attribute said properties to the effects objects have on us as representations. But the thing in itself remains postulated.

But all that aside....what would a list of these problems entail? — Mww

I mean, it could be a Collingwood-esque presupposition, things in themselves that is. Not everybody buys it as you know. I do, in a modified form.

Well, it's not anything too revelatory at all, but this entails that we add much more to the world than what we otherwise would normally assume. If one can appreciate the scale of this, then the very scheme which Collingwood elaborates as being "metaphysics", seems to weaken.

Because I take metaphysics to be about the world, but it turns out we can say very little about it.

.what would the function of intentionality be, such that the absence of it makes the system untenable at best, and thought impossible at worst? — Mww

I'm not clear on the function. We know too little about the nature of mental processes. A guess would be, it gives further stability to world, and helps anchor thoughts to representations, which would otherwise not be differentiated properly.

What is the result, or, what is its contribution to the system? — Mww

Again, my guess is stability and facilitating the process of thinking.

How do you feel about equating individuation with conceptualization? — Mww

I would say that individuation is part of the conceptualization we use to navigate the world. Individuation, much like the continuity of representations, and the stability representations seems to have, are facts of our cognitive make up.

is that there are mind-independent attributes of the environment which are perceived or cognized in various similar ways by other animals as well as humans. — Janus

In some respects yes. One property that seemingly most minds do, is attribute a permanent existence to objects in experience. In reality, we know that these objects change all the time, but we don't perceive them in this manner.

We must accept solidity as a fact of our experience of the external world, which seems to have such a property. The rest is more difficult to pin out, because I see them as forms or organizing stimulus, rather than the world per se. Although the world is the one providing the stimulus. It's a kind of receding object.

Sorry, my thinking goes way down at this time of day... :)

I think the most plausible explanation is that there are real mind-independent "structures" that constrain the ways we perceive things. We can't say what they are completely "absent us", because anything we can say is not absent us. — Janus

Yes, there are structures. I think so too. The nature of these structures are hard to decipher, I think. Even though we manage to navigate the world somehow, it's not trivial.

I do think there are things absent us, we cannot merely think the world to completion, because we don't have enough relevant data. Hence the need for further experience, and science and experimentation.

I don't think that "extension" is a well defined term..... — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it isn’t, nor does it need to be. It is a general, albeit necessary, condition of objects met with unaided human perception.

In a sense, it means to be extended in a specific way, but that way is left unspecified. — Metaphysician Undercover

To be extended does not make necessary extension in a certain way. To be extended in a certain way, or, to possess a specific bounded extension, is shape. All shapes are reducible to extension in space, which is all that is necessary for the matter of objects, as far as our sensibility, and thereby our representational faculty, is concerned.

we do add colours, sounds and textures to the representations — Manuel

We add conceptions to the representations in the naming of them, sure...red, loud, rough, etc., a veritable plethora, but I’m not sure we add color, sound, or texture to general intuitions. I rather think these are given to us merely by the mode of receptivity having the capacity for it. Why have ears if not to hear sound?
————

Not everybody buys it as you know. — Manuel

You’re too kind; hardly anybody buys it.

I take metaphysics to be about the world, but it turns out we can say very little about it. — Manuel

I take metaphysics to be about me, which I can say everything about, and all me’s of like kind, which I can infer some things about. The world? Ehhhh.....it’s there, always was, always will be, or not, not my concern. Or, I suppose, only of relative concern.
————

we add much more to the world than what we otherwise would normally assume...... — Manuel

You mean, like, we build stuff? Redirect Nature from her own course? Yeah, we do that alright.

......If one can appreciate the scale of this, then the very scheme which Collingwood elaborates as being "metaphysics", seems to weaken. — Manuel

How does the fact we add to the world weaken Collingwood’s metaphysical scheme? I thought his metaphysics was predicated on “thinking scientifically”, same as Kant. You must have meant something else by adding to the world.
————-

.....what would the function of intentionality be...
— Mww

A guess would be, it (....) helps anchor thoughts to representations, which would otherwise not be differentiated properly. — Manuel

Ok, I can see that. Me......I just leave that anchor to understanding, and proper differentiation to judgement. I know intentionality implies teleology, purposesiveness, so to speak, but I think that a bridge too far. I’m an admitted metaphysical reductionist, so from where I sit, the only intentionality in humans, is knowledge. Game’s end, donchaknow.

