This is important to understand. It reaches into the issue of consciousness itself, and it's why Descartes is wrong about "I think, therefore I am." There is no such conclusion to be drawn. I simply think. — Sam26

Although it makes no sense to say that I am in pain but I do not know it or I am not conscious that I am in pain, that I do not know that I am in pain is a grammatical claim. I think you are reaching into the wrong issue.

Something that does not think cannot be deceived, and only something that can think can doubt. I cannot be deceived about or doubt that I exist unless I am a thing that thinks.

@frank started a thread a few months ago https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14302/descartes-reading-group/p1 . What Descartes means by thinking and the significance of his claim were discussed. From the Second Meditation:

Well, then, what am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wants, refuses, and also imagines and senses.

Although it makes no sense to say that I am in pain but I do not know it or I am not conscious that I am in pain, that I do not know that I am in pain is a grammatical claim. I think you are reaching into the wrong issue. — Fooloso4

The use of the words, doubt, know, believe, being conscious, all have correct and incorrect grammatical uses within certain contexts or forms of life; so they provide certain constraints on what can be said reasonable or rationally. And of course "...I do not know that I am in pain is a grammatical claim," so I'm not sure of your point.

Something that does not think cannot be deceived, and only something that can think can doubt. I cannot be deceived about or doubt that I exist unless I am a thing that thinks. — Fooloso4

Why would you think that my point conflicts with these obvious ideas? My point is that in terms of what I can know, it doesn't make sense (and you seem to agree) that I know that I am in pain, and in a similar vain, it also doesn't make sense to claim "I think, therefore I am." which is also a knowledge claim of a similar type. It's not as though I can arrive at these conclusions outside the grammar of the language-games in which they occur. There is no internal language-game (as per the private language argument) that allows me to do this. Descartes, I would contend is doing just this. He starts by doubting everything, which is nonsense from the start. He creates his own private conceptual scheme and proceeds from there.

And of course "...I do not know that I am in pain is a grammatical claim," so I'm not sure of your point. — Sam26

The point is, it does not reach into the issue of consciousness itself. What is at issue here is not what is at issue for Descartes.

My point is that in terms of what I can know ... — Sam26

The point is, it is not a matter of what I can and cannot know.

There is no internal language-game ... — Sam26

Right, quite the opposite, Descartes' is a daring political language-game addressed to those who are capable of thinking for themselves. It is rhetorical. How can he call into question the authority of the Church and "the philosopher" without suffering the same fate as Galileo? He does this by pretending to call everything into question. His meditations are not internal or private. After all, he is writing to be read. It is from beginning to end public.

It doesn't matter if it's rhetorical or if he's pretending, it's nonsense. Descartes was just confused on this point. Moreover, Wittgenstein's ideas go directly to much of what Descartes was trying to say. That's my take. I'm not a fan of Descartes. :smile:

Descartes was just confused on this point. — Sam26

Someone does seem to be confused. Taking things out of context can often lead to confusion.

But this thread is not the place to discuss Descartes. To do so reasonable and responsibly would require reading him carefully, but since you are not a fan, that is not likely to happen.

(2) and (4) are the interlocutor. Otherwise, the "Yes, but all the same..." makes no sense, nor do the m-dashes.

A. In what sense are my sensations private?
B. – Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it.
A. – In one way this is false, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word “know” as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know if I’m in pain.
B. – Yes, but all the same, not with the certainty with which I know it myself!
A. – It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I’m in pain. What is it supposed to mean
B. – except perhaps that I am in pain?

Feynman perhaps misses that there is a difference between the brown-throated thrush and the brown thrasher, for which it is often mistaken. To know the name of the bird is to be able to distinguish it from other birds.

At some place – Early in PI, I think – Wittgenstein makes the point that naming is like putting the pieces on the board before a game. It's not making a move in the game; but it must be done in order to play. But part of the language game of ornithology is distinguishing different bird types by their features. Being able to name different birds is making moves in the game of ornithology.

Something from elsewhere:

I spoke earlier of the dissimilarity between "I have a pain in my hand" and "I have an iPhone in my hand". The temptation is to think that because the grammar is the same, the pain is a thing in the way the iPhone is. As a matter of exegesis, the next few pages of PI show Witti to be rejecting this. He talks of how the length of a rod seems obvious, but not the length of a sphere; the notion of length ceases to have application, because we cannot imagine the opposite, the "width" of a sphere. He points out how a dog might simulate being in pain, but that the situations in which this occurs shows the dog isn't. He talks of feeling another's pain.

