People can and do use words without knowing the meaning of the word. — Corvus

How can you successfully use the word "bamba" in a sentence if you don't know what it means?

This is obviously not true especially when you consider how a child learns. — Apustimelogist

How can a child successfully use the word "mwanasesere" if they don't know what is means?

Peffel is inaccessible presumably only because its an unusual concept but I see it as no different from a concept like a liger or mule or any other kind of hybrid thing that actually exists in reality and so is therefore an accessible concept. — Apustimelogist

It is true that I can define "peffel" as part "pen and part Eiffel Tower".

But the problem leads to my personal concepts of "pen" and "Eiffel Tower", both of which are unique to me, as they have developed over a lifetime of experiences that only I have had.

Consider the word "angst".

We could use the dictionary, where "angst" is defined as "a feeling of deep anxiety or dread, typically an unfocused one about the human condition or the state of the world in general". "Anxiety" is defined as "a feeling of worry, nervousness, or unease about something with an uncertain outcome". Continuing, "worry" is defined as "feel or cause to feel anxious or troubled about actual or potential problems". "Troubled" is defined as "beset by problems or difficulties". Either the definitions become circular or are never ending. — RussellA

The definitions become circular and never ending, because you have kept on looking for them.  They are not themselves circular and never ending in nature.

Something is circular and never ending doesn't follow that one cannot learn them.
Words like Angst don't exist in the physical world.  It is an invented word by someone, and the meaning was given to it.  I recall the first time when I was confronted with the word, I had no idea what it meant, but by reading up the definition in the book, I roughly knew what it meant.  But my understanding of it was still not clear.  But I was able to use the word even with roughly knowing what it meant.

It is a state of mind, which one cannot point to.  It can be only described or explained by other words.

I am using "pointing" to include its synonyms, such as signalling, showing, indicating, gesturing, flagging, labelling, motioning, etc. — RussellA

Synonyms are not to be used blindly to replace another synonyms just because they are synonyms. They all bear similar meanings, but depending on the circumstance and situation you are describing, you cannot use them as if they were the same meanings.

How can you successfully use the word "bamba" in a sentence if you don't know what it means? — RussellA

What do you mean by "successfully" here? Could you please clarify?

The word "peffel" can be used by anyone to mean ""part [your] pen and part Eiffel Tower" regardless of your personal feelings about the words "pen" or "Eiffel Tower". — Luke

True, once "peffel" has been defined as "part my pen and part Eiffel Tower", anyone can use it in language regardless of my personal concepts of either "my pen" or "Eiffel Tower".

In the same way, anyone can use the word "pain" in language, regardless of anyone's personal sensation of pain.

Violet is not your concept. But your understanding of the concept is accessible to others, depending on how you use it. — Luke

There are public concepts, such that "Violet light is at the higher end of the visible spectrum, with a wavelength from 380 to 450 nm". There are also private concepts, such as my personal experience when looking at something in the world having a wavelength of 400nm.

The point is that our experiences are irrelevant to linguistic meaning; to language use. — Luke

I agree, as with the beetle in PI 293, the beetle drops out of consideration in the language game.

Synonyms are not to be used blindly to replace another synonyms just because they are synonyms — Corvus

True, they don't have the same meaning, only similar meanings. As Wittgenstein said, family resemblances.

What do you mean by "successfully" here? Could you please clarify? — Corvus

For the listener to understand the meaning of the sentence.

I recall the first time when I was confronted with the word, I had no idea what it meant, but by reading up the definition in the book, I roughly knew what it meant. — Corvus

We cannot learn the meaning of every word we use in language just from the dictionary, otherwise none of the words we use would have any connection with the world outside language. Sooner or later, there must be some words we use that we learn their meaning directly from the world outside language

The question is, if not "pointing" from the word to something in the world outside language, then how?

True, they don't have the same meaning, only similar meanings. As Wittgenstein said, family resemblances. — RussellA

Most of the words you listed as synonyms for pointing to seem wrong words for what you meant by pointing to in the context.

For the listener to understand the meaning of the sentence. — RussellA

What if the other party didn't know the meaning of "bamba", then what? What would be the point of you saying it thinking that you knew the meaning? You say to me "I don't like bamba". But having listened to your sentence, I don't know what it means. You knew the meaning of bamba, and said confidently what you said to me would make successful use of language. But the other party doesn't know what you are saying. I might ask you back "What the heck is bamba?" At that point, have you successfully used your language?

My point is your claim that knowing the meaning of words is a precondition of using language seems wrong.

