Then how do you know that "there are x number of blades of grass in the world and nobody believes it" is true? — Luke
Is there any reason/argument why "¬Kp" can only mean that p's truth value is unknown, and not that the sentence p is unknown? — Luke
It's "know that P", not "know of p".which says, formally, for all propositions p, if p then it is possible to know that p.
So this proposition: "there are x number of blades of grass in the world and nobody believes it" is true. Yet it can't be known to be true.
— Bartricks
Then how do you know that "there are x number of blades of grass in the world and nobody believes it" is true?
— Luke
I don't. No one can. That's the point. — Bartricks
But you said that it was true? — Luke
But you said that it was true. You both know and don't know that it's true? — Luke
That does not appear anywhere in the argument. — Banno
That proposition might be true. Assume it is. — Bartricks
The knowability thesis is that all truths (i.e. all true statements) are, in principle, knowable. — Luke
That thesis is demonstrably false. I am demonstrating its falsity by providing you with examples of truths that, if true - and it's metaphysically possible that they are - could not be known. — Bartricks
My point is that you don't know whether those statements are true or not; — Luke
I'm not following your argument. — Banno
And suppose that collectively we are non-omniscient, that there is an unknown truth:
(NonO) ∃p(p∧¬Kp) — SEP article on Fitch's paradox
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