We add conceptions to the representations in the naming of them, sure...red, loud, rough, etc., a veritable plethora, but I’m not sure we add color, sound, or texture to general intuitions. I rather think these are given to us merely by the mode of receptivity having the capacity for it. Why have ears if not to hear sound? — Mww

I believe the gist of the issue is that of "receptivity". Although it is, in a sense, true that we are receptive to these properties of the phenomena, it is nonetheless misleading, in as much as hearing, seeing, touching are active capacities, they just don't feel active, because they are unconscious or sub-conscious.

If they're not active, then we lose them: people go blind, deaf and so on.

How does the fact we add to the world weaken Collingwood’s metaphysical scheme? I thought his metaphysics was predicated on “thinking scientifically”, same as Kant. You must have meant something else by adding to the world. — Mww

I had in mind his claim that metaphysics is about "absolute presuppositions". I think it is more than this. It goes beyond statements about what we presuppose to actual experience. Then again, I may be misreading his project.

Plenty of figures claim "scientific" metaphysics, like Peirce or Russell. Those are good. But once we get to Quine and beyond, no, thanks.

metaphysical reductionist — Mww

Not sure what this means.

Yes, there are structures. I think so too. The nature of these structures are hard to decipher, I think. Even though we manage to navigate the world somehow, it's not trivial.

I do think there are things absent us, we cannot merely think the world to completion, because we don't have enough relevant data. Hence the need for further experience, and science and experimentation. — Manuel

:up:

To be extended does not make necessary extension in a certain way. — Mww

My OED says of "extend", "lengthen or make larger in space or time". The problem is, as I explained, that "matter" does not require any spatial extension. This leaves only temporal extension, and temporal extension is explained by the concept of inertia. But we still have the issue of "mass". "Mass" cannot be explained by "extension". It is directly related to inertia, as a sort of quantity of inertia, but it is not the same thing as inertia, So "extension" fails as a proposal for the principal property of matter, because the principal measurement of matter, mass, is not a measurement of an extension.

All shapes are reducible to extension in space, which is all that is necessary for the matter of objects, as far as our sensibility, and thereby our representational faculty, is concerned. — Mww

But the issue is matter which has no spatial extension. This is what denies spatial extension from being the defining feature of matter.

matter which has no spatial extension — Metaphysician Undercover

Any examples of that you could show us?

The possibility of matter absolutely presupposes space and time,
— Mww

Matter is what maintains its spatial presence as time passes. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your position presupposes matter, mine presupposes the possibility of matter. You’re talking about matter as if its already given, I’m talking about how it possible that it is given.

For that matter which affects my senses, I don’t care about matter that is merely “extended in time”, but absolutely require matter that is extended in space, otherwise there is no affect on my senses at all, and for me in which case, I would have no means to know matter exists, a most profound absurdity.

Not to say there’s anything wrong about your physics, only that it is misplaced. Which makes this.....

But the issue is matter which has no spatial extension. — Metaphysician Undercover

.....entirely irrelevant.

.....hearing, seeing, touching are active capacities, they just don't feel active, because they are unconscious or sub-conscious. — Manuel

In a way, it is confusing, insofar as it is empirically undeterminable, in that sensing is an active capacity of which we are quite conscious, but of the generation of phenomena which represents those sensations, we are not. Hence, speculative, albeit logically consistent, metaphysical theory.

Nevertheless, the human physiology, and the empirical science behind it, sustains the fact that we are not internally conscious of what happens between the sensation of a thing, and the registration of it in the brain. It can be measured, displayed on test equipment, and so on, but not be present in a first-hand, subjective consciousness.

