Your claims treat experience as a thing that exists somewhere within the human body — NOS4A2

No. Just a thing that exists. It doesn't matter where it is. the network analysis is the same, it's based on data flows, not location. The estimation of hidden states by nodes inside a Markov Blanket excluding those states is just a mathematical expression. It's irrelevant where anything is in the physical world.

[quote="Isaac;

712199"]Then you're arguments are missing an important detail. Why? If it's not that the way you see the world is true, then why would I want to see it that way, what's in it for me?[/quote]

To be fair to various postmodernists, it is not all conceptions of truth that are suspect, but truth as a human relation to context-independent , intrinsic facts.

For instance, Derrida is famous for asserting that there is nothing outside the rest, by which he means nothing outside some context or other. Yet he holds onto a purely context-dependent notion of truth.

“For of course there is a "right track", a better way, and let it be said in passing how surprised I have often been, how amused or discouraged, depending on my humor, by the use or abuse of the following argument: Since the deconstructionist (which is to say, isn't it, the skeptic-relativist-nihilist!) is supposed not to believe in truth, stability, or the unity of meaning, in intention or "meaning-to-say, " how can he demand of us that we read him with pertinence, preciSion, rigor? How can he demand that his own text be interpreted correctly? How can he accuse anyone else of having misunderstood, simplified, deformed it, etc.? In other words, how can he discuss, and discuss the reading of what he writes? The answer is simple enough: this definition of the deconstructionist is false (that's right: false, not true) and feeble; it supposes a bad (that's right: bad, not good) and feeble reading of numerous texts, first of all mine, which therefore must finally be read or reread.

Then perhaps it will be understood that the value of truth (and all those values associated with it) is never contested or destroyed in my writings, but only reinscribed in more powerful, larger, more stratified contexts. And that within interpretive contexts (that is, within relations of force that are always differential-for example, socio-political-institutional-but even beyond these determinations) that are relatively stable, sometimes apparently almost unshakeable, it should be possible to invoke rules of competence, criteria of discussion and of consensus, good faith, lucidity, rigor, criticism, and pedagogy.”

To be fair to various postmodernists, it is not all conceptions of truth that are suspect, but truth as a human relation to context-independent , intrinsic facts. — Joshs

Right. So the question would be why that relation, and not another possible relation?

within interpretive contexts (that is, within relations of force that are always differential-for example, socio-political-institutional-but even beyond these determinations) that are relatively stable, sometimes apparently almost unshakeable, it should be possible to invoke rules of competence, criteria of discussion and of consensus, good faith, lucidity, rigor, criticism, and pedagogy — Joshs

This is all very well, but Derrida here invokes 'stability' as the measure of an interpretive context within which he would advocate these 'rules'. Why is 'stability' the criteria? Does he provide an argument for this? (I've not read Derrida). Why would an unstable (perhaps new, vibrant, but immature) interpretative context not be a better one to invoke the rules of?

If postmodernism is presented as just skepticism, there would be no reason to have standards of truth. — Jackson

Skepticism says there’s a real world external to our conceptions but we have no way of verifying the fidelity of our conceptions with that reality.
Postmodern authors say that we are always directly in touch with reality in the form of changing contextual webs of relations in which we participate. Within these webs there can be relative stability of intelligibility and ‘truth’.

Skepticism says there’s a real world external to our conceptions but we have no way of verifying the fidelity of our conceptions with that reality.
Postmodern authors say that we are always directly in touch with reality in the form of changing contextual webs of relations in which we participate. Within these webs there can be relative stability of intelligibility and ‘truth’. — Joshs

I don't find "postmodern" to be one thing. Too vague.

Why would an unstable (perhaps new, vibrant, but immature) interpretative context not be a better one to invoke the rules of? — Isaac

Because by its nature an unstable interpretive context has no consistent ‘ rules’. A new , immature context is internally inconsistent, shifting, confused. It offers no discernible pattern. One could argue that personal experiences of emotional crisis exemplify the slide from a stable to an unstable interpretive context. Fear, anxiety and anger are crises of intelligibility, a poorly structured territory of experience where our anticipations fail us.

Because by its nature an unstable interpretive context has no consistent ‘ rules’. — Joshs

OK, so what about the inconsistent, ever changing ones. Why not apply those?

A new , immature context is internally inconsistent, shifting, confused — Joshs

Uh huh. What would be the problem with applying rules from such a system (as and when they arise)?

A new , immature context is internally inconsistent, shifting, confused
— Joshs

Uh huh. What would be the problem with applying rules from such a system (as and when they arise)? — Isaac

Once these rules arise the context would no long be new and immature. It would have morphed into the sort of discursive system that Derrida is talking about
where norms of discourse are intelligible.

Once these rules arise the context would no long be new and immature. It would have morphed into the sort of discursive system that Derrida is talking about
where norms of discourse are intelligible. — Joshs

So the moment there's a discernable rule it's wise to apply it?

If there is multiple minds, then isn't it necessary that there is something which separates one mind from another? — Metaphysician Undercover

For A and B to be separate there must be some C that makes them separate? Why? What then separates C from A and B? Some D? And so on ad infinitum. Seems an unreasonable requirement.

