And talking about it accomplishes what? — baker

Why does one do anything? Does there have to be an achievable goal? Don't psychologize it please, unless you are leading somewhere?..

Does it suffice? — Tzeentch

For some people, it clearly does.

What you're after is objective morality, absolute authority.

Antinatalists (at least the variety one usually encounters in secular Western settings) don't go far enough in their criticism of procreation. It is existence itself they should be criticial of, not merely procreation. — baker

Are you sure I haven't done that in the past? Look at some of my past posts focusing on Schopenhauerian philosophy. However, though it CAN be relevant to THIS debate, this particular argument can work on its own, though I think can be quite elucidated from it. I have discussed at length the difference between what I have called "necessary suffering" and "contingent suffering". But again, doesn't have to be discussed in this debate.

Why does one do anything? — schopenhauer1

For a purpose.

Does there have to be an achievable goal?

Yes. All other action is irrational/maladaptive.

Yes. All other action is irrational/maladaptive. — baker

Well, you can say that about any philosophical debate, right? That's a whole value sentiment that can be discussed in another thread. Should philosophical debates about life be discussed? I think it is super relevant because we are humans living the human condition and we can analyze what this condition entails. And as far as it having a purpose, it is the definition of something of an ethics that can be applied, so your assessment is wrong.

And as far as it having a purpose, it is the definition of something of an ethics that can be applied, so your assessment is wrong. — schopenhauer1

Wrong how?

It's a very relevant topic that can be applied in life (whether to procreate or not). I would say a pretty central one.

I'm still trying to articulate this more clearly, but I'd like to ask you, can you define what it is that makes not imposing harms from scratch (for someone else) more ethically relevant than not causing benefits from scratch (for someone else)? — schopenhauer1

I lean strongly towards there being an ethical duty not to cause harm to others.

I don't believe there to be an ethical duty to cause good to others, because it would come with too many problems. It would imply a duty to meddle in other people's affairs, a duty to get involved in literally everything one possibly can, because not to cause good would be to neglect one's moral duty. People rarely (if ever) have a complete understanding of a given situation, so not only is the implication one MUST meddle, but also that one must do so with little more than ignorance as a basis. After all, all one has is one's subjective understanding.

Further, not to cause harm is an effort by the actor not to take actions that interfere with the will of a subject. To endeavor to cause all the good one can is to interfere regardless of the will of a subject.

Lastly, earlier in this thread I argued for non-interference being a morally neutral option. That means inaction is morally acceptable, even if it means potentially missing out on causing good. This flows from the first point, namely that if non-interference is not acceptable when there's a potential for good, it becomes a moral imperative to interfere in everything, with all the problems that brings.
And second, non-interference causes no harm.

Why is it that if someone already existed and I forced them to play my game of limitations and harms with some good, THAT would be roundly rejected, but if I created someone from scratch (let's say snapped my fingers) THAT is considered fine and dandy? — schopenhauer1

I agree, this seems inconsistent. I've been using my sky-diving example to inquire about this very same question.

What you're after is objective morality, absolute authority. — baker

Ideally, yes. But in the absence of such sound, consistent reasoning will do.

it would come with too many problems. It would imply a duty to meddle in other people's affairs, — Tzeentch

Yes, that slippery slope argument. I called it a brand of "repugnant conclusion". All your efforts would have to be towards other people's affairs. If you can work 18 hours a day helping people, you would be doing your best to "help" (interfere?) whenever you can at all possible times. Also then you run into probability unknowns.. You can almost never know how much you are helping in this way versus that way. The opportunity costs then have to rely on just "what you think" which may be way off. Or you are relying on social scientists' or philosophers pet calculation. Where is the demarcation? It is always conveniently selected to make it seem like a neat fit. I also think that ideas of supererogatory can be relevant here.

For example, once certain people decided that the way to end their suffering was to kill all the Jews. — baker

Why was that maladaptive? Why were they mistaken? — baker

As I wrote in the post you only half-quoted:

Short-term efficacy – scapegoating, genocide – at the expense of long-term sustainability (i.e. forming habits / institutions for 'othering' even their own because (some believe) "that is a way to end their suffering"). — 180 Proof

So if you still have to ask, baker ... :brow:

Maybe so, but I neither claim nor implied it could be, so I don't see the relevance of your remark.

For example, once certain people decided that the way to end their suffering was to kill all the Jews.
— baker
Why was that maladaptive? Why were they mistaken?
— baker
As I wrote in the post you only half-quoted:
Short-term efficacy – scapegoating, genocide – at the expense of long-term sustainability (i.e. forming habits / institutions for 'othering' even their own because (some believe) "that is a way to end their suffering").
— 180 Proof
So if you still have to ask, baker ... — 180 Proof

This is a philosophy forum, not the watercooler.

Why wouldn't destroying an entire social category be "sustainable" in the long term? People have always done this. What reason is there to think that it isn't "sustainable" in the long term?

