Truth ranges over propositions and such. — Banno
Is hitting the target a property of the arrow? — Srap Tasmaner
But can you fill it out? — Banno
Hence I avoided "Truth is a property of propositions and such". — Banno
I don't know what you mean when you say "Truth ranges over propositions and such." — Srap Tasmaner
If true claims can be unwarranted and unwarranted claims can be true, then defining truth in terms of warrant seems unwarranted. — Pie
In order to miss the target, there must be a target to miss. — Banno
it is propositions and such that are true, or not — Banno
Problem? — Srap Tasmaner
But this exchange reminds me of Kant's distinction between logic as such, and transcendental logic -- the primary difference being one abstracts from spatio-temporal relations, and the other does not. If you'll allow the indulgence, I believe it goes back to Aristotle's definition of non-contradiction which you are mirroring here, Janus --
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“It is impossible for the same thing to belong and not to belong at the same time to the same thing and in the same respect” (with the appropriate qualifications) (Metaph IV 3 1005b19–20). — Aristotle in the SEP on Logic
Still, worth highlighting that the relationship between time and logic is thorny. In a sense logic should be timeless. Yet we live in time. What to do with that? — Moliere
Indeed, if belief and truth were not different, then all we would need for knowledge would be justified belief. — Banno
I believe in mathematics truth is defined as provable i.e. knowledge is justified true belief. — Agent Smith
A complex post; above my paygrade pal. — Agent Smith
I think it's just a post just going around in circles, making it seem complex, but it is the inevitable going around in circles when trying to claim not merely belief, but knowledge (except in the case of that which is presently perceived) that is the problem. Belief may consist in feeling certain, but we don't merely want to feel certain, since then it would be possible to be wrong, but aspire, futilely, to be certain; in other words to be able to claim knowledge that we, per impossibile, know that we know and know that it cannot be wrong.
Of course, for all practical, non-skeptical, purposes we have all kinds of "certain" knowledge. — Janus
So you agree that truth is a relation between a proposition and something else. — Srap Tasmaner
truth ranges over propositions — Banno
So you agree that truth is a relation between a proposition and something else. There might be more that goes into that, but it's at least that. — Srap Tasmaner
Well, hold on a second there. Suppose the case of seeing the sheet-as-sheet. — Moliere
Fallibilism springs to mind. — Agent Smith
Seems a step too far. I think I maintained that truth ranges over propositions — Banno
I don't know what you mean when you say "Truth ranges over propositions and such."
— Srap Tasmaner
Nor do I, apart from that it is propositions and such that are true, or not. In a way this is stipulating the sense of "true" we are using here; as might be opposed to a true friend or a true note. — Banno
What's the difference between seeing the sheet and seeing the sheet-as-sheet? — creativesoul
statements, beliefs, friends, bicycle wheels, and so on — Srap Tasmaner
Again, this is ill-formed, mixing predicate and propositional terms with abandon. — Banno
This way you can formalize the sentence "if the cat is on the mat then that cat exists" as
Q(a)→∃x(x=a)
where a is that cat, and Q(y) means that "y is on the mat".
But you can't get to "q exists". That'd be an instance of the existential fallacy. That a set has a particular attribute does not imply that the set has members.
Fred's belief is different to what is true. — Banno
Such constant symbols cannot be quantified...
Just that. The argument is ill-formed. — Banno
This way you can formalize the sentence "if the cat is on the mat then that cat exists" as
Q(a)→∃x(x=a)
where a is that cat, and Q(y) means that "y is on the mat".
What does this difference amount to? How is Fred's false belief different from someone's true belief, other than one propositional statement is true and the other is false, which amounts to a difference about the facts. Also, I do believe truth and falsity are properties of propositions. — Sam26
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