Then he asks of our use of "the language which describes my inner experience" (§256), and "how we "simply associate names with sensations..." But note the use of the em-dash at the end of this comment. Because he next moves into what is considered the heart of the private language argument, §259 &c.

And the upshot of that is that it is improper to talk of representing our own pains and pleasures. "I have a pain in my hand" is not like "I have an iPhone in my hand"; it is more like "Ouch!"

If one were to treat of a private, subjective world, it seems one may not be able to name items therein. — Banno

(edited) The relevance is in showing how the section around §242 is a lead in to the private language argument.

There are reasons that the Cogito is difficult to parse logically; and why, when it is so parsed, say into free logic, it is invalid.

Given that, whatever pull the Cogito has must come from it's positioning within the games we play - as points out Descartes does in the Second Meditation.

While Fooloso4 and might disagree on the usefulness of the Cogito, they seem to agree that it doesn't make sense to say that I know I am conscious.

And it makes no sense for you to doubt that you are conscious.

And that's the core of the Cogito, and why it is useful.

Naming is not yet a move in a language-game – any more than putting a piece in its place on the board is a move in chess. One may say: with the mere naming of a thing, nothing has yet been done. Nor has it a name except in a game. This was what Frege meant too when he said that a word has a meaning only in the context of a sentence. — PI §49

I'm starting to think the best way to get the most out of Wittgenstein is to approach a set of philosophical problems with the approach used in the Tractatus and then the approach used in the PI. I think only using the aphorisms and some of the examples in his work just treads over the same ground and doesn't really bring the significance of Wittgenstein's approach onto philosophy.

So for example. One problem in philosophy is whether time, space, causality, are external or in the mind. Kant said it was the mind's conditions that allow for these things (transcendental) and thus not external. Cool, so Kant had a theory that tried to explain things..

So how would early and later Wittgenstein deal with this problem? Or if he wouldn't, how would he go about critiquing Kant? These are the kind of things that reveal the cache value of Wittgenstein's work.

A. In what sense are my sensations private?
B. – Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it.
A. – In one way this is false, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word “know” as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know if I’m in pain.
B. – Yes, but all the same, not with the certainty with which I know it myself!
A. – It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I’m in pain. What is it supposed to mean
B. – except perhaps that I am in pain? — Banno

Only another 692 paragraphs in Part I to go through after we have agreed PI 246.

Wittgenstein is un-bolded, the interlocuter is bolded.

Regarding "It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I’m in pain. What is it supposed to mean"

I have had difficulty with this part of the paragraph.

Translating into my own words, I believe that this means that I would be joking if I said that I know I am in pain.

As you wrote "While @Fooloso4 and @Sam26 might disagree on the usefulness of the Cogito, they seem to agree that it doesn't make sense to say that I know I am conscious.", it must surely follow that if it doesn't make sense to say that I know I am conscious, then it also cannot make sense to say that I know I am in pain.

As we seem to agree that it wouldn't be sensible to say that I know I am in pain, this suggests that this is Wittgenstein's opinion.

Regarding "except perhaps that I am in pain?"

Translating into my own words, I believe that this means I would be joking if I said that I know I'm in pain because this means no more than I am in pain

As we seem to agree that it wouldn't be a sensible thing to say that I know I am in pain because this means no more than I am in pain, this suggests that this also is Wittgenstein's position.

Feynman perhaps misses that there is a difference between the brown-throated thrush and the brown thrasher, for which it is often mistaken. To know the name of the bird is to be able to distinguish it from other birds. — Banno

Yes, to know the name of a bird allows one to be able to distinguish it from other birds, and to know the name of a chess piece allows one to distinguish the Queen from the King.

But as you say "Naming is not yet a move in a language-game". A piece is named, but what exactly is being named. Is it the form, that a piece has a rounded crown, or is it the content, that the piece can move any number of squares in any direction.

Similarly in the expression "he is in pain". What exactly is being named, the form, the pain behaviour, the crying, or the content, the private sensation of pain, the beetle in the box?

I agree when you say "And the upshot of that is that it is improper to talk of representing our own pains and pleasures. "I have a pain in my hand" is not like "I have an iPhone in my hand"; it is more like "Ouch!""

