Again, it is not the content of the belief that matters, but whether the explanation of why we have the belief mentions the reality of what it is a belief about.

You keep mentioning the belief in God - I don't know why. Again, you seem to think that I am saying that belief in God is debunked. NO!!

It is belief in reasons that is debunked by an exclusively evolutionary explanation of those beliefs.

I have outlined the argument above. There's really no way of making it clearer.

So, what you're sayin' is that it's true that there is a reason to believe that the belief that there are reasons to believe is false.

Isn't that self-contradictory? You're providing a reason that there are no reasons. Isn't that like saying here's a dog and therefore there are no dogs?

Er, no. I am saying that there are reasons to do and believe things.

Er, no. I am saying that there are reasons to do and believe things. — Bartricks

I need to take a breather! Will get back to you later. G'day.

[quote="Bartricks;d13161"we can explain why we can trust - or at least, default trust - our intuitions[/quote]
You are talking a lot about intiution(s) but I din't see the words "knowldge" and "consciousness" mentioned at least once. How can you speak about external world, evolution, God, etc. without these two very important elements?

It sounds like the only thing human beings have is intuition, i.e knowing something instinctively, without the need for conscious reasoning ...

I don't know what your point is.

I don't know what your point is. — Bartricks

Maybe because you don't know what "knowldge" and/or "consciousness" are ... If you did, you would certainly get my point.

Focus. Address the argument in the OP. It makes no mention of knowledge or consciousness. So why are you mentioning them? It makes no mention of my mum's recipe for rhubarb tart either - shall we talk about that?

You have two options.

1) Express yourself better so you do not constantly find yourself telling others they are ‘not addressing the OP’ when they have and found little to nothing of content.

2) Be constantly ignored and ridiculed due to the inability to react to how people respond to your posts where the blame is put 100% at their doorstep.

If someone reads what you wrote and replies to it then it might help to either point out the misunderstanding (without insulting them) and/or trying to express what you meant more precisely, or just try another approach.

I’m done with you for a month. Bye

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Read the op carefully. Then address a premise. Say clearly which premise you believe to be false and provide some justification.

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If you don't quote my text, and respond a week later, it is impossible to know what you are referring to.

Show some modesty and do philosophy. — ArielAssante

Good advice, you should practice it.

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Very interesting and insightful.

By an 'intuition' I mean a representative mental state that is not an impression or belief. And it is by intuition that we are aware of reasons to do things.
I say this just to clarify that though believing something on the basis of an intuition is not 'reasoning', it is - or can be - to believe it on a rational basis.

So for example, I know by intuition that 1 x 2 = 2. But I know by reasoning that 3 x 16 = 58. And both are rational.

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Yes to the first part. That is, one does not have to posit any actual reasons in order to explain why creatures who believed in them would be selected for.

This is one of your better arguments if I'm understanding it right. However:

Well, if we do not need to posit any reasons to believe things, then Ockham's razor tells us not to do so. — Bartricks

seems to miss. We have reason to believe things because we are capable of perceiving things and then adapting ourselves or changing the world based on those perceptions, thus generating meaning in the process in our suitably developed brains. You continually interact with this forum because you derive meaning from doing so, and thus have good reason to believe that, according to Ockham's Razor, your interactions with said forum are worthwhile.

So even if we don't need to posit reasons to believe things, I think we are justified in doing so merely because we, as humans, can create meaning in ways that are not totally governed by mere intuition. I think you and I just disagree about what the source of that is.

I mean, do you really think that early humans actually operated purely based off of intuition? I think human nature has a strong analytical aspect, and probably always has, and that it can be explained in terms of evolution minus any hocus pocus about God guiding us with divine subtlety.

Do you agree that if the correct explanation of why a person believes that p makes no mention of p's actual existence, then we should not posit p, other things being equal?

It's just I don't understand your point. You seem to agree that a pure evolutionary story about our development would not require us to posit any actual reasons to do things. But then you said some stuff about human psychology which seemed irrelevant. And then you question beggingly characterized belief in God as hocus pocus. It didn't hang together as a criticism.

No. Just because one does not make mention of P actually existing in expressing why they think P is true does not mean we shouldn't posit P.

You make the argument yourself that God need not be invoked directly as responsible for our intuitions - that they may be derived from natural selection - but nonetheless posit that God is the only way to understand why we have reasons - specifically reasons to believe that we have reasons to believe things, such as that our intuitions actually are guided by truthful sensory perception and reflect an external reality.

This is not the same as what you just proposed to me.

If that is indeed what you were trying to do there, that is.

I am arguing that a purely evolutionary story about our development will not have to posit any actual reasons.

That's why it's false. False. Not true. But false.

Now, when I explain why such an explanation does not have to posit any actual reasons, you do realize I am not endorsing the view in question? You do understand, do you, that I think a purely evolutionary story is false?

So it is false because we do have reasons, at least according to you?

And yes, I understand that just because you accept it needs no reasons does not mean that you believe it is true.

It's quite clear what I am doing. It just requires that one pay attention to what I actually argue.

I think this premise is true:

If a purely evolutionary story of our development is true, then there are no reasons to do and believe things.

That doesn't mean I think a purely evolutionary story is true.

It doesn't mean I think reasons don't exist.

Can you see that?

So when I defend the truth of that premise, I am not defending those two claims.

christ all bloody mighty! I think there are- are - reasons to do things.
I said only a fool or a scoundrel thinks there are no such things.

When someone says that, they're not saying they themselves are a fool or a scoundrel.

When someone says they believe there are reasons to do things, that does not mean the exact opposite.