What if the other party didn't know the meaning of "bamba", then what, what would be point of you saying it thinking that you knew the meaning? — Corvus

True, if I said "xx xyx yyxx yxyx", and neither of us knew the meaning of any of the words used, would anything meaningful arise from our conversation?

How can you successfully use the word "bamba" in a sentence if you don't know what it means? — RussellA

One can make successful use of language using the word "bamba" without knowing the meaning of "bamba". Consider the following sentence.

You told me you like bamba, but I don't bloody know what you mean by "bamba".

That is a use of language using the word "bamba", and the speaker made up a sentence which any English speaker would understand without knowing the meaning of "bamba".

True, if I said "xx xyx yyxx yxyx", and neither of us knew the meaning of any of the words used, would anything meaningful arise from our conversation? — RussellA

Yes, of course. I would say to you "What the heck do you mean by that? I have no clue what the bloody non-sense you are talking about." This is a meaningful sentence in our conversation.

5) The foreman must say "bring me X" — RussellA

The foreman does not say "bring me X". He says "X".

If "X" didn't mean X, then nothing would happen and there would be no activity. — RussellA

If "X" simply meant the object, there would be no activity. The meaning of "X" is determined by the activity and not simply by the name of the object.

Thanks for catching that. It’s #308. “How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about behaviourism arise?——The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice.”

If "X" simply meant the object, there would be no activity. The meaning of "X" is determined by the activity and not simply by the name of the object. — Fooloso4

True, that's why the foreman doesn't just say "X" but rather "bring me X". The word "bring" determines the activity, not the object "X".

Yes, of course. I would say to you "What the heck do you mean by that? I have no clue what the bloody non-sense you are talking about." This is a meaningful sentence in our conversation. — Corvus

At least we agree that meaning is an important part of communication.

True, that's why the foreman doesn't just say "X" but rather "bring me X". The word "bring" determines the activity, not the object "X". — RussellA

The foreman does not say "bring me X". He lacks the words to say so.

For this purpose they make use of a language consisting of the words “block”, “pillar”, “slab”,
“beam”.

(PI 2)

This language consists only of what we might think of as names of objects, but that would be wrong. That is not the way these words, the only words in this complete primitive language, function. That is the point. A language consisting of only the names of objects cannot be a complete language.

You repeat the same misunderstanding over and over.

I don't think there is any helping you.

Actually no, @RussellA has a point. He said:

The foreman may look at something X in the world, but if this observation didn't give rise to an inner concept Y, they would be aphilosophical zombie, and wouldn't be able to say "bring me X". Similarly, the assistant may look at something X in the world, but if this observation didn't give rise to an inner concept Z, they would also be a philosophical zombie, and wouldn't be able to bring X.

In order for something to happen, for there to be an activity, there must be all the following:

1) There must be an X in the world
2) X must have been named "X"
5) The foreman must say "bring me X"
3) The something X that the foreman looks at must give rise to his inner concept Y
4) The something X that the assistant looks at must give rise to his inner concept Z — RussellA

Unless I am reading him wrong, this parallels an idea I had when answering in the Kit Fine thread:

When I hear "meaning is its use", I sometimes see this as a normative statement, and not a descriptive one. If everyone were zombies, and/or if no one had an internal understanding of a word that roughly corresponds to the concept, but its use (outward behavior way they expressed and acted when they spoke or heard the word) was always correct, would you really say that people understand the "meaning" of a word? — schopenhauer1

@Banno @schopenhauer1 @RussellA

For example, we don’t know someone is in pain, not because it is “unknowable”, but because when someone seems to be in pain, we don’t: “know” their pain, we react to it, to the person; their pain is a plea, a claim on us—we help them (or not); that’s how pain works.
— Antony Nickles

I have to disagree with you here. At PI 246, Wittgenstein says:

If we are using the word “know” as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know if I’m in pain.
— PI 246 — Luke

We actually agree here; it’s just I didn't make it clear between the senses of “know”. Of course I can “know” you are in pain, but this sense is, as Witt says, "as it is normally used" (emphasis added)(there are actually a few ordinary senses of "know"); what you point out (and is Witt's sense of its use in this passage) is in its sense that: I recognize pain, become aware of it; see the signs, even if it is from repression, even from contextual information (not just "your behavior") say, that the mother that you loved died recently, even though you are exhibiting no signs of pain or are forcing yourself to appear happy.