IE, in language, it seems that the form is being named, not the content of the form.

but what exactly is being named. — RussellA

Why need there be a something that is being named?

What does "Ouch!" name?

IE, in language, it seems that the form is being named, not the content of the form. — RussellA

Perhaps the game is not one of naming at all.

Why need there be a something that is being named? What does "Ouch!" name? Perhaps the game is not one of naming at all. — Banno

Wittgenstein and the Cartesian problem

Wittgenstein asks how words refer to sensations. His interlocutor asks if the word "ouch!" is describing the other's pain, Wittgenstein say no, the word "ouch!" is replacing the pain behaviour, and neither describing the pain behaviour nor the other's pain.
PI 244: How do words refer to sensations?....................."So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?"—On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.

We can only know about someone else's private sensations from their outward behaviour. For example, knowing that they are in pain because of their pain behaviour, such as exclaiming "ouch!". However, even that may be misleading, as they may not be in pain whilst still exhibiting pain behaviour, or they may be in pain and not exhibit any pain behaviour or even that they may be having the private sensation of pleasure whilst exhibiting pain behaviour
PI 304 "But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour accompanied by pain and pain-behaviour without any pain?"—Admit it?

Accepting that the word "ouch!" replaces pain behaviour, we could generalise and say that words replace physical things in the world. The word "ouch!" replaces pain behaviour, the word "table" replaces tables. But it is more complicated than that. Neither an ouch! nor a table are platonic forms existing independently in the world. They only exist in the mind as concepts. As concepts, they have no single essence, they don't stand for objects, but rather refer to a set of different things that share some undefinable commonality, some family resemblance.

Concepts and words are similar as forms of language. From the SEP article on Concepts, concepts are psychological entities existing in the mind, enabling thought within an internal system of representation and having a language-like syntax and compositional semantics. Wittgenstein presented the argument that language must be rule-governed, and as rules cannot be private, they must be publicly grounded. Words, being part of the language game, must therefore depend on their meaning on a language-speaking community external to any individual. Wittgenstein makes the Private Language Argument from PI 243 onwards.

Wittgenstein and an argument against solipsism
1) Concepts don't exist in the world as platonic forms, but only in the mind.
2) As Wittgenstein presents an argument against a private language, the meaning of words must be grounded outside the mind in the public sphere.
3) Wittgenstein wrote in Tractatus para 4 that A thought is a proposition with a sense, meaning that thoughts are sentences in the head, thereby linking concepts in the mind with words in a world of language users.
4) If thoughts exist inside the mind and language exists outside the mind, then if thoughts are language, then this is presenting an argument against Cartesianism and against Descartes' solipsism of the separation of mind and body.

Why need there be a something that is being named?
Words cannot replace something that cannot be observed in the world. As described in the beetle in the box analogy in PI 293, words cannot replace unobservable things such as love, beauty, pain, unicorns, but can replace observable behaviour that has been caused by such unobservable behaviour. The private sensation of pain does have real world consequences, and it is these real world consequences that are named. As private sensations are unobservable, then if there was nothing in the world to observe, there would be nothing to name.

Can nothing be named? I could invent the word "ajuhgte", but if it wasn't replacing something in the world, the word would be meaningless.

What does "Ouch!" name?
The word "ouch!" replaces a set of particular observed behaviours in the world having certain undefinable resemblances to each other. If naming is defined as replacing, then the word "ouch!" names a set of particular observed behaviours in the world having certain undefinable resemblances to each other.

Perhaps the game is not one of naming at all.
In the language game are words, where a particular word replaces a set of different things in the world having certain undefinable resemblances to each other. If "naming" is defined as replacing, then the language game must be that of naming.

You seem stuck on naming. It's no wonder, then, that you are having so much difficulty. Stop looking for what is named and instead look at what is being done.

"Ouch!" is not a name for some group of behaviours. It is a behaviour.

"Ouch!" is not a name for some group of behaviours. It is a behaviour. — Banno

"The word "ouch!" and behaviour
As Wittgenstein describes, the word "ouch!" replaces a person's particular behaviour. But isn't it the case that the word "ouch!" is not a behaviour, but replaces a behaviour ?
PI 244: How do words refer to sensations?....................."So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?"—On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.