Any examples of that you could show us? — Wayfarer

I think the best example is "virtual particles". The issue I believe arises from the the practise of positioning mass as a "centre of mass". Interactions between massive objects are modeled on the basis of a centre point of mass, very similar to what we commonly call the centre of gravity. This places the mass at a non-dimensional purely hypothetical "point". Since it is not a real, or true representation of how the mass of an object actually exists, when we model two centres of mass interacting, there is a need to employ "virtual particles" as a medium between the two points which represent the two centres of mass of the two objects, in order to model the two cetnres of mass as interacting with each other. In other words, instead of modeling how the two massive objects actually interact with each other, two hypothetical centres of mass are modeled as interacting, via the medium of hypothetical virtual particles.

Your position presupposes matter, mine presupposes the possibility of matter. You’re talking about matter as if its already given, I’m talking about how it possible that it is given. — Mww

But "matter" is purely possibility in the first place. As defined by Aristotle, it is potential, the potential for change. So in talking about "the possibility of matter" you are proposing the possibility of a possibility. This would either be redundancy, and we would take possibility (as matter) for granted, like I do, or else the two possibilities might negate each other to form some sort of actuality. The latter is incoherent, so we are left with the former, we take matter, as possibility, for granted, as a given.

For that matter which affects my senses, I don’t care about matter that is merely “extended in time”, but absolutely require matter that is extended in space, otherwise there is no affect on my senses at all, and for me in which case, I would have no means to know matter exists, a most profound absurdity. — Mww

The problem is that it is not matter which affects your senses. If we adhere to the formal understanding of "matter" as expounded in Aristotle's hylomorphism (which our current understanding of matter is based in), it is forms which affect your senses, not matter. What affects your senses is activity, actuality, and it is the forms of things which are active, and changing. Matter is posited as the principle of potentiality, to allow for the possibility of such active forms, but it is purely cognitive, a logical principle required for our minds to make sense of the reality that forms are active.

But "matter" is purely possibility in the first place — Metaphysician Undercover

That the “matter” of the thing that just broke my finger is a “hammer” is indeed mere possibility, but it remains that a material thing broke my finger. To say otherwise, is only to exhibit “....recourse to pitiful sophisms....”.

If we adhere to the formal understanding of "matter" as expounded in Aristotle's hylomorphism (which our current understanding of matter is based in), it is forms which affect your senses, not matter. — Metaphysician Undercover

You know the drill as well as I, that theories expand as a consequence of general experience. Or maybe just speculative imagination. Aristotle, though a great and honorable thinker and still serves as reference to some modern metaphysics, has himself been at least partially superseded, with or without justification being moot. So saying, while I agree hylomorphism is still the current paradigm in human cognitive systems metaphysically, the occasions or placements of them have been separated, insofar as matter is external, but form has been moved to the internal and deemed.....

“....that the content of the matter can be arranged under certain relations. But that in which our sensations are merely arranged, and by which they are susceptible of assuming a certain form, cannot be itself sensation. It is, then, the matter of all phenomena that is given to us à posteriori;; the form must lie ready à priori for them in the mind, and consequently can be regarded separately from all sensation.....”.
(Remember...I dislike the term “mind”, but that’s what the guy said, so, far be it from me to be so presumptuous as to change it)

That being the case, it is not form that affects sensibility, but matter alone. Perfect example of the meaning of all that, can be found in, e.g., circa1909/1919 Picasso paintings, which exemplify how representations of matter can be disarranged purely from the thought of it.

That the “matter” of the thing that just broke my finger is a “hammer” is indeed mere possibility, but it remains that a material thing broke my finger. To say otherwise, is only to exhibit “....recourse to pitiful sophisms....”. — Mww

I wouldn't deny that it was a material thing. The matter in it is what gives it the capacity to break your finger, which is also material.

So saying, while I agree hylomorphism is still the current paradigm in human cognitive systems metaphysically, the occasions or placements of them have been separated, insofar as matter is external, but form has been moved to the internal and deemed..... — Mww

I don't agree that form has been moved to the internal. All material objects have a form, the "shape" of a material object, which you were already talking about, is a formal aspect. This use of "form", to refer to the shape, is so common, you may have forgotten about it when you say "form has been moved to the internal and deemed".

It is, then, the matter of all phenomena that is given to us à posteriori;; the form must lie ready à priori for them in the mind, and consequently can be regarded separately from all sensation.....”. — Mww

This reverses the classic Aristotelian description, which is derived from Plato. The matter, being passive, is a receptacle which receives the form that is active. This is described in Plato's Timaeus. It doesn't make sense to say that the form lies ready to receive, because forms are active. What lies ready is the passive matter, and it receives the active form, which informs.