Above, I meant "do not" as in: that is not how pain works (Witt will say "Grammatically), not that we cannot know. This sense of "know" is the version of "knowledge" that the skeptic would like to have (the interlocutor): knowledge of some inner process (intention, my meaning) or thing (impression, experience) that would ensure I am not wrong about you being in pain, which starts not just because we can be wrong about it (fooled, judge incorrectly), but, also, that we at times want (Cavell says, desire) there to be a space between their pain and our normal awareness of it--that we want to be buffered from their pain, from their being in pain (see below).

And this gets at the sense of ordinary "knowing" (in addition to awareness) that I am contrasting to the skeptic's use I just described (the "metaphysical use" as Witt says). This is the normal sense that I "acknowledge" pain--that the way it works** (its grammar) is that I accept or reject you because the pain is "yours" (in your body, owned by you). We also have this relation to our own pain, that we accept or deny it (suppress it; not that it is unique, un"knowable", only theirs). This is why the skeptic does not make sense (is abstracting from the grammar, and ordinary criteria and context) in saying "I know I'm in pain" (other than the normal use when we say that: as an acknowledgment to others; possibly to an accusation that I am suppressing a pain I should be "facing"--like, "yeah yeah, I know!").

And so within the desire (the prerequisite, the necessity) to have perfect (metaphysical, certain) knowledge (that your pain correspond exactly with mine or it is not valid), hides the wish (the decision, the "conviction" Witt says p. 225) to deny the other, to not be responsible for them. The way pain "works"** is that their pain is a moral claim on me to which my response reflects on my character.

(**"works" as to say: the workings of the grammar, which are the implications of (our interests in) the expression of their pain (or their words... ); not how the "language" of pain "works" in some theory of meaning, or, say, how the process of pain "works" in the body; thus why science can't do the job of philosophy (what it shows ourselves).

Can’t follow at this point. Can you give the gist in easy way?

Who said they are looking for exact certainty of someone’s pain? It’s an assumption we are not zombies and that pain is roughly negative in similar ways.

I feel like this is built on a lot of straw man assumptions about philosophy

I would think you'd say what you think I mean (paraphrase) and then ask questions about specific parts where it gets confusing, no?

I commented based on what I thought.

Actually no, RussellA has a point. — schopenhauer1

The blind leading the blind...

This thread gets better and better.

In the same way, anyone can use the word "pain" in language, regardless of anyone's personal sensation of pain. — RussellA

Now you're getting it.

There are also private concepts, such as my personal experience when looking at something in the world having a wavelength of 400nm. — RussellA

I don't see why you would call your personal experience a concept.

I agree, as with the beetle in PI 293, the beetle drops out of consideration in the language game. — RussellA

Yep.

Ok bot. Same sarcastic remarks when a point is made you don’t like. What’s funny is you anyone can play that game all day on anything. Posturing at its worst.

Thanks.

Except the bit where it doesn't matter in the slightest what the builder and the assistant have "in their heads" so long as the assistant brings the slab to the builder.

That you made the same mistake in another thread is not a good thing.

How can you successfully use the word "bamba" in a sentence if you don't know what it means? — RussellA

:rofl:

You just did.

Now someone will start bleating about use and mention. As if mentioning wasn't a use.

Unless I am reading him wrong — schopenhauer1

If you mean Wittgenstein and not @RussellA then you are reading him wrong.

What does "slab" mean? How does the meaning of slab differ from the builder's alleged inner concept "slabY"? And how does this differ from the assistant's inner concept "slabZ"? How is it these three things - slab, y, and Z get sorted out so that the assistant brings the builder a slab? Or is it four things - slab, y, z, and whatever your inner concept is? But I think I know what "slab" means, and it is not what you or Russell means. Is it then six - slab, y, z, whatever your inner concept, his inner concept is, and my inner concept? Should we add Wittgenstein's inner concept? Is there any end to this multiplicity of confusion?

We can dispense with inner concepts and zombies and subsequent confusion. The assistant brings the builder a slab because he has been trained to do so. His training consists of being able to identify a slab and bring it to the builder. Being able to identify a slab does not mean forming an inner concept. All that is required is being able to distinguish this thing from the other things he has been trained to identify and bring. All with this one word "slab".

How can a child successfully use the word "mwanasesere" if they don't know what is means? — RussellA

You know what, I think I must have misread this. I was thinking about we don't have to know explicit definitions to use words and children don't learn using explicit definitions.

But the problem leads to my personal concepts of "pen" and "Eiffel Tower", both of which are unique to me, as they have developed over a lifetime of experiences that only I have had. — RussellA

This seems a bit trivial to me because I would say it applies to a lot if not all words.