The word "ouch!" and naming.
Wittgenstein says that there is a strange connection between a word and an object
PI 38 - Naming appears as a queer connexion of a word with an object

But some words are clearly not the names of objects, such as the word "ouch!"
PI 27 Think of exclamations alone.......Water!, Away!, !Ow.......Are you inclined still to call these words "names of objects"

So what is the thing that the label is attached to. It cannot be the object, because as Wittgenstein says, if humans showed no outward sign of their inner sensations, showed no behaviour, then the language game would be impossible.
PI 257 - What would it be like if human beings shewed no outward signs of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc.)? Then it would be impossible to teach a child the use of the word 'tooth-ache'."

As regards naming, Wittgenstein says that "naming" means "attaching a label to a thing ". As "naming" also means attaching a word to a thing, then words are labels.
PI 15 - It will often prove useful in philosophy to say to ourselves: naming something is like attaching a label to a thing.

For Wittgenstein:
1) The word "ouch!" replaces a behaviour.
2) Naming means attaching the word "ouch!" to a behaviour, ie, the word "ouch!" names a behaviour.
3) Therefore, "attaching" a word to a behaviour means "replacing" a behaviour by a word.

For Wittgenstein:
1) The word "ouch!" replaces a behaviour.
2) Naming means attaching the word "ouch!" to a behaviour, ie, the word "ouch!" names a behaviour.
3) Therefore, "attaching" a word to a behaviour means "replacing" a behaviour by a word. — RussellA

This is not what Wittgenstein is saying. “Ouch” is an expression of pain, not naming the behaviors that commonly associated with pain. If my arm is stabbed, I do not grab my arm and look at my face wincing in a mirror and say “that behavior is ‘Ouch’. Alternately, I may just say “Ouch” without any of the pain behaviors, or the behavior varies from event to event.

That some words are names does not imply that all words are names.

Also from §38: "— If you don’t want to produce confusion, then it is best not to say that these words name anything".

Naming things is just one way in which words can be used, one sort of language game among many. There are others. Talk of pain has a superficial resemblance to talk of objects, "I have an iPhone in my hand" looks very much like "I have a pain in my hand". But Wittgenstein is showing that the game being played in each case is very different. The pain is not open for inspection in the way that the iPhone is.

This leads some to speculate that the pain is a private thing, an invisible object known only to the person in pain. This is the view Wittgenstein is rejecting.

But Wittgenstein is not providing us with an alternative. He's not saying pain is not this sort of thing, it's that sort of thing; he's saying rather that it's not a thing at all. Any more than there is a thing named by "ouch!".

This line of thinking broadens into what was subsequently called the Private Language Argument. In a way it is a pity this happened, since subsequently folk tend to treat the the sections from §244 - §271 as discreet, when they are part of this extended discussion.

“Ouch” is an expression of pain, not naming the behaviors that commonly associated with pain — Richard B

My arm is stabbed, I feel pain, and involuntarily my face winces. If I don't know the English language, I cannot say "ouch!". The only way an observer can know the possibility of my internal sensation is from my behaviour, my face wincing.

When learning the English language, I am taught that the word "Ouch!" is attached to the behaviour of a wincing face. Replacing the behaviour of a wincing face by the word "ouch!" then allows me to take part in the language game. As you say "I may just say "ouch!" without any of the pain behaviour."

PI 257 - "What would it be like if human beings shewed no outward signs of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc.)? Then it would be impossible to teach a child the use of the word 'tooth-ache'."

Before learning the English language, I can express my pain through a wincing face. After learning the English language, I can express my pain not only through a wincing face but also by saying "ouch!". In that sense, one can rightly say that "ouch!" is an expression of pain.

"Ouch!" is a name in the language game. As a name, it names something. As shown by the beetle in the box analogy, it cannot name the sensation, but can only name the behaviour, as described in PI 257. "Ouch!" can only name the behaviour.

Talk of pain has a superficial resemblance to talk of objects, "I have an iPhone in my hand" looks very much like "I have a pain in my hand". — Banno

As Wittgenstein said in PI 304 "Naming appears as a queer connexion of a word with an object."

A name can only name something known, something that can be directly observed. A name cannot name something that is unknown, something that cannot be directly observed.

Richard Floyd in The Private Language Argument argues that it is not the case that Wittgenstein is saying that there are no private sensations, only that such sensations are unknown to outside observers.