Can you explain, do you have something more than mere gut feeling for this?

Even you yourself advised that a certain social category should be destroyed by suicide.

Anti-"antinatalism" does not entail pro-natalism. The "moral" arguments in favor of "antinatalism" proffered thus far have been neither valid nor persuasive.
— 180 Proof

An argument can only be persuasive to someone, to a person. It cannot be objectively, suprapersonally persuasive.

Maybe so, but I neither claim nor implied it could be

Yes, you did: The formulation you used isn't one where you'd merely state your opinion, but declares a lot more, namely, that what you're saying is an objective, absolute truth.

Which assessment of mine do you believe is wrong?

Well, my "opinion" happens to agree with "objective truth", so stop whinging about it counter my claims of STFU.

Why bother with philosophy then ...

Why bother with philosophy then ... — baker

In order to address that very question.

Believing oneself to be the speaking organ of objective truth is the death of philosophy.

Ad hominems & non sequiturs are the health of sophistry.

The person being born was not forced to live. they cannot have been because they didn't exist until after that event. — Isaac

That's irrelevant. The parents know that by their direct actions a child will come to be, and that child has no choice in whether it does or not. It's an intentional act that disregards the wills of whom it affects - an act of force.

If I recall, that's your argument. Your the one who wants to avoid all responsibility for anything you didn't directly cause. — Isaac

You recall incorrectly.

In the case of procreation the parents cause the child to be born. In the examples we discussed the moral agent doesn't cause anything and therefore does not bear responsibility.

Talking about imposing the necessary conditions of existence is absolute nonsense on stilts. One cannot impose that which is a necessary condition. — Isaac

It is imposing the state of affairs that entails that necessary condition. How is it not?

It is imposing the state of affairs that entails that necessary condition. — schopenhauer1

Yes. It is. But not imposing them on a person. Imposing them on an embryo.

If I force someone to become a soldier, I'm not forcing a soldier to become a soldier, I'm forcing a civilian to become a soldier.

If I force a rich man to give away all of his money and become poor, I'm not forcing a poor man to be poor, I'm forcing a rich man to be poor.

If I force a stationary person to move, I'm not forcing a moving person to move.

... and so on.

In the examples we discussed the moral agent doesn't cause anything and therefore does not bear responsibility. — Tzeentch

The examples hinged on the fact that your mental state did not cause anything. Your only argument for that was that the causal chain was indirect.

Oh this is pedantic.
An action led to a person existing. That person existing has entailed necessary conditions. It's probably the same argument you are having with tzeentch right now.

An action led to a person existing. That person existing has entailed necessary conditions. — schopenhauer1

Yes. I agree with all that.

None of that argues against procreation. Creating a person (with necessary conditions) is fine if it's for the greater good and you've good reason to believe they won't mind those necessary conditions.

Having lost the argument above, you then resort to it being unfair to impose that on a person without their consent (even if for the greater good and assuming justifiably they won't mind). But one didn't impose that on a person. One imposed it on a embryo, and there's no moral issue with imposing something on an embryo without its consent. So your counter fails.

One imposed it on a embryo, and there's no moral issue with imposing something on an embryo without its consent. So your counter fails. — Isaac

:rofl: .. Really? This is your argument? That conceiving a child to birth takes 9 months and that there is a period between conception and birth, this thus refutes that the parents imposed? A wait time between the initial action and the outcome (a person) somehow makes the imposition null? How? Why does it have to be the exact immediate effect of conception and not the result 9 months later?

A wait time between the initial action and the outcome (a person) somehow makes the imposition null? How? Why does it have to be the exact immediate affect of conception and not the result 9 months later? — schopenhauer1

The wait time is irrelevant. It could be instantaneous. If I instantaneously make someone a soldier. Did I make a civilian into a soldier, or did I make a soldier into a soldier?

The wait time is irrelevant. It could be instantaneous. If I instantaneously make someone a soldier. Did I make a civilian into a soldier, or did I make a soldier into a soldier? — Isaac

It is that there was a state of affairs thus that you made a soldier. It doesn't matter what the previous state was.

It is that there was a state of affairs thus that you made a soldier. — schopenhauer1

Yep. I agree. But on whom did I impose, who did I force. Did I force a soldier to become a soldier, or did I force a civilian to become a soldier?

Doesn't matter. You caused a soldier to be. Without you, no soldier.

Doesn't matter. You caused a soldier to be. — schopenhauer1

It matters intently because you lost the argument about simply causing people to be. Causing people to be has no moral problem. They'll probably be happy enough and its for the good of the already living community.

You want to say that some unjust, immoral 'forcing' has taken place against someone's will. But no such forcing has taken place. The entity that was forced had no will, no moral status, nothing more than forcing a rock to roll downhill.

Doesn't matter. You caused a soldier to be. — schopenhauer1

Of course the other very strong evidence that it does matter is the lengths you're going to to avoid just answering it.