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Using your analogy. Doesn't the content of the games have an influence over the rules of the games, as in modal logic?

I think what you are interested in, if you truly mean valency as it is defined in chemistry, is some kind of weighted probabilistic logic.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probabilistic_logic

It is a rather undeveloped field.

I think what you are interested in, if you truly mean valency as it is defined in chemistry, is some kind of weighted probabilistic logic. — ernestm

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Valency_(linguistics)

Oh , I see what you are asking. If a sentence has nouns for both a subject and object, and for simplicity one considers both to be references to physical objects, then there is more than one descriptive pointer in the sentence which may or may not refer to something existent. For example

The King of France is a unicorn

has two failures in reference, the first being that there is no king of France, and the second being that unicorns are imaginary. Substituting a name which does have a reference for either one does not change the proposition to one which can be either true or false, unless it is further qualitied:

In the novel by Peter S. Beagle, the unicorn is called Lady Amalthea
Lady Amalthea is a unicorn

My idea of posting the OP was that valency exists where there are conditions for some state of affairs (function) to exist.

Most of 'logic', as Wittgenstein just takes care of itself.

Modal logic is one area where I think the function runs backwards, where the state of affairs themselves (the function) dictate the behaviour of the variables inside the function.

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To me, modal logic looks, well, unnecessary. Or, to be sharper, what does modal logic make possible that was not possible before? — tim wood

In my understanding, all of 'logic' is absolute, or again as Wittgenstein said, logic takes care of itself.

There is where modal logic deviates from the norm. Modal logic seems to be the only type of logic that is observer dependent. For example, say God we're omniscient and eternal, then modalities would be irrelevant to him since his observation of the sum total of modalities in existence is tautologically true on face value.

But this all pushes for a closer look at your original question, "Thus, is there any valence to logical truths or conditions?" — tim wood

So, what I just said has some bearing on what is mentioned above. Namely, that modal logic is subject to changing conditions and that seems to me to be an indication that logic can have some valence as opposed to strict and absolute categorical logical proofs. Once can argue, that why stop at modal logic, why not mention quantum logic for the matter? Well, in my mind the holistic aspect of modal logic leaves the room in its scope for non-deterministic behaviour.

In the link you provided, valence seems to be about the words that can be meaningfully connected to verbs (maybe I got that wrong - please correct!). It seems a miss-application, then, to try to apply valence to logical truths or conditions (what, actually, does "conditions" mean in this context?). — tim wood

What makes you say that? Where is the difference in our line of thought here?

An example of the problems that arise absent preparatory groundwork is that I think of logic as being contentless, merely manipulations of symbols under arbitrary rules of manipulation. And some manipulations seem useful; some more than others. How does valence work with symbols? And so forth.... — tim wood

That is an interesting assertion. I do wonder in what way logic and its versatility 'work/is applied' in reality.

I mean it's all really confusing to me. If reality can be simulated via logic, then shouldn't all Platonists necessarily be logicians too? Doesn't logic come before math?

mean it's all really confusing to me. If reality can be simulated via logic, then shouldn't all Platonists necessarily be logicians too? — Question

That's not how they see it. I explained the view from Russell, which is that language is descriptive. You discussed Wittgenstein as a game theorist, however right that is. Platonists don't see it either way, and none of these groups think of reality being 'simulated.' That's a modern idea derived from the growth of computers, which have supplanted WHY people think with HOW.

I was just remembering, when I started college in 1979, I was told I'd have to take statistics. I went to meet him, he had been sitting in front of an Apple 2E for a solid week. He had read the manuals and written one program, then he just sat there looking at it. For a week.

When I arrive, he looked up and said, "I had to think what to tell you a long time. This thing is going to make enough pointless numbers to make hell boil over, and I'm throwing out all the textbooks on what I should be teaching you. My job now is to stop you taking this thing for granted, and think about what numbers it generates that have any meaning. Because I guarantee you, you will be seeing a lot of people citing its numbers as some kind of irrefutable truth the rest of your life."

It was only this last week that I realized how profound what he said was, because the same applies for words as for numbers. So the same has gradually boiled over into all philosophy--the computer has replaced people's search for meaning with a search for some empty model that means nothing, yet appears to describe everything.

I've read the OP a couple times, but I don't understand what it's asking.