Doesn't special relativity depend on relations with it's observer-based frame of reference? How would you reformulate either special or general without relations? — Marchesk
We carve this variance into objects, properties and relations, because of our biology and culture.
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So while Azzouni is a hard-core nominalist, he rejects anti-realism and logical positivism. — Marchesk
My major problem with Humean causality is that it gives no explanation for why A always follows B, which could change at any point in the future. — Marchesk
Quantum mechanics is incompatible with relativity and so assuming a quantum theory of gravity can be found then he need not worry about relativity. — Michael
f he says that we carve this variance into objects then it seems that he’s being an anti-realist about these objects, even if he’s not being an anti-realist about the “fabric with features”. — Michael
What does it mean for A to cause B? — Michael
How is this any different to saying “if A happens then B happens”? — Michael
You don't understand the notion of causality? — Marchesk
he definition I provided above is Lewis’ counterfactual theory of causation. — Michael
Unfortunately we’re looking for something more formal to explain this relationship. Can we translate what you say here into symbolic logic? — Michael
What does symbolic logic have to do with causality or laws of nature? It's interesting you want to use a syntactic formalism in a discussion on nominalism. — Marchesk
My own account of causation is taken from Lewis: A causes B if it is not possible for A to be false and B to be true. — Michael
A necessitates B — Marchesk
How is this any different to saying “if A happens then B happens”? — Michael
How is this any different to saying “if A happens then B happens”? — Michael
You don't understand the notion of causality? If it could be shown that A causes B, then it will always be the case that B follows A. But if it's just A happens then B happens, it doesn't have to continue being that way, since nothing necessitates it. That's where the problem of induction comes from. — Marchesk
I think to say that A necessitates B is exactly the same as to say "If A happens then B happens". And that is not affected by additions like "if C happens then B happens" because A is not specified as the sole cause of B. That latter could be formulated as "If B happens then A must have happened". And you can always add: " And C and or D and or E, and so on, must have happened". The idea of necessary and/or sufficient causes or conditions.
But these formal definitions seem to be lacking the essential element of our conception of causation; which is some kind of energetic forcing, not mere correlation — Janus
But these formal definitions seem to be lacking the essential element of our conception of causation; which is some kind of energetic forcing, not mere correlation. — Janus
My own account of causation is taken from Lewis: A causes B if it is not possible for A to be false and B to be true. — Michael
This assumes a linear causation chain. I.e., no other cause for B exists. If C also causes B, then A can be false and B true, and still A, like C, causes B. :chin: — jgill
Moreover, if the physical universe itself is an automaton (something with "states" that succeed one another according to a fixed equation), then it is unintelligible how any particular structure can be singled out as "the" causal structure of the universe. — Joshs
What you can't say is that there aren't really rules, because the rules are what makes it a particular cellular automation. Something has to determine what state the cells will change to each generation. Similarly, one could argue that the rules described by physics determine the evolution of all the world states. And we can consider other universes with different rules, and how that would change what sort of universe you get, or how long it lasts — Marchesk
The problem of induction says we don't know this to be true about the future. But if there is a C which makes it so that A can't be false and B be true, then we do know that B follows A in the future.
The C could be in A or B, it could be a law prescribing A & B, or it could be something else connecting B to A. I think it would be easier to discuss an example than just to talk about C in abstract terms. — Marchesk
The counterfactual definition still doesn’t solve the problem of induction... — Marchesk
... and it doesn’t distinguish between impossible and possible but never happens.
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