Once these rules arise the context would no long be new and immature. It would have morphed into the sort of discursive system that Derrida is talking about
where norms of discourse are intelligible.
— Joshs

So the moment there's a discernable rule it's wise to apply it? — Isaac

We do t first have rules that just sit there waiting for
us to apply them. As Wittgenstein argued , a rule only exists in the moment of its application. The sense of a rule is its immediate, contextual use. To apply it is to create its sense. Before we choose to apply rules, we already find ourselves ‘thrown into’ a particular discursive world, as Heidegger put it.

Been out all day - it's my son's (real world) graduation.

Solipsism is not refuted by your undefended claim that there are multiple minds. There are two possibilities : either p exists before being experienced or p exists after (at the moment of) being experienced. If after (i.e., the experiencing mind must be present for existence), then solipsism. If before, then idealism amounts to a renaming of the external world because you don't like icky matter.

But assuming the second possibility, the problem is compounded for the idealist : if the external world is just mind-stuff, then one must posit an uber-mind (or god). This adds an unnecessary level of complexity.

There are two possibilities : either p exists before being experienced or p exists after (at the moment of) being experienced. If after (i.e., the experiencing mind must be present for existence), then solipsism. — Real Gone Cat

That doesn’t follow. If there are multiple minds then solipsism isn’t the case.

No. Just a thing that exists. It doesn't matter where it is. the network analysis is the same, it's based on data flows, not location. The estimation of hidden states by nodes inside a Markov Blanket excluding those states is just a mathematical expression. It's irrelevant where anything is in the physical world.

If it exists it has a position. We ought to be able to point to it.

I’m afraid I’m terrible at math. What would the Markov blanket be in biological terms?

now I’m hungry — Joshs

Then I will say again that your PoMo blade does not have a grip, that it cuts the hand the wields it as much as that against which it is wielded.

Then I will say again that your PoMo blade does not have a grip, that it cuts the hand the wields it as much as that against which it is wielded. — Banno

It protects all wielding hands, by inviting coordination among indefinite multiplicities of would-be sword wielders . Let me rearrange your thought a bit with the help of Ken Gergen:

“Poatmodernist thought militates against the claims to ethical foundations implicit in much identity politics - that higher ground from which others can so confidently be condemned as inhumane, self-serving, prejudiced, and unjust. Constructionist thought painfully reminds us that we have no transcendent rationale upon which to rest such accusations, and that our sense of moral indignation is itself a product of historically and culturally situated traditions. And the constructionist intones, is it not possible that those we excoriate are but living also within traditions that are, for them, suffused with a sense of ethical primacy? As we find, then, social constructionism is a two edged sword in the political arena, potentially as damaging to the wielding hand as to the opposition.”(Social Construction and the Transformation of Identity Politics)

Empiricism rejects the reality of number on the basis that numbers don't exist within the time-space framework — Wayfarer

That's not right, of course.

Neither you nor any mooted empiricists think that you will bump into a "5" around the next bend, or that they have a seven in a jar int he cupboard.

And again the question arises, what is it you mean when you say that numbers are real? Real as opposed to what?

Your point, again, eludes me. What is the "constructionism" in your quote - it is introduced without explanation.

↪Joshs Your point, again, eludes me. What is the "constructionism" in your quote - it is introduced without explanation. — Banno

Didnt have a chance to finish the edit.

Then I will say again that your PoMo blade does not have a grip, that it cuts the hand the wields it as much as that against which it is wielded.
— Banno

It protects all wielding hands, by inviting coordination among indefinite multiplicities of would-be sword wielders . Let me rearrange your thought a bit with the help of Ken Gergen: — Joshs

Idealism doesn't hold that some statement p is true only if it is believed or known to be true. Idealism holds that only minds and mental phenomena exist. It's a position regarding the substance-nature of the world, not about truth. — Michael

Yet idealism holds as a minimal position that reality is mind-dependent. Reality is of course what is said by true sentences. Hence idealism must hold that the truth of a sentence true is dependent on mind.

Not just that a sentence is a mental construct, with which a realist would agree. A realist can say that there are innumerable true sentences that are not in any way related to any mind. An idealist cannot agree. For an idealist it is nonsense to talk about reality, and hence about truth, apart from mind.

For idealism, there can be no states of affairs beyond true beliefs. This is not true for realists.

The non-existence of an external material world doesn't entail that all counterfactuals are knowable and that all mathematical theories are provable. Taking an extreme form of idealism as an example, even if only my mind and my experiences exist, I don't know what I'm going to experience tomorrow. — Michael

Your extreme idealist must conclude that because it is not part of experience, what you will do tomorrow does not (yet) exist. It is not either true nor false.

Empiricism rejects the reality of number on the basis that numbers don't exist within the time-space framework
— Wayfarer

That's not right, of course. — Banno

Scientists tend to be empiricists; they imagine the universe to be made up of things we can touch and taste and so on; things we can learn about through observation and experiment. The idea of something existing “outside of space and time” makes empiricists nervous: It sounds embarrassingly like the way religious believers talk about God, and God was banished from respectable scientific discourse a long time ago.