PI 304 Not at all. It is not a something., but not a nothing either!

As a table is a public object, it can be named within the language game. As the sensation of pain is private, it cannot be named within the language game, but what can be named within the language game is pain behaviour, the effect rather than the cause, such as a face that winces.

But what about the unicorn. How can unicorns be named, when unicorns don't exist in the world. The Oxford Dictionary defines a unicorn as "a mythical animal typically represented as a horse with a single straight horn projecting from its forehead".

As Wittgenstein establishes, the word "pain" describes neither the private sensation of pain not the pain behaviour but replaces the pain behaviour. Similarly, the word "unicorn" describes neither something existing in the world nor is described by its definition "a mythical animal typically represented as a horse with a single straight horn projecting from its forehead", but replaces the words "a mythical animal typically represented as a horse with a single straight horn projecting from its forehead".

PI 244 - On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it

"Unicorns" exist as a replacement to the set of words ""a mythical animal typically represented as a horse with a single straight horn projecting from its forehead".

Therefore:
1) The word "iPhone" replaces an object that can be directly observed
2) The word "pain" replaces a pain behaviour that can be directly observed.
3) The word "unicorn" replaces the set of words ""a mythical animal typically represented as a horse with a single straight horn projecting from its forehead" that can be directly observed.

"Ouch!" can only name the behaviour. — RussellA

What behaviour does it name?

"Ouch" is not the name of a behaviour; it is an expression of pain. One does not name anyone's pain as "ouch". One says "ouch" when they are in pain; to express their pain. As you note, the behaviour of saying "ouch" replaces the behaviour of wincing. However, that does not mean that "ouch" is a synonym for "wince". Wincing is the name of a behaviour, but "ouching" is not.

"Wince" is the name of an expression of pain, whereas (to say) "ouch" is an expression of pain. Wincing and saying "ouch" are both behaviours that express pain. "Ouch" is not the name of an expression of pain. Saying "ouch" is an expression of pain.

"Ouch" is not the name of a behaviour; it is an expression of pain — Luke

I agree with the second part, as I wrote before "In that sense one can rightly say that "ouch!" is an expression of pain."

However, I'm not sure about the first part.

If I want to communicate to someone who can see me that I am in pain, I can wince. If I want to communicate to someone who cannot see me that I am in pain, I can say "ouch!"

A word such as "ouch!" can replace a behaviour such as wincing.

PI 244 - On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it

If a word can replace something, then it names that something. For example, as the word "table" can replace the words " a piece of furniture with a flat top and one or more legs, providing a level surface for eating, writing, or working at", then "table is the name for a piece of furniture with a flat top and one or more legs, providing a level surface for eating, writing, or working at".

Similarly, as "ouch!" can replace a particular behaviour, then "ouch!" names that particular behaviour.

Wincing is the name of a behaviour, but "ouching" is not. — Luke

From Wittgenstein's Beetle in the Box analogy PI 293, the word "pain" in the language game cannot refer to any private sensation of pain, as any private sensation of pain drops out of consideration in the language game. This means that the word "pain" can only refer to the pain behaviour, either the act of wincing or saying "ouch!"

The act of wincing and saying "ouch!" are both pain behaviours.

I would agree that the act of saying "ouch" names a behaviour, but I would not agree that the word "ouch" names a behaviour.

I would agree that the act of saying "ouch" names a behaviour, but I would not agree that the word "ouch" names a behaviour. — Luke

I agree that the word "ouch" has to be in context. It could be the Organisation for the Understanding of Cluster Headache, a BBC website reflecting the lives and experiences of disabled people, a term in the dictionary or a speech act from someone having a rock dropped on their foot. As Wittgenstein said "The question is: "In what sort of context does it occur?"

It’s not about context. “Ouch” is not a behaviour. Saying “ouch” (or saying anything) is a behaviour.

As W says at 15: “naming something is rather like attaching a name tag to a thing.”

“Ouch” isn’t the name of anything; it’s what you say when you hurt yourself.

Well, first, Kudos to you for your persistence. These are not easy ideas, and it is pleasing to see someone who is determined to work through an extensive argument rather than accept a YouTube video as gospel, as is so common in these threads.