My argument:

1. If p, then q
2. Not q
3. Therefore not p.

You: so, you think p is true

Me: no,I think it is false.

You: but do you not think p is not true?

Me: no,I think p is false

You: but you think that if p then q

Me: yes

You: so you think p

Me: no. I think not p.

Me: if I'm going to the shop, I'll buy you some toffees

You: you're in a shop?

Me: no.

You: you've bought me some toffees?

Me: no

You: I get that you haven't bought me any toffees. But you're in a shop, yes?

Me: no.

Now, pay attention: 'if a wholly evolutionary story about our development is true, then there are no reasons to do or believe anything'.

That has the same form as 'if I go to the shop, I will buy you some toffees'.

It doesn't mean "An evolutionary story about our development is true". That's like thinking I am in the shop. And it doesn't mean "there are no reasons to do or believe anything". That's like thinking I have bought you some toffees.

Again: 'if' does not mean 'is the case'.

@Bartricks

Would you agree that reasons to do things are founded upon knowledge about the outcome of an action. For example, let's say a person would not like the way they would look if they lost their teeth. Such person knows flossing and brushing their teeth would prevent their fall; so, such person flosses and brushes their teeth to prevent them from falling, and at the same time the person avoids an appearance they would not like. In this example, the person's reason to floss and brush their teeth (either not liking the way they would look if they had no teeth or mere precaution or any other reasons - i.e. they want to keep their teeth so they are able to eat or they want to avoid the physical pain of loosing your teeth, I dunno) is founded upon the knowledge that flossing and brushing your teeth prevents their loss.

Now, let's say a person believes in god. Following the logic presented in the previous example, such person's reason(s) to believe in god must be founded on knowledge about the outcome of believing in god. Be it personal satisfaction, or social acceptance, or psychological well-being, no matter the outcome, the person's reason to believe in god can only be a reason-to-do if the person knows about the outcome of carrying the action (believing in god).

Let's imagine now that there is a person who harbours in their mind the idea that there is a god but has no reasons to believe this; a completely possible scenario, I think. In this case, a reason for such person to believe in god would manifest only when the person knows about the outcome of carrying such action.

In all this examples, the person must be able to gather and store knowledge to be able to have reasons-to-do things. If a person did not have the faculties of gathering and storing knowledge, then the person would not be able to know about the outcome of actions, and therefore would be unable to form reasons-to-do things, in my opinion.

Following this logic, a question arises which is: is natural selection acting at the level of reasons-to-do things, or at the level of the faculties to gather and store knowledge, or at both, or are there any other levels we should consider first?

I think I mentioned in some previous post that you were oversimplifying things, and I hope you understand what I mean with these examples. It might be the case that natural selection acts only at the level of organs in a given organism - i.e. it affects the eye, but not the faculty of vision as a whole (at least not directly) -, or maybe natural selection affects only independent structures - i.e. the cornea, the iris, eyelashes, the retina - and emergent features resulting from the collective functioning of these structures are not truly under the effect of natural selection. It might even be the case, that some features of an organism do not affect its fitness and can be passed over generations until one day such features might affect the fitness of the organism that has them. It might be that the faculty to form reasons-to-do things, which is dependent on the faculty to gather and store knowledge, is evolving not under the effect of natural selection, but some other force(s) (bottleneck events, genetic drift, artificial selection, etc).

All this might be out of topic, but again I just want to hopefully show you how complex is the topic you are trying to discuss, and how lightly you are arriving to your conclusion. So, I think that a better place to start is to demonstrate that natural selection and reasons-to-do things can actually be discussed together because it might be the case that there is no relationship at all between the two.

Would you agree that reasons to do things are founded upon knowledge about the outcome of an action. — Daniel

No, for knowledge itself involves reasons. That is, to 'know' something is to have reason to believe it (among other things).

There is that which gives rise to us having a reason to do something or believe it. That, I would say, is the basis or ground of the reason. And then there is the reason itself.

It is important not to conflate the ground of a reason with the reason itself.

For example, let's say a person would not like the way they would look if they lost their teeth. Such person knows flossing and brushing their teeth would prevent their fall; so, such person flosses and brushes their teeth to prevent them from falling, — Daniel

You are describing the ground or basis upon which a person may have a reason to do something. But although everyday speech allows us to refer to the grounds of reasons as 'reasons', a reason is distinct from that which gives rise to it.

You have said that this topic is complex. I assume, then, that you can appreciate this complexity and will not make the mistake of conflating the ground of a reason with the reason itself?

My hunger gives me a reason to get myself a sandwich. That does not mean my hunger and the reason are the same. The hunger is the basis of the reason - the explanation of why I have the reason - but the reason itself is not the hunger.

Now, a wholly evolutionary story about our development will mention these grounds. And they will mention our belief that such grounds give us reasons to do things and believe things. But what such an evolutionary story will not have to posit is any actual reasons themselves.

It seems to me that it is you who is not appreciating this point. There are two mistakes people commonly make here. The first is to confuse the belief that p with p itself. So, believing that we have reason to do x is not the same as there actually being reason to do x. The second is doing what you're doing - which is to confuse the basis or ground of a reason with a reason itself.

There is no problem providing an evolutionary explanation of the grounds of the reasons that there appear to be, or providing an explanation of the appearances and beliefs in reasons to do and believe things. The problem is that these are not themselves reasons.

@Bartricks

I have this feeling you're conflating debunking with unnecessary.

True that as per evolution, there needn't be actual reasons (to believe/do) [unnecessary] even when we believe there are but from this it doesn't follow that there really are no reasons (to do believe) [actuality]. You can't go from possibility to actuality like that, no sir, you can't!