Platonism, as mathematician Brian Davies has put it, “has more in common with mystical religions than it does with modern science.” The fear is that if mathematicians give Plato an inch, he’ll take a mile. If the truth of mathematical statements can be confirmed just by thinking about them, then why not ethical problems, or even religious questions? Why bother with empiricism at all? — What is Math?

And again the question arises, what is it you mean when you say that numbers are real? Real as opposed to what? — Banno

Real as opposed to useful conventions.

Mathematical objects are in many ways unlike ordinary physical objects such as trees and cars. We learn about ordinary objects, at least in part, by using our senses. It is not obvious that we learn about mathematical objects this way. ...Some philosophers, called "rationalists", claim that we have a special, non-sensory capacity for understanding mathematical truths, a rational insight arising from pure thought. But, the rationalist’s claims appear incompatible with an understanding of human beings as physical creatures whose capacities for learning are exhausted by our physical bodies. ...The indispensability argument in the philosophy of mathematics is an attempt to justify our mathematical beliefs about abstract objects, while avoiding any appeal to rational insight. — The Indispensability Argument in Philosophy of Mathematics

Yet idealism holds as a minimal position that reality is mind-dependent. Reality is of course what is said by true sentences. — Banno

You're interpreting that too literally. It doesn't mean the existence of the summit of Mt Everest doesn't exist because you yourself have never seen it. In this context, 'mind' is not 'the contents of your conscious or discursive thought'. Idealism refers to the process by which the mind generates or constructs the totality of your understanding, including the subconscious, unconscious and parasympathetic processes that give rise to your conscious awareness. There are any number of facts that one may be completely unaware of and this remain true.

That didn't help.

I gather you want to defend some sort of inter-subjective (a terrible term) agreement as a defence against relativism.

Do you really wish to argue that there are other minds, but not tables and chairs and trees and rocks? How are you to know about other minds, if not via your experience of their bodies?

How do you know that there are other minds?

Despite the length of some of your posts, you haven't said enough for me to make sense of your position.

Real as opposed to useful conventions. — Wayfarer

But money is real, as are mortgages and property. Yet all are conventions.

Idealism refers to the process by the mind generates or constructs the totality of your understanding, including the subconscious, unconscious and parasympathetic processes that give rise to your conscious awareness. — Wayfarer

And we are back to the still unanswered question: constructed from what?

And we are back to the still unanswered question: constructed from what? — Banno

Physicists arrive at the same question. What are strings constructed from? Apparently at some point you're supposed to stop asking.

you're supposed to stop asking — Tate

That's pretty much it - at some stage the questions must end so we can get on with it. See, again, Quantum Wittgenstein.

But money is real, as are mortgages and property. Yet all are conventions. — Banno

Of course! Many items of the furniture of our minds are real.

And we are back to the still unanswered question: constructed from what? — Banno

Atoms? The fundamental particles - or is it fields now? - of physics? What do you think?

Atoms? The fundamental particles - or is it fields now? - of physics? What do you think? — Wayfarer

I think you are now saying that there is what @Hello Human called an "external material world".

As I've explained previously, Kant's transcendental idealism does not deny the existence of the material world. Indeed most idealisms that I'm interested in do not. They don't propose that the material world is 'merely' or 'only' a product of one's individual mind, or that it's a fantasy or an illusion, in any gross sense.

In the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant included a 'critique of problematical idealism' to distance his work from Berkeley's. (This is the item I had said was 'too technical' in a previous discussion. A summary can be found here.)

So Kant doesn't deny the existence of the material world but I think he rightfully denies what we would call the 'mind-independent reality' of the material world. That is the gist of his 'copernican revolution in philosophy'. So he acknowledges the existence of the world but denies that it has intrinsic or inherent reality.

That is why it is possible for Kant to be at once an empirical realist and a transcendental idealist. He doesn't deny the facts of empirical science - Kant was extremely diligent in attempting to accomodate them. It should be recalled Kant's theory of nebular formation (modified by LaPlace) is still part of current science, and that he lectured in scientific subjects (then known as natural philosophy).

I've just now found Bernardo Kastrup's doctoral dissertation on analytical idealism. It was supervised and critiqued by Galen Strawson, David Chalmers, Daniel Stoljar, and many others. Kastrup is, I think, a credible exponent of idealism in the modern context (if you're interested.)

(I should note that I'm in agreement with many aspects of Josh's criticisms but not all. My orientation in philosophy has always been shaped by the acceptance of the tenets, or the idea of, a perennial philosophy, and you won't as a rule find that in post-modernism.)

That’s the point. Banno is arguing that if idealism is the case then everything is known (even referring to us as being omniscient). I’m explaining that this isn’t the case. Even if idealism is true I still don’t know what tomorrow will bring. — Michael

It's a reductio. If idealism is true then we know everything. We do not know everything. Hence idealism is false.

(This is a joke version of Fitch's Paradox... sad that I feel the need to point this out.)