That being the case, it is not form that affects sensibility, but matter alone. — Mww

I don't think so, matter is purely passive, and therefore cannot affect the senses. Forms are active, and each particular thing has an individual form which is unique to itself, by the law of identity. This is how we can validate the existence of separate, independent objects, by recognizing that each thing has a particular form. This makes individual, independent objects real, the fact that each has its own particular, unique form. So we uphold the law of identity because we believe in this. Each form is active, but it is separate, independent from other forms, making individual material objects real distinct things. It is not the matter which separates one object from another, so it is not matter which validates the idea of separate, individual objects.

.

The matter in it is what gives it the capacity..... — Metaphysician Undercover

....to affect my senses.

‘Nuff said.

So we uphold the law of identity because we believe in this. — Metaphysician Undercover

The law of identity, being a human construct, has Nature as its justification, so is upheld merely from lack of contradiction.

....to affect my senses.

‘Nuff said. — Mww

Not really, because the capacity to, or possibility of affecting your senses is not the same as actually affecting your senses. And, we need to acknowledge that difference. Once we acknowledge that difference, and that it is a real, logically respectable difference, it becomes extremely difficult to explain why, or how, there could be such a difference.

We can imagine the existence of something completely passive (matter), which is totally inactive in an absolute sense. Being totally inactive it does not affect your senses. However, we can assign to it the capacity to move, or be moved, and it is the movement of it which affects the senses. Then we see the difference between the capacity to affect the senses and actually affecting the senses.

So if we understand sensation as a receptance of activity, then anything which is not active cannot be sensed. And we have no reason to deny the possibility of the non-active, just because we cannot sense it. And, we cannot deny from a non-active thing, the capacity to be moved and therefore be sensible.

However, the principles of modern physics (relativity specifically) have removed the reality of the non-active (absolute rest). So now it appears like we don't have the capacity to talk scientifically (or even intelligently, if that requires science) about the difference between the capacity to affect the senses, and actually affecting the senses. The difference is rendered as unintelligible by denying the reality of the principle of absolute rest.

The law of identity, being a human construct, has Nature as its justification, so is upheld merely from lack of contradiction. — Mww

I would say that the law of identity is upheld to support the law of non-contradiction. If there is no such thing as identity then "contradiction" is meaningless. So we give "contradiction" meaning, and this requires a law of identity, making identity logically prior to contradiction.

the capacity to, or possibility of affecting your senses is not the same as actually affecting your senses. (...) it becomes extremely difficult to explain why, or how, there could be such a difference. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’m perceiving something, or, I’m not perceiving something. Something is present to my senses, or it isn’t. The negations, I perceive what isn’t there, or, I don’t perceive what is there, are absurd. How much less difficult can it be?

we can assign to it the capacity to move, or be moved, and it is the movement of it which affects the senses. — Metaphysician Undercover

So if I don’t think the tree capable of moving, it can’t, and because of that, I won’t see it?

Cum hoc ergo proper hoc, and you should know better.

I’m perceiving something, or, I’m not perceiving something. Something is present to my senses, or it isn’t. The negations, I perceive what isn’t there, or, I don’t perceive what is there, are absurd. How much less difficult can it be? — Mww

It isn't absurd to think that there might be something there which you do not perceive. The senses are very specific, and only sense the specific type of activity which they are designed (evolved) to sense; each sense picking up a different form of activity. It's not absurd at all to think that there could be something passive there which is not sensed at all, or even a type of activity, for which a sense has not been developed to sense.

So if I don’t think the tree capable of moving, it can’t, and because of that, I won’t see it? — Mww

I can't figure out what you are trying to say here. We see trees, and trees are actively moving. Their electrons are continuously interacting with the light, that's how you can see them. To think of the tree as potentially not moving would be a falsity, an impossibility. However, we can conceive of the possibility of something (matter) which is not moving, and is therefore not sensed. And, we can assign to that thing, the capacity to move, or be moved, and at this time it could be sensed.