Next, it's not clear to me where, if at all, we are disagreeing. You quote Wittgenstein, to my ear as if you were countering some of what I have claimed, and yet the bits you quote support my contention.

So to repeat what might be the one fundamental problem underpinning your misinterpretation of Wittgenstein. Words are not all just the names of things. That this is the case is set out in the first 40 or so sections of PI, where Wittgenstein enjoins us not to think, but to look, and so to move from our dogmatically accepted view that words stand for things and instead look at what we actually do with words, in particular cases.

So "Ouch!" is not the name of a pain, nor the name of a behaviour, nor the name of anything else; it is instead something we do with a word.

Consider some more examples:
"Hello."
"Good Bye."
"Fire!"
"Look out!"
"Charge!"
"Please don't!"

These do not name; they are performances. A greeting, a farewell, a command, a warning, a plea. Things we do with words.

Wittgenstein is at great pains to insist that we not look for the meaning of a word, as given by the thing named, but instead that we start to look at what is being done with those words, by way of starting to look at their use.

It was, one way or another, the realisation that so much of our language does not fit into the simple predicate-name formulae of the Tractatus that brought him out of the wilderness to work on the PI.

Now it seems that you are clinging to the idea that words all refer to something; that they are all ultimately analysable as nouns. If this is so, then you will not be able to grok the argument of the PI, and there is little progress that can be made.

So, do you agree that we do other things with words besides name things? That it is better to look for the meaning of our utterances in what we do with them than to look for what they name?

Because until you see this, there is no way you can follow Philosophical Investigations.

I would agree that the act of saying "ouch" names a behaviour, but I would not agree that the word "ouch" names a behaviour. — Luke

I agree that the word "ouch" has to be in context. It could be the Organisation for the Understanding of Cluster Headache, a BBC website reflecting the lives and experiences of disabled people, a term in the dictionary or a speech act from someone having a rock dropped on their foot. As Wittgenstein said "The question is: "In what sort of context does it occur?" — RussellA

I think Norman Malcolm in "Turning to Stone" helps clarify what is being discuss here. He says:

"Wittgenstein's argument has established that there is an essential connection between the meaning of first-person psychological language and the primitive expression of fear, anger, pain, in human behavior. But how does this connection make its appearance in the teaching of language? Wittgenstein puts the question like this: 'How does a human being learn the meaning of the names of sensations?-of the word "pain" for example"(PI 244). In a familiar passage he suggests what seems to be the only possibility:

Words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expression of the sensation and put I'm their place. A child has hurt himself and cries; and now the grown-ups talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behavior.
'So you are saying that the word "pain" really means crying?' On the contrary, the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it (PI 244)

The suggestion does not mean that adults get the child to identify sensation of his as pain. This would only reintroduce the untenable notion of 'inner ostensive definition'. Nor does the suggestion mean that the word 'pain' stands for or refers to crying-which would be a form of behaviorism. What the suggestion says is that the adults coax the child into replacing his crying with words such as 'hurts' or 'pain'. The crying was a primitive expression of pain. The uttered words, by taking the place of the primitive expression, become an expression of pain. Uttering those words becomes, for the child, a new form of pain-behavior; and for others it serves as a criterion for the child's being in pain."

Yep.

“Ouch” isn’t the name of anything; it’s what you say when you hurt yourself. — Luke

An English speaker would say "ouch!", an Indonesian speaker would say "aduh!", meaning that exclaiming "ouch!" is not an innate behaviour but is rather learnt as part of a language.

Uttering those words becomes, for the child, a new form of pain-behavior; and for others it serves as a criterion for the child's being in pain." — Richard B

As you point out, a key para is 244 So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?"— On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.

As you say, it makes sense that the word "pain" is a pain behaviour, as crying is a pain behaviour. As Wittgenstein says, the word "pain" replaces crying rather than describe it.

The child is aware of its inner sensation of pain and outer instinctive behaviour of crying. The child learns that it can replace its crying by the word "pain". The child has learnt the rule that it can replace its particular behaviour by a particular word.

The problem is, as the tortoise said to Achilles, where is the rule that there are rules. How did the child learn the rule that its particular behaviour can be replaced by a particular word?

You say "Nor does the suggestion mean that the word 'pain' stands for or refers to crying-which would be a form of behaviourism."

If the child didn't discover the rule that there are rules through behaviourism, then how does the child know